AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Abdur Rahim, J.—These appeals in my opinion must fail. Objection is taken to the valuation of the District Judge in respect of plots 611 F,
611 G, 383, A2. The District Judge has awarded Es. 1,143 per acre for all these plots. Mr. Ramesam contends that these are back lands and that
there-, fore they ought not to be valued at the same rate as the lands with frontage. But I think the District Judge is right in holding that the purchase
by the Madura Mills Company in 1915 of lands similarly situated furnishes a good index of the proper market price. We have considered the
question carefully and are not prepared to dissent from the District Judge''s estimate.
The appeals are dismissed with costs. The time for payment will be 3 months from this date.
A preliminary objection has been taken with reference to the memoranda of objections. The memoranda of objections relate not merely to the
plots covered by the appeals but also to other plots, though all the plots to which the memoranda of objections relate are the subject of the same
petition to which the appeals relate. I should take it that each petition forms a separate case in the land acquisition proceedings and the award on
each petition is a separate decree. Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act incorporates by reference the provisions of the CPC applicable to
appeals from original decrees. Order XLI, Rule 22(1) of the CPC provides for memorandum of objections in these words : "" Any respondent
though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree may not only support the decree on any of the grounds decided against him in the
court below, but take any cross objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal provided he has filed such objection in the
appellate court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such
further time as the appellate court may see fit to allow."" The section is expressed in very general language, but after having heard the matter fully
discussed I have little doubt that a memorandum of objections may be filed against the decree as a whole or against a part of it which may not be
the aubject matter of the appeal. One of the strongest cases that have been brought to our notice is that reported in Kamat v. Kamat I.L.R (1884)
B 368 the judgment of Sargent, C.J. There the appeal was with respect to costs disallowed by the lower court and the memorandum of objections
related to the decree on the merits and it was held that such cross objections could lie. There is also a Full Bench ruling of this Court in Munisami
Chetty v. Abbu Reddi ILR (1913) M. 705 : 27 M.L.J. 740 There by a memorandum of objections a question which affected a co-respondent to
the appeal was allowed to be raised. Our attention has also been drawn to a judgment of the Bombay High Court Raghunatha v. Secretary of
State ILR (1905) B. 514. The case there arose out of a matter under the City of Bombay Improvement Act. The appeal was with reference to a
certain percentage allowed for water-cess while the memorandum of objections raised a question as regards the allowance for vacancies, and it
was held that such a memorandum of objections was valid Mr. Ramesam while conceding that under the CPC it is not necessary that the
memorandum of objections should be only with reference to that part of the decree which is the subject matter of the appeal, argues that Section
54 of the Land Acquisition Act makes a difference so far as appeals in land acquisition cases are concerned. He lays stress on the provision of that
section ""an appeal shall lie to the H igh Court from the award or from any part of the award of the court in any proceedings under this Act"" and
argues that the legislature in expressly saying that an appeal shall lie from any part of the award wanted to imply that the decree under appeal must
be taken to be that part of it to which objection was taken by the appellant. He then argues that the memorandum of objections must be confined
to the subject matter of the appeal itself as that is the decree that is appealed against within the meaning of Section 54. But what Section 54 enacts
is in no way different from the ordinary provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, because an appeal may be filed against the entire decree or any
part of it. Once an appeal is filed, a memorandum of objections may be filed by the respondent with reference to any portion of the decree to
which he objects. I do not think therefore that Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act makes any difference in the law and I hold that the
respondents are entitled to press their memorandum of objections.
On the merits, I am satisfied that the District Judge has given a perfectly fair price for the plots referred to in the memorandum of objections and
I dismiss them with costs.
Seshagiri Aiyar, J.
I agree. On the merits, although there is this that must be said in favour of Mr. Eamesam''s contention that the frontage should be differently
valued from the back portion, having regard to the fact that the valuation on which the District Judge has relied was given a year before the
proclamation, I agree with my learned brother in holding that the value fixed by the District Judge does not err on the side of giving the claimants
too much and that the appeals must be dismissed.
On the question of the memorandum of objections, my mind had been vacillating a good deal during the course of the argument and, after having
had the matter fully discussed, I have also come to the conclusion that the respondents are entitled to be heard. There is a great deal to be said in
favour of the view taken by Lindley, M. E. in National Society for the Distribution of Electricity by Secondary Generators v. Gibbs (1900) 2 Ch.
D, 280. The learned Lord Justice points out that if a cross notice is given in respect of a matter which is not the subject matter of the appeal,
ordinarily a party should not be heard about it. But the language of the CPC is very wide. Beading Order XLI, Rule 22 and Rule 33 of the same
order together it looks as if the legislature intended to give a party every means of remedying the injustice which has been done to him by the action
of the lower courts. It is arguable that as the inherent powers vested in the court by Rule 88 are wide enough to cover all cases of injustice, Rule
22 should be confined to cases where the objection relates to the subject matter in appeal; but it is doubtful whether the party''s right of invoking
the aid of the court was intended to be less extensive than the right of the court to move suo motu, having regard to the language of Rule 22. In my
opinion, it is safe to say that wherever the right of a respondent has been imperilled by the appellant preferring an appeal, it is apparently the
intention of the legislature that every facility should be given to him to get his rights adjusted by filing a memorandum of objections. The decision, to
which my learned brother referred in Kamat v. Kamat ILR (1881) B 368 is a very strong illustration of this view. The decision in Munisami Mudali
v. Abhu Reddy ILR (1918) M. 705 also seems to point to the fact that what the appellant objects to is not to be the criterion, but the question in
each case must be whether the respondent''s rights have in any way been imperilled by the action taken by the appellant. As regards Section 54 of
the Land Acquisition Act to which the learned Government Pleader drew our attention, I have little hesitation in holding that it makes no departure
from the ordinary rule of the CPC which allows a party to appeal not only against the whole decree but also against parts of it. For these reasons I
agree that the memorandum of objections should be disposed of on the merits.
On the merits, I agree that the memorandum of objections must be dismissed.