The Court on its Own Motion vs National Highway Authority of India, Nagpur and Others

B.R. Gavai, J—As to whether a statutory Tribunal (in the present case, Principal Seat of the National Green Tribunal at Delhi) has a power to pass an order contrary to the orders passed by the Constitutional Court of this country?, and (ii) as to whether in case of the conflicting orders passed by a Constitutional Court and a Statutory Tribunal, the authorities are bound to comply with which order ? These are some of the unfortunate and unwarranted questions that we are called upon to answer in the present proceedings.

Though provoked by an intervenor M/s. Shrushti Paryavaran Mandal to decide all these questions on earlier occasions, this Court restrained itself from doing so. However, today we are left with no other alternative but to decide these issues. If we fail to decide this issue, we will be compelling various authorities of the State Government and National Highway Authority of India (hereinafter referred to as the "NHAI") to face the proceedings before the learned Principal place of the National Green Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the learned Tribunal") which has issued a notice to them, vide order dated 7.9.2015, to show-cause as to why their properties be not attached and/or they be not committed to the Civil Prison.

A prelude to the controversy:--

"Times of India" which is undisputedly one of the leading newspapers in the country had published a news item on 20.9.2013. The headline of the said news-item is "40 Killer Metre Stretch on NH7". The bold portion in the said news-item is as under:--

"When TOI travelled Mansar to Khawasa route on NH7, the experience was nothing but hellish. Deep ditches and loose gravel have made driving risky on this road, which has turned from bad to pathetic following heavy rainfall this monsoon. This also threatens to affect tourist flow to forests falling on the route. NHAI and road contractor seem least bothered."

It is to be noted that the report is in seven columns. A blame is sought to be put on the NHAI for the precarious condition of the said road. It is stated in the said report that the quality of the road worsened gradually over years together. A blame is also put on the respondent No. 3 for the worst condition of the road. It is to be noted that in the said report, the TOI has highlighted that according to Deolapur police about 5 deaths had occurred in one year. However, the said report goes on further to state that, as per the villagers the deaths are much more and nearing about 100. The report further says that mechanics at Deolapur and Mansar say that various vehicles break down on this stretch thereby requiring to utilize the services of the mechanics. The report further goes to say that the highway is a major route for north-south traffic. The report goes on to say that on account of the bad condition of the road, tourism in the adjoining areas like Karmazari, Pench on the Maharashtra side, etc. had also adversely affected.

Taking into consideration the precarious condition of the road highlighted by Times of India, this Court by an order dated 24.9.2013 took suo motu cognizance of the said issue and requested Shri N.A. Padhye, learned Advocate to act as Amicus Curiae in the said matter.

The matter was listed from time to time and various orders were passed by this Court monitoring progress of repairs of the said stretch on National Highway No. 7. Subsequently, the Court also took suo motu cognizance of the bad condition of two patches of National Highways, one between Nagpur and Jabalpur and another between Nagpur and Amravati.

It may be relevant to refer to some of the orders passed by this Court in the present proceedings:--

"In the order dated 29.10.2013 it was noticed by the Court that the four-laning work of 37 kilometers could not take place because of want of clearance from the Forest Department. However, the Court did not consider the said aspect on the said date, as at that point of time taking into consideration the worst condition of the road, which had resulted into various accidents and also casualties, the Court was basically concerned with the immediate repairs to be carried out on the said patch. On the said date, the Court noted the statement made on behalf of NHAI regarding the schedule for carrying out the immediate repairs. Vide order dated 18.12.2014 we also brought the bad condition of roads on National Highway No. 6 between Nagpur to Amravati and the part of road between Nagpur to Hyderabad on National Highway No. 7 under the ambit of the said Public Interest Litigation."

The first order which concerns the felling of trees on patch of 37 kms. between Deolapur to Khawasa was passed by this Court on 5.11.2014. It will be relevant to refer to following part of the said order:--

"Insofar as Mansar-Khawasa patch on National Highway No. 7 is concerned, it is brought to our notice that though the Central Government has taken a stand that permission of National Board of Wild Life is not necessary for cutting the trees, the State Government has requested the Central Government to reconsider the issue.

We request the learned Government Pleader to take instructions in that regard from the State Government and inform the Court in the next week as to what is the stand of the State Government."

It could thus be seen that it was brought to the notice of this Court that though Central Government had taken a stand that permission of National Board of Wildlife was not necessary for cutting the trees, the State Government had requested the Central Government to reconsider the issue. The Court had, therefore, requested the learned Government Pleader appearing in the matter to take instructions from the State Government and inform the Court about the stand of the State Government on the next day.

When the matter was listed on 14.11.2014, this Court passed the following order:--

"In so far as the patch of 37 km. near Mansar on National Highway No. 7 between Mansar and Khawasa is concerned, though the substantial part of National Highway No. 7 has been four-laned, the said 37 km. could not be four-laned on account of non-issuance of various permissions. A status report has already been placed on record along with Pursis dated 5.11.2014.

On the last date, it was pointed out to us that though the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of India had informed that the permission of the National Board of Wildlife was not necessary, the State Government was insisting on the same. One of the other hurdles in the starting of four-lane was condition No. 10 which required permission of this Court/National Green Tribunal in Writ Petition No. 1277/2000. In so far as condition No. 9, i.e. the permission of National Board of Wildlife is concerned, Shri Shailesh Ganeshrao Tembhurnikar presently working as Chief Conservator of Forest, Nagpur Circle has filed affidavit dated 11.11.2014. In the affidavit, it is clearly stated that since the Government of India itself has clarified that the permission of National Board of Wildlife is not necessary, no such permission can be insisted upon. In that view of the matter, it is clear that the project cannot be withheld on account of condition No. 9, i.e. non-obtaining of the permission of National Board of Wildlife. The question now remains is as to whether the permission of either this Court or the Green Tribunal would be necessary as provided in Clause 10 of the in principle permission granted by the Ministry of Environment and Forest dated 13.12.2013.

Mrs. B.H. Dangre, learned Government Pleader, has taken us through various orders passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 1277/00 as well as orders passed by the learned Green Tribunal in the matter after its transfer to the Green Tribunal.

We have perused the various orders passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 1277/00 and subsequently, the orders passed by the Green Tribunal, on the matter being transferred to it. Upon perusal of the orders, we have not come across any such order which can be said to have an effect that for undertaking the project like the expansion of National Highways, the permission of either this Court or the learned Green Tribunal would be necessary. In any case, it is informed that proceedings before the learned Green Tribunal are concluded and nothing is pending before it.

The Ministry of Environment and Forests is a Ministry created by the Central Government for ensuring that all environmental matters including the conservation of forests, the permission to fell trees for execution of certain projects and the requirement of compensatory afforestation and allied matters is looked into. The Ministry consists of the persons possessing requisite expertise in that matter. When the Ministry created for this specific purpose and empowered to look into all the environmental aspects, grants the permission for execution of the project, we cannot sit in an appeal over the decision of the said Ministry, unless it is pointed out to us that the exercise of the powers of the said Ministry is vitiated on any of the grounds that are permissible while exercising the powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

It is nobody''s case that the Ministry of Environment and Forests while granting permission dated 13.12.2013 to the project in question has not taken into consideration the relevant factors that are required to be taken into consideration or taken into consideration the irrelevant factors which have no bearing on the matter in issue.

No doubt that the authorities while granting permission are also bound to ensure that the loss caused to the environment on account of deforestation is compensated by compensatory afforestation. The perusal of the status report which is placed on record would clearly reveal that an amount of Rs. 3,73,04,500/- towards cost of compensatory afforestation (CA) and an amount of Rs. 3,95,44,538/- towards the Net Present Value (NPV) of the forest land being diverted has already been remitted in the account of the Ad-hoc Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Agency (CAMPA). It could thus be seen that the user agency has deposited an amount of Rs. 7,68,49,038/-. The learned Government Pleader has informed us that after following procedure prescribed, the amount would come to Forest Department of the State of Maharashtra for Compensatory Afforestation. We are sure that the Central Government as well as the State Government, in order to have ecological balance would ensure that the compensatory afforestation on account of the trees that would be felled for the execution of the project would be done in the earnest manner, so that there is least adverse impact on the ecology. Needless to state that from the communication of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest dated 17.7.2014 addressed to the Principal Secretary, Forests it could be seen that the Forest Department has already earmarked an area of 98.492 hectares, which would be utilized for compensatory afforestation.

In that view of the matter, we make it clear that condition No. 10 cannot be insisted upon and as such, would not be an impediment in the work of four-laning of National Highway No. 7 in the stage between Mansar-Khawasa.

In that view of the matter, we direct the State Government to submit a compliance report to the Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forest within a period of one week from today. On receipt of the said compliance, the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of India would consider the issue for grant of formal approval under Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 and pass orders in that regard within a period of three weeks thereafter.

After the permission is granted by the Government of India, Ministry of Environment under Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 there should be no impediment with NHAI to proceed further with the project of four-laning of the stretch between Mansar and Khawasa."

The perusal of the order would reveal that this Court had observed that the four-laning of the patch of 37 kms. on National Highway could not take place on account of non-issuance of various permissions. The Court had also noticed that it was the stand of the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of India that the permission of National Board on Wildlife was not necessary. However, the State Government was insisting on the same. Another hurdle that was noticed by us was with regard to permission of this Court/National Green Tribunal in view of the orders passed in Writ petition No. 1277/00. We have noted in the order that an affidavit was filed by Shri Shailesh Tembhurnikar who was working as Chief Conservator of Forest stating therein that since the Government of India itself had clarified that the permission of National Board of Wildlife was not necessary, no such permission could be insisted upon. This Court had, therefore, observed that the project could not be withheld on account of condition No. 9, i.e. non-obtaining of permission of National Board of Wildlife.

Upon perusal of the orders passed in Writ Petition No. 1277/00 and the orders passed by the learned Green Tribunal, this Court observed that we did not come across any such order, from which it could be constructed that it was necessary to obtain permission of this Court or the learned Green Tribunal for undertaking the project like the expansion of National Highways. It was also noticed by this Court that the proceedings before the learned Green Tribunal were no more pending and the proceedings were disposed of.

This Court had further observed that the Ministry of Environment and Forest is a ministry created for ensuring that all environmental matters including the conservation of forests, the permission to fell trees for execution of certain projects and the requirement of compensatory afforestation and the allied matters are looked into. It was further observed that the Ministry consists of persons possessing requisite expertise in the matter. The Court had further observed that when the Ministry created for specific purpose and empowered to look into all the environmental aspects, grants the permission, this Court cannot sit in an appeal over the decision of the said ministry, unless it was pointed out to us that the exercise of the powers of the said Ministry is vitiated on any of the grounds that are permissible while exercising the powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The Court had further observed that the authorities while granting permission are also bound to ensure that the loss caused to the environment on account of deforestation is compensated by compensatory afforestation. Upon perusal of the status report, it was observed that the amount of Rs. 3,73,04,500/- towards cost of compensatory afforestation and amount of Rs. 3,95,44,538/- towards the Net Present Value of the forest land being diverted was already remitted in the account of the Ad-hoc Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Agency (CAMPA). It was observed that an amount of Rs. 7,68,49,038/- was already deposited by the user agency. The Court had recorded the statement of the learned Government Pleader that after the prescribed procedure was followed, the amount would come to Forest Department of the State of Maharashtra for Compensatory Afforestation. It was further observed that the Central Government as well as the State Government in order to have ecological balance would ensure that the compensatory afforestation on account of the trees that would be felled for execution of the project, would be done in the earnest manner so that there would be least adverse impact on the ecology. It was further observed that the Forest Department had already earmarked an area of 98.492 hectares, which would be utilized for compensatory afforestation.

After observing all that, the Court had made it clear that the condition No. 10 cannot be insisted upon and as such, would not be an impediment in the work of four-laning of National Highway No. 7 in the stage between Mansar-Khawasa. The Court had directed the State Government to submit a compliance report to the Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forest within a period of one week from today. On receipt of the said report, Ministry of Environment and Forest was directed to consider the issue of grant of formal approval under Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 and pass an order in this regard within a period for three weeks thereafter. It was further observed that after the permission was granted by the Ministry of Environment under Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, there should be no impediment with NHAI to proceed further with the project of four-laning of the stretch between Mansar and Khawasa.

The matter was thereafter listed before us on 7.1.2015. We had passed the following order:--

"Insofar as the four-laning of National Highway No. 7 on a patch between Mansar and Khawasa is concerned, it appears that the work of four-laning on the said patch could not commence since there is no meeting of minds between the Forest Department and the National Highway Authority of India.

It appears that taking into consideration the fact that the said patch passes through the forest and that it is a part of corridor wherein there is a movement of wildlife, it is insisted by the forest authorities that there should be a flyover for the entire stretch.

However, according to the NHAI if the flyover is to be constructed, the costs of the project would escalate by Rs. 750 crores and the project itself would not be feasible.

Time and again we have insisted that the danger to the environment and ecology has to be minimized. However, at the same time the development work cannot be hampered with. For economic development of the country, the National Highways'' work as important lifelines.

The judicial notice may be taken of the fact that on a patch on National Highway No. 6 between Bhandara and Deori, on one side of the road there is a Nagzira Wildlife Sanctuary and on the other side there is Navegaon Wildlife Sanctuary. Undisputedly the said areas have also corridors for movement of wildlife. It is noticed that on the said Highway while four-laning underpasses have been provided at frequent distances so as to facilitate the free movement of the wildlife from one area to the other area. We find that if such an arrangement is made on a patch between Mansar and Khawasa, it would take care of the concern of the Forest Department and allow free movement of wildlife from one side of the road to other side.

It is to be noted that if the provision of 6 underpasses as proposed by NHAI is accepted, the costs would escalate by approximately about Rs. 20 to 25 crores whereas if flyover is to be constructed, it would escalate by Rs. 750 crores. We do not want to go into the issue as to whether 6 number of underpasses would be sufficient or not. Even if it is accepted that it will be necessary to have more number of underpasses, still if we compare the costs if flyover is to be constructed and more number of underpasses are provided, the difference would be manifold.

Since the matter is pending for a considerable time, we find that it would be appropriate that the Hon''ble Chief Minister of the State of Maharashtra; Hon''ble Minister of Road, Transport and Highways and Shipping and Hon''ble Minister of State (Independent Charge) of Environment, Forest and Climate Change of the Union of India intervene in the matter and impress upon the authorities concerned to arrive at an amicable arrangement.

In that view of the matter, we request the learned ASGI and the learned Government Pleader to convey our request to the Hon''ble Chief Minister, State of Maharashtra; Hon''ble Minister of Road, Transport and Highways and Shipping and Hon''ble Minister of State (Independent Charge) of Environment, Forest and Climate Change to intervene in the matter and impress upon all the concerned authorities to arrive at an amicable arrangement."

The perusal of the said would reveal that there was no meeting of minds between the various authorities. The Forest authorities insisted that for free movement of the wildlife on both sides of the road, in order to provide them a corridor, there should be a flyover for the entire stretch. However, the NHAI was opposed to it on the ground that it will escalate the cost of project by Rs. 750 crores. We had specifically observed in our order that the danger to the environment and ecology had to be minimized. However, at the same time, the developmental work cannot be hampered with. We had observed that for economic development of the country, the National Highways work as important lifelines.

By the said order, we had requested the Hon''ble Chief Minister of State of Maharashtra, Hon''ble Minister of Road, Transport and Highways and Shipping and Hon''ble Minister of State (Independent Charge) of Environment, Forest and Climate Change of the Union of India intervene in the matter and impress upon the authorities concerned to arrive at an amicable arrangement. The matter was thereafter listed on 4.2.2015. It will be relevant to refer to the following part of the order:--

"Vide order dated 7th January 2015, insofar as the patch of National Highway between Mansar and Khawasa is concerned, we had specifically clarified that this Court would not permit anything to be done which will cause danger to the environment and ecology and, while doing the developmental work, the authorities must ensure that minimum damage to the environment and ecology, is caused. However, at the same time, we had made it clear that for economic development of the country, providing of necessary infrastructure including four-laning of National Highways was necessary.

We had noted the concern of the National Highway Authority of India ("NHAI") that if the proposal of the Forest Department is accepted, the cost of the Project would be escalated by Rs. 750 crores and, as such, it was not feasible. We, therefore, requested the Hon''ble the Chief Minister of Maharashtra; Hon''ble Minister of Road, Transport, Highways & Shipping and the Hon''ble Minister of State (Independent Charge) of Environment, Forest and Climate Chance to intervene in the matter.

It appears that in pursuance to the orders passed by this Court, the Committee consisting of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (Wildlife) Nagpur; Project Director of NHAI; representative of the Wildlife Institute of India and representative of the National Tiger Conservation Authority; Chief Conservator of Forests and Field Director, Pench Tiger Reserve, Nagpur, Chief Engineer Public Works Region, Nagpur and the Chief Conservator of Forests (Territorial) Nagpur was constituted. The said Committee has submitted two reports - one is regarding mitigation measures and the second regarding forest conservation measures.

Insofar as the forest conservation measures are concerned, we do not find it necessary to go into the details of the report inasmuch as the Committee of the experts has found certain measures to be taken in the interests of the conservation of forests. Mrs. Bharati Dangre, learned Government Pleader states that demand for an amount of Rs. 497 lakhs would be put up to the NHAI for depositing it in the ad-hoc account of CAMPA. We, therefore, direct the NHAI to pay an amount of Rs. 497 lakhs within a period of one week from demand being raised by the Principal Conservator of Forests, (Wildlife) Maharashtra State. The said amount shall be credited in the ad-hoc CAMPA account.

However, insofar as the mitigation measures are concerned, though we are aware about our limitations and also aware of the fact that we do not possess expertise in the matter; even as a laymen, we find that the measures as suggested by the Forests Department and Wildlife Institute of India, at least, prima facie, do not appear to be practical. No doubt, that it is a fundamental duty of every citizen that he should endeavour to protect the wildlife and environment. However, at the same time, the concern should not be blown out of proportion and make it impractical. In the measures suggested by the Forests Department at five places, minor bridges are proposed to be extended so that additional culverts would be provided for free movement of wildlife from one part to the other part of the road. We do not propose even to interfere with that suggestion. However, the major factor which results into increasing the cost of the project manifold, is the length of the underpasses as proposed by the Forest Department. At two places, the underpasses have been proposed having a length of 1 kilometre each, with ramp of 300 meters on either side. At one place, the underpass proposed is 300 meters with ramp of 300 meters on both sides. Insofar as one ramp of 100 meters is concerned, we also do not propose to interfere with the same. However, we are prima facie of the view the underpasses of one kilometre length and of 300 metres length with ramp of 300 on each side, would increase the cost of the project manifold.

We could have understood the concern of the Forest Department if a new road is being constructed. However, the Project concerned is only four-laning of the existing road. The road is in existence for a period of more than a century. At least, to our knowledge, not much casualties have been reported on account of any accidents on the said patch between the speedy vehicle and an animal. Had there been any data with regard to casualties occurred on account of speeding vehicles, we could have understood the concern of the Wildlife Institute of India and the Forest Department to have underpasses of such length. However, in the period of more than a century and when there was not a single underpass and only there were small bridges which facilitated the movement of wildlife on one side of the road to the other side, no casualties were reported, then it is difficult to understand as to why the underpasses of such length are necessary. One kilometre is not a short distance. We, therefore, at least, prima facie, find that the suggestions given by the Wildlife Institute of India and the Forest Department regarding the underpass of 1000 metre and 300 metre, do not appear to be necessary. We find that it will be more than appropriate if more number of underpasses are provided. Even an underpass of 100 metres would be roughly 300 feet. We find that such a distance could easily enable the wildlife to move from one area to the other.

We would, therefore, appreciate if the Forest Department and the Wildlife Institute of India understand the ground realities and also have a look at the data regarding casualties that have taken place, on the road which is in existence for a period of more than 100 years, while arriving at a reasonable proposal.

A judicial notice may be taken that not only the various national Highways but also of railway lines pass through some of the National Parks. The judicial notice also can be taken of the fact that there are reported casualties of elephants in the Rajaji National Park on account of movement of railways and that too in the night time. We would also request the Forest Department and the Wildlife Institute of India to place on record as to what steps are taken by them for preventing the casualties in those area.

Insofar as the patch between km. Nos. 679 and 689 is concerned, there is no proposal either to have any bridge or an underpass on the said patch. In that view of the matter, we do not find any difficulty in commencing the work on the said patch. It is however, reported that the said work cannot commence unless felling of the trees is undertaken. Insofar as the conservation measures are concerned, we have already directed the NHAI to credit an amount of Rs. 497 lakhs within a period of one week no sooner the demand is made by the Forest Department. Not only this, but an area has also been identified for compensatory forestation. In that view of the matter, we permit the NHAI to fell the trees on the patch between Km. Nos. 679 and 689 and start the work on the said patch."

The perusal of the said order would reveal that, it was again reiterated that the Court would not permit anything to be done which would cause danger to the environment and ecology and while doing the developmental work the authorities must ensure that minimum damage is caused to the environment and ecology. It was, however, made clear that at the same time for economic development of the country, providing necessary infrastructure including four-laning of Highway was necessary. In the said order, it was noted that in pursuance of earlier orders passed by this Court, a Committee of various experts was constituted and it had submitted two reports, one regarding mitigating measures and the second regarding forest conservation measures. In so far as the forest conservation measures are concerned, it was observed that it was not necessary to go into details of the report, inasmuch as the Committee had found certain measures to be taken in the interest of conservation of forests. The Court had also recorded the statement of the learned Government Pleader that a demand for an amount of Rs. 497 lakhs would be put up to the NHAI for depositing in the Ad-hoc Account of CAMPA. The Court had directed NHAI to deposit an amount of Rs. 497 lakhs within a period of one week from demand being raised by the Principal Conservator of Forests (Wildlife), Maharashtra State.

However, in so far as the mitigating measures are concerned, though the Court observed that it did not possess the expertise in the matter, even as laymen, the measures as suggested by the Forest Department and Wildlife Institute of India, at least, prima facie did not appear to be practical. It was observed that it was a fundamental duty of every citizen that he should endeavour to protect the wildlife and environment. However, it was observed that at the same time, the concern should not be blown out of proportion to make it impractical. It was also noted that the road which was being four-laned was not being constructed for the first time but was in existence for more than a century. The Court had, therefore, again requested the Forest Department and the Wildlife Institute of India to understand the ground realities and also to have a look at the data regarding casualties that have taken place on the road which is in existence for a period of more than 100 years. The Court also requested the Forest Department and the Wildlife Institute of India to place on record as to what steps are being taken by them for avoiding casualties in the Rajaji National Park on account of movement of railways and that too in the night time. However, in so far as the patch between km. Nos. 679 and 689 is concerned, since there was neither a proposal to have any bridge or an underpass, the Court found that there was no difficulty in commencing the work on the said patch. The Court had observed that in so far as conservation measures are concerned, it had already directed the NHAI to credit an amount of Rs. 497 lakhs within a period of one week, no sooner the demand is made by the Forest Department. It was also observed that an area had also been identified for compensatory afforestation. The Court had, therefore, permitted the NHAI to fell the trees on the patch between km. Nos. 679 and 689 and start the work on the said patch.

No doubt that on subsequent dates some intervening developments had taken place with which we will deal in the later part of the order. However, the perusal of order of this Court dated 4.3.2015 would reveal that the State Government had granted the permission to fell the trees on patch between Kms. Nos. 679 and 689. However, when the matter was listed on 10.6.2015 it was brought to the notice of the Court that the Government vide order dated 8.5.2015 had withdrawn the said permission. However, the learned Government Pleader on the said date made a statement that the State had decided to withdraw the order dated 8.5.2015, vide which the permission granted to fell the trees was withdrawn. On 24.6.2015 we had noted that though on 10.6.2015 the State Government had made a statement that it was withdrawing the order dated 8.5.2015 it took sometime to consult the Law and Judiciary Department and ultimately the same was withdrawn on 22.6.2015. On the said date, the Court directed the NHAI to deposit an amount of Rs. 45,77,796/-in the Ad-hoc CAMPA account and an amount of Rs. 85,34,353/- with the FDCM against the expenditure of tree cutting in the diverted forest land and towards damages to the area of FDCM respectively. The said amount was directed to be deposited within a period of one week from the date of the said order.

On 29.7.2015 an application was filed by M/s. Srushti Paryavaran Mandal (hereinafter referred to as intervenor NGO) for recalling the order passed by this Court dated 14.11.2014. By a speaking order the Court rejected the said application.

On 30.7.2015 this Court had passed the order as under:--

"Shri S.M. Ghare, learned counsel appearing on behalf of National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) states that on account of slow pace of Forest Department in felling the trees, the work of expansion of four-lane cannot be undertaken. It is submitted that unless all the trees are felled, it will not be possible to commence the work of four-lane. He further submits that in the event the Forest Department requires any assistance from NHAI, the NHAI is ready and willing to provide the same. Smt. Bharati Dangre, learned Government Pleader states that the Forest Department would require at least three months period for felling the trees.

We find that when NHAI is ready to provide all assistance necessary for felling the trees, the same should not take much time. We therefore, grant one month''s time to the NHAI so also the Forest Department, for felling the trees. The NHAI is further directed to provide all necessary assistance along with the requisite machinery as demanded by the Forest Department.

As already made it clear on earlier occasions, the Court is also concerned about the environmental aspect. Perusal of our order dated 14th November 2014 would clearly reveal that the amount towards compensatory afforestation and Net Present Value of the forest land to the tune of Rs. 7,68,49,038/- was also deposited with the respondent-authorities for the purpose of afforestation. We fail to understand as to why when the said amount for afforestation was deposited with the Competent Authority, the work of compensatory afforestation was not started in the present year.

When the Court is permitting the respondent authorities to proceed further with the expansion of the highway by permitting felling of trees, it is bounden duty of the respondents to take necessary steps in order to make compensatory measures so as to meet the loss which is caused by felling of trees. We are informed that as against 20436 trees which are likely to be felled, the Forest Department has been given funds by the NHAI for planting 1,10,000 trees. Not only this, but an area of around 100 acres is also earmarked for that purpose. When the funds are available and when the area is earmarked therefor, there is no reason as to why the work of compensatory afforestation should not have been commenced.

We, therefore, call upon the respondent No. 4 to show cause as to why an action against him should not be taken for not starting the afforestation work in the present year. The said show cause notice is made returnable on 12th August, 2015.

Insofar as mitigation measures for ensuring free flow of wildlife from one side of the road to the other side is concerned, we are informed that the decision as was taken in the meeting of the Hon''ble Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Hon''ble Minister of Surface Transport, Union of India and Hon''ble Minister for Environment, Union of India is not acceptable to the Experts'' Committee. We, therefore, request the Hon''ble aforesaid three constitutional authorities to again have a meeting with all the stakeholders including experts in the field and come out with some workable solution. We make it clear that while expanding the national highway and making it four-lane, every care should be taken that the interest of the wildlife is protected so that the wildlife including animals like tiger and bison, can freely move from one side to the other side of the road, inasmuch as the said area is one of the corridors which connects Pench Tiger Reserve with Kanha Tadoba Reserve. We further make it clear that while permitting expansion of the said road, we will hear all the stakeholders including the interveners who are vaingloriously espousing the cause of wildlife and pass orders which would ensure proper mitigation measures and free flow of wildlife from one side of the road to other side of the road."

The perusal of the said order would reveal that this Court had taken a serious cognizance of the fact that though an amount of Rs. 7,68,49,038/- was already deposited with the authorities of the Forest Department for the purpose of afforestation, the work of compensatory afforestation was not yet started by the Forest Department. It was specifically observed that when the Court permitted the respondent authorities to proceed further with the expansion of the highway by permitting felling of trees, it was bounden duty of the respondents to take necessary steps for implementing compensatory measures, so as to meet the loss which is caused by felling of trees. It was noted that as against 20436 trees which are likely to be felled, the Forest Department has been given funds by the NHAI for planting 1,10,000 trees. The Court further observed that an area of 100 acres was also earmarked for the said purpose. It was observed that when the funds were available, there was no reason as to why the work of compensatory afforestation should not have been commenced. The Court had, therefore, called upon the respondent No. 4 to show-cause as to why an action against him should not be taken for not starting the afforestation work.

In the said order, it was also noticed that as requested by this Court, the Hon''ble Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Hon''ble Minister of Surface Transport, Union of India and Hon''ble Minister of Environment, Union of India had intervened in the matter. We had noticed that the decision taken in the meeting of the above three Hon''ble Ministers was not acceptable to Experts Committee. This Court, therefore, requested the aforesaid three constitutional authorities to again have a meeting with all stakeholders including experts in the field and come out with some workable solution. It was again reiterated that while expanding the National Highway every care should be taken that the interest of wildlife is protected so that the wildlife including the animals like tiger and bison can freely move from one side to the other side of the road, inasmuch as the said area is one of the corridors which connects Pench Tiger Reserve with Kanha and Tadoba Reserves. The Court had further made it clear that while permitting expansion of the said road, it would hear all the stakeholders including the intervenors who are vigorously espousing the cause of wildlife and pass orders, which would ensure proper mitigating measures and free flow of wildlife from one side of the road to other side of the road.

We may place on record that various orders passed by this Court in the present matter, have now finally led to an amicable solution being arrived at. The State of Maharashtra has now passed an order on 9.9.2015 permitting diversion of 49.246 hectares of Reserve Forest, Protected Forest and Zudpi Jungle land for construction of National Highway No. 7 from Mansar to Madhya Pradesh in favour of NHAI - Pandurna (M.P.). No doubt that the same is subject to various conditions including subject to the further order passed in the present P.I.L. and Appeal Nos. 25/15, 44/15 & 66/15 before the learned National Green Tribunal. We may also place on record that in spite of its earlier resistance, the NHAI has now agreed for construction of various structures for implementation of mitigating measures in the aforesaid project. The NHAI has now agreed to construct three wildlife corridors of 750, 750 and 300 meters each with five meters height along with other statutory conditions stipulated in the forest clearance issued by Ministry of Environment and Forest. We prima facie find that this would sufficiently take care of the concern of all those who are espousing the cause of wildlife. However, we do not propose to pass any final orders in this regard without hearing all the stakeholders.

The orders passed by this Court dated 14.11.2014 and 4.2.2015 came to be challenged by the intervenor NGO before Their Lordships of the Apex Court. Their Lordships passed the following order on 10.4.2015:--

"Learned counsel appearing for the applicants/petitioners seeks leave to withdraw the applications for permission to file special leave petitions with liberty to move appropriate forum.

Permission sought for is granted.

The applications for permission to file special leave petitions are disposed of as withdrawn with liberty to the applicants/petitioners to move appropriate forum by making appropriate application for appropriate relief(s)."

The perusal of the said order would reveal that the petitioners sought liberty to withdraw the petition with liberty to move an application with liberty to move appropriate forum. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the intervenor, that the appropriate forum as envisaged by Their Lordships of the Apex Court was a statutory appeal before the learned Green Tribunal as well as an application for review before this Court. According to the petitioners, in view of the liberty granted by the Hon''ble Apex Court, they preferred an appeal before the National Green Tribunal, so also the Review Application before this Court.

In so far as the Review Application of the present intervenors is concerned, as already discussed by us hereinabove, by an elaborate order this Court had rejected the same. It was observed that the orders passed by this Court which were sought to be recalled, were already challenged before the Apex Court and the applicant had not pressed into service the said S.L.P. and sought liberty to withdraw the same. It was further observed that the applicant could not prosecute two remedies simultaneously and as such, he had to choose between the two. The Court further observed that since the applicants desired to take recourse to both the remedies simultaneously, this Court could not entertain the Review Application and the same was rejected.

As already discussed hereinabove, the intervenor NGO preferred an appeal under Section 16 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 before the learned Tribunal being Appeal No. 25/15. The perusal of the proceedings in the said appeal would reveal that the learned Green Tribunal has passed various orders from time to time.

On 6.5.2015 the learned Tribunal passed an order which reads as under:--

"Heard. The Learned counsel appearing for Applicant. Issue notice on the application for condonation of delay. The Learned Counsel appearing for MoEF accepts notice, waive service, pray for time to seek instruction. Liberty to serve the State of Maharashtra through their Resident Commissioner granted.

In the meanwhile, we restrain Project Proponent and any Authority for from felling any tree in the areas covered under the project.

List the matter on 15th May, 2015."

Vide the order dated 3.7.2015 the learned Tribunal granted last chance to the respondents to file the replies. When on 27.7.2015 the reply was not filed on behalf of the National Tiger Conservation Authority, the learned Tribunal was pleased to issue a bailable warrant against the Principal Secretary of the National Tiger Conservation Authority.

The matter was again listed on 5.8.2015 before the learned Tribunal. In the order passed on the said date, the learned Tribunal has observed that the Ministry of Environment and Forest (hereinafter referred to as "MoEF") vide letter dated 13.12.2013 had granted in-principle approval for diversion of 49.246 hectares of forest land in favour of the Project Proponent subject to 32 conditions. The learned Tribunal has reproduced condition Nos. (ix) & (xxvi). The learned Tribunal further observes that these conditions have not been complied with till date. We may state that in our orders, which were challenged before the Hon''ble Apex Court, we had already considered the said two conditions. The learned Tribunal further goes on to observe that the Project Proponent has not obtained the permission from National Board for Wildlife. It is to be noted that the said issue was also considered by us in the order which was challenged before the Apex Court. The learned Tribunal in the said order has reiterated the settled legal position that no Court has competence to pass directions contrary to the law nor the Court can direct an authority to act in contravention of statutory provisions. The learned Tribunal further has observed that it has been informed regarding the high level meeting of the higher officials. The learned Tribunal further observes that it is a settled canon of constitutional jurisprudence that powers of the Hon''ble Supreme Court and Hon''ble High Courts under Articles 32 and 226 respectively cannot be totally excluded by a statute. However, the learned Tribunal gives words of caution, that these constitutional powers of the higher courts are required to be exercised sparingly. The learned Tribunal further goes on to observe that this Court was exercising the jurisdiction in relation to improving the condition of the roads and that the interim directions which were passed were only in that regard. It goes further to observe that the scope of Writ Petitions before the High Court and the present appeals are totally different and distinct. The learned Tribunal observes that the background of sustainable development presupposes adherence to Precautionary Principle and doctrine of Balancing. The learned Tribunal further observes that development is necessary for the progress of the country but not by irretrievable and irreversible damage to the ecology and environment and that too, in violation of the statutory provisions of the laws in force. The learned Tribunal further observes that the High Court did not in any way intend to deal with or render these statutory appeals pending before the Tribunal infructuous.

On 24.8.2014 the learned Tribunal specifically records that during the pendency of the proceedings before the learned Tribunal, the Project Proponent has already received clearance of the National Board for Wildlife in accordance with law. It has further observed that the Project Proponent had proposed to take large scale mitigating steps so as to ensure that no injury or inconvenience is caused to the wildlife.

However, after all this, when the Intervenor NGO approaches the learned Tribunal with a grievance that the orders passed by the learned Tribunal are flouted, the learned Tribunal has passed an order on 7.9.2015 issuing show-cause notices to:--

"(1) Secretary of Forest and Environment, State of Maharashtra,

(2) Chief General Manager of the NHAI, State of Maharashtra,

(3) Chief Conservator of Forest, State of Maharashtra"

calling upon them to show-cause as to why their properties be not attached and/or they be not committed to the Civil prison and further directions be not passed against them. In the meantime, the learned Tribunal has further directed the Commissioner of Police and the S.P. in-charge of the above area and the Collector to ensure that no trees are permitted to be felled or cut by any Authority or the Project Proponent.

Immediately after the receipt of the notice, two Civil Applications are filed before us. Civil Application No. 1671/15 is filed on behalf of the officers of the State Government and Civil Application No. 1683/15 is filed on behalf of the officers of the NHAI. We do not propose to finally dispose of these Civil Applications as of today, inasmuch as the learned Counsel for the intervenor NGO was furnished with the copies of the said Civil Applications yesterday and day before yesterday, respectively. We are of the considered view that passing any final orders on the present Civil Applications without affording an adequate opportunity to the intervenor NGO would not be in consonance with the principles of natural justice and specifically so when the orders passed by the learned Tribunal are on the application of the said NGO. Since Shri Mandlekar, learned Counsel for intervenor, seeks two weeks'' time to file reply, we grant two weeks'' time. However, if we fail to pass any orders today, we will be compelling the officers of the State Government and the NHAI to face the contempt proceedings on Monday and that too for following the directions issued by this Court. In that view of the matter, though we were reluctant and avoided for considerable time, we are compelled to answer the aforesaid questions.

The Constitution Bench consisting of Hon''ble Seven Judges in the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1997 SC 1125 : (1997) 83 CLT 815 : (1997) 92 ELT 318 : (1997) 228 ITR 725 : (1997) 3 JT 589 : (1997) 3 SCALE 40 : (1997) 3 SCC 261 : (1997) SCC(L&S) 577 : (1997) 2 SCR 1186 : (1997) 105 STC 618 : (1997) AIRSCW 1345 : (1997) 3 Supreme 147 was considering the issue regarding ouster of jurisdiction of the Hon''ble Apex Court and the High Courts under Article 32 & 226 of the Constitution of India as was provided under the Administrative Tribunals Act. The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was constituted under the enabling provisions of Article 323-A of the Constitution of India. Sub-clause (d) of Clause (2) of Article 323-A specifically enables the Parliament to legislate a law for establishment of Administrative Tribunal Act and also provides for exclusion of jurisdiction of all the Courts except jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 136 with respect to disputes as referred to complaints referred to in Clause (1). The Apex Court after scanning the entire law on the question as to whether the powers of the Apex Court and High Courts of judicial review as could be found in Article 32 & 226 respectively amounts to basic structure or not, observed thus in paragraph Nos. 78 & 79:--

"78. The legitimacy of the power of Courts within constitutional democracies to review legislative action has been questioned since the time it was first conceived. The Constitution of India, being alive to such criticism, has, while conferring such power upon the higher judiciary, incorporated important safeguards. An analysis of the manner in which the Framers of our Constitution incorporated provisions relating to the judiciary would indicate that they were very greatly concerned with securing the independence of the judiciary. These attempts were directed at ensuring that the judiciary would be capable of effectively discharging its wide powers of judicial review. While the Constitution confers the power to strike down laws upon the High Courts and the Supreme Court, it also contains elaborate provisions dealing with the tenure, salaries, allowances, retirement age of Judges as well as the mechanism for selecting Judges to the superior courts. The inclusion of such elaborate provisions appears to have been occasioned by the belief that, armed by such provisions, the superior courts would be insulated from any executive or legislative attempts to interfere with the making of their decisions. The Judges of the superior courts have been entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution and to this end, have been conferred the power to interpret it. It is they who have to ensure that the balance of power envisaged by the Constitution is maintained and that the legislature and the executive do not, in the discharge of their functions, transgress constitutional limitations. It is equally their duty to oversee that the judicial decisions rendered by those who man the subordinate courts and tribunals do not fall foul of strict standards of legal correctness and judicial independence. The constitutional safeguards which ensure the independence of the Judges of the superior judiciary, are not available to the Judges of the subordinate judiciary or to those who man Tribunals created by ordinary legislations. Consequently, Judges of the latter category can never be considered full and effective substitutes for the superior judiciary in discharging the function of constitutional interpretation. We, therefore, hold that the power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Articles 226 and in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded.

We also hold that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all Courts and Tribunals within their respective jurisdictions is also part of the basic structure of the Constitution. This is because a situation where the High Courts are divested of all other judicial functions apart from that of constitutional interpretation, is equally to be avoided."

It could thus be clearly seen that the Apex Court even when a provision in the Constitution enabled the Parliament to make a law thereby excluding the powers of judicial review except under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that the power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Articles 226 and in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure and, therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded. Their Lordships of the Apex Court further go on to observe that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all Courts and Tribunals within their respective jurisdictions is also part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

It will be further relevant to refer to following observations of the Apex Court in paragraph Nos. 91 to 93 which read thus:--

"91. We may first address the issue of exclusion of the power of judicial review of the High Courts. We have already held that in respect of the power of judicial review, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226/227 cannot wholly be excluded. It has been contended before us that the Tribunals should not be allowed to adjudicate upon matters where the vires of legislations is questioned, and that they should restrict themselves to handling matters where constitutional issues are not raised. We cannot bring ourselves to agree to this proposition as that may result in splitting up proceedings and may cause avoidable delay. If such a view were to be adopted, it would be open for litigants to raise constitutional issues, many of which may be quite frivolous, to directly approach the High Courts and thus subvert the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. Moreover, even in these special branches of law, some areas do involve the consideration of constitutional questions on a regular basis; for instance, in service law matters, a large majority of cases involve an interpretation of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. To hold that the Tribunals have no power to handle matters involving constitutional issues would not serve the purpose for which they were constituted. On the other hand, to hold that all such decisions will be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls will serve two purposes. While saving the power of judicial review of legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, it will ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through the process of adjudication in the Tribunal. The High Court will also have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which will be of use to it in finally deciding the matter.

It has also been contended before us that even in dealing with cases which are properly before the Tribunals, the manner in which justice is dispensed by them leaves much to be desired. Moreover, the remedy provided in the parent statutes, by way of an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, is too costly and inaccessible for it to be real and effective. Furthermore, the result of providing such a remedy is that the docket of the Supreme Court is crowded with decisions of Tribunals that are challenged on relatively trivial grounds and it is forced to perform the role of a First Appellate Court. We have already emphasised the necessity for ensuring that the High Courts are able to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of Tribunals under Article 227 of the Constitution. In R.K. Jain''s case, after taking note of these facts, it was suggested that the possibility of an appeal from the Tribunals on questions of law to a Division Bench of a High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal falls, be pursued. It appears that no follow-up action has been taken pursuant to the suggestion. Such a measure would have improved matters considerably. Having regard to both the afore-stated contentions, we hold that all decisions of Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323A or Article 323B of the Constitution, will be subject to the High Court''s writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls.

We may add here that under the existing system, direct appeals have been provided from the decisions of all Tribunals to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. In view of our above-mentioned observations, this situation will also stand modified. In the view that we have taken, no appeal from the decision of a Tribunal will directly lie before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution; but instead, the aggrieved party will be entitled to move the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and from the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court the aggrieved party could move this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution."

It would thus reveal that the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in unequivocal terms has held that the Tribunals will have a power to handle matters involving constitutional issues. The Apex Court held that if it is held that the Tribunals do not have power to handle matters involving constitutional issues could not serve the purpose for which they were constituted. It has further been observed that on the other hand to hold that all such decisions will be subject to jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India and before Division Bench of High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls will serve two purposes. It held that while saving powers of judicial review, all legislative action, vested in the High Courts under Article 226 & 227 would ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through the process of adjudication in the Tribunal. The High Court will also have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which will be of use to it in finally deciding the matter. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court clearly holds that all decisions of Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323A or Article 323B of the Constitution, will be subject to the High Court''s writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls.

The perusal of paragraph 93 of the judgment of the Constitution Bench would further reveal that the function of the Tribunals is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals would be subject to scrutiny before the Division Bench of respective High Courts. The Constitution Bench holds that all such Tribunals will continue to act as the only Courts of first instance in respect of areas of law for which they have been constituted. It has been held that it will not be open for a litigant to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where the question of vires of statutory legislations (except as mentioned where the legislations which creates the particular legislation) is challenged by availing the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. We find that the learned Tribunal has rightly held that a dispute concerning area which is specifically earmarked for particular Tribunal, the aggrieved party is required to first approach the Tribunal and cannot approach the High Court directly.

Recently, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Kollidam Aaru Pathukappu Nala Sangam v. P. Ettikkan in Writ Petition Nos. 7146/14 & others decided on 6.8.2014 had an occasion to consider the issue as to whether in view of the establishment of the learned Green Tribunal the powers of judicial review of High Court under Article 226 are taken away or not. Relying on the observations of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (cited supra) the Division Bench holds that when the Apex Court, even in spite of specific provision in a statute under Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, excluding judicial review, holds that the power of judicial review could not be taken away, there was no question of by any implication the powers of judicial review in the matters for which the learned Green Tribunal was established could be taken away. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court.

It could thus clearly be seen that it is a settled position of law that the High Courts exercise the power of judicial review over all the Tribunals which are situated within its jurisdiction. However, though we have all the respect at our command for the learned Green Tribunal, the position vice versa would not be permissible in law.

We may gainfully refer to the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Priya Gupta and Another Vs. Addl. Secy. Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and Others, (2013) 2 ABR 326 : (2013) 1 AD 207 : (2013) 116 CLT 91 : (2013) CriLJ 732 : (2013) 1 JT 27 : (2013) 1 RCR(Criminal) 850 : (2012) 12 SCALE 289 : (2013) AIRSCW 268 . Hon''ble Shri Justice Swatanter Kumar (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Supreme Court has succinctly culled down the position as under:--

"12. The government departments are no exception to the consequences of wilful disobedience of the orders of the Court. Violation of the orders of the Court would be its disobedience and would invite action in accordance with law. The orders passed by this Court are the law of the land in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. No Court or Tribunal and for that matter any other authority can ignore the law stated by this Court. Such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working, otherwise there would be confusion in the administration of law and the respect for law would irretrievably suffer. There can be no hesitation in holding that the law declared by the higher court in the State is binding on authorities and tribunals under its superintendence and they cannot ignore it. This Court also expressed the view that it had become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have a grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. It must be remembered that predictability and certainty are important hallmarks of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country, as discipline is sine qua non for effective and efficient functioning of the judicial system. If the Courts command others to act in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and to abide by the rule of law, it is not possible to countenance violation of the constitutional principle by those who are required to lay down the law. (Ref. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs and Officials Liquidator v. Dayanand) (SCC p.57, paras 90-91)."

It could thus be seen that Their Lordships of the Apex Court in unequivocal terms held that no Court or Tribunal and for that matter any other authority can ignore the law stated by the Hon''ble Supreme Court. It held that such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working, otherwise there would be confusion in the administration of law and the respect for law would irretrievably suffer. It has been held that the law declared by the higher court in the State is binding on authorities and tribunals under its superintendence and they cannot ignore it. The Apex Court expressed a caution that it had become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have a grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. Their Lordships of the Apex Court further held that predictability and certainty are important hallmarks of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country, as discipline is sine qua non for effective and efficient functioning of the judicial system. There is no question of we agreeing with the principles as laid down by the Apex Court. We are bound by the same and we bow down before the said principles.

In this background, we will have to consider the present matter. This Court on a newspaper item published in Times of India way back in September, 2013 has taken a cognizance regarding precarious situation of the 40 kms. Stretch of National Highway between Mansar to Khawasa. We are grateful to the said newspaper for highlighting such an important issue, on the basis of which this Court was moved to take cognizance. While considering various issues, the other two stretches of National Highways between Nagpur to Amravati and Nagpur to Hyderabad were also brought under the ambit of this Public Interest Litigation. The matter proceeded on a regular basis and the Court while exercising the jurisdiction of continuous mandamus, issued various directions from time to time, so that the National Highways which are important lifelines of the country are properly maintained. It will be appropriate to refer to the observations o the Division Bench of this Court presided over by His Lordship Justice R.M. Lodha (as His Lordship then was) dated 31st August, 2006 in PIL Suo Motu Writ Petition No. 8 of 2005 and PIL WP No. 3 of 2005 in paragraph No. 9 which read thus:

"9. It is the obligation of the Civic Authorities and the other agencies of the State to secure to the public the means of communication in good and proper condition. There cannot be any justification for the bad roads in the financial capital of the country. The people of Mumbai contribute hugely to the revenue of the Centre, the State and the Civic Body. Are they not entitled to the good civil amenities including roads in good condition? How long the citizenry would continue to suffer bad roads? In the context of the constitutional provisions, the existence of roads in reasonable conditions is embraced in the citizens'' right to life. Every person is entitled to ''life'' as enjoined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The directive principles have been read into Article 21 to make life more meaningful and not mere its existence. Good roads are the necessity to the life. There has to be roads for communication in reasonable condition in view of the constitutional imperatives. This is well settled. It needs no emphasis. It is thus imperative for the MCGM to make available proper roads to the people in the city of Mumbai through out the year. The Corporation has to discharge its constitutional and legal obligations unfailingly. What we have said above is applicable equally to all the other authorities like Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority, Mumbai Port Trust, Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation, the Public Works Department and the Thane Municipal Corporation. It is their duty, responsibility and obligation to provide proper roads within their jurisdiction to the commuters through out the year. By serious consequences by infringing the valuable rights of the people. Lest it must be forgotten, bad road mean physical damage, huge economic loss and more accidents."

(emphasis supplied).

It would thus be clearly seen that this Court has held that the existence of roads in reasonable condition is embraced in the citizens'' right to life. Their Lordships held that the directive principles have to be read into Article 21 to make life more meaningful and not mere its existence. The Division Bench holds that there have to be roads for communication in reasonable condition in view of the constitutional imperatives. It has been further observed that bad roads mean physical damage, huge economic loss and more accidents.

This Court so as to ensure a right to citizens available under Article 21 and in order to ensure improvement of roads, so that it no longer remains a death-trap for citizens, has issued directions from time to time and while issuing such directions one of the issues which cropped up was regarding four-laning and the hindrances on account of non-issuance of various permissions for felling of trees. The Court has been monitoring from time to time and we are happy to state that, as of now no hindrances remain in force. The two issues with which the learned Tribunal was concerned regarding the permission of the National Wildlife Board of India and the final order to be passed by the State Government under Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act, also no more remains to be stumbling block. As already observed by the learned Tribunal, the National Wildlife Board of India has already granted its permission. The State Government vide order dated 9.9.2015 has also granted final permission under Section 2 of the Conservation of Forests Act. Not only that, but the NHAI in spite of its initial reluctance has now agreed for mitigating measures. It has agreed to construct two wildlife crossings of 750 meters each and one of 300 meter with five meter height along with other statutory conditions stipulated in the forest clearance issued by MoEF and CCF. We may state that on account of judicial intervention and on account of a request made by this Court to the Hon''ble Chief Minister and two Hon''ble Ministers of Union of India to intervene in the matter, the issue has been amicably resolved. If the authorities would have been permitted to travel at their speed, one does not know as to how much time would have been required for getting all the necessary permissions.

The exercise of plenary jurisdiction by the Constitutional Courts so as to achieve larger public interest is not unknown to the Indian jurisprudence. It is on account of an expansive meaning given to Article 21 by Their Lordships of the Apex Court and various High Courts, various rights, which in nobody''s imagination in 1950, could be construed as right to life, have now been found to be a part of Article 21. While exercising that jurisdiction, we had passed various orders and finally all hurdles in the four-laning of the said project are now removed.

We are in complete agreement with the observations of the learned Green Tribunal that this Court also does not have power to pass any directions contrary to the statutory provisions or to issue a direction to act contrary to law. With due respect, this Court has not issued any such directions. The orders have been reproduced hereinabove. However, even if the learned Tribunal was of the opinion that any of orders passed by this Court are not in accordance with the law, with great respect to the learned Tribunal, the only jurisdiction to correct orders of this Court vests with the Hon''ble Apex Court of India and not with any other Tribunal or Court. As already discussed hereinabove, our orders were already challenged by the intervenor NGO before the Apex Court. The order of the Apex Court shows that the intervenor sought liberty to withdraw the petition. In our understanding of law, not pressing the S.L.P. by the applicant NGO, would amount to accepting the orders passed by this Court. However, unfortunately, the intervenor thereafter again filed two proceedings - one before this Court and one before the learned Tribunal. As already discussed hereinabove, we dismissed the application filed by the N.G.O. by a speaking order.

However, we are at pains to observe that in spite of our specific directions holding the field and in spite of S.L.P. challenging the same being withdrawn, the learned Tribunal has initially passed an order on 6.5.2015 and continued the same from time to time. As already discussed hereinabove that though these facts were brought to our notice on earlier dates, however, as a mark of respect to the learned Tribunal, we did not observe anything. We were under a great hope that better counsel would prevail upon the intervenor NGO. We had expected the intervenor to withdraw the appeal filed by it before the learned Tribunal and to avoid this unpleasant situation of conflicting orders. Not only this, but the perusal of our order dated 29.7.2015 would also reveal that learned Counsel for the intervenor NGO was specifically informed that the Court was inclined to consider their application for review, provided the applicant makes a statement that they would not pursue the remedy before the other forum. However, unfortunately, on account of the intervenor NGO simultaneously prosecuting both the remedies, one before this Court and the other before the learned Tribunal, this unfortunate situation has arisen. When the matter was placed before us on 10th June, 2015, the learned Counsel for the respondent authorities brought to our notice the conflicting orders passed by the learned Tribunal dated 6th May, 2015. However, as already discussed hereinabove, as a mark of respect to the learned Tribunal, we did not observe anything in our order. Faced with the situation of conflicting orders passed by the learned Tribunal and this Court, a query was made by the Counsel for the authorities as to what should be done by them. We had observed that it was for the authorities to decide as to between the orders passed by the Constitutional Court and the Statutory Tribunal, which order they would abide by. This query was also made to the learned Counsel for the NGO. It appears that the State Government ultimately understanding the right legal position restored the order permitting felling of trees. We are prima facie of the view that the manner in which the present matter has progressed right from September, 2013 and the sequence in which various orders were passed by this Court were not brought to the notice of the learned Tribunal by the intervenor NGO. We have no manner of doubt that had all these facts been brought to the notice of the learned Tribunal, the learned Tribunal would not have passed the orders contrary to the orders passed by this Court.

On one of the dates a suggestion was given by the intervenor NGO for the alternate route of Nagpur-Chhindwara-Seoni. If the said alternative is to be accepted, it would increase the travel distance by approximately 70 km. We had, therefore, requested Shri Sanyal, learned Standing Counsel for the Maharashtra Pollution Control Board to get a preliminary report from National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (hereinafter referred to as the ''NEERI") as to what environmental effect would be caused by the addition of distance by 70 kms. Shri Sanyal, learned Counsel has brought the necessary details from NEERI. As per NEERI, taking into consideration that approximately 6000 vehicles ply on the said route and taking into consideration that on an average heavy vehicles give an average of 5 km. per litre, the extra diesel consumption would be around 84000 litres per day. The yearly additional consumption of diesel would be around 3,06,60,000 litres. The carbon emission is 0.720469 kg. per litre. The extra run, therefore, would result into additional emission of approximately 60500 kg. Carbon per day and that would come to about 2,21,00,000 kg. per year. As per NEERI, the carbon sequestered by trees per year is 22.6 kg. Carbon per year. Taking into consideration that 22976 trees are required to be felled, the carbon sequestered by the said trees would be approximately around 5,20,000 kg. If 5,20,000 kg. is deducted from 2,21,00,000 kg., the figure would be 2,16,00,000 kg. It could thus be seen that if the suggestion of the NGOs. for alternate route is to be accepted, it will lead to additional consumption of 3,06,60,000 litres of diesel per year and an additional carbon emission of 2,16,00,000 kg. It is not in dispute that oil is also a precious natural resource. While ensuring sustainable development, unnecessary extraction of oil resource is also required to be avoided. Further, if the suggestion of the NGO is to be accepted, it will lead to additional carbon emission of 2,16,00,000 kg. It cannot be said that an additional carbon emission of such a huge magnitude will have no impact on the environment and ecology. We are of the considered view that while considering the ecological and environmental aspects, piecemeal approach will have to be avoided and entire factors would be required to be taken into consideration. We again reiterate that we are aware about limitations and that we do not possess the expertise in the matter. However, the aforesaid figures are on the basis of the preliminary study made by NEERI, as pointed out to us Shri Sanyal, learned Counsel. This is apart from the fact that while permitting the expansion of four-laning, we have ensured that necessary measures for compensatory afforestation and necessary mitigation measures for providing wildlife corridor are implemented by the authorities. Not only this, but the perusal of our order dated 30.7.2015 would reveal that we had made it clear that while permitting expansion of the said road, we will hear all the stakeholders including the intervenor, who is vigorously espousing the cause of wildlife and pass orders which would ensure proper mitigation measures and free flow of wildlife from one side of the road to the other side of the road. However, it appears that the intervenor NGO was more interested in putting the officers of the State and NHAI behind bars, rather than an amicable solution which ensures the four-laning of the road and also compensatory afforestation and mitigation measures for free flow of wildlife from one part of the road to the other part of the road.

There is another angle to it. The National Green Tribunal is constituted under the National Green Tribunals Act, 2010. It will be relevant to refer to Sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the said Act, which reads thus:--

"S. 4. Composition of Tribunal--(1) The Tribunal shall consist of --

(a) a full time Chairperson;

(b) not less than ten but subject to maximum of twenty full time Judicial Members as the Central Government may, from time to time, notify;

(c) not less than ten but subject to maximum of twenty full time Expert Members, as the Central Government may, from time to time, notify.

(2) The Chairperson of the Tribunal may, if considered necessary, invite any one or more person having specialised knowledge and experience in a particular case before the Tribunal to assist the Tribunal in that case.

(3) The Central Government may, by notification, specify the ordinary place or places of sitting of the Tribunal, and the territorial jurisdiction falling under each such place of sitting.

(4) The Central Government may, in consultation with the Chairperson of the Tribunal, make rules regulating generally the practices and procedure of the Tribunal including--

(a) the rules as to the persons who shall be entitled to appear before the Tribunal;

(b) the rules as to the procedure for hearing applications and appeals and other matters including the circuit procedure for hearing at a place other than the ordinary place of its sitting falling within the jurisdiction referred to in sub-section (3), pertaining to the applications and appeals;

(c) the minimum number of Members who shall hear the applications and appeals in respect of any class or classes of applications and appeals:

Provided that the number of Expert Members shall, in hearing an application or appeal, be equal to the number of Judicial Members hearing such application or appeal;

(d) rules relating to transfer of cases by the Chairperson from one place of sitting (including the ordinary place of sitting) to other place of sitting."

It could thus reveal that the Central Government by notification is required to specify the ordinary in place or places of sitting of the Tribunal and the territorial jurisdiction falling under each such place of seat. It will also be relevant to refer to Rule 11 of the National Green Tribunals (Practices & Procedure) Rules, 2011, which reads thus:--

"11. Place of filing application or appeal.--An application or appeal, as the case may be, shall ordinarily be filed by an applicant or appellant, as the case may be, with the Registrar of the Tribunal at its ordinary place of sitting falling within the jurisdiction, the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen."

Perusal of Rule 11 would reveal that an application or appeal, as the case may be, is required to be filed by an applicant or appellant, as the case may be, with the Registrar of the Tribunal at its ordinary place of sitting falling within the jurisdiction, the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen.

The Union of India has issued a notification in exercise of powers vested in it under sub-section (3) of Section 4 on 17.8.2011. It will be relevant to refer to the said notification:--

"MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS NOTIFICATION

New Delhi, the 17th August, 2011

S.O. 1908(E).--In exercise of powers conferred by subsection (3) of Section 4 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (19th of 2010), the Central Government hereby specifies the following ordinary places of sitting of the National Green Tribunal which shall exercise jurisdiction in the area indicated against each:--

Provided that till the Benches of the national Green Tribunal become functional at Bhopal, Pune, Kolkata and Chennai, the aggrieved persons may file petitions before the National Green Tribunal at Delhi and till such time the notification No. S.O. 1003(E) : , dated the 5th May, 2011 in the Ministry of Environment and Forests, shall continue to be operative.

[F. No. 17(4)2010-PL] RAJNEESH DUBE, Jt. Secy."

It could thus be seen that in so far as Maharashtra is concerned, it squarely falls within the Western Zone which has a place of sitting at Pune. No doubt that the proviso to said notification provides that till the Benches of the National Green Tribunal become functional at Bhopal, Pune, Kolkata and Chennai, the aggrieved person can file application before the National Green Tribunal at Delhi. Undisputedly, on the date on which the appeal was filed by the intervenor NGO, the Bench of National Green Tribunal at Pune for Western Zone had already started functioning. In that view of the matter, in view of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Act and Rule 11 of the said Rules, it is only the Bench at Pune which had a jurisdiction to entertain the matter as the cause of action arose within the State of Maharashtra.

To a pertinent query to Shri Mandlekar, learned Counsel for the intervenor, as to whether there is some provision in the National Green Tribunal Act or the Rules framed therein, analogous to the powers of Hon''ble Chief Justice which permits the matter from any of the Benches to be transferred to the Principal seat or from any of the Benches to another Bench, the learned Counsel has not been in a position to point out any such provision. In that view of the matter, we are prima facie of the view that the learned Principal Seat at Delhi had no jurisdiction to entertain any matters wherein a cause of action arose within the State of Maharashtra. However, we keep this issue open to be enlightened by Shri Mandlekar, at the stage of final hearing of the present application.

We may also refer to an order of the Apex Court in the case of Munna Lal Karosia Vs. State of M.P. and Others, (2012) 12 SCC 255 . In the said case, an order was passed in the contempt proceedings against the appellant before the Apex Court. The Apex Court clearly observes that a person who had though acted contrary to the order of High Court but in accordance with orders of the Apex Court could not be held guilty of contempt of Court.

In the present case, all the applicants before us have acted in accordance with the orders passed by this Court. No doubt that the learned Tribunal has observed that in an area reserved for the learned Tribunal, a party is first required to approach the Tribunal and not the High Court. However, it is to be noted that the present lis is not initiated on a complaint of any individual aggrieved person. The Court has suo motu taken cognizance of the precarious conditions of the roads and passed orders therein from time to time. The orders passed are touching various spheres and many of them beyond the jurisdiction of the learned Green Tribunal. The issues regarding felling of trees is one of the incidental or ancillary issues which is a part of larger issue of ensuring a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 to have the roads in a good condition. Article 43 mandates development of backward areas. Providing good infrastructure including good roads is one of the pre-requisites for achieving the final mandate of the Directive Principles of Socio-economic development of backward areas and people. As already discussed hereinabove, as highlighted by the Times of India, the said patch had become a death trap. Large number of accidents, some of them leading to casualties have also taken place on the said road. No doubt that a concern for wildlife is necessary as envisaged in Fundamental Duties but at the same time the question is as to whether the roads should be permitted to remain in the same condition, wherein human beings lose their lives or suffer grievous injuries and ailment on account of worst condition of roads.

Perusal of the various orders passed by various Division Benches of this Court would reveal that this Court has time and again emphasized the need for causing minimum damage to the environment and ecology and also for implementing mitigation measures, so that the natural wildlife corridor is not broken. Each and every order quoted hereinabove will clearly show that this Court while emphasizing the need for development has also emphasized the need for causing minimum damage to the ecology and environment and providing necessary mitigating measures for protecting the wildlife corridor. The permission for the first time was granted on 4.2.2015 only after this Court ensured that the necessary amount for conservation measures, compensatory afforestation and net present value was deposited with the Competent Authority and an area for compensatory afforestation notified.

While exercising the jurisdiction in that regard, in a way we might have encroached upon the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal to some extent. It is always stated that to err is a human. The Judges are ultimately human beings and they are also prone to error. However, in a constitutional framework, the jurisdiction that can correct our errors, is only with the Hon''ble Supreme Court. In the present case, as already discussed hereinabove, this Court is seized of the matter right from September, 2013. The first order passed by this Court permitting felling of trees was passed on 4.2.2015. The same was challenged before the Apex Court by filing a S.L.P., which was withdrawn. However, subsequently, the respondent NGO went in appeal before the learned Green Tribunal which passed the order for the first time on 6.5.2015, i.e. after a period of four months from the date on which the orders were passed by this Court. If this Court had passed any order contrary to the earlier orders passed by the learned Tribunal on the learned Tribunal being seized of the matter, certainly the same would not have been permissible in law. However, it is not so in the present matter. The factual situation is otherwise.

We, therefore, find that continuation of proceedings before the learned National Green Tribunal about the issues with which this Court is seized of, much prior to the intervenor NGO filing an appeal before the learned Tribunal, at least in so far as territorial jurisdiction of this Court is concerned, would not be in the interest of justice.

We further find that the continuation of contempt proceedings against the applicants before us would not be in the interest of justice, inasmuch as the said officers would be required to face undue hardship and that too for following the directions issued by a Constitutional Court. We make it clear that we are restricting our orders only in so far as territorial jurisdiction of this Court is concerned. We do not wish to observe anything with regard to matters pertaining to the State of Madhya Pradesh.

In that view of the matter, by an interim order, we direct that all proceedings in Appeal No. 25/15, Appeal No. 44/15 and Appeal No. 66/15 pending before the learned National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, in so far as the areas which fall under our territorial jurisdiction are concerned, shall stand stayed.

We further direct that the effect and operation of the order passed by the learned Tribunal dated 7.9.2015 including the issuance of contempt notice to the applicants and directions to the other officers shall also stand stayed.

The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to forthwith communicate this order to the Registrar of learned National Green Tribunal at Delhi.