The Commissioner of Income Tax vs Mothey Ganga Raju and Others

Victor Murray Coutts Trotter, C.J.—On the direction of the learned Judge several separate questions have been formed for our

determination. In our opinion the answers to the first three dispose of the whole matter and preclude us from going into the others. The first

question is whether four applications are necessary in this case for taking action u/s 66(2) of the Act. That is the section which says that the Income

Tax. Commissioner is to state a case when a proper application is made accompanied by the proper fee which is Rs. 100, as matters stand. These

applicants were four persons. They had once been an undivided family and, had they remained so, different considerations might arise, but they

had in fact become separated and they were separately assessed. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to have a case stated regarding them all on a

single fee of Rs. 100. That, of course, was an impossible attitude to take up and as they were divided the result was that it was an application by

four people each of whom, as my learned brother put it, can be deemed to have paid one-fourth of the prescribed fee. I have no sympathy with the

applicants because they were expressly told or their Vakil was expressly told the position by a letter from Mr. Strathie, the Commissioner, dated

13th February. 1924. He points out ""only one sum of Rs. 100 is deposited. There were however, separate assessments and four appellate orders.

u/s 66(2) each assessee must put in a separate-application and each must deposit the prescribed fee of Rs. 100. I cannot, therefore, act on the

present application."" Then he goes on: ""If you wish me to deal with all the cases, will you please send four separate applications and an additional

Rs. 300? If however, you are willing that only one case should be dealt with and if you tell me with which case you wish me to proceed, I shall

treat the Rs. 100 as having been received from that individual."" The applicants could have put the whole matter right by accepting one of those two

alternatives. Instead of that the. Vakil sends an answer saying that as all the questions were common to the four, applicants, a reference in one will

necessarily cover the case of all. Then he says he writes to his client. He must have known time was passing and in the result the time had elapsed

before he communicated with his client, and ascertained his decision as to which of the two alternatives he would accept. Thereupon Mr. Strathie

wrote the letter on the 19th February in which he says that the time is gone for his reply, that the reply was in every case evasive (as indeed it was)

and he declired to take any further action in the matter, Thereupon, penitent too late, the Vakil writes a letter at once requesting that the Rs. 100

sent with the application should be treated as deposited on behalf of Mr. M. Narasimha Rao and that a reference, may be made in his case leaving

the other people over. That is the position and our answer to the question must be that the application as originally sent was defective and that the

fee that accompanied even if the application was in order was insufficient. It is not Competent for four separately assessed persons to combine

their applications for a case stated of this sort in one document. But, even assuming that they may be as an instance where the points to be raised

were the same, it is obvious that, as they were separately assessed, their cases must be separately stated and they must pay a separate fee of Rs.

100 for each assessment under the Act.

Then, the next question is if the answer to question (1) is in the affirmative as it has now been answered in the affirmative whether there was no

proper application before the Commissioner for his taking action in the case of one of the applicants. The answer is no. He had offered to do that

and his offer was not accepted.

The third question is whether there was any power to extend the period in this case or whether the Commissioner had no discretion in the

matter. The answer is that the Statute fixes a time and it would be an obviously undesirable burden on the Income Tax Commissioner to put upon

him the consideration of questions as to whether he should exercise discretion in the direction of leniency in one case and not in another. The

Statute is express and there is no provision in it for any official or even for the Court to extend the time. Therefore, as our answers to the first three

questions are what I have outlined the remaining questions which, I suppose, raise the merits we are unable to deal with. Rupees 150. will be

allowed for costs of Government.

Kpishnan, J.

I agree.

Beasley, J.

I agree.