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Judgment
J.B. Pardiwala, J.—In this writ petition, Petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs:
(A) This Hon''ble Court would be pleased to declare that the provisions of Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act are illegal and ultravires Act. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and are inoperative and of no legal effect whatsoever.
(B) That this Hon''ble Court would be pleased to issue a writ of prohibition restraining the Respondents Nos. 1,6 and 7, their servants, agents and officers from acting under and/or in pursuance of and/or under the authority of said Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
(C) This Hon''ble Court would be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside impugned notices at Annexures P, Q and R to the petition, being ultravires, illegal and/or contrary to the provisions of law.
(D) This Hon''ble Court would be pleased to issue a writ of prohibition restraining the Respondents Nos. 1,6 and 7 and/or their servants, agents and/or officers from acting upon and/or in pursuance of the impugned notices.
(E) This Hon''ble Court would be pleased to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the Respondent Nos. 1,2,3 and 4 to comply with the promises and obligations of the package deal as well as the terms and conditions mentioned in the sanctioned letters Annexures ''A'' and ''B''.
(F) That this Hon''ble Court would be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the Respondent No. 1 to extend the validity of the Notifications dated 14th August, 1984 issued under Sections 3 and 4 of the Bombay Relief Undertaking (Special Provisions) Act, 1958 for a period of three years as envisaged in the revised package deal dated 30.5.1986, being Annexure ''T'' hereto.
(G) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the present petition, this Hon''ble Court would be pleased to issue injunction restraining the Respondent Nos. 1, 5 and 6, their servants, officers and agents from taking any steps pursuant to the impugned show cause notices, Annexures ''P'', ''Q'' and ''R'' to the petition as well as from issuing any further show cause notices and/or initiating any penal action/ proceedings against the Petitioners for the so called alleged closure and breach of any of the provisions of law relating to any closure.
(H) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the present petition, this Hon''ble Court would be pleased to stay the proceedings in the Criminal Complaint Nos. 2123/84, 3047/84 and 3048/84 filed in the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad against the Petitioner No. 1 and its officers.
(I) Pending the hearing and final disposal of this petition, this Hon''ble Court would be pleased to direct the Respondent No. 1 to continue the validity of the Notifications issued u/s 3 and 4 of the Bombay Relief Undertaking (Special Provisions) Act, 1958 dated 14th August, 1985 for a further period of three years.
(J) Ad-interim exparte injunction in terms of paragraphs (G), (H) and (I) herein above may kindly be granted.]
(K) Any other and further relief as this Hon''ble Court may deem fit may be granted".
Today when the matter was taken up for hearing being a very old matter, at the outset, learned senior Counsel, Mr. S.I. Nanavati appearing for the Petitioners informed the Court that Petitioner No. 1, the Commercial Ahmedabad Mills Co. Ltd. has gone under liquidation long time back. He further informed the Court that Official Liquidator, as on today, is in-charge of the assets of the Company. He requested this Court to issue notice to the Official Liquidator so that he can appear in this petition and assist the Court. However, taking into consideration the fact that the main prayer in the writ petition is with regard to declaring Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act as ultra vires Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, the presence of the Official Liquidator would not be necessary. Secondly, since the Company has gone under liquidation long time back, other reliefs as prayed for in the petition have also fallen into insignificance. We are only left now with the first prayer as regards Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act as ultra vires Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
However, this issue also now stands concluded with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Orissa Textile and Steel Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa and Others, While upholding the validity of Section 25-O as amended by Act 46 of 1986, Supreme Court has observed as under:
(20) Reliance was also placed on the observations, in Excel Wear''s case, that there could be several methods to regulate and/or restrict the right of closure e.g. by providing for extra compensation over and above the retrenchment compensation. It was submitted that this was also a substantive ground on which Section 25-O (as it then stood) was struck down. It was submitted that the amended Section 25-O still suffers from the same vice inasmuch as permission to close could still be refused. It was submitted that this amounts to the restriction being excessive and unreasonable. We are unable to accept this submission. We do not read the observations in Excel Wear''s case, which are relied on, as laying down, that that could be the only method of lying down a reasonable restriction. We read these observations as being a suggestion as to one method of imposing a reasonable restriction. This is clear from the following observations in Excel Wear''s case:
The law may provide to deter the reckless, unfair, unjust or mala fide closures. But it is not for us to suggest in this judgment what should be a just and reasonable method to do so.
As set out hereinabove, the main consideration would be the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer. But that cannot be the only consideration. As stated hereinabove, there could be exceptional circumstances or overriding reasons where, in the interest of general public, there would have to be a restriction on closure for some time. The observations relied on, cannot be read out of context. It is not possible to accept the submission that if reasons are genuine and adequate the appropriate Government must always grant permission to close, even though interest of general public and/or other factors require that the business be continued for some time.
(22) Again, in the case of Premium Granites and Another Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, it has been held that the phrase "public interest" finds place in the Constitution and in many enactments and has since been noted and considered by this Court in various decisions. It has been held that the said expression is of a definite concept and that there is nothing vague about it. Undoubtedly, in Maneka Gandhi''s case it had been held that a fundamental right had not been breached. However, that would make no difference to the understanding of the term "in the interest of the general public". In our view, the phrase "in the interest of the general public" is the phrase of a definite connotation and a known concept. This phrase, as used in amended Section 25-O, has been bodily lifted from Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. As stated in Maneka. Gandhi''s case if it is not vague in the Constitution, one fails to see how it becomes vague when it is incorporated in amended Section 25-O.
(24) We see no substance in these contentions. Amended Section 25-O is the law which lays down the restriction. As has been set out above, there is nothing vague or ambiguous in its provision. It is Section 25-O which gives the power to grant or refuse permission. It would be impossible to enumerate or set out in Section 25-O all different contingencies or situations which may arise in actual practice. Each case would have to be decided on its own facts and on the basis of circumstances prevailing at the relevant time. All that can be set out, in the Section, are guidelines. These have been set out in amended Section 25-O.
(25) Mr. Cama also submitted that amended Section 25-O was discriminatory inasmuch as a firm of lawyers or chartered accountants or doctors or a ospital employing several hundred workmen could close down on giving 60 days notice and on payment of closure compensation but in cases of a factory, mine or plantation permission to close could be refused. Just such an argument has ben negatived in Excel Wear''s case. In Excel Wear''s case it has been held that the classification is reasonable. We see no reason to take a different view.
(26) We, therefore, hold that the amended Section 25-O is not ultra-vires the Constitution. We hold that it is saved by Article 19(6) of the Constitution.
In this view of the matter, nothing remains in the present petition and therefore, the same is disposed of accordingly. Rule stands discharged.