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Judgment
Sushil Kukreja, Judge.
The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant, who was respondent No. 1 before the learned Court below (hereinafter referred to as “the appellant”) under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) against award dated 20.07.2006, passed by learned District Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as “the learned Reference Court”), in Land Reference Petition No. 8 of 2005, whereby the learned Reference Court held that the petitioners are not entitled for enhanced amount of compensation.
The brief facts of the case are that State of H.P., issued notification, dated 07.04.1993, under Section 4 qua acquisition of the land situated in village Sarkaghat, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P., for the purpose of construction of Jogindernagar Sarkaghat Ghumarwin Road. The said notification was published in H.P. Rajpatra on 15.05.1993 and in news papers, i.e., Dainik Tribune on 18.05.1993 and in Jansata on 18.05.1993. On 09.09.1993 notification under Sections 6 and 7 was issued, which was published in H.P. Rajpatra on 02.10.1993 and news papers, i.e., Virpartap on 25.11.1993 and in Hindi Milap on 25.11.1993. Thereafter, the land of the petitioners was acquired for the aforesaid public purpose.
2(a). The Land Acquisition Officer, HPPWD, Mandi, determined the compensation and on 16.04.1996 awarded the compensation to each of the petitioners.
2(b). The petitioners, feeling aggrieved, approached the learned Reference Court for enhancement of the compensation amount. The learned Reference Court, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, held that the petitioners are not entitled for enhanced amount of compensation and dismissed the Reference Petition. Hence, the appellant/Land Acquisition Collector preferred the instant appeal under Section 54 of the Act with a prayer to set-aside the impugned award to the extent that interest from the date of possession, i.e., w.e.f. 01.01.1955 to the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act, i.e., 18.05.1993, which was allowed by Land Acquisition Collector as well as by the learned Reference Court, was not permissible and deserves to be set-aside by allowing the instant appeal.
Learned Additional Advocate General contended that the learned Reference Court has failed to appreciate the evidence in its right and true perspective. He further contended that the impugned award, whereby the award passed by the Land Acquisition Collector, was affirmed, be set-aside to the extent that the interest allowed from the date of possession, i.e., w.e.f. 01.01.1955 to the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act, i.e., 18.05.1993, which was allowed by the Land Acquisition Collector as well as by the learned Reference Court, be set-aside by allowing the instant appeal.
Conversely, learned vice counsel appearing for respondents No. 13, 14 and 16, raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal. The learned vice counsel contended that as the appellant had passed award acting as a quasi judicial authority, he is not competent to maintain the present appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed on this count.
I have heard the learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant, learned vice counsel for respondents No. 13, 14 and 16 and also carefully examined the records.
The perusal of the memo of parties before the learned District Judge, Mandi, H.P. reads as under:
“1.Shri Bachitar Singh,
2.Shri Gulab Singh,
3.Shri Ishwar Singh,
4.Shri Raghu All sons of Shri Sangaru
5.Smt. Jai Dai, w/o Shri Sohan Singh,
6.Ms. Maya Devi, d/o Shri Sohan Singh,
7.Smt. Savitri, wd/o of Shri Om Chand s/o of Shri Sohan Singh,
8.Ms. Anita, d/o Shri Om Chand.
9.Raj Kumar s/o Shri Om Chand.
10.Shyam Kumar s/o Shri Om Chand ,
11.Narbada
12.Ranjna, both daughters of Shri Om Chand All minors through their natural guardian mother Smt. Savitri Devi, wd/o of Shri Om Chand s/o Shri Sohan Singh, all residents of village Kunalag Gali, Suranga, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.
…..Petitioners.
Versus
1.Land Acquisition Collector, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P.,
2.Smt. Jai Dai, wd/o Shri Amar Singh
3.Shri Kamlesh Kumar,
4.Shri Narender Kumar,
5.Shri Rakesh Kumar, all sons of Shri Amar Singh,
6.Shri Bhag Singh,
7.Shri Ludar Singh, both sons of Shri Nika,
8.Shri Virender Kumar
9.Shri Surender Kumar sons of Shri Paras Ram,
10.Ms. Swantantra Devi,
11.Ms. Sirji Devi, both daughters of Shri Paras Ram,
12.Smt. Shanti Devi, wd/o of Shri Paras Ram,
13.Shri Makhan Lal, son of Shri Hira Lal,
14.Ms. Usha,
15.Ms. Meera,
16.Ms. Tripta, all daughters of Shri Amrit Lal,
17.Shri Sanjay,
18.Shri Vijay, both sons of Shri Amrit Lal,
19.Smt. Raj Kumari, wd/o Shri Amrit Lal, all residents of Village Sarkaghat,
20.Smt. Lajja Devi, wd/o late Shri Parian Singh,
21.Shri Anil Kumar, son of Shri Partap Singh, both residents of village Lukanu,
22.Smt. Premi Devi, wd/o late Shri Kanshi Ram,
23.Shri Sanjeev Kumar,
24.Shri Rajeev Kumar, both sons of Shri Kanshi Ram,
25.Ms. Tulsi Devi
26.Ms. Dompti Devi,
27.Ms. Damodari Devi,
28.Ms. Bhagan Devi, all daughters of Shri Bhadar, resident of Sarkaghat,
29.Shri Ranjeet Singh, son of Shri Lachhaman,
30.Ms. Janaku Devi,
31.Ms. Rattani Devi,
32.Ms. Masarvi Devi, all daughters of Shri Lachhaman, all residents of village Lukanu,
33.Smt. Devku Devi, wd/o Shri Lachhaman, r/o village Lukanu, all residents of Suranga, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P
…..Respondents.”
The impugned award passed by learned District Judge, Mandi, H.P., dated 20.07.2006, has been challenged under Section 54 of the Act before this Court by Collector, Land Acquisition, Mandi, H.P., (hereinafter referred to as the “Collector”). It is a settled position of law that an adjudicating authority which exercises quasi judicial powers and discharges quasi judicial functions cannot in the absence of any specific conferment of power, challenge an order passed by the Appellate Authority. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, Collector has no locus standi to challenge the award passed by learned Reference Court affirming his order and the appeal filed by the Collector is per se not maintainable, as the Collector was the quasi judicial authority, which passed Award No. 3, dated 20.04.1996, and the same was assailed by the petitioners before the learned Reference Court (District Judge) which affirmed the same.
In Mohtesham Mohd. Ismail vs. Special Director, Enforcement Directorate & another [(2007) 8 SCC 254], the question considered by the Supreme Court was whether a Special Director appointed under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 himself can prefer appeal under Section 54 of the said Act before the High Court, against an order passed by the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board. The Apex Court held as under:
"16. An adjudicating authority exercises a quasi judicial power and discharges judicial functions. When its order had been set aside by the Board, ordinarily in absence of any power to prefer an appeal, it could not do so. The reasonings of the High Court that he had general power, in our opinion, is fallacious. For the purpose of exercising the functions of the Central Government, the officer concerned must be specifically authorized. Only when an officer is so specifically authorized, he can act on behalf of the Central Government and not otherwise. Only because an officer has been appointed for the purpose of acting in terms of the provisions of the Act, the same would not by itself entitle an officer to discharge all or any of the functions of the Central Government. Even ordinarily a quasi- judicial authority cannot prefer an appeal being aggrieved by an dissatisfied with the judgment of the appellate authority whereby and whereunder undefined its judgment has been set aside. An adjudicating authority, although an officer of the Central Government, should act as an impartial tribunal. An adjudicating authority, therefore, in absence of any power conferred upon it in this behalf by the Central Government, could not prefer any appeal against the order passed by the Appellate Board."
Thus, applying the principles laid down in the decision referred to above, it has to be necessarily held that the Collector who passed the award, is not competent to maintain the present appeal. The Collector, being a quasi judicial authority, could not have a locus standi to challenge the order of the learned Reference Court, which affirmed his order. The Collector was an adjudicatory authority who exercised power of quasi judicial nature to determine the lis. He himself could not have claimed any litigative interest in the subject matter. The statutory Authority which functions as Adjudicating Authority and discharges quasi judicial powers, cannot claim for itself either a locus standi or a litigative interest to challenge the order of the Reference Court which considers its own order. The Collector having acted in his capacity as quasi judicial authority cannot be allowed to become a judge in his own cause and be permitted to challenge the award of learned Reference Court which had set-aside the order passed by it.
Hence, in view of my aforesaid discussion, the appeal, having been filed by the Collector, who happened to be authority whose order was affirmed in terms of the award under challenge, is not maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed on this point alone. As the preliminary point is held in favour of the respondent (petitioners), no further aspects are required to be gone into. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed being not maintainable.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand(s) disposed of.