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T. Nandakumar Singh, J.—These two misc. applications i.e. MC (WA) No. 87/2014 in WA No. 10/2011 and MC (WA) No. 88/2014 in WA No. 32/2011, challenging the maintainability of the writ appeals i.e. WA No. 10/2011 and WA No. 32/2011 filed against the common judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 26.04.2010 for allowing the revision petitions filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India (wrongly registered as writ petitions) i.e. WP(C) No. 51(SH) 2004 and WP(C) No. 52(SH)2004 challenging the common judgment and order dated 09.10.2003 passed by the learned District Judge, Shillong in Misc. Civil Appeal Nos. 3 (H) and 4 (H) of 1994 and the order dated 17.11.2003 passed by the learned District Judge, Shillong in C.R.P. No. 1 (H) of 2003 were jointly heard for disposal by a common judgment and order.
Heard Mr. N Mozika, learned counsel for the applicants, Mr. K Paul and S Thapa learned counsel for the respondents.
Paras 1 and 12 of the impugned common judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 26.04.2010 for allowing the said revision petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, read as follows:--
"Date of Judgment and Order: 26.04.2010
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
These revision petitions filed under Article 227 of the Constitution (wrongly registered as writ petitions) involving a common question of law and arising out of the common judgment and order dated 9-10-2003 passed by the learned District Judge, Shillong in Misc. Civil Appeal Nos. 3 and 4 (H) of 1994 and the order dated 17-11-2003 passed by him in C.R.P. No. 1 (H) of 2003, were heard together and are now being disposed of by this common judgment.
The result of the foregoing discussion is that these revisions succeed. The common judgment and order dated 9-10-2003 and dated 17-11-2003 passed by the learned District Judge, Shillong in Misc. Appeal Nos. 3 (H) and 4 (H) of 1994 and C.R.P. No. 1 (H) of 2003 are hereby set aside. The Collector shall now proceed with and complete the recovery proceedings in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible, more so, when the cases have been pending since 1994. The parties are, however, directed to bear their respective costs."
The fact of the case, shorn detail, sufficient for deciding these two misc. applications i.e. MC (WA) No. 87/2014 in WA No. 10/2011 and MC (WA) No. 88/2014 in WA No. 32/2011 is recapitulated. The petitioner No. 1 in both the revision petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India i.e. WP(C) No. 51(SH) 2004 and WP(C) No. 52(SH)2004, is the Chief Executive Officer Meghalaya Board of Wakf, which had come into existence in the year 1976 after the State of Meghalaya was bifurcated from the State of Assam in the year 1972, but in the interregnum, the management and affairs of the wakf properties in the State of Meghalaya continued to be controlled by the Assam Wakf Board. Haji Elahi Buksh Wakf Estate of Shillong is one of the registered wakf properties under the Meghalaya Board of Wakf. This Wakf Estate has several valuable landed properties and the properties in question in the revision petition i.e. WP(C) No. 51(SH) 2004 situated at G.S. Road, Police Bazar, Shillong covered by Patta No. 62 granted by the collector, East Khasi Hills, Shillong, stands in the name of Md. Suleman i.e. petitioner No. 2 of the revision petition i.e. WP(C) No. 52(SH)2004. The revision petitioner No. 2 Md. Suleman was initially appointed as Joint Mutawalli as per Wakf Deed dated 09.11.1936 by the Assam Board of Wakf on 04.03.1973 and 23.04.1975 with Haji Kammo Mia and after his death in the year 1980, the petitioner No. 2 became the sole Mutawalli vide order dated 07.02.1980 of the Meghalaya Board of Wakf. The respondent No. 1 in the revision petition i.e. WP(C) No. 51(SH) 2004 i.e. appellant in WA No. 10/2011 and the respondent No. 1 in revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India i.e. WP(C) No. 52(SH)2004 through their predecessor-in-interest had occupied the said landed properties of Haji Elahi Buksh Wakf Estate of Meghalaya and surreptitiously constructed multi-storied RCC building only on a strength of unregistered tenancy (Lease) Agreement dated 12.04.1972 and 12.04.1974 without any permission and sanction from the competent authorities and even contrary to the terms and conditions of the said agreement engaged in multifarious business by renting out the building to numbers of tenants thereby earning a huge amount of money and fraudulently depriving the sole Mutawalli and the Meghalaya Board of Wakf of any benefits that ought to have been used for the purpose of charity.
On getting the information of such unauthorized occupation, the Meghalaya Board of Wakf in its meeting held on 17.02.1982 at Mahendraganj decided to setup a Sub-Committee to enquire into Haji Elahi Buksh Wakf property located on holding No. 64 (old). Accordingly, an enquiry under Section 36A of the Wakf Act, 1954 was initiated and the Meghalaya Board of Wakf gave a statutory notice dated 23.12.1983 to the respondents of the said revision petition i.e. WP(C) No. 51(SH) 2004 and WP(C) No. 52(SH) 2004 to furnish all the relevant documents and papers to facilitate the enquiry. The Sub-Committee made a thorough spot enquiry and inspection into the matter. After, affording reasonable opportunities to the said respondents/present appellants of WA No. 10/2011 and WA No. 32/2011 and also after hearing the Sub-Committee finally submitted its report to the Meghalaya Board of Wakf. The Meghalaya Board of Wakf after considering the report, resolved to recover the said Wakf property in question, and requisitioned for its recovery by the Collector, East Khasi Hills, Shillong as provided under Section 36-B of the Wakf Act, 1954. On receipt of the requisitioned order from the Meghalaya Wakf Board, the Collector, East Khasi Hills, Shillong gave a statutory notice to the said respondents of the said revision petitions/present appellant of WA No. 10/2011 and WA No. 32/2011 to quit and vacate the Wakf and its premises within 30 (thirty) days vide order dated 18.07.1986. It is the further case of the Chief Executive Officer Meghalaya Board of Wakf, Shillong that the order of the Meghalaya Wakf Board operates as the decree of a Civil Court and the notice of eviction issued by the Collector under Article 36-B of the Wakf Act, 1954, is the power exercised by him (Collector) as the Executing Court under the 1983 Rules. The order of the Collector is appealable under Section 36-B (4) of the Wakf Act, 1954. The respondents in the said revision petitions (present appellants of WA No. 10/2011 and WA No. 32/2011) did not file the appeal against the said order of the Collector, East Khasi Hills, Shillong dated 17.07.1986, instead moved the High Court by way of writ petition being Civil Rule No. 176(SH)1989. The High Court vide order dated 27.09.1992 dismissed the writ petition i.e. Civil Rule No. 176(SH)1989 and directed the respondents of the revision petitions i.e. WP(C) No. 51(SH) 2004 and WP(C) No. 52(SH) 2004 to exhaust the statutory remedy as provided under Section 36-B (4) of the Wakf Act, 1954. Accordingly, the respondents of the said revision petitions i.e. WP(C) No. 51(SH) 2004 and WP(C) No. 52(SH) 2004 filed two appeals being Misc. Civil Appeal No. 3 (H) of 1994 and Misc. Civil Appeal No. 4 (H) of 1994 against the said order of the Collector dated 18.07.1986 before the learned District Judge, Shillong. The learned District Judge, Shillong vide common judgment and order dated 09.10.2003 allowed the appeals. Both the petitioners of revision petitions i.e. WP(C) No. 51(SH) 2004 and WP(C) No. 52(SH) 2004 being aggrieved, sought for review of the said common judgment and order of the learned District Judge, Shillong dated 09.10.2003 by filing C.R.P. No. 1 (H) of 2003 jointly, however, the learned District Judge, Shillong rejected the said C.R.P. No. 1 (H) of 2003 vide judgment and order dated 17.11.2003.
The findings of the learned District Judge, Shillong, as reproduced by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and order dated 26.04.2010, are that "the tenancy in question were created by the said Haji Kanumia in favour of the father of the private respondents; that their father was allowed to run the business in a temporary structures situated on the disputed properties, for which monthly rents were fixed, but the structures were devastated by fire; that the private respondents were evidently the tenants of the Haji Elahi Wakf Estate managed and run by the said Haji Kanumia and that the said Haji Kanumia subsequently issued the authorization letter allowing the private respondents to construct the RCC buildings thereon with their own costs and expenses. According to the learned District Judge, the notice dated 15.12.1980 issued by Md. Taiyab, the respondent No. 4 in the appeals, disclosed that notice had been served upon the private respondents in his capacity as the new mutawalli as the previous mutawalli had expired and that they had been paying rents to the said Md. Taiyab. On the basis of these findings, the learned District Judge concluded that the private respondents could not be termed illegal occupants of the Haji Elahi Wakf Estate. The learned District Judge disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Committee constituted by the Board accepting the case of the petitioners noticed earlier and questioned as to how the private respondents became unauthorized occupants of the disputed properties when they took the same rents from the said Md. Manumia, more so, when the RCC buildings were subsequently constructed by them in terms of the authorization letter issued by the former; the enquiry report was also silent as to in what manner, the private respondents had tried to usurp the disputed properties. The learned District Judge also disputed the view taken by the Enquiry Committee that the private respondents were barred by Section 36 of the 1954 Act from occupying the disputed properties which were located in an urban area for more than one year under lease. According to the learned District Judge, Section 36 did not say that wakf property located in urban area could not be occupied from more than one year even under a lease; which is mainly concerned with the duties of mutawalli. Though the learned District Judge found from the said report that there was some internal dispute between Md. Suleman and Md. Taiyab, he held that the private respondents could not be victimized for this so long as they regularly paid rents to the rightful owner or the authorized agent. The learned District Judge also recorded the findings that it is the duty of the Board to decide as to who is the authorized mutawalli; that the enquiry was held ex-parte and no copy of the report was furnished to the private respondents; that the file of the Collector disclosed that the parties were not given sufficient opportunity to place their grievances before issuing the notice under Section 36-B(2) of the Wakf Act, 1955 (sic) and that notices were issued without applying his mind. According to the District Judge, as the transfer by way of lease is not included in Section 36-A(1) of the 1954 Act, the tenancy agreements in question are not hit by Section 36-B(1), and the notices under Section 36-B of the 1954 Act are, therefore, without jurisdiction. The notices were accordingly set aside by the learned District Judge. The correctness of the views taken by the appellate court is called into question in these revision petitions".
The observations and findings of the learned Single in the impugned judgment and order dated 26.04.2010 are that "from the provisions extracted above, it is plainly shown that Section 36-A of the Amended in 1964 requires the previous sanction of the Board for transfer of any immovable property of a wakf by way of sale, gift, mortgage or exchange or a lease for a period not exceeding three years in the case of agricultural land, or for a period exceeding one year in the case of non-agricultural land or building; this is notwithstanding anything contained in the wakf deed. The question whether this provision is mandatory or not is answered by the subsequent provisions, namely, Section 36-B, which categorically states, among others, that the Board may send a requisition to the Collector having the territorial jurisdiction to obtain and deliver possession of the wakf property which has been transferred in contravention of Section 36-A . In Sharif-ud-din Vs. Abdul Gani Lone, AIR 1980 SC 303 : (1980) 1 SCC 403 : (1980) 1 SCR 1177 : (1980) 12 UJ 39 , it has been observed that whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow. It is obvious that in the 1984 amendment, upon which heavy reliance is placed by the learned District Judge, the term "lease" was nowhere found and the transaction for which the previous sanction of the Board is required are confined to "gift", "sale", "exchange" and "hypothecation". Interestingly, under Section 56 of the Wakf Act, 1955, it is provided that a lease or sub-lease for any period exceeding three years of any immovable wakf property shall be void while a lease or sub-lease for a period exceeding one year and not exceeding three years of such property shall also be void unless it is made with the approval of the Board. Learned Single Bench was of the opinion that this new Act is not applicable to this case. In the instant case, the cause of action arose sometime in the year 1985. Therefore, the question to be considered is whether the Wakf (Amendment), 1984 can be invoked? The answer must be in the negative. The statement of Objects and Reasons of the Wakf Act, 1995, as already noticed, confirms that the Wakf (Amendment) 1984 was never enforced except for the provisions indicated earlier, which has no relation with the controversy involved here. It must have escaped the attention of the learned District Judge that the 1984 amendment was never in force in so far as the provisions of Sections 36-A and 36-B of the 1954 Act as amended in 1964 was concerned and has in the process proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 1984 had been enforced all along. He, therefore, acted with material irregularity in invoking the provisions of an Act which are still-born or, at any rate, are never enforced. This amounts to improper exercise of jurisdiction. Once it is found that Sections 36-A and 36-B of the 1954 Act as amended in 1964 were then applicable, there is no difficulty in holding that the tenancy agreements in question executed in favour of the two private respondents without the previous sanction of the Board shall have to be declared invalid and could never have been acted upon. Therefore, the Board was right in sending requisitions to the Collector for recovery of the disputed wakf properties".
The respondents of the present appeals i.e. WA No. 10/2011 and WA No. 32/2011 being aggrieved by the said common judgment and order of the learned District Judge, Shillong dated 09.10.2003 passed in Misc. Civil Appeal Nos. 3 (H) and 4 (H) of 1994 and the order dated 17.11.2003 passed in C.R.P. No. 1 (H) of 2003 filed the revision petitions under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India i.e. WP(C) No. 51(SH)2004 and WP(C) No. 52(SH)2004 before the erstwhile Gauhati High Court. The learned Single Judge of the erstwhile Gauhati High Court had treated the said revision petitions as petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and accordingly, taken up as a revision petitions and disposed of by passing the said common judgment and order dated 26.04.2010. Paras 1 and 12 of which, had been quoted in the aforesaid paras. Under Chapter V Rule 1 of the Rules of the High Court of Meghalaya, 2013, an appeal shall lie before the Division Bench against the order of the Single Judge passed in the writ jurisdiction, not arisen out of matters pending or decided by Civil Court, Revenue Court or District Council Court. Chapter V of Rule 1 of the Rules of High Court of Meghalaya, 2013 reads as follows:--
"CHAPTER V RE-DIVISION BENCH AND FULL BENCH
Writ Appeal against order passed by Single Judge. - An appeal shall lie before the Division Bench against the order of the Single Judge passed in the writ jurisdiction, not arisen out of matters pending or decided by Civil Court, Revenue Court or District Council Court, within a period of thirty days."
The present appeals i.e. WA No. 10/2011 and WA No. 32/2011 are filed against the common judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 26.04.2010 passed in the said two revision petitions i.e. WP(C) No. 51(SH) 2004 and WP(C) No. 52(SH) 2004 filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The respondent No. 1 of the said two writ appeals filed the misc. applications i.e. MC (WA) No. 87/2014 in WA No. 10/2011 and MC (WA) No. 88/2014 in WA No. 32/2011, challenging the maintainability of the writ appeals. Paras 3,4,5 and 6 of the said two misc. applications i.e. Misc. (WA) No. 87/2014 in WA No. 10/2011 and MC (WA) No. 88/2014 in WA No. 32/2011 read as follows:--
"3. That the applicant states that though the cause title states that the said applications were filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, were in fact both in form as well as in substance, revision applications under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This is evident from the following facts:
(a) That the prayer made was for simply setting aside and quashing of the order dated 9.10.2003 passed by the learned District Judge and there was no prayer for issuance of any writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Further there was no averment with regard to violation of any fundamental right.
(b) Writ Petition under Art. 226 is an original proceeding while application under Art. 227 is in the nature of revisional/appellate proceeding. In the instant case, the order under challenge was the order dated 9.10.2003 passed by the learned District Judge, Shillong in Civil Appeals.
(c) Writ Petition under Art. 226 is a public law remedy and the main respondent should either be the Government, Government agencies or a State or Instrumentalities of the State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. In the instant application the opposite party No. 1/writ appellant (a private individual) was the sole respondent. Collector, East Khasi Hills was only a proforma respondent.
(d) The averments in the application and grounds of revision confined to the exercise of jurisdiction by the learned appellate court.
(e) Even the Gauhati High Court Rules deals with Writ Petition under Art. 226 and application under Art. 227 separately. Further at the relevant point of time, applications filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India were registered as Writ Petitions.
That the applicant further states that the learned Single Judge also exercised jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as paragraph 1 of the judgment and order dated 26.4.2010 categorically states as follows:
These revision petitions filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India (wrongly registered as writ petitions) involving a common question of law arising out of the common judgment and order dated 09.10.2003 ................. were heard together and are now being disposed of by this common judgment:"
The learned single Judge in Paragraph 12 of the judgment further observed as follows:
The result of the foregoing discussion is that these revisions succeed. ......................"
That as stated above, the applications in W.P. (C) No. 52 of 2004 and W.P. (C) No. 51 (H) 2014 were filed by the applicant Board under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and were argued within the parameters of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Further, the learned single Judge also exercised jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and not writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, and passed the judgment and order dated 26.04.2010 in the said W.P. (C) No. 51 of 2004 and W.P. (C) No. 52 (H) 2014. Aggrieved by the same the opposite party No. 1 has preferred the instant writ appeal under the Gauhati High Court Rules (Now Meghalaya High Court Rules). Rule 1 of Chapter V of the Meghalaya High Court Rules clearly provides as follows:
Writ Appeal against order passed by Single Judge. - An appeal shall lie before the Division Bench against the order of the Single Judge passed in the writ jurisdiction, not arisen out of matters pending or decided by Civil Court, Revenue Court or District Council Court, within a period of thirty days."
That the applicant states that in view of the above, the instant writ appeal has been preferred by the opposite party against the judgment and order dated 26.04.2010 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 51 of 2004 and W.P. (C) No. 52 (H) of 2014 in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and not writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further the order of the learned single Judge arises from the order dated 9.10.2003 passed by the learned District Judge, Shillong in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 3 (H) 1994 and Misc. Civil Appeal No. 4 (H) 1994. Hence the instant writ appeal is not maintainable."
The Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and Others, AIR 2003 SC 3044 : (2003) 4 CTC 48 : (2003) 6 SCALE 133 : (2003) 6 SCC 675 : (2003) 2 SCR 290 Supp : (2003) WritLR 722 : (2003) AIRSCW 3872 : (2003) 6 Supreme 390 held that the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction. This sense it is akin to appellate, revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Paras 22, 24 and 25 of the SCC in Surya Dev Rai''s case (Supra) read as follows:--
"Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227
"22. Article 227 of the Constitution confers on every High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction excepting any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the armed forces. Without prejudice to the generality of such power the High Court has been conferred with certain specific powers by clauses (2) and (3) of Article 227 with which we are not concerned here at. It is well-settled that the power of superintendence so conferred on the High Court is administrative as well as judicial, and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in the High Court is paving the path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. The power under Article 227 is wider than the one conferred on the High Court by Article 226 in the sense that the power of superintendence is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction. Else the parameters invoking the exercise of power are almost similar.
Difference between a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227
The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai: 1986 Supp SCC 401. Proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction.
Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasions wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labeling their petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and technicality of the subject, we venture to state the broad general difference between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction and in this sense it is akin to appellate, revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by the inferior court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, may be by way of guiding the inferior court or tribunal as to the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior court or tribunal should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu as well."
The Apex Court in Sushilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar and Ors. v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha and Ors: 1993 Supp (1) SCC 11 observed that the appeal before Division Bench lies against order of Single Judge in a petition under Article 226, however, test is whether or not the facts justify filing of petition either under Article 226 or under Article 227 but it is filed under both the Articles, court should treat the petition as being made under Article 226 so as not to deprive the party of the right of appeal to Division Bench under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Bombay High Court when substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. The Apex Court in Sushilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar''s case (Supra) observed:
"Thus, the determining factor is the real nature of the principal order passed by the single Judge which is appealed against and neither the mentioning in the cause title of the application of both the Articles nor the granting of ancillary orders thereupon made by learned single Judge would be relevant. Thus, in each case, the Division Bench may consider the substance of the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the single Judge has mainly or principally exercised in the matter his jurisdiction under Article 226 or under Article 227. In the event in his judgment the learned single Judge himself had mentioned the particular Article of the Constitution under which he was passing his judgment, in an appeal under Clause 15 against such a judgment it may not be necessary for the Appellate Bench to elaborately examine the question of its maintainability. When without mentioning the particular Article the learned single Judge decided on merits the application, in order to decide the question of maintainability of an appeal, against such a judgment, the Division Bench might examine the relief granted by the learned single Judge. When more than one relief are granted by the learned single Judge, for maintainability of an appeal, the determination would be the main and not the ancillary relief. When a combined application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is summarily dismissed without reasons, the Appeal Court may consider whether the facts alleged warranted filing of the application under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution. (Second part of paragraph 1)."
The Apex Court in Sushilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar''s case (Supra) had noted the decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Sushilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar and Ors v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha and Ors, and also referred the decision of the Apex Court in Umaji Keshao Meshram and Others Vs. Radhikabai and Another, AIR 1986 SC 1272 : (1986) 1 SCALE 681 : (1986) 1 SCC 401 Supp : (1986) SCC 401 Supp : (1986) 1 SCR 731 : (1986) 2 UJ 319 and judgment of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 520 of 1989 Ratnagiri District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Watve: 1993 Supp (1) SCC 9.
No doubt in each case, the Division Bench may consider the substance of the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the learned Single Judge has mainly or principally exercised in the matter his jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 227. However, in the event in his judgment, the learned Single Judge himself had mentioned the particular article of the Constitution under which he was passing his judgment, in an appeal under Clause 15 against such a judgment it may not be necessary for the appellate bench to elaborately examine the question of its maintainability. In the present case, the learned Single Judge clearly mentioned in his common judgment and order dated 26.04.2010 against which the present two writ appeals i.e. WA No. 10/2011 and WA No. 32/2011 had been filed the particular article of the Constitution of India under which he passed his judgment i.e. the impugned common judgment and order dated 26.04.2010. Over and above, the learned Single Judge in a clear term mentioned in his judgment and order dated 26.04.2010 that he passed the judgment and order in exercise of his supervisory jurisdiction akin to revisional jurisdiction. But in a case, learned Single Judge without mentioning the particular article under which he passed his judgment, the Division Bench may decide the question of maintainability of the appeal against such judgment of the learned Single Judge by examining as to whether the relief had been granted by exercising its original jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Further, when a combined application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is summarily dismissed without reasons, the appeal court may consider as to whether the facts alleged warranted filing of the application under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution.
The Apex Court in Ashok K. Jha and Others Vs. Garden Silk Mills and Another, (2009) 123 FLR 1094 : (2009) 11 JT 630 : (2009) 12 SCALE 160 : (2009) 10 SCC 584 : (2010) 1 SCC(L&S) 78 : (2009) 13 SCR 886 : (2009) 9 UJ 4182 observed that if the judgment under appeal i.e. writ appeal is found to have been passed by the learned Single Judge by mainly and principally invoking the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, letters patent appeal i.e. intra-court appeal from such judgment would not be maintainable. Para 36 of the SCC Ashok K. Jha''s case (Supra) read as follows:--
"36. If the judgment under appeal falls squarely within four corners of Article 227, it goes without saying that intra-court appeal from such judgment would not be maintainable. On the other hand, if the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court for issuance of certain writ under Article 226, although Article 227 is also mentioned, and principally the judgment appealed against falls under Article 226, the appeal would be maintainable. What is important to be ascertained is the true nature of order passed by the Single Judge and not what provision he mentions while exercising such powers."
The Gauhati High Court (Division Bench) in Nirmala Debnath and Anr v. New India Assurance Company Ltd. and Ors: (2007) 1 GLR 741 held that writ appeal against the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. Para 19 of the GLR in Nirmala Debnath''s case (Supra) read as follows:--
"19. It is only the light of verdict of Supreme Court in Umaji Keshav Meshram (supra) subsequently followed in Lokmat (P.) Newspaper Ltd. (supra), the writ appeal could be entertained by the Division Bench if learned Single Judge has exercised its jurisdiction under article 226 but if the jurisdiction has been exercised under article 227, then the writ appeal would not be maintainable, however, where facts justify filing of petition both under article 226 and article 227 and the petition so filed if dismissed by learned Single Judge on merits, then petition should be treated to have been made under article 226 of the Constitution so as not to deprive the writ petitioner of his valuable right to prefer appeal/writ appeal before the Division Bench. To declare with certainty as to whether in substance the petition was under article 226 or under article 227 the relevant averments in writ petition, pleadings, facts and records as well as the prayers have to look into. Since, as revealed in the present writ appeal the impugned order dated 18.12.2000 was passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 227 keeping in view the averments, pleadings and prayers of the W.P. 121 of 2000 without making any comments on the merits of the impugned order or maintainability of W.P. (C) 121 of 2000 at this stage presently this court (Division Bench) for lack of power or lack of jurisdiction is unable to entertain the writ appeal in question."
We anxiously considered the pleadings and facts of the revision petitions and also the relief sought for therein i.e. WP(C) No. 51(SH)2004 and WP(C) No. 52(SH)2004 filed against the common judgment and order dated 09.10.2003 passed by the learned District Judge, Shillong in Civil Misc. Appeal Nos. 3 (H) and 4 (H) of 2004 and also the clear findings of the learned Single Judge in the impugned common judgment and order dated 26.04.2010 that he passed the impugned common judgment and order dated 26.04.2010 in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction akin to revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; and we are of the considered view that the impugned common judgment and order dated 26.04.2010 was passed by the learned Single Judge by invoking his supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, WA No. 10/2011 and WA No. 32/2011 are not maintainable. Hence, MC (WA) No. 87/2014 in WA No. 10/2011 and MC (WA) No. 88/2014 in WA No. 32/2011 are allowed and WA No. 10/2011 and WA No. 32/2011 are hereby dismissed.