The Chief Engineer/Distribution, Vellore Region, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board vs The Presiding Officer, Labour Court and R. Amirthakatesan

Markandey Katju, C.J.—This writ appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge dated 30.09.2004.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order and find no infirmity in the same.

The respondent-workman''s service had been terminated by the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. He raised an industrial dispute which was

referred to the Labour Court, Vellore and the Labour Court by its award dated 08.02.1995 set aside the order of dismissal and directed

reinstatement with backwages. Admittedly, that award has become final. Thereafter, the workman filed an application u/s 33C(2) of the Industrial

Disputes Act and along with that application he also filed details of the calculation of backwages which is at page 35 of the writ appeal paper

book.

Mr. V. Radhakrishnan, learned counsel for the appellant has filed a different statement of details of backwages, but admittedly that statement of

the appellant was not filed before the Labour Court.

In writ jurisdiction we cannot see any material which was not placed before the Labour Court. Ordinarily fresh evidence is not allowed in a writ

petition when any award or order of the inferior court or tribunal is challenged. It is only the material which was already on record before the

inferior court or tribunal which can be looked into by this Court in writ jurisdiction. Hence, we are not inclined to look into the statement of details

of backwages sought to be produced before us by the learned counsel for the appellant since that statement had not been produced before the

Labour Court. We are fortified in this view by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nicks (India) Tools Vs. Ram Surat and Another, vide para

The Supreme Court has observed therein as follows:-

On the contrary, it is for the first time before this writ court the appellant tried to produce additional evidence which was rightly not considered by

the High Court because the same was not brought on record in a manner known to law.

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was not given sufficient time by the Labour Court. However, it appears that the

appellant had not asked for any further time before the Labour Court. Moreover, the application u/s 33C(2) was filed by the workman on

14.11.1995, and the counter affidavit was filed on 25.01.1996 and the order was passed on 20.02.1996. Thus, proceedings were pending before

the Labour Court for more than three months, and we cannot agree that the appellant was not given sufficient time by the Labour Court.

It is well settled that proceedings before the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal are meant to be expeditious proceedings. Three months time is

surely sufficient for the appellant to produce whatever materials he wanted to produce, particularly when the material was in his own possession.

Now a days people are complaining that the judiciary is taking a long time to decide a case, but when a judge decides the case quickly then again

he is blamed for doing so. We cannot approve of this kind of practice. Surely, three months time was long enough time for the appellant to have

produced any material which he wanted to produce before the Labour Court. The writ appeal is, therefore, dismissed. However, we make it clear

that any payment already made by the appellant will be adjusted towards the payment to be made under the order of the Labour Court u/s 33C(2)

of the Industrial Disputes Act. Consequently, WAMP No. 1503 of 2005 is also dismissed.