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Judgment
Raju, J.—When the writ miscellaneous petitions came up before this Court for hearing, it was considered having regard to the nature of the
relief sought for and the stage of the proceedings, that the main writ petitions themselves can be taken up for final hearing. Hence, the writ petitions
themselves have been taken up for hearing. Since similar and identical issues are involved in all these writ petitions, they are dealt with together.
The petitioner in all these writ petitions is the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board for whose benefit the lands in question covered by
the impugned proceedings came to be acquired by the State Government under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. We are
concerned with Award No. 4 of 1987 said to have been passed on 20.1.1988 by the first respondent. Not satisfied with the quantum of
compensation awarded, the respective owners and persons interested who are arrayed as respondents in addition to the authorities of the State
Government, have sought for reference for enhanced compensation to the competent civil court. The reference u/s 18 appears to have been made
to the second respondent-Sub-Court. Tirunelveli and entertained as L.A.O.P. Nos. 43, 46 and 47 of 1988 which are the subject matter of W.P.
Nos. 1078, 1079 and 1079 of 1994 respectively. The second respondent-court by its judgment and decree dated 19.1.1989 appears to have
enhanced the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer by eighteen times for the purpose of deciding the issues raised in these writ
petitions, the details of the actual quantum awarded either by the Land Acquisition Officer or by the Sub-Court have no relevance and, therefore,
are not referred to. There is no controversy over the fact that subsequent to the judgment and decree of the second respondent-Court, the State
has filed appeals in A.S. Nos. 657 to 659 of 1989 and these appeals are said to be pending on the file of this Court as on date.
While matters stood thus, these writ petitions mentioned above have been filed by the petitioner, seeking for writs of certiorari to call for and
quash the judgments and decrees of the second respondent-Sub-Court. Tirunelveli in L.A.O.P. Nos. 46 to 48 of 1988 rendered on 19.1.1989.
The very contention as also the right claimed to challenge the judgments of the second respondentcivil court is based on the provisions contained in
the Land Acquisition (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989, Tamil Nadu Act 14of 1990 published in the Tamil Nadu Government Extraordinary
dated 9.5.1990, having regard to Section 1(2) of the said amendment Act, according to which the Act came into force at once namely, 9.5.1990,
the date of publication of the Amendment Act in the Gazette. Section 2(3) of the said Amendment Act inserted Clause (d) to Section 20 in the
following terms:
(d) if the acquisition is not made for the Government, the person or authority for whom it is made.
Section 3 of the Amendment Act is as follows:
Section 20 of the Principal Act, as amended by Section 2, shall apply also to all proceedings pending before any court, on the date of the
commencement of this Act.
A normal and cursory reading of the above amendments introduced by the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act would taken together with the provisions
of Section 20 of the principal Act would show that on a reference being made by the Collector to the court of the reference sought for u/s 18 of
the Act, the court concerned shall thereupon cause a notice, specifying the day on which the court will proceed to determine the objection and
directing their appearance before the court on such date on the various categories of persons illustrated in Clauses (a) to (d). Consequently, by
virtue of the insertion of Clause (d) to Section 20, the notice contemplated u/s 20 of the Act is obliged to be served, if the acquisition is not made
for the Government, also on the person or authority for whom it is made.
Based on the above amended provisions and relying upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Sri Kanyaka Parameswari
Devasthanam and Charities Vs. His Holiness Sri La Sri Ambalavana Pandara Sannadhi Avl. Adheena Kartha Thiruvaduthurai Adheenam and
Another, , the petitioner challenge the judgments and decrees of the second respondent-court on the ground that the failure to serve notice if the
proceedings in L.A.O.P. Nos. 46 to 48 of 1988 upon the writ petitioner vitiates the judgment passed by the second respondent-Court, and
therefore, they are liable to be set aside. It is also contended that the mere intervention of the petitioner in the appeals pending before this Court
would not effectively help to make independent arguments by the petitioner to assail the correctness of the judgment of the second respondent-
Court, since the petitioner was not a party before the court below.
Mr.R. Swaminathan, learned Additional Government Pleader (Civil), while reiterating the above stand taken for the petitioner, invited my
attention to some of the decisions of this Court as well as that of the Supreme Court and the same requires to be referred to before rendering a
decision on the plan raised on behalf of the petitioner. In substance, the stand taken for the petitioner by the learned Additional Government
Pleader based on the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act as also the judgments relied upon by the learned Additional Government Pleader is that the
amended provisions of Section 20 of the main Act with Clauses (d) inserted to Section 20 was ordained to apply also to all proceedings pending
before any court on the date of the commencement of the amendment Act, and that being an amendment pertaining to the procedure, the
amendment must be construed so as to have a retrospective operation to all proceedings pending before any Court. Pursuing the said line of
submission, it is contended by the learned Additional Government Pleader that the pendency of the appeals on the file of this Court in A.S. Nos.
657 to 659 of 1989 would render the amended provisions applicable to the case on hand and as a consequence whereof the judgment of the
second respondent-court itself would stand vitiated. In other words, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the pendency of the first
appeals in this Court is sufficient to attract the amended provisions which indisputably came into force with effect from 9.5.1990 from its inception
to the subject matter in issue so as to vitiate even the judgment of the second respondent-Court passed prior to 9.5.1990, and thereby enable the
petitioners to challenge them indepedently.
Per contra, Mr. Peppin Fernando learned Counsel for respondents-claimants in W.P. Nos. 10789 and 10790 of 1994 and Mr. S.D. Balaji,
learned Counsel for respondents-claimants in W.P. No. 10788 of 1994 contended that notwithstanding the provisions contained in Section 3 of
the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1990 the mere insertion of Clause (d) to Section 20 with effect from 9.5.1990 and that too long after the decision under
challenge cannot, in any manner, undermine the judgments rendered prior to the said date by the second respondent-Sub-Court and that if at all
the remedy of the petitioner-Board is only to get themselves impleaded in the pending first appeals on the file of this Court and to vindicate their
rights in accordance with law.
Whatever may be the earlier decision on the subject with of a Full Bench of this Court the decision reported in Neyveli Lignite Corporation
Limited v. P.R. Rangaswamy AIR 1990 Mad. 160, the position become well settled in law, that the beneficiaries for whose benefit the lands were
acquired by the Government are not entitled to be treated as parties to the Land Acquisition Proceedings and further appeals arising out of the
same excepting to the limited right provided u/s 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. It was also held by the learned Judges of the Full Bench therein
that the beneficiaries on whose behalf the lands were acquired are not entitled to be added as parties in the land acquisition compensation
proceedings and, therefore, there was no question of issuing notice to them and that their right to challenge the awards in any manner is also
curtailed.
In the decision reported in Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited v. P.R. Govindarajulu and 2 Ors. 1993 W.L.R. 678, AR. Lakshmanan, J. had
an occasion to deal with the scope of the amendment including the effect of the. transitional provision provided in the form of Section 3 of the Tamil
Nadu Amendment Act. That was a case wherein on the date when the Amendment Act came into force, the proceedings for enhanced
compensation pursuant to the reference made u/s 18 were pending before the concerned civil court, but the court concerned though had disposed
of the matters by passing judgments on 13.1.1992, has not chosen to take into account the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act and
omitted thereby to issue notices to the beneficiaries of the acquisition. In the light of the above, and having regard to the impact of Section 3 of the
Amending Act, the learned Judge held that the passing of the judgment on the claim for enchancement of the compensation by the court to which
the matter has been referred without giving notice to the persons in terms of the amended Clause (d) of Section 20 vitiates the judgments
themselves and consequently renders the judgments of the civil court liable to be set aside. The learned Judge, as a matter of fact, set aside the
judgments.
Reference was made to a passage in paragragh 295 of the book entitled The Construction of Statutes by Crawford to justify the claim that
where the amendments may be given retrospective effect. To support the said plea, the following decisions were also referred to:
Anant Gopal Sheorey Vs. The State of Bombay, , Lachmeshwar Prasad v. Keshwar Lal (1941) 5 3 L.W. 373, AIR 1935 49 (Privy Council) .
Mukerjee, Official Receiver v. Musammat Ramratan Kurer and Ors. 43 L.W. 336, Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami Vs. Setra
Veeravva and Others, , Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory Vs. Subbash Chandra Yograj Sinha, , N.T. Patel and Company Vs.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, , Lakkaju Satyanarayana Vs. Majati Venkatarattamma and Another, .
Relying on the above decisions, it has been contended for the petitioners that the amended law is bound to be applied by the court to the cases
pending before it; notwithstanding the fact that when the claim or cause arose or instituted such amendment of the law was not available or in force.
Strong reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Lakkaju Satyanarayana
Vs. Majati Venkatarattamma and Another, . That was a case wherein the Division Bench was dealing with a writ of certiorari to quash the order of
the Subordinate Judge of Tenali in C.M.A. No. 6 of 1950 setting aside the order of the Rent Controller and directing the writ petitioner to be
evicted under the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The ground on which eviction was ordered was stated to be
default in payment of rent within the prescribed time. The court therein considered the so-called default to be technical but at the same time, such
default justified the order of eviction. Notwithstanding the said position, the writ petitioner therein appears to have placed reliance on the clause
introduced newly by the then Madras Act VIII of 1951 and Section 9 of the Amending Act had the effect of adding a proviso to Section 7(2) of
the main Act. The effect of the proviso introduced was that if the Controller is satisfied that the tenant''s default to pay or tender rent was not wilful,
he may, before making an order of eviction give the tenants a reasonable time, not exceeding 15 days, to pay or tender the rent due to the landlord
upto the date of such payment or tender. The learned Judges of the Division Bench felt that if the amended provision, namely the proviso
introduced to Section 7(2) of the main Act applied to the case of the writ petitioner before them, the petitioner would be entitled to have the
application for eviction dismissed. Reliance was placed in this regard to Section 20 of the Amendment Act VIII of 1951. It was stated therein that
any application made, appeals preferred or other proceedings instituted under the said Act and pending at the commencement of the Act shall be
disposed of ""as if this Amendment Act had been in force at the time when such application, appeal or proceedings was made, referred or
instituted. ""While dealing with the effect of such a provision in the context of a challenge made to the order of eviction passed by the Appellate
Authority, in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the absence of any further avenues of remedy under the Act as it stood
then, the learned Judges of the Division Bench held as hereunder:
We are clear, however, that Section 20 applies to this case, because we agree with Mr. Ramachandra Rao that the appeal preferred to the
Subordinate Judge must be deemed to be pending so long as the application to quash the order is pending in this Court. In Halsbury''s Laws of
England Vol. 9 page 838 (Section 1420), the nature of a writ of certiorari to thus set out:
The writ of certiorari issues out of a superior Court and is directed to the Judge, or other officer of an inferior Court of record. It requires that the
record of the proceedings in some cause or matter depending before such inferior Court shall be transmitted into the superior Court to be there
dealt with, in order to insure that the applicant for the writ may have the more sure and speedy justice.
See also Short and Mellor''s Crown Practice (2nd Edn.), page 14. The rule nisi in this case in terms calls upon the Subordinate Judge of Tenali to
send for the use of this Court all the records with all things touching the same as fully and perfectly as they have been made by the learned Judge. It
is obvious that the decision in the appeal is again set at large, as at lost its finality the moment this Court issued the rule nisi. This Court can on this
application for certiorari set aside by quashing the order in the appeal. Surely, in such circumstances, it must be said that the appeal is pending. In
In re. Clagette''s Estate Fordham v. Clegett (I), Jeseal M.R., when discussing the question when an insolvency can be treated as pending observed
thus:
What is the meaning of the word ""pending""? In my opinion, it includes every insolvency in which any proceeding can by any possibility be taken.
That I think is the meaning of this word ''pending'' A cause is said to be pending in a Court of Justice where any proceeding can be taken in it. That
is the test. If you can take any proceeding it is pending. ""Pending"" does not mean that it has been tried, it may have been tried years ago. In our
opinion, therefore Section 20of Madras Act VIII of 1951 applies to this case.
I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side. I am of the view there can be no serious
controversy over the legal position that a court exercising appellate jurisdiction is bound to consider any change in the law affecting the question
involved in the appeal and which was effected subsequent to the decision appealed against. The same was also reiterated on many an occasion by
the Apex Court too, one such instance is the case reported in Mithilesh Kumar and Another Vs. Prem Behari Khare, . That was a case wherein
the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 came up for consideration as to its import on past transactions. The Benami Transactions
(Prohibition) Act though contained no specific provision making its operation retrospective, the Act being a piece of prohibitory legislation,
prohibiting benami transactions subject to certain stated exceptions rendering such transactions punishable also prohibiting the right to defences
against the recovery of benami transactions as defined under the Act, the Apex Court construed the legislation to be a declaratory legislation and
expressed the view that all properties held benami at the moment of the Act coming into force may be affected irrespective of their beginning,
duration and origin and that will be so even if the legislation is not retrospective but only retroactive. But, so far as the case on hand is concerned, it
requires to be seen whether even the said principles entitle the petitioner in these writ petitions to have the awards quashed in these proceedings
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In my view, neither the principles referred to supra, nor the ratio of the decision laid down in
Lakkaju Satyanarayana Vs. Majati Venkatarattamma and Another, will be of any assistance to the petitioner to have those writ petitions allowed,
which are filed seeking to quash the judgments of the second respondent-civil court.
As noticed earlier, the awards were passed in these cases on 20.1.1988 and the judgments on reference for enhanced compensation came to
be rendered by the second respondent-Court on 19.1.1989. The amendments came into force only on 9.5.1990 and the provisions of Section 3
of the Amendment Act rendered the amendment to Section 20 of the main Act applicable to proceedings pending. That being the position, the only
course of applying the amended provisions to the case on hand at this stage of the proceedings is by this Court on the appellate side in the pending
appeals A.S. Nos. 657 to 659 of 1989. The parties to the appeal before the High Court itself, on being brought to their notice of the amended
provisions, has to take notion in this regard. Without waiting for the formalities, the petitioner also shall be at liberty to take out applications to
implead them as parties respondents in A.S. Nos. 657 to 659 of 1989, and once such application are made, the question of impleading them
becomes a very formal one and not only inevitable but a must in view of the binding force and effect of Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Amendment
Act. Whatever may the position in this regard, the pendency of the appeal proceedings cannot be a ground to indepedently file a writ petition in this
Court to challenge the validity of the judgment passed by the second respondent-Court which not only had decided the matter and rendered the
judgment long prior to the coming into force of the Amendment Act on 9.5.1990, but which court was also not obliged to given any notice as
visualised in Clause (d) of Section 20 of the Act and the court cannot be attributed with any failure to issue a notice which it was otherwise bound,
to challenge the judgment in question. As a matter of fact, the Division Bench while dealing with the decision reported in Lakkaju Satyanarayana
Vs. Majati Venkatarattamma and Another, has applied the amended provisions of law in proceedings challenging the order of the authority below
since the Court considered and held that in the absence of any further avenue of remedies under the Act, the filing of the writ petition challenging
the order of eviction kept the proceedings pending. The pending of the appeals cannot be availed of in these independent writ petitions to challenge
the judgment of the court invoking Section 3 of the amendment Act. So far as the case on hand is concerned, the pendency of the appeals alone
can be considered to keep the subject matter a pending proceedings and it is only that court which is seized in of the appeals that could apply the
amended provisions of law is such pending proceedings and not the writ court before whom independent writ petitions have been filed by a third
party to the proceedings before the second respondent.
The fact the petitioner may be put to inconvenience in vindicating his rights since he was not a party before the Land Acquisition Officer of the
civil court is no ground to countenance the plea made in these writ petitions. Such grounds may be relevant and vital for consideration by the
appellate court in the pending appeals the need for either calling for a further finding from the court below with liberty to adduce evidence by the
petitioner as well as by other parties or for setting aside the judgments and decrees of the civil court and remitting the matter for fresh
consideration. But, at the same time, those consideration cannot weigh with this Court to entertain these writ petitions at the instance of the
petitioners to set aside the judgment rendered, for the reasons sought to be urged in support of the challenge.
For all the reasons stated above, I am of the view that these writ petitions have to fail and, accordingly, they shall stand dismissed. As noticed
earlier, the dismissal of these writ petitions shall not preclude the petitioner from moving the Appellate side for this Court to bring them as parties
respondents on regard to the appeals and urge the ground based on the amended provisions as a ground of attack against the very judgments of
the second respondent-Court which is the subject matter of challenge in the appeals. The observations if any, made in this Order for the purposes
of disposing of these writ petitions shall not be construed as any expression of opinion on the right of the petitioner to challenge the judgments
rendered by the second respondent on the ground of the amended provisions and the entitlement of the petitioner to be brought on regard and
challenge the said judgments for all or any of the grounds as are permissible in law. No costs.