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Judgment
D. Murugesan, J.—The appellant company is a Government of India undertaking functioning under the administrative control of Department
of Atomic Energy and is in the process of separating strategic minerals like Zircon, Monazite, Ilmenite, Rutile, Garnet etc., For expansion of its
mining activities in Manavalakurichi area, the appellant company required a large extent of land and accordingly, lands admeasuring about 40.072
HA were acquired by the Government of Tamil Nadu and possession of the land was also handed over to the appellant company during the year
1990-1991. The land owners were paid adequate compensation. The land owners/displaced persons approached this Court by way of writ
petitions seeking for a direction to the appellant company to fulfil the promises by providing suitable employment to one member of each family as
they were dispossessed of their lands by the acquisition proceedings. The writ petitions were laid only on the ground that in the award enquiry, the
Manager of the appellant Company had promised before the Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, that one member from each family of the
individuals, whose lands were acquired, would be given employment in the appellant company. In view of such promise, the appellant Company is
estopped from denying such benefit.
By a common order dated 09.12.2002, the writ petitions were allowed with a direction to provide appointment to one member of each of the
displaced families. It was also directed that till such time, such appointments are made, the appellant company should not make any appointment to
class 3 and 4 posts or other lower class or menial posts. Based upon the above direction, other consequential directions were also issued.
Mr. Sanjay Mohan, learned Counsel for the appellants would contend that the appellant company, being a public sector undertaking directly
controlled by the Department of Atomic Energy, cannot make any appointments contrary to the rules. No scheme was framed for employment of
the family members, whose lands were acquired. He would submit that the land owners have been paid the compensation for the lands and in such
event, they cannot compel the appellant company to provide employment. He would also submit that the decision to provide employment shall be
taken at the level of Board, and the promise given by Manager of the Company during the award enquiry, is not binding on the Company.
Consequently, estoppel could be pleaded against the Company.
On the other hand, Mr. Parthasarathy, learned Counsel for the contesting respondents/writ petitioners would contend that inasmuch as the
Government of Tamil Nadu issued G.O.Ms. No. 324 Revenue Department dated 18.03.1986 directing all public sector undertakings to recruit
without reference to the employment exchange at least one member of each family, who were displaced on account of acquisition of lands for any
project and in view of the said G.O., the writ petitioners are entitled to succeed. He would also submit that having assured employment to the
members of the displaced families at the time of the award enquiry, the appellant company is estopped from going back on the promise.
Insofar as the first contention as to the G.O. is concerned, it is to be seen that the said G.O. is only an administrative instruction and it cannot be
held to be mandatory compelling the appellant to provide employment at least to one member of each family, whose lands were acquired. The
appellant company is admittedly a public sector undertaking, directly coming under the administrative control of the Department of Atomic Energy
and the recruitment shall be made only in accordance with the rules. Our attention was not drawn by the land owners that as per the rules, the
displaced persons/erstwhile land owners are entitled to seek for employment. Of course, the provision for such employment can be made by the
undertaking itself by framing schemes and in such event, the displaced persons/land owners could claim employment on the basis of the scheme. In
the absence of any such scheme, a direction to the appellant company to provide employment to the displaced persons/erstwhile land owners
would amount to a direction contrary to the very regulations or rules governing the appointments.
The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents had contended that under similar circumstances, the Apex Court in the judgment reported in
Calcutta Port Trust v. Deba Prosad Bag 1994 Supp.(2) SCC 102 has relied similar Government Order and had directed the employment. In that
case, a similar Government Order directing employment of displaced persons was considered by the Port Trust for whose benefit the lands were
acquired and it was resolved to offer employment considering the fact that those persons are uprooted and were never paid any compensation.
Such resolution was passed as a rehabilitation measure. On the basis of the resolution, certain eligible candidates were also considered and there
was a dispute as to the appointment. In that context, the Apex Court had held that the uprooted persons are entitled to employment. However, on
the facts of this case, as already stated, the land owners/displaced persons were paid compensation and the Board has not resolved to provide
employment to the familymembers of the land owners/displaced persons. Hence, on facts then judgment of the Apex Court is distinguishable.
In The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and The Chief Engineer, North Chennai Thermal Power Project Vs. Arulnathan and Others, , a
Division Bench of this Court held that the displaced persons or the land owners do not have any fundamental right to be provided with employment
solely on the ground that their lands have been acquired. This judgment was followed by a subsequent Division Bench in W.A. Nos. 2113 to 2180
of 2001 etc., dated 19.08.2006.
For the above said reasons and particularly in the absence of any scheme and except the G.O. which is in the nature of administrative
instruction, this Court would not be justified in issuing directions compelling the appellant company to provide employment to one member of each
family, displaced by acquisition.
Coming to the issue relating to estoppel, the doctrine of ""promissory estoppel"" has developed as a principle of reasonableness and fairness and
is used against statutory bodies and Government authorities on whose representations or promises, parties or citizens act and some detrimental
consequences ensure because of refusal of authorities to fulfil their promises or honour their commitments. In Jit Ram Shiv Kumar and Others Vs.
State of Haryana and Others, the Apex Court has held as follows:
On a consideration of the decisions of this Court, it is clear that there can be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power of the
State. So also the doctrine cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. The Government
would not be bound by the act of its officers and agents who act beyond the scope of their authority and a person dealing with the agent of the
Government must be held to have notice of the limitations of his authority. The Court can enforce compliance by a public authority of the obligation
laid on him if he arbitrarily or on his mere whim ignores the promises made by him on behalf of the Government. It would be open to the authority
to plead and prove that there were special considerations which necessitated his not being able to comply with his obligations in public interest.
In Hira Tikkoo Vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh and Others, the Apex Court has held in para 25 as follows:
Surely, the doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied against public authorities when their mistaken advice or representation is found to be in breach
of a statute and therefore, against general public interest. The question, however, is whether the parties or individuals, who had suffered because of
the mistake and negligence on the part of the statutory public authorities, would have any remedy of redressal for the loss they have suffered. The
rules of fairness"" by which every public authority is bound, require them to compensate loss occasioned to private parties or citizens who were
misled in acting on such mistaken or negligent advice of the public authority. There are no allegations and material in these cases to come to a
conclusion that the action of the authorities was mala fide. It may be held to be careless or negligent. In some of the English cases, the view taken is
that the public authorities cannot be absolved of their liability to provide adequate monetary compensation to the parties who are adversely
affected by their erroneous decisions and actions. But in these cases, any directions to the public authorities to pay monetary compensation or
damages would also indirectly harm general public interest. The public authorities are entrusted with public fund raised from public money. The
funds are in trust with them for utilisation in public interest and strictly for the purposes of the statute under which they are created with specific
statutory duties imposed on them. In such a situation when a party or citizen has relied, to his detriment, on an erroneous representation made by
public authorities and suffered loss and where the doctrine of ""estoppel"" will not be invoked to his aid, directing administrative redressal would be
more appropriate remedy than payment of monetary compensation for the loss caused by non-delivery of the possession of the plots and
consequent delay caused in setting up industries by the allottees.
Recently in the judgment reported in Kuldeep Singh v. Government of NCT Delhi 2006 AIR SCW 3627 the Apex Court has once again
reiterated the same law.
From the above law declared by the Apex Court, it is seen that doctrine of ""promissory estoppel"" cannot override the public interest in the
event the act of the Government or the appellant in this case that the action was fair and reasonable. In this case, as the appellant cannot bye-pass
the procedure of selection, more particularly in the absence of any scheme, a mere promise made by the General Manager of the Company,
cannot be considered to be a promissory estoppel.
The contention of the respondents is that as the Manager has promised for offering employment to one member of each family of displaced
person during the award enquiry, the appellant Company cannot go back and deny such employment. First of all, it is not the case of the displaced
persons that they offered the land voluntarily without there being any objection solely on the ground that they will be provided employment
opportunity. The lands were acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act and the land owners participated in the 5-A enquiry, made
their objections. Equally they also participated in the award enquiry and accepted the compensation amount. Though there is a promise made by
the Manager of the appellant Company, the displaced persons did not part with the land only on such promise. That apart, the appellant being a
public sector undertaking is controlled by the Department of Atomic Energy and in the absence of such decision, the mere promise by the Manager
was not bind the appellant Company and consequently, such promise given by the Manager of the Company, cannot be considered to be one of
estoppel that could be pleaded against the appellant Company. Hence, the said contention is also rejected.
That apart, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed for one more reason viz., the land acquisition proceedings were completed by passing
Award during September, 1990 and compensation was paid to all the land owners. The land owners have approached this Court in the year
2000, after the period of ten years. Hence the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of latches.
For all the above reasons, we are not inclined to accept the relief sought for in the writ petitions in seeking for a direction to the appellant
company for providing employment to one member of each family, who were displaced by the acquisition proceedings. Accordingly, the writ
Appeals are allowed and the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, W.A.M.P. Nos. 414 to 420 of 2003 are closed.