The Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh vs The Advocate General and Another

R.S. Pathak, C.J.—The Petitioners challenge the validity of an order dated 21st November, 1972, made by the Advocate-General, Himachal Pradesh, in proceedings for election to the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh. They also pray for mandamus directing the Advocate-General to verify the list submitted by the Returning Officer of candidates returned at the election.

The Advocates Act, 1961, was amended by Section 24 of the Himachal Pradesh Act, 1970, and thereby provision was made for a Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh consisting of 15 members. By virtue of Section 5 of the Advocates Act, it is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal and can sue and be sued by that name. The first Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh was constituted in accordance with Section 24(5)(a) of the State of Himachal Pradesh Act. The Chief Justice of the High Court nominated the members. Their term of office was one year from the date of the first meeting of the Bar Council or until the election of their successors in accordance with the Advocates Act, whichever was earlier.

The first meeting of the Bar Council was held on 7th November, 1971. Before the expiry of one year, proceedings were taken to hold elections to the Bar Council. Shri Bhim Sen, Secretary of the Bar Council, was appointed the Returning Officer to conduct the elections. On 30th August, 1972, the election programme was issued. According to it, nominations would be entertained from 11th to 15th September, 1971, and the date of scrutiny was 16th September. The last date of withdrawal of a candidature was the 22nd September. For those entitled to vote at the district headquarters, except Simla, the date of polling was 21st October while for those entitled to vote at the seat of the High Court the date was 23rd October. Voting papers sent by post had to reach by 23rd October. The counting of votes was fixed for 28th October at 11.00 A.M. in the Bar Council office. A copy of the election programme was sent to the Advocate-General on 1st September.

The counting of votes by the Returning Officer took place on 28th October, 1972. Three candidates, Shri S.S. Ahuja, Shri I.C. Gupta and Shri R.M. Sehgal were eliminated during the counting. The Returning Officer prepared a list of the elected candidates and submitted it to the Advocate-General for verification and signature by him. Shri R.M. Sehgal, however, filed an objection before the Advocate-General assailing the validity of the counting carried out by the Returning Officer and the correctness of the list submitted by him. The Advocate-General commenced an enquiry into the matter. Upon his request, the Returning Officer submitted a reply to the objection. Apprehending that the Advocate-General would call for the voting papers to examine them, the Executive Committee of the Bar Council decided on 6th November, 1972, that in case he declined to verify the list of elected candidates without scrutinising the voting papers and insisted on inquiring into their validity the matter should be taken to Court. The Secretary was authorised to take necessary action in that behalf. On 21st November, 1972, the Advocate-General made the impugned order, observing that in order to determine whether the candidates set out in the list had been duly returned he had to take a decision with regard to defaced voting papers and to examine whether the votes had been justly and fairly counted. Accordingly, he directed the Returning Officer to place the voting papers before him. The Petitioners dispute his competence to make such order and, therefore, the present writ petition has been filed.

During the pendency of the writ petition Shri R. M. Sehgal applied for being impleaded as a Respondent in the writ petition and the prayer was granted by us by an order dated 20th December, 1972.

A large number of preliminary objections have been taken by the Respondents to the maintainability of the writ petition and the grant of relief thereon. Other objections, which can hardly be described as preliminary objections, have also been taken. It is appropriate that before dealing with the merits of the case those objections are considered and disposed of.

It is first contended that an alternative remedy was available to the Petitioners under Sections 48A and 48B of the Advocates Act, and it has not been shown by the Petitioners that the remedy was not as adequate and efficacious as the present writ petition. A plain reading of Section 48A shows that it does not apply. It refers to a proceeding which has been disposed of by a State Bar Council or a Committee thereof. As regards Section 48B, it provides:

48B. Power to give directions.--(1) For the proper and efficient discharge of the functions of a State Bar Council or any Committee thereof, the Bar Council of India may, in the exercise of its powers of general supervision and control, give such directions to the State Bar Council or any Committee thereof as may appear to it to be necessary, and the State Bar Council or the Committee shall comply with such directions.

(2) Where a State Bar Council is unable to perform its functions for any reason whatsoever, the Bar Council of India may, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, give such directions to the ex-officio member thereof as may appear to it to be necessary, and such directions shall have effect, notwithstanding anything contained in the rules made by the State Bar Council.

It seems to me that relief in respect of the present dispute cannot be appropriately granted under either of the above sub-sections. Under Sub-section (1) the Bar Council of India can issue a direction to the State Bar Council or any Committee thereof. Under Sub-section (2), it can give directions to the ex-officio member of the State Bar Council. It is not empowered to issue a direction to the Advocate-General. When the impugned order was made by the Advocate-General, it was made by him as Advocate-General and not as a member or Committee of the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh. In any event, it is well settled that the existence of an alternative remedy is not in every case a good ground for rejecting a writ petition. What should be considered among other things, are the circumstances in which the petition has been filed, the nature of the controversy raised therein, the gravity and importance of the questions involved, and the desirability of an authoritative pronouncement of the law on a matter vitally affecting the public or a section of the public. The question raised in this writ petition relates to the scope of the powers of the Advocate-General under Rule 33(1) of the Election Rules in the matter of verifying the list of elected candidates submitted to him by the Returning Officer. It is a serious question of law. So far as is known, the question has not been decided previously by any Court, and there is no precedent to guide the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh in the matter. Accordingly, I am of opinion that we should entertain this writ petition.

The second objection is that the Petitioners are not aggrieved parties and therefore not entitled to maintain the writ petition. It is urged that the legal rights of the Petitioners are not affected by the impugned order of the Advocate-General. The Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh is the first Petitioner. The term of office of the members of the Bar Council, it is pointed out, has expired and they have no rights left. The Bar Council, it is submitted, cannot be said to be interested in the controversy raised in this case. And as regards the second Petitioner, the Returning Officer, it is said that he became functus officio after submitting the list of the elected candidates to the Advocate-General. In my opinion, the first Petitioner, the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh, being a corporate body having perpetual succession continues to exist and the mere circumstance that the term of office of its members has expired does not negative its existence. A State Bar Council has several functions entrusted to it u/s 6 of the Advocates Act. They include the function of providing for the election of its members and doing all other things necessary for discharging that function. A State Bar Council is entitled to question any order which has the effect of impeding or interfering with proceedings for the election of its members. The election process has reached a certain stage under the Election Rules, and the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court for determining whether an order made by the Advocate-General in that election process has the sanction of law. In regard to the second Petitioner, it must be noted that the direction of the Advocate-General calling for the voting papers is addressed to the Returning Officer, and the latter is entitled to question that direction. To my mind, both Petitioners arc entitled to maintain this writ petition.

The third objection is that the omission of the Petitioners to implead all the candidates, those elected and those defeated, is fatal to the maintainability of the writ petition. The successful candidates, it is said, are vitally interested in being heard inasmuch as the impugned order of the Advocate-General would enable him to examine the voting papers and to determine whether the list setting out their names as elected candidates can be sustained. In respect of the unsuccessful candidates, the Respondents maintain that they would be interested in supporting the impugned order of the Advocate-General as an examination of the voting papers by the Advocate-General could disclose that they were entitled to be the returned candidates. It is urged that they are necessary parties, or at least proper parties. It is now well settled that a necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively, and a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is desirable for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceedings. In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia Vs. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, the Supreme Court laid down that in a petition for certiorari the successful party in whose favour the impugned order had been passed as well as the tribunal which passed the order were necessary parties. Proper parties, it observed, were those whose presence, although not necessary, was desirable for the settling of the questions involved in the controversy. The necessary parties in the present case may be said to be the Advocate-General, who made the impugned order, Shri R.M. Sehgal, at whose instance it was made and the Returning Officer to whom it was directed. This writ petition cannot be disposed of effectively in the absence of any of them. As regards the successful candidates and the remaining defeated candidates, they would be affected only indirectly or incidentally by a decision on the impugned order. At this stage, when the Advocate-General has merely called for the voting papers, they cannot be said to be directly or immediately affected. Considered in real terms, they are not. At the stage at which the controversy rests presently, it does not appear that the successful or defeated candidates arc necessary parties. In my opinion, they are not even proper parties. The validity of the impugned order can be effectively adjudged in their absence. The Respondents have referred to Udit Narain Singh (supra) and N. Raghavendra Rao v. Deputy Commissioner 1964 (7) SGR 549, Those cases do not advance the case of the Respondents.

The fourth objection is that the Election Rules of the Himachal Pradesh Bar Council have no legal effect inasmuch as the approval of the Bar Council of India has not been obtained, and therefore, it is said, the writ petition for the enforcement of Rule 33 does not lie.

Section 15 of the Advocates Act confers power to make rules providing for, inter alia, the election of members of the Bar Council. Section 15(3) provides:

No rules made under this section by a State Bar Council shall have effect unless they have been approved by the Bar Council of India.

Now so far as the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh is concerned Section 24(5)(f) of the State of Himachal Pradesh Act provides:

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Advocates Act as amended or modified by Sub-sections (3) and (4)(f) The rules made or deemed to have been made by the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana in force immediately before the date on which the first Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh is duly constituted in accordance with the provisions of Clause (a) shall, subject to such modifications and adaptations as may be made therein by the Chairman of the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh, be deemed to be the rules made by the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh and shall have effect accordingly.

Originally the Advocates Act provided for one Bar Council for the State of Punjab and the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh, known as the Bar Council of Punjab. When Punjab was re-organized by the Punjab Re-organization Act, 1966, the Advocates Act was amended so as to provide now for a Bar Council for the States of Punjab and Haryana and the Union territories of Chandigarh and Himachal Pradesh. It was known as the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana. That Bar Council exercised jurisdiction within the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh. It is not disputed that the rules framed by the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana were approved by the Bar Council of India. Those rules continued in force in the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh. When the State of Himachal Pradesh was established under the State of Himachal Pradesh Act, 1970, provision was made by Section 24(3) of that Act for amending the Advocates Act in order to provide a separate Bar Council for the State of Himachal Pradesh. The first Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh was, by Section 24(5)(a) of the Act, to be a body nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, but until it was constituted the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana was, by Section 24(5)(b) to function as the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh. That supposed the application of the rules made by the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana to the State of Himachal Pradesh. When thereafter the first Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh was constituted by nomination by the Chief Justice, Section 24(5)(f) provided that the rules made by the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana in force immediately before the date of such constitution would, subject to such modifications and adaptations made therein by the Chairman of the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh, be deemed to be rules made by the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh and would have effect accordingly. Because the provisions of Section 24(5)(b) and Section 24(5)(f) could be said to be inconsistent with Section 24(3), a non obstante clause was introduced in the opening portion of Section 24(5). It is apparent from the foregoing that the rules made by the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana had been in operation already for some considerable time in Himachal Pradesh before the first Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh was constituted. They were rules which had received the approval of the Bar Council of India. Those rules were made applicable as rules deemed to have been made by the Bar (Council of Himachal Pradesh. If the rules continued without modification or adaptation it seems beyond dispute that fresh approval of the Bar Council of India would not be necessary. Even if the rules were adapted they would still, it seems to me, not require fresh approval. Adaptations in the rules would involve mere mechanical changes so that they could read as rules made by the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh. In the case of modifications, a question might arise whether fresh approval is necessary. But as that is not a matter with which we are concerned I express no opinion on it, because admittedly the specific provisions in the rules which we are called upon to consider have not suffered any modification since they were framed by the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana.

It will also be noticed that Section 24(5)(f) not only declares that the rules made by the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana would be deemed to be rules made by the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh but it also provides that they would "have effect accordingly". In other words, they would be treated as rules made by the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh and they would be operative as such rules. Before the constitution of the first Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh the rules were "in force" or had effect as rules made by the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana. And now, as rules deemed to have been made by the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh they would similarly have effect or be operative. The expression in Section 24(5)(j) "shall have effect accordingly" clearly connotes that the rules are effective or, what is another way of saying it, are rules in force; in other words, they are rules which must be considered to have received the approval of the Bar Council of India. There is no force in this objection and it is rejected.

The fifth objection is that no cause of action for maintaining the writ petition has arisen yet. It is pointed out that the impugned order of the Advocate-General does not incorporate any decision on the merits of the list of returned candidates. As to that, it is apparent from the impugned order that the Advocate-General has directed the Secretary of the State Bar Council to produce the voting papers before him. The validity of that direction is in question before us, and to my mind, that constitutes a sufficient cause of action for maintaining this writ petition. There is the further objection that no mandamus can be directed to the Advocate-General to verify the list of elected candidates because he has not yet refused to do so. He can do so, the Respondents say, only after he has satisfied himself that the candidates mentioned in the list have in truth been elected according to a proper count of the voting papers. The question whether the Advocate-General can embark upon an inquiry into whether the candidates set out in the list can be said to be elected has yet to be decided on the merits. What the Petitioners expect of the Advocate-General is to sign the list submitted to him without anything more. The Advocate-General has refused to do that. If the Petitioners are right in their view of what the Advocate-General is obliged to do they are entitled to a mandamus.

The sixth objection is that the Petitioners by reason of their conduct are disentitled to relief. It is urged that the Petitioners arc denying to the Advocate-General access to the records necessary to enable him to verify and certify the list and are thus preventing the Advocate-General from giving a decision in regard to the correctness of that list. I am not impressed by that contention. Whether or not the Advocate-General is entitled to access to the voting papers is a matter to be decided on the merits of the controversy before us.

The seventh objection is that the entire election is invalid because notice of the election had to be published in the Official Gazette and because of that omission the election has no legal status. We are referred to Section 14 of the Advocates Act. The submission is misconceived. Section 14 provides:

Election to Bar Councils not to be questioned on certain grounds--No election of a member of a Bar Council shall be called in question on the ground merely that due notice thereof has not been given to any person entitled to vote thereat, if notice of the date has, not less than thirty days before that date, been published in the Official Gazette.

According to the section, if notice of the election has been published in the Official Gazette not less than thirty days before the date of the election that will constitute a sufficient defence against an attack on the ground that due notice of the election has not been given individually to any voter. The notice in the Official Gazette is, by Section 14, presumed to be constructive notice to all persons entitled to vote. But if individual notice has in fact been duly given, Section 14 does not come in to play at all. Plainly read, Section 14 does not make publication in the Official Gazette a mandatory requirement of the election process.

The validity of the elections is also challenged on the ground that the Secretary of the Bar Council was appointed the Returning Officer. It is urged that the rules do not contemplate that the Secretary of the Bar Council and the Returning Officer should be one and the same-person. It is pointed out that the two functionaries are different, and we are referred to the definition of "Returning Officer" in Rule 3(p) as "the person appointed by the Bar Council as such to conduct an election", and to Rule 35 which provides that "the Secretary shall be incharge of the conduct of the election". There is nothing, as far as I can sec, preventing the same individual from functioning as Secretary as well as the Returning Officer. It has not been shown that there is anything inconsistent between the duties entrusted to the two functionaries so as to preclude the same individual from filling both offices. There was a vague appeal to the principle of "checks and balances", but that appeal is not supported by anything in the scheme of the rules.

The next objection is that the Advocate-General is a member of the Bar Council and therefore no relief can be sought by the Bar Council against him. The submission is without merit. The Advocate-General, where mentioned as such in the Election Rules, functions as an authority distinct and independent of the Bar Council. The responsibilities entrusted to him under the Election Rules are discharged by him as Advocate-General of the State and not as a member of the Bar Council.

It is also contended by the Respondents that the elections could not be held before an Election Tribunal was duly constituted. Rule 34(5) provides:

(5) The Election Tribunal shall be appointed by the Bar Council on or before the date on which the time and place of the election is fixed under Rule 4.

Explanation.--The date means the date on which polling is to be held.

The earliest of the dates fixed for polling was 21st October, 1972. There is no averment by the Respondents in the record before us that the Election Tribunal was not constituted before that date. On the contrary, an affidavit before us and the original record of the Bar Council, to the perusal of which learned Counsel for the Respondents states he has no objection, show that the Election Tribunal was constituted on 1st October, 1972.

It is also urged that as the Advocate-General was not present during the counting, the counting was invalid. Now, the rules do not specifically declare that the Advocate-General should be present at the time of counting. But his presence, I think, is necessarily implied at the time when the question falls to be decided whether a voting paper has been defaced. He has been made, by Rule 23(3), the final arbiter of that question. Rule 6(b) provides for the issue of notice to him of the date, time and place of the counting of the votes. It will also be noted that his decision must be rendered before the counting is completed in order to enable the Returning Officer to properly complete that process. And it will further be noted that by Rule 25 a candidate or his agent is entitled to be present at the time of counting. Any decision by the Advocate-General in regard to defaced voting papers must, therefore, be given in the presence of the candidates or their agents, should they decide to be present. It may be that a candidate or his agent present at the time of counting may raise the question whether a certain voting paper has been defaced. It is alleged that such a question was raised by Shri S.S. Ahuja, one of the candidates, and the Returning Officer ignored the objection. Whether such objection was raised is a matter for decision more appropriately in an election petition and not in this writ petition. An election petition is the more convenient remedy for deciding that question of fact rather than this writ petition. It will be for the Election Tribunal to decide whether the objection was raised. If the finding is that it was, then it will be for the Election Tribunal to consider further whether the absence of the Advocate-General can be said to invalidate the counting.

So far as the Advocate-General is concerned, it is not open to him to contend that because he was absent at the time of the counting the counting is invalid. He was duly informed of the date, time and place of the counting when a copy of the election programme was served on him. Further, his absence at the time of counting cannot serve as a ground for conferring on him the power to decide under Rule 33(1) whether any or some of the voting papers have been defaced if that power has not been vested in him otherwise under that rule.

In my opinion, none of the objections raised by the Respondents have any force and they are rejected.

Turning then to the controversy on its merits, we are required to decide whether Rule 33(1) empowers the Advocate-General to direct the Secretary of the Bar Council to produce the voting papers before him. Rule 33(1) provides:

Upon the completion of the count, a list of the candidates elected to the Bar Council shall be prepared and signed by the Returning Officer and submitted by him to the Advocate-General who shall verify the same by his signature.

For the Petitioners, it is contended that at the stage when the Returning Officer submits the list of the elected candidates under Rule 33(1), all that the Advocate-General can do is to sign the list by way of verification. He has no authority, it is said, to enquire into the correctness of the list. The Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Advocate-General is entitled to examine whether the entire election process has been conducted in accordance with the rules, and in particular to scrutinise whether the voting papers considered by the Returning Officer have been rightly included or excluded in the process of counting and whether on a correct computation carried out in accordance with the rules the list submitted by the Returning Officer sets out the elected candidates. It is urged that the responsibility of verification vested in the Advocate-General under Rule 33(1) is a serious responsibility. The Respondents rely on Re An Attorney AIR 1914 Cal. 192 Baladin v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Sushil Kumar Gupta v. Joy Shankar Bhattacharjee AIR 1971 1543, The dictionary meaning of "verify" in Websters Third International Dictionary has also been placed before us, and so has the following statement in Corpus Juris Secundum:

The word ''verify'' is defined generally as meaning to confirm or establish the truth; to confirm the truth or truthfulness of, to confirm or establish the authenticity of; to authenticate, to substantiate; to substantiate by reasoning; to prove; to show to be true; to find correct, to ascertain to be correct; to make certain by comparison; to check or test the accuracy of exactness of.

It seems to me that the question can be resolved quite simply. The Election Rules indicate that three major functionaries have been associated with the election process. After the Bar Council has drawn up the election programme, the Secretary performs the functions concerned with notification of the election programme, the receipt and scrutiny of nomination papers, notices of withdrawal, publication of the final list of candidates contesting the election, preparation of the electoral roll and despatching or issuing the voting papers. The Returning Officer appoints the Polling Officers who conduct the poll. Thereafter, the ballot boxes and the packets containing postal voting papers arc handed over to the Returning Officer. The actual counting is conducted by the Returning Officer himself. The counting is effected according to the rules, and upon the completion of the count the Returning Officer prepares and signs a list of the elected candidates. The Advocate General is associated with the election process from the beginning to the end. But it will be seen that he plays a distinct and limited role at its different stages. In the beginning, he receives notice of the election programme. When the nomination papers arc scrutinised, he decides the validity or otherwise of a nomination paper which the Secretary may consider invalid, and he may allow a defect in the nomination paper to be rectified. Thereafter, when the list of contesting candidates is finalised, a copy of the list is sent to him. After the poll, if during the counting a question arises whether a voting paper has or has not been defaced he decides that question. Upon the completion of the count the list of elected candidates prepared and signed by the Returning Officer has to be submitted to him. He is charged with the duty of verifying the list by his signature. A copy of the list so certified is then given to him.

It will be noticed from the foregoing analysis that specific functions in the course of the election process have been assigned to different functionaries. There is nothing to show that the Advocate-General has overall control over the election process or has been appointed to ensure a valid execution of all the functions involved in the election process. While he is entitled to notice of the stage reached by the election process from time to time, he has been appointed the Judge of certain questions only, the validity of a nomination paper and whether a voting paper has been defaced or not. When the count has been completed and the Returning Officer submits the list of elected candidates to the Advocate-General the Advocate-General is required by Rule 33(1) "to verify the same by his signature". What is the Advocate-General expected to do? The count has been completed by the Returning Officer, who alone is entrusted with the function. The Advocate-General cannot question the count. It is a completed process, and if it was proposed that he should be empowered to reopen it there would have been specific language in the rules to that effect. Such language exists only in the rules relating to the Election Tribunal. By Rule 34(6) the Election Tribunal has power to order a recount. A recount of the votes is a serious matter, and legislative history shows that whenever a recount is (contemplated the statute generally makes express provision for that purpose. The statute also makes provision for the conscquences which could follow a recount. If the result of the recount shows that the count by the Returning Officer is erroneous, power is conferred upon the appropriate authority to make consequent orders. No rule invests such a power in the Advocate-General. What then is intended by saying that the Advocate-General "shall verify (the list) by his signature"? The answer is to be found on reading Rule 33 as a whole. The list of elected candidates prepared and signed by the Returning Officer is submitted to the Advocate-General, he verifies the list by his signature and "after such certificate" a copy of the list is published in Official Gazette and sent to the Advocate-General, the Bar Associations and notified by the Bar Council. On the publication of the list in the Official Gazette, the persons whose names appear in the list are deemed to have been elected. The machinery provided here is concerned with making the list of elected candidates a certified list which on compliance with the procedure laid down attains legal authority and is the final document in the election process. It is for the purpose of investing the list with that legal status that the Advocate-General, as a constitutional dignitary independent of the Bar Council is required to sign the list. His signature gives to the list the stamp of authority and certifies the list. The language of the rule is also significant. The Advocate-General verifies the list "by his signature". The mode of verification indicates the scope of his act. By signing the list he verifies that it is the list of elected candidates submitted to him by the Returning Officer. In other words, he verifies the document. He is not called upon to verify that the candidates shown in the list have been duly elected. It has been said that the Advocate-General can at least examine whether the candidates have been set out in the list in conformity with the count. Now, after the count has been completed, the preparation of the list by the Returning Officer is a mechanical process, leaving no play for discretion and little scope for erroneous judgment. A mistake of that nature can always be corrected before the Advocate-General certifies the list by signing it. It is nobody''s case that such a mistake exists in the present case.

In my judgment, the Petitioners are entitled to succeed.

The petition is allowed. The order dated 21st November, 1972 made by the Advocate General, Himachal Pradesh, is quashed. The Advocate-General is directed to verify the list of elected candidates submitted to him by the Returning Officer by signing it. In the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs.

D.B. Lal, J.

I agree.