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Judgment
N.K. Kapoor, J.—This judgment shall dispose of LPA Nos. 101 and 102 of 1997 as these arise out of same judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 26.2.1997. For disposal of these two appeals, reference is being made to the facts as noticed in LPA No. 101 of 1997.
Briefly put, Mala Quarry Workers Union (Registered) through its President Shri Nar Singh filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC to be impleaded as respondent in CWP No. 1702 and 1703 of 1993. These applications were allowed by the Court vide order dated 26.2.1997. Vide another application, Workers Union sought modification of the order dated 13.1.1997. Operative part of this order reads as under :-
"Since the petitioners, on their own, have undertaken not to indulge in mining or quarrying and have also undertaken not to remove the material lying near the mines and quarries, the State of Haryana is directed to constitute an expert Committee as per the judgment of the Apex Court in CWP (Civil) No. 202 of 1995 within four weeks from today, the Expert Committee so constituted within one month thereafter, shall make an endeavour to submit report in terms of the direction of the Apex Court as contained in CWP (Civil) No. 202 of 1995, to this Court. State Government shall depute a high official to see that the undertaking given by the petitioners through their counsel is strictly complied with and no departure in that regard is made. State Government shall forward the name of the Official to this Court appointed to oversee compliance so that in case of any departure, that official is held responsible for the same. The writ petitioners shall use only that raw-material for manufacturing the cement which is lying in the factory premises. In case they want to get raw material for making cement from the states other than the State of Haryana, they shall give advance notice to the official to be appointed by the State of Haryana so that he may be in a position to see that the raw material lying near the mines and quarries is not used under the garb of raw material imported from outside the State of Haryana.
In case the Expert Committee appointed by the State Government in terms of the direction contained in CWP (Civil) No. 202 of 1995 fails to submit report as directed, it shall be open to the writ petitioners to approach this Court for revival of the stay order or for any other direction that this Court may deem fit to give, in the circumstances of this case.
Accordingly, stay order dated February 4, 1993 passed in CWP No. 1702 of 1993 and CWP No. 1703 of 1993 shall stand vacated.
Copy of this order be forwarded to the Chief Secretary to Government of Haryana, Chandigarh, for compliance.
Copy of this order be given to counsel for the parties Dasti on payment. The matter shall be taken up for further hearing on 1.4.1997."
According to the Workers Union, on account of order dated 13.1.1997, work has been suspended by the Company and the workers/members of the Union who are 82 and 52 in number respectively have been issued directions .not to come on duty after 20.1.1997 and 14.2.1997. In addition thereto, it was stated by the Workers Union that despite representations made to the Management of the Company as well as to the Assistant Labour Commissioner that emoluments have not been paid, the matter has not been attended to which has now put the families of the Workers almost at the verge of starvation. Workers were not in a position to meet day to day expenses to pull on their families. Workers Union accordingly prayed for modification of order dated 13.1.1997 directing the Company to pay to the workers/members of the applicant Union their full emoluments and also that they may not be retrenched or removed from service.
This was contested by the Company stating that three departments of the company i.e. ropeway, saw-mills and kilns have been closed on account of non-availability of raw material. It is on account of this that workers working in these aforesaid departments were asked not to report for duty. The company further averred that workmen had raised industrial dispute and presently the matter is pending before the Labour Commissioner Haryana, at Chandigarh. Besides it, it was averred that Civil Writ Petition No. 202 of 1995, the basis on which order dated 13.1.1997 was passed is now listed for hearing before the apex Court on 25.2.1997 and the matter be deferred till it is decided by the Supreme Court of India. It was further averred that the Company is already suffering a loss of Rs. 2 crores per month on account of non-availability of raw material and so is not in a position to pay salary to the workers of the respondent-union. Objection with regard to maintainability of such an application by the respondent and the relief, if any, could be granted in their favour in the writ petition was also raised.
The Court on considering the matter in the light of submissions made by the respective counsel came to the conclusion that it would be appropriate to direct the Company to pay to its workers their full emoluments till such time final orders are passed by this Court in the writ petition. Support for this view was taken from the directions given by the apex Court in order dated 12.12.1996 passed in CWP (C) No. 202 of 1995. Accordingly, learned Single Judge directed that notwithstanding the closure of industry, pursuant to order dated 13.1.1997 the workmen employed with it continued to be paid their full emoluments due and that they shall not be retrenched or removed for this reason. The company was further directed to pay arrears of their emoluments within one week of the date of order.
Feeling aggrieved by the order of learned Single Judge dated 26.2.1997, the appellants has preferred these two appeals.
Learned Counsel for the appellant after referring to the factual aspects which have been briefly noticed, argued that the order passed by the learned Single Judge in a pending writ petition is, in fact, a final order as it burdens the appellant with financial liability despite a prohibitive order passed by the Court not to carry out any mining activity till the disposal of the writ petition. Thus the impugned order being final is appealable.
The counsel further argued that the learned Single Judge has not properly construed the order passed by the apex Court in CWP (S) No. 202 of 1995. The Court while examining the merits relating to protection and conservation of forests throughout the country thought it appropriate to issue notice to Central Government as well as Governments of all States and as an interim measure gave certain directions under the caption ''General'' as well as certain specific directions to some of the States, namely, Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Hill Regions of U.P. and West Bengal and State of Tamil Nadu. Under the caption ''General'', it was directed that " all on-going activity within any forest in any State throughout the country, without the prior approval of the Central Government, must cease forthwith. It is, therefore, clear that the running of saw-mills of any kind including veneer or plywood mills and mining of any mineral are non-forest purposes and are, therefore, not permissible without prior approval of the Central Government. Accordingly, any such activity is prima facie violation of the provisions of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980. Every State Government must promptly ensure total cessation of all such activities forthwith." The Court, however, directed that "notwithstanding closure of any saw-mills or other wood based industries pursuant to this order, workers employed in such units will continue to be paid their full emoluments due and shall not be retrenched or removed from service for this reason." Thus, according to the learned counsel whereas on closure of saw-mills and other wood based industries, workers in these mills have been directed to be retrenched or removed from service for this reason no such direction has been given with regard to workers employed in a mining activity. Learned Single Judge erred in law to include the workers associated with mining activity despite the clear intention of the apex Court. In any case, workers, if so aggrieved, ought to have approached the apex Court for necessary clarification.
Admittedly, workers have already raised an industrial dispute and reconciliation proceedings have failed. The matter is pending before the government for reference. This being no, relief, if any, if at all permissible, can be granted by the Labour Court. Even otherwise too, no such relief can be claimed by the respondent in writ petition nor granted by the Court.
Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, raised objection as to the maintainability of appeal terming the impugned order to be interim. On merit, it is stated that the apex Court while prohibiting the running of saw-mills of any kind including veneer or ply-wood as well as mining of any mineral unless prior approval of the Central Government is accorded presently order of cessation of all such activities and taking a humble view of the problem further directed that despite closure of the activities, workers in these industries will not be retrenched or removed from service on this account and that they would be paid their full emoluments. This, in fact, is the essence of the order of the apex Court dated 12.12.1996. It is in the light of the aforesaid order of the apex Court dated 12.12.1996 that the learned Single Judge has ordered for payment of emoluments to the workers of the company. The order is perfectly just and legal calling for no interference. No doubt, while ordering for payment of full emoluments to workers of saw-mills and other wood based industries, there is no reference to the persons working in mining activities, but the same appears to be a case of unintentional omission. In fact, if the order is read in the light of earlier directions whereby cessation of all such activities have been ordered forthwith, the latter part of the judgment ordering for payment of wages would indeed encompass the persons working in the mining activities as well. Counsel thus prayed that the appeals deserves to be dismissed.
Whether the impugned order comes within the purview of a judgment is to be decided in the first instance. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the judgment of the apex Court in case reported as Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania and Another, and decision of Division Bench of this case in case reported as Balbir Singh Wasu Vs. Lakhbir Singh Wasu and Others, . Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, drew support from the decision of this Court in case reported as Faquir Chand and Ors. v. Financial Commissioner (1978) 80 P.L.R. 357.
The apex Court in Shah Babulal Kliimji''s case (supra) in an elaborate discussion and on examining the view taken by the various High Courts held that following considerations must prevail with the Court:-
"(1) Thus the trial Judge being a senior court with vast experience of various branches of law occupying a very high status should be trusted to its discretionary or interlocutory orders with due regard to the well settled principles of civil justice. Thus, any discretion exercised or routine orders passed by a trial Judge in the course of the suit which may cause some inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice one party or the other can be treated as a judgment otherwise the appellant Court (Division Bench) will be flooded with appeals from all kinds of orders passed by the trial Judge. Courts must give sufficient allowance to the trial Judge and raise a presumption that any discretionary order which he passes must be presumed to be correct unless it is ex facie legally erroneous or causes grave and substantial injustice.
(2) That the interlocutory order in order to be a judgment must contain the traits and trappings of finality either when the order decides the question in controversy in an ancilliary proceedings or in the suit itself or in a part of the proceedings."
In the instant case, vide the impugned order a direction has been given to the Company to pay workers their wages (though they are not working). Such an order have burdened the company with financial liability. It is final between the parties and nothing else is to be determined even while finally deciding the pending writ petition. Such an order can be appropriately described as a final order and this being so, would come within the purview of judgment and hence appealable. We thus hold that an appeal against such an order is maintainable.
The other dispute pertains in determining whether direction for payment of wages could be issued by the Court when the same is already subject matter of industrial dispute. Admittedly, workers in the first instance approached the authority under the Industrial Disputes Act. Reconciliation proceedings were initiated and as the matter could not be resolved by the Reconciliation Officer, the same has been sent to the government for reference to be made to a Labour Court for adjudication. Since Workers Union in the first instance has already moved under the Industrial Disputes Act and rightly too, the application now filed firstly to be impleaded in the pending writ petition and thereafter praying for a direction to the company to pay them wages is, in fact, impermissible in the context of the facts of the present case.
The matter can be examined from yet another angle. Assuming that workers who have been deprived of wages approached this Court by filing a writ petition, whether such a writ is maintainable against a registered company as, admittedly, the same does not fall within the ambit of State, could be the core question before any relief could be granted by the Court. We have no doubt that any such writ petition filed by the workers against a limited company is not maintainable in law. At best, an aggrieved person - worker - is entitled to agitate his grievance before a Labour Court. The writ petition could also be dismissed on account of existence of an alternative remedy. Accordingly, we are of the view that no such interim direction could be issued in favour of added respondents in the pending writ petition.
As noticed earlier, the apex Court in CWP (C) No. 202 of 1995 has ordered for cessation of mining activities forthwith and it is in keeping in view the direction of the apex Court that the learned Single Judge too vide order dated 13.1.1997 directed the appellant not to indulge in any mining or quarry any further. With the aforesaid direction, work in the unit where these affected workers were employed has come to standstill. Company has declined them wages primarily for the reason that since they are not performing any work, they are not entitled to wages. Learned Single Judge, on the other hand, has held that they are entitled to wages taking support from the view of the apex Court wherein specific direction has been given to the employers that they would pay full emoluments to the workers and that workers would not be retrenched or removed from service for this reason.
Parties differ as to the ''true'' meaning of the order of the apex Court dated 12.12.1996. According to the learned counsel representing the workers, mere non-mentioning of mining activities in the operative order of the judgment will not take away the rights of the workers in the mining activity to their wages as has been awarded to workers of saw-mills and other wood based industries. We have again gone through the direction given by the apex Court and find that whereas all such activities like running of saw-mills including veneer or ply-wood mills and mining of any mineral have been ordered to stop forthwith, workers of saw-mills or other wood based industries alone have been ordered to be paid full emoluments due with a further direction that they will not be retrenched or removed from service for this reason. Whether omission i.e. non-mentioning of workers associated with mining activity is intentional or by oversight can only be clarified by the apex Court. In any case, this Court has no power to add anything to the judgment of the apex Court. Thus, we find substance in the plea of the appellant and hold that, as per decision of the apex Court, workers employed in mining activity are not covered for payment of wages or as regard their retrenchment or removal. In would be upto the Workers Union or individuals to approach the apex Court for necessary direction, if so advised.
Accordingly, we accept these appeals and set aside the impugned order dated 26.2.1997.