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Judgment
Natarajan, J.—The Madras Bar Association represented by its Secretary, the Madras High Court Advocates Association represented by
its Secretaries and the Tamil Nadu Judicial Officers Association represented by its General Secretary, seek intervention, by means of their
respective applications mentioned above, in the proceedings in Contempt Application No. 24 of 1980 pending before this Bench. The prayer for
intervention by the respective Associations, has been made in the following circumstances :
Consequent upon the learned Advocate-General moving this Court for the respondents, viz., (1) R. M. Krishna Raju, c/o. The Editor, The Hindu,
Madras, (2) G. K. Kasthuri, the Editor, The Hindu, Madras, and (3) S. Rangarajan, the Printer and Publisher of the Hindu, Madras, being
punished for contempt of the High Court, under Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, a notice was issued to the
respondents and they have entered appearance and filed their counter-affidavits. For the 1st respondent, as many as 272 Advocates have signed
the Vakalat filed on his behalf. It has since transpired that the 1st respondent, R. M. Krishna Raju is a legal practitioner and a member of the
Madras High Court Advocates Association. On account of this factor, the Madras Bar Association (hereinafter referred to as the ''Bar
Association'') and the Madras High Court Advocates Association (hereinafter referred to as the ''Advocates Association'') seek intervention in the
proceedings. We may briefly refer to the grounds set out in the affidavits filed on behalf of the respective associations justifying the claim for
intervention.
In the affidavit filed in support of the petition filed on behalf of the Bar Association it is stated as follows :
The Bar Association desires to make submissions on the contempt application as the matter involves the maintenance of the high dignity and
reputation of courts and judges and the scope of a fair comment of the members of the Bar and the public in general on the functioning of the
judiciary and the role of the legal profession as also the scope of journalistic reproduction of comments and letters. It is a matter of public
importance requiring clear and definite guidance for the future."" The prayer made is that the Bar Association may be impleaded as a party-
respondent pro forma or permitted to make representations on the points involved.
In the affidavit filed on behalf of the Advocates Association, it is stated as follows :-
......... The above application raises question of general importance of the rights of the Members of the Bar to hold a (meeting ?) to express their
opinion, regarding the functioning of judiciary in a general way;"" The Association has therefore prayed for its coming in as intervener.
In the application made by the Tamil Nadu Judicial Officers Association (hereinafter referred to as the ''Officers Association''), it is stated as
follows in the affidavit filed by the Association''s joint secretary;
I submit that certain portions of the said letter as alleged in the affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondent are intended to scandalise or lower
the authority of the Courts amounting to criminal contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. I further submit that some of the portions are
specifically directed against the subordinate judiciary and hence the executive committee of the Tamil Nadu Judicial Officers Association has
resolved unanimously to intervene in the above matter and get itself impleaded as party respondent.
I beg to state that in view of the facts mentioned above, the presence of the petitioner herein as party respondent before this Honourable Court
is necessary for the proper, complete and effectual adjudication of the above Contempt Application. I submit that otherwise the Tamil Nadu
Subordinate Judiciary against whom certain specific allegations have been made with ulterior object of undermining its authority will go
unrepresented and may even lead to some complications later causing great hardship and prejudice to the several judicial officers who are the
members of the petitioner association.
The prayer of the Association is for being impleaded as a third party-respondent.
When these applications were filed, the Office returned the papers calling for particulars as to how the petitions are maintainable, since (1) there
appeared to be no provision in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or the rules framed thereunder for third parties to intervene in contempt
proceedings; and (2) the relevant provision of law should be quoted inasmuch as the CPC is not made applicable to the proceedings instituted
under the Contempt of Courts Act. Thereupon, the learned Counsel appearing for the various Associations sought for and were given opportunity
to argue the question of maintainability before us in open Court.
When the question of maintainability was argued, it was generally stated that the High Court has got inherent powers to allow the intervention or
impleader petitions; that it is open to the High Court to formulate its own procedure in the matter of disposal of contempt applications; and that in
the interests of justice opportunity must be afforded to the Associations to intervene, and/or to make representations on the merits of the contempt
application. Certain authorities were also cited before us by Mr. M. Raghavan and Mr. Venkatachari, the learned counsel appearing for the Bar
Association and Advocates Association, respectively. We shall refer to those authorities more appropriately at a later stage.
As it appeared to us that there is no provision in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, or the rules framed thereunder for third parties to seek
interventions or impleader in contempt proceedings and as it also appeared that the matter was res integra, we asked the learned Counsel for the
Associations and Mr. Chellaswamy, the learned counsel for the Officers Association to elucidate some matters, which in our opinion, have a
considerable bearing on the maintainability of the intervention petitions. As the learned counsel wanted time to reply out queries, we set out the
points in the form of a questionnaire and granted time to the counsel to make their representations.
The points for elucidation set out in the nature of a questionnaire, are as given below :-
Is the first respondent an Office-bearer of the Association ?
If not, has he written the article for and on behalf of the Association as its spokesman ?
Has the article been written by the author in his capacity as an Advocate in a case ?
If not then how can the matter be treated as affecting the rights and privileges of an Advocate ?
Do the members of the Association claim greater rights in matters of contempt that the first respondent, who is also a member of the Association
?
If really the rights and privileges of Advocates also arise for consideration what further contentions can be advanced by the Association besides
those which can be advanced by the first respondent himself ?
If an Advocate who is a member of the Association is prosecuted for offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code or other Penal
legislations or if a suit is filed against him for damages, for defamation etc. will the Association seek intervention in such cases also for elucidation of
matters regarding the position and status of Advocates as a General class in such matters ?
If the Association will not seek intervention in such cases, then on what basis can a difference be made in respect of contempt matters alone ?
Assuming for argument''s sake we concede the right of the Association to intervene, what will be the position when a police officer or a
policeman, or a doctor or an engineer, an industrial worker or a transport worker, a plantation worker or an agriculturist etc. is issued a show
cause notice in a contempt matter and the respective Association to which he belongs wants to intervene in order to find out the rights and
previleges of its members ? In law and equity can we make a difference between the Advocates'' Association on the one hand and the concerned
Association which wants to intervene on the other ?
If there are rival associations and all of them seek intervention to put forth conflicting arguments in a contempt matter, what is the court to do ?
We can''t discriminate. If all of them are allowed to intervene, the scope of the enquiry will get escalated and the matter is likely to go out of the
control of Court.
If an intervention petition as the one on hand is allowed, and the contemner wants to tender an apology and have the matter closed can the
interveners raise objections to the Court accepting the apology and closing the matter and contend that irrespective of the closure of the
proceedings as far as the contemner is concerned, the contempt proceedings should still go on for determination on the questions raised by the
interveners ?
In answer to question 1 and 2, it was conceded by Mr. Raghavan and Mr. Venkatachari that the first respondent was not an office-bearer of
the Association and he had not written the article under consideration in the contempt application on behalf of the Association as its spokesman.
To question Nos. 3 and 4, the answer was that though there was nothing in the article as it appeared in the newspaper to indicate that it has been
written by an Advocate, we must nevertheless treat this as an article written by an Advocate as its author, viz., the first respondent happened to be
one. For question Nos. 5 and 6, it was stated that though the rights of the members of the Bar and Advocates'' Association may only be
coextensive with the rights of an individual lawyer, yet the members of the Bar Association and Advocates'' Association should know, with
precision and accuracy, the limit of their rights in making comments on courts and their functioning. In answer to query No. 7, it was contended
that if a member of the Bar Association or Advocates'' Association was prosecuted for an offence under the I.P.C. or other penal legislations or a
suit was filed against him for damages, for defamation, etc., the Association would not seek intervention in those cases. But, Mr. Sankaran, the
learned counsel for the first respondent, who also holds the office as President of the Advocate''s Association, stated that no such concession can
be made and that even in such cases, if intervention by the Association was deemed necessary, the Association would seek intervention. As
regards question No. 8, the answer was that contempt matters stand on a different footing inasmuch as the fountain of justice must be kept pure
and unsullied and it is for that laudable purpose, the Bar Association and Advocates'' Association were seeking intervention.
For query No. 9, the general answer was that if the circumstances of the case rendered it necessary, then other Associations also can seek
intervention in contempt matters instituted against one of its members in his individual capacity in order to get a general ruling on the rights of its
members. It was however submitted that the Association of Advocates would, undoubtedly, stand on a different footing as Advocates were
recognised as officers of Court. As regards question No. 10 the answer was that without discrimination rival Associations may be permitted to
intervene and advance conflicting arguments and such a procedure should not cause apprehension in the mind of the Court, since it is the Court
which has the final say in the matter. Lastly, for question No. 11, Mr. Venkatachari stated that the Association will not work at cross purposes
with the Court. Mr. Raghavan however said that in appropriate cases, the Association, though it may not have a right to insist upon punishment
being awarded can attempt to prevail upon the Court to award punishment to a contemner, in view of the gravity of the contempt committed by
him.
Since the petition filed by the Officers Association stands on a different footing, we think it would be appropriate to deal with it separately. We
shall therefore now consider the claims of the Bar Association for intervention in the contempt proceedings. On bestowing our anxious
considerations to the matter, we find it impossible to accept the claim of the two Associations that they have a right to be impleaded and that their
presence as well as their representations would contribute to the matter being presented in proper perspective before us. Our reasons for our
conclusion are as set out below :-
Admittedly the 1st respondent is not an office bearer of either of the Associations. Nor has he written the article as a spokesman of the
Association. In fact there is nothing in the article itself to show that it has been written by an Advocate, much less, as an Advocate in discharge of
his duties of the learned profession to which he belongs to. It is only late in the day it has been revealed that the author of the article is an
Advocate, because the second and the third respondents refused to disclose in the first instance, who the author was and it was only after the
initiation of contempt proceedings were indicated, they divulged the particulars of the 1st respondent. In such circumstances, it is beyond our
comprehension as to how the rights of an Advocate can be said to be involved in the contempt proceedings. Viewed in that light, the interest
evinced by the Bar Association and Advocates Association to intervene in these proceedings, appears to be uncalled for. Surely, it is not the case
of the petitioner Associations that in matters of contempt, the members of the legal fraternity have greater rights and privileges than other citizens of
the country and such special rights must be recognized and safeguarded by Courts.
Assuming for argument''s sake that the 1st respondent wrote the article in the discharge of his duties as an Advocate and that there is a case for
delineating the higher limits up to which Advocates can exercise their right of fair comment in contrast with the rights of other citizens, we are totally
at a loss to know what further contentions can be advanced on behalf of the members of the Associations, which the learned Counsel appearing
for the 1st respondent cannot themselves put forward in justification of the action of the 1st respondent, especially when the 1st respondent has the
benefit of the wise counsel of such a large number of Advocates, the number being 272, who have pledged themselves to plead on his behalf
through their chief spokesman, Mr. Sankaran, Yet another mystic factor, is, as to how contempt proceedings initiated against an Advocate can be
asked to be placed on a special footing on the ground that it affects the rights and privileges of the Advocates in general, but in so far as actions
against an Advocate for offences under the Indian Penal Code, etc., are concerned, or in suits for damages for defamation, etc., the Advocate has
to defend for himself and the rights of Advocates, as a class, would not arise for consideration.
If we are to concede in principle that in contempt proceedings taken against an Advocate, the general rights of the members of the legal
profession are involved, and on that score, the respective Association must be given an opportunity to put forward arguments about the general
and abstract rights of the members of the profession as such then we can find no principle in law, on which we can refuse permission to a medical
practitioners'' Association to intervene when contempt proceedings are initiated against a medical practitioner. An engineer''s Association to
intervene when an engineer is issued notice of contempt proceedings and similarly, the rights of other Associations to seek intervention when a
member of the respective Association, such a Police Officer'' Association, Industrial Workers'' Association, Transport Workers'' Association,
Plantation Workers'' Association, Agriculturists'' Association etc., is called upon to enter appearance and defend himself in contempt proceedings.
If we are to adopt such a wide door policy, which must necessarily be adopted if there is to be no complaint of discrimination, if we concede the
request of the Bar Association and Advocates'' Association for intervention, then it will undoubtedly lead to contempt enquiries getting escalated
beyond their true circumscribed limits and the contempt proceedings enlarged beyond proportion. The argument that the Advocates occupy a
distinct position in the judicial set up viz., being considered as officers of Court does not involve the consequence that they, as a body, should be
allowed to intervene in every case in which the conduct of an Advocate comes up for judicial scrutiny. The contention of Mr. Sankaran that the
Associations may have to intervene ""when deemed necessary"" shows that there is practically no limit to the potential area of intervention, and the
consequence may well be that even ordinary matters coming before Courts may assume a complexity far out of proportion to its contours.
Another undesirable, but inevitable concomitant of the unrestricted entry of third-parties in contempt proceedings would be that they may
overstep their limits and canvass the Court to adopt a harsh and severe attitude towards the contemner even in those cases where the Court is
inclined to treat the matter lightly and discharge the contemner of the contempt notice, or prevail upon the contemner by applying pressure on him
not to express regret and tender apology even in those cases where a contemner wants to exhibit locus paenitentiae and seek the pardon of Court.
It is needless for us to say that contempt proceedings stand on a footing of their own and cannot be equated with other proceedings since the
Court is not engaged in deciding a cause between two parties, but is engaged in exercising its jurisdiction and powers to vindicate the majesty of
law in its active manifestation against obstruction or outrage. In one sense, the court acts in such matters as judge of its own cause and as such, its
decision must rest purely on its own analysis and view of the matter and uninfluenced by the passions and prejudices of third-parties. In other
words the court must apply its dispassionate mind in judging whether a contemner has committed contempt or not and if the finding is a positive
one what the sentence should be. Such aloofness of approach and detachment of view will be put in jeopardy if interveners, however well
intentioned they might be, are allowed to enter the arena and allowed to identify themselves for or against the contemner. Likewise to deprive a
contemner of a chance to escape from the rigorous punishment by repenting for his actions and tendering apology to the Court on account of
enthusiastic interveners lending temporary support for his cause and espousing his actions will be and act of the highest injustice to the contemner
himself. We are therefore of opinion that the presence of interveners may lead to the flaming up of passions as well as loading the armoury for or
against the contemner with unwanted weapons, which will not only vitiate the atmosphere, but make the court get involved more than what is
necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, and the contemner, a hero or a villain even against his own wishes.
Mr. Raghavan and Mr. Venkatachari placed reliance upon the cases mentioned below to fortify their claim for intervention. The first of the
cases is, Narayanan Nambiar, v. Sankaran Namboodiripad, 1968 Ker LT299 FB wherein the cause title discloses that Mr. K. Velayutham
Nambiar and Mr. S. Eswara Ayyar appeared for the Advocates Association. The next citation also relates to E. M. S. Namboodiripad case and
the report is contained in E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad Vs. T. Narayanan Nambiar, . In this report, it is shown that the State of Kerala had
entered appearance as intervener. In Re: Shri Sham Lal, , in the cause title, Mr. S. K. Jain is shown as Advocate for intervener. Placing reliance on
these cases, it was argued that there has been precedent for third parties entering appearance in contempt proceedings as interveners and leading
assistance to the Court. On going through the judgments, we find that there is no reference as to the circumstances under which the interveners
sought intervention and whether their request was acceded and they were allowed to make representations. The judgments do not contain any
dictum regarding the locus standi of third parties to seek intervention in contempt petitions and on what basis and under what circumstances, the
intervention petitions can be allowed. It appears therefore to us that the question of the right of third parties to appear as interveners in contempt
proceedings as well as the ramifications that are likely to follow in the event of interveners being given an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings may not have arisen for consideration in the various cases referred to above. We are, therefore, of opinion that the citations referred
to above, do not provide any guiding principle of law on the basis of which we can sustain the application of the Bar Association and the
Advocates Association.
Yet another decision to which our attention was invited is Shri C.K. Daphtary and Others Vs. Shri O.P. Gupta and Others, . What had
happened in the case was that Shri C. K. Daphtary and three other Advocates brought to the notice of the Supreme Court, the committing of
contempt of court by O. P. Gupta and two others. The learned Counsel contended, on the strength of this case, that the Advocates are Officers of
the Court and have therefore a duty to bring to the notice of the Court the committing of contempt whenever such a thing happened and a right to
bring to the notice of the Court matters of contempt extended up to the Advocates or the Association to which they belong participating in the
proceedings as well and putting forth their views for or against the alleged contemners.
We are not in the least persuaded by this argument, because the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act affords scope for third parties to
bring to the notice of Court the commission of contempt; but they do not go further and provide that third parties, including those who act as
sentinels and bring to the Court''s notice matters of contempt, can seek the right of participation in the proceedings as interveners. In this
connection, we may only refer to the relevant portions of Sections 14 and 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, which read as follows :-
14 (1) When it is alleged or appears to the Supreme Court or the High Court upon its own view, that a person has been guilty of contempt
committed in its presence or hearing, the Court may cause such person to be detained in custody, and, at any time before the rising of the Court on
the same day, .......
15 (1). In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in Section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action
on its own motion or on a motion made by -
(a) the Advocate-General, or
(b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General.
From the above provisions, it may be seen that the Act provides for third parties also bringing to the notice of Court the commission of
contempt. But the matter stops with the initial stages of the matter. A right of participation is not given under the Act to third parties, including those
who act as informers. On this aspect of the matter, we may point out with advantage that the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, are
not governed by the provisions of the Civil P.C. Even under S. 17(4) where a reference is made to the Civil P.C., it is only stated that attachment
under sub-section (3) shall be effected in the manner provided in the Civil P.C., 1908 for the attachment of property in execution of a decree for
payment of money. In fact, this position is conceded by the Advocate Association in the affidavit filed by its Senior Secretary. The relevant portion
reads as follows :-
I respectfully submit that although there is no specific provision for impleading of parties under the Contempt of Courts Act (Act VII of 1971) it is
always open to this Hon''ble Court to adopt its own procedure and practice in consonance with justice to permit Madras High Court Advocates
Association to come on record as ""Interveners"" to assist this Hon''ble Court .....
Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act empowers the Supreme Court or the High Court, as the case may be, to make rules not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, providing for any matter relating to its procedure. In accordance with this section, this High Court has
framed rules. We are therefore governed by the Act and the rules in the matter of procedure, also and we find that there is no provision either in
the Act or in the rules for third parties being allowed to intervene in contempt proceedings. In view of this position, we cannot accede to the
request of the Advocates'' Association that we formulate a procedure of our own and allow the petitions seeking intervention.
Departing for a moment from the trend of discussion, we may mention about the expression made by Mr. Raghavan and Mr. Venkatachari
about the reasons, which have impelled the Associations to seek intervention in the proceedings. Both the learned Counsel assured the Court that
they were not seeking intervention to espouse the defence of the 1st respondent, but only to see that the dignity of courts and the majesty of law
are maintained. We have no reason to doubt the assurance given by the learned counsel. But even so, we cannot refrain from referring to certain
portions contained in the affidavit of Mr. Venkatachari, which strikes a discordant note to the assurance given by him. We extract below the
relevant portion in the affidavit.
The above application raises question of general importance of the rights of the Members of the Bar to hold and to express their opinion,
regarding the functioning of judiciary in a general way; Bona fide expression of such opinions by members of the Bar cannot constitute contempt of
Court. There is distinction between contempt and fair comment and the approach of the judiciary should be in such matters to en-courage honest
expression of opinion for ''Strengthening Judiciary'', I submit that the members of the Bar are interested in presenting their point and view on the
subject matter, viz., the letter to the Editor, published on The Hindu dated 27th March, 1980.
This passage sufficiently indicates that however detached the interveners may want to be, the possibility of their overstepping their limits to the
advantage or detriment of the contemner, cannot be ruled out, and such a development would neither conduce to the Court forming its pinion in a
detached manner, nor the contemner having freedom of choice to contest the proceedings or to tender apology and seek the pardon of court.
Reverting now to the main discussion, we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Baradakanta Mishra Vs. Justice Gatikrushna
Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, , where the peculiar nature of contempt proceedings have been succinctly set out. The relevant
portion occurs in para 5 at page 2258, and it runs as follows :-
It has always been regarded as well settled law so far as criminal contempt is concerned, it is a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged
contemner. No one has a statutory or common law right to say that he is entitled as a matter of course to an order for committal because the
alleged contemner is guilty of contempt. All that he can do is to move the court and draw its attention to the contempt alleged to have been
committed and it will then be for the Court, if it so thinks fit, to take action to vindicate its authority and commit the alleged contemner for
contempt. It is for the Court in the exercise of its discretion to decide whether or not to initiate a proceeding for contempt. Even if the Court is
prima facie satisfied that a contempt has been committed, the Court may yet choose to ignore it and decline to take action. There is no right in any
one to compel the Court to initiate a proceeding for contempt even where a prima facie case appears to have been made out. The same position
obtains even after a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court on a motion made to it for the purpose. The Court may in the exercise of its
discretion accept an unconditional apology from the alleged contemner and drop the proceedings for contempt, or, even after the alleged
contemner is found guilty, the Court may, having regard to the circumstances, decline to punish him. So far as the contempt jurisdiction is
concerned, the only actors in the drama are the Court and thee alleged contemner. An outside party comes in only by way of drawing the attention
of the Court to the contempt which has been committed; he does not become a part of the proceeding for contempt which may be initiated by the
court"".
In the light of this clear pronouncement and the reasons given by us supra, we cannot entertain the intervention petitioner filed by the Bar
Association and the Advocates Association.
Coming now to the petition filed by the Officers'' Association, we have indicated even earlier that this petition stands on a different footing. We
need not go into the question whether the grievance entertained by the Assistant Secretary viz., that the letter of the 1st respondent is directly
aimed at the subordinate judiciary and has the effect of lowering the prestige of the subordinate judiciary to such an extent as to place them in
ridicule and contempt before the members of the public, is justified or not. Suffice it to say that even if the grievance of the Officers'' Association is
a well founded one, it is only the High Court that can take action against the contemner. Sections 10 and 11 of the Contempt of Courts Act, read
as follows :-
Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in
respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercise in respect of contempts of itself.
(proviso omitted)
A High Court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into or try a contempt of itself or any court subordinate to it, whether the contempt is alleged to
have been committed within or outside the local limits of its jurisdiction, and whether the persons alleged to be guilty of contempt is within or
outside such limits.
From the above sections it is manifestly clear that even in respect of the contempt of any subordinate Court, it is only the High Court that can
take action against the contemner. The High Court acting as the apex institution has to safeguard the interest of the subordinate courts. As such, the
Officers Association cannot seek intervention.
Mr. M. R. Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel appearing for the second and third respondents had nothing to say for or against the intervention
petitions filed by the Bar Association and the Advocates Association, but so far as the petition filed by the Officers Association is concerned, he
raised certain objections. He referred to paras 2 and 3 of the affidavit filed by the Joint Secretary of the Officers'' Association and Sections 10 and
11 extracted above and contended that if the subordinate Judiciary felt that the respondents had committed contempt, they are only entitled to
bring to the notice of the High Court the commission of the contempt and they have no right to ask for impleader in the proceedings instituted by
the High Court for contempt. Mr. Narayanaswamy also referred to the proviso to Section 10 which lays down that no High Court shall take
cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court Subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable
under the Indian Penal Code and argued that if it was a case of contempt of the Subordinate Judiciary, the High Court should not take cognizance
at all of the matter. Another argument advanced was that in the petition filed by the learned Advocate General for initiation of action for contempt,
the averments are that aspersions have been cast and defamatory remarks have been made against the learned Judge of the High Court, and as
such, there is no room at all for the members of the subordinate judiciary to contend that the publication is directed against them. We do not feel
called upon to consider the objections of Mr. Narayanaswamy, since we are of opinion that the express provisions contained in Sections 10 and
11 of the Act disentitle the Officers'' Association from seeking intervention. The resultant position is that the petition filed by the Judicial Officers
must also fail.
For all the reasons given above, all the three petitions seeking intervention, have to fail and they will accordingly stand dismissed.
On behalf of the Bar Association and the Advocates Association, oral applications are made for grant of a certificate under Article 134(1)(c)
of the Constitution of India for an appeal being preferred to the Supreme Court against our order. In the first place, we do not think that the
applicants stand in the position of aggrieved persons because they are not directly or indirectly concerned in the contempt proceedings. They had
only come forward with the intervention petitions for the purpose of rendering assistance to Court in disposing of the main contempt application.
Even otherwise, we do not consider the subject matter of the order as one which is fit for being taken in appeal to the Supreme Court. We,
therefore, dismiss the applications.
Applications dismissed.