High CourtsDivision Bench(2026) 07 KL CK 1656

Thara L.S vs Union Of India & Ors.

High Court Of Kerala · Decided on 15 July 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Soumen Sen, C.J · Syam Kumar V.M., J
CASE NUMBER
WP(CRL.) NO. 712 OF 2026

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

68 paragraphs · 6,725 words

Syam Kumar V.M., J.

This W.P.(Crl.) is filed by the wife of Mr. Ramesh Kumar, who is detained in the Central Prison, Poojapura, Thiruvananthapuram, and continues to be under detention pursuant to the order passed by the 2nd respondent under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (for short ‘PIT NDPS Act’). Petitioner challenges the detention of her husband as illegal and seeks to issue a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of certiorari quashing the orders leading to his detention.

2.

Copies of the detention order bearing No.HomeSSC1/149/2025-HOME dated 16.11.2025 issued by the 2nd respondent and the Confirmation Order bearing No.GO (Rt) No.191/2026/Home dated 16.01.2026 are produced along with the W.P.(Crl.) as Exhibits P1 and P2 respectively. Petitioner inter alia seeks to quash Exhibits P1 and P2 orders.

3.

After admitting the W.P.(Crl.) into file, this Court had directed the 1st and 2nd respondents to file their respective statements. Pursuant thereto, counter affidavit has been filed by the 1st respondent on 07.07.2026. No statement or counter has been filed by the 2nd respondent.

4.

Since it was deemed necessary to have a closer scrutiny of the records and procedures undertaken by the authorities leading to Exhibits P1 and P2 orders, we had directed the learned Public Prosecutor to produce the relevant documents and the opinion of the Advisory Committee in a sealed envelope. Pursuant to the said direction, a sealed cover has been produced containing the ‘Report and Opinion dated 12.01.2026 of the Advisory Board in R.C. (PIT NDPS) No.140 of 2025 which concerns the detenu as well as the connected details of the proceedings held by the Advisory Board.

5.

We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr.M.H.Hanis, Advocate, Mr.Biju Meenattoor, learned Senior Public Prosecutor who appeared for respondents 2, 3 and 5 to 7 and Mr.Benraj K.R., Central Government Standing Counsel representing the 1st respondent.

6.

The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Exhibit P1 order issued by the 2nd respondent invoking Section 3 (1) of the PIT NDPS Act and its confirmation by the 1st respondent, vide Exhibit P2 order are illegal, arbitrary, and vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record. According to the learned counsel, the said orders are liable to be quashed as they were issued mechanically, without any proper application of mind, and without complying with the mandatory provisions under Sections 9(b) and 9(c) of the PIT NDPS Act. Substantial prejudice, it is submitted, had been caused to the detenu due to the non-compliance of the statutory requirements by the respondents while issuing Exhibits P1 and P2 orders.

7.

It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that right from the inception of the proceedings leading to detention of the detenu, there has been violation of the mandatory procedure. For instance, no report in respect of the Exhibit P1 order was sent to the Central Government within 10 days of passing the order, as stipulated in Section 3(2) of the PIT NDPS Act.

8.

According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, there has been a delay of 5 months between the passing of Exhibit P1 order and the last prejudicial activity alleged against the detenu. A delay of 3.5 months has occurred in sponsoring the detenu and a delay of 38 days has occurred in passing Exhibit P1 order after releasing the detenu in the last prejudicial activity. It is admitted that no explanation is forthcoming for the above said delays thereby vitiating the entire proceedings.

9.

It is contended that in both cases which are taken into consideration for detaining the detenu, the detenu was let out on bail and the sufficiency of bail conditions to deter the detenu from committing similar offenses was not taken note of by the authorities. The screening committee constituted under the order dated 06.10.1988 did not consider the change in circumstances after the detenu was released on bail and hence the order of the screening Committee is vitiated. It is also contended that compelling circumstances to book the detenu had not been explained and the triple test laid down in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another [(1991) 1 SCC 128] has not been met. According to the counsel, in the case at hand, the non-mentioning of the fact that the detenu was on bail and the non-consideration of the bail conditions clamped on the detenu itself show the non-application of mind of the detaining authority, and the same vitiates the impugned order. Non supply of translated copy of documents relied on for passing of Exhibit P1 Detention Order is alleged and it is contended that the same had prevented the detenu from submitting a detailed representation. Violation of natural justice principles is also alleged stating that Exhibit P1 and P2 orders had been issued by the same officer of the state.

10.

It is further contended by the learned counsel that though the detenu had submitted a representation (Exhibit P3) with the limited information that he possessed,the same was not considered as is mandated in law thereby causing serious prejudice to the detenu and violation of his fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution. To buttress the contentions put forth regarding the alleged non-consideration of Exhibit P3 representation preferred before the 1st respondent, and its legal consequences, the learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the dictum laid down in Rasna A.K. v. State of Kerala [2025 KHC OnLine 1690], wherein it was held that inaction on the part of the respondents in considering such representation submitted by the detenu against his detention violates Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, rendering the detention illegal. Relying on the same dictum, it is contended that a delay of more than two months in considering the representation, without explanation, would violate the detenu's constitutional rights, rendering his continued detention illegal, invalid, and unconstitutional. According to the learned counsel, the detenu’s representation to the 1st respondent (produced as Exhibit P3), allegedly remained unconsidered.

11.

The learned counsel for the petitioner also alleges specific violations of mandatory provisions, including violation of Section 9 (b) of the PIT NDPS Act. It is pointed out that though it was mandatory to make a reference in respect of the detention order before the Advisory Board within five weeks from the date of detention, and such an opinion ought to have been given by the Advisory Board within a period of 11 weeks stating its opinion as to whether there was sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the said time periods mandated in the provisions had not been complied with. Thus, on the said ground of non-compliance with the statutorily ordained time limits too, it is submitted, Exhibits P1 and P2 orders are liable to be set aside.

12.

In the light of and upon being confronted with Annexure R1 Memorandum produced by the 1st respondent along with its counter affidavit dated 06.07.2026, which reveals that Exhibit P3 representation dated 27.12.2025 (30.12.2025) preferred by the detenu had been considered, rejected and intimated on 30.04.2026, the learned counsel submitted that such consideration does not stand the scrutiny of law. He submits that Annexure R1 merely follows a printed format and it could be applied to any case. There is no proper application of mind to the case at hand and not even a prima facie conclusion has been arrived at regarding the need or circumstance leading to the detention of the petitioner under the PIT NDPS Act. The crime numbers and charging sections, nature of alleged offences, the manner in which the authorities had considered his case and the correctness of the reasoning adopted, which are all aspects that ought to be disclosed, have not been even mentioned or seen to have engaged the attention of the 1st respondent. The learned counsel contends that such boiler-plate templates with a standardised reusable set of texts or formats cannot be relied on by the authorities while exercising jurisdiction and issuing orders under the PIT NDPS Act in discharge of the duties under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. As regards the delay in disposing of the representation, reliance is placed on the dictum laid down in Mohinuddin @ Moin Master v. District Magistrate, Beed and others [(1987) 4 SCC 58]; Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India [(1995) 4 SCC 51]; Rajammal v. State of T.N., [(1999) 1 SCC 417]; Tara Chand v. State of Rajasthan and others [(1981) 1 SCC 416] ; Jaseela Shaji v. The Union of India and others (2024 KHC OnLine 6499).

13.

The learned counsel for the petitioner thus, seek to quash Exhibits P1 and P2 orders and to allow the W.P.(Crl) as prayed for.

14.

Per contra, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor appearing for respondents 2 to 7 stoutly refuted the contentions put forth by the counsel for the petitioner and submitted that all statutory requirements had been complied with while issuing Exhibits P1 and P2 orders. It is submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that the detenu is involved in two cases under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), and is a person who has been indulging in illicit traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. It is submitted that of the two cases considered against the detenu, one is a case registered in 2024 and the other is a case registered in 2025. The first case involves 16.18 grams of methamphetamine and the second one is a case involving 46.04 grams of methamphetamine. It is submitted that in both cases the FIR was registered on the belief that the contraband article was MDMA, but later chemical analysis revealed that it is methamphetamine. Accordingly, necessary correction reports had been filed in the court. The learned Public Prosecutor submitted that in both the cases the contraband article was seized from the possession of the detenu and he was not alone at the time of detection. The detenu and the co-accused were found possessing methamphetamine in both cases and the quantity involved was not a small quantity meant for consumption .

15.

The learned Public Prosecutor submits that the contention that the detenu was on bail and the efficiency of the bail conditions were not looked into by the authorities is unsustainable. It is pointed out that the detention order specifically, notes that the detainee had been placed in a rowdy history sheet of the Deputy Superintendent of Police Nedumangad and that he had blatantly violated the stringent bail conditions in Crime No.111 of 2024 of Sreekaryam Police Station and had got involved in subsequent crime, i.e., Crime No.825 of 2025 of Peroorkada Police Station. The said aspect had been pointed out by the sponsoring authority and the fact that the detenu is a repeated offender who gives scant respect to the bail conditions and is likely to exploit any leniency given to him by the justice system had been duly taken note of and considered.

16.

The learned Public Prosecutor submits that the last prejudicial activity involved by the defendant is Crime No.825 of 2025 on 26.02.2025 of Perurkada Police Station. He was arrested on the same day and remanded to judicial custody and was later granted bail by the court on 09.10.2025 with conditions. Considering the criminal antecedents of the detenu, it was evident that the bail conditions were not sufficient to curb his narcotic criminal activities, as he had violated similar bail conditions imposed in the past when he was released on bail in Crime No. 111 of 2024 of Sreekaryam Police Station. It is alleged that the detenu is an active drug peddler and his activities are a threat to society and future generations, thus necessitating invocation of preventive detention measures under the PIT NDPS Act.

17.

The learned Public Prosecutor further submits that in compliance with the mandates of Section 3(2) of the PIT NDPS Act, a report was submitted by respondent No.2 to the Ministry of Finance, Government of India. Thus, the statutory mandate in this respect stands complied with by respondent No.2 within the prescribed time limit. As regards compliance with the mandatory condition in Sections 9(b) and 9(c) of the Act, it is pointed out by the learned Senior Public Prosecutor that Exhibit P1 order of detention dated 16.11.2025 had been referred to the Advisory Board on 29.11.2025 and the opinion of the Advisory Board dated 12.01.2026 was duly received by the 2nd respondent. Following the receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board, an order of confirmation of Exhibit P1 detention order was issued by the 2nd respondent on 16.01.2026. The ground for detention prepared in Malayalam language, which contained all the relevant facts related to the detention, had also been served on the detenu during execution of Exhibit P1 order. Thus, it is submitted that all mandatory provisions of the PIT NDPS Act were scrupulously complied with by the 2nd respondent within the prescribed time limit and there is no cause or reason to interfere with Exhibits P1 and P2 orders.

18.

On behalf of the 1st respondent Union of India, it is submitted by the Central Government Standing Counsel that the date of detention order is 16.11.2025 and the same was sent by the 2nd respondent to the 1st respondent on 20.11.2025 and it was received by the first respondent on 13.04.2026. It is submitted that no delay occurred in reporting the detention under Section 3(2) of the PIT NDPS Act. As regards the Exhibit P3 representation, it is submitted by the learned Standing Counsel for the Central Government that the allegation that Exhibit P3 representation of the detenu was not considered is incorrect. It is submitted that Exhibit P3 representation was received by the Central Government on 30.12.2025 and on the very same day the Central Government had called for entire reports and records from the State Government. Subsequently reminders were sent to the State Government on different dates such as 15.01.2026, 02.02.2026, 17.02.2026, 03.03.2026, 02.04.2026 and 08.04.2026. Finally on 13.04.2026 the Central Government received the report along with relevant records relating to the detention of the detenu from the State Government and on 27.04.2026, Exhibit P3 representation was disposed of by the Central Government. The factum of disposal was intimated to the detenu vide Exhibit R1 Memorandum and the same was received by him on 04.05.2026. The learned Standing Counsel invites our attention to Exhibit R1 dated 30.04.2026 in this respect. It is submitted by the learned Standing Counsel that though the detenu had raised several grounds which were either factually incorrect or pertained exclusively to the domain of the State Government, the Central Government has fully complied with its statutory obligation under the PIT NDPS Act by issuing and communicating vide Exhibit R1 Memorandum.

19.

According to the learned counsel for the Union of India, Exhibit P3 representation thus stood duly considered and disposed of by the Central Government in accordance with law. The allegation that the representation remained unconsidered is wholly unfounded and factually incorrect. It is further submitted that the Central Government has discharged its statutory obligation to independently consider the representation submitted by the detenu, and there has been no deliberate or unexplained delay on the part of the Central Government in that regard. The time taken for consideration, according to the learned counsel, was attributable to the need to obtain necessary comments and records from the State Government, without which an effective consideration of the representation was not possible. Immediately upon receipt of the requisite materials, it is submitted, the representation was processed with due diligence and disposed of by the competent authority, that too within a reasonable time. The learned counsel thus submits that the contentions put forth by the petitioner regarding non-consideration of Exhibit P3 representation is devoid of merits and are liable to be rejected.

20.

We have heard both sides in detail and have considered the respective contentions put forth. We have also perused the report of the Advisory Board along with the ‘Reasons for its opinion’, and the ‘Proceedings of the Advisory Board’ produced by the learned Public Prosecutor in a sealed envelope. We note that the Advisory Board had heard both sides and after an elaborate consideration of the contentions put forth on behalf of the detenu as well as for the State had provided its opinion.

21.

The following questions arise for our consideration :

1.

Whether Exhibit P1 detention order is vitiated by delay and has been passed mechanically without considering the relevant materials?

2.

Whether there were valid and compelling reasons for passing the impugned orders of detention while the detenu was on conditional bail in the last prejudicial activity?

3.

Whether there has been non compliance with the mandatory requirements under Sections 9 (b) and (c) of the PIT NDPS Act while issuing Exhibits P1 and P2 orders?

4.

Was there any unexplained/ unreasonable delay in considering Exhibit P3 representation preferred by the detenu to the 1st respondent thereby causing prejudice to the detenu?

22.

At the outset we proceed to consider the contention that Exhibit P1 detention order and Exhibit P2 confirmation order are vitiated by delay.

23.

The question of delay in preventive detention matters is no longer res integra. It is trite as has been laid down in a catena of high authoritative precedents that delay, by itself, is not a determinative factor in matters of preventive detention. What is relevant is whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained and whether, by reason of such delay, the live and proximate nexus between the prejudicial activities of the detenu and the necessity for preventive detention has been snapped. [See Golam Hussain v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta [(1974) 4 SCC 530]; Jagan Nath Biswas v. State of West Bengal (1975) 4 SCC 115; T.A Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala (1989) 4 SCC 741; M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India (1990) 2 SCC 1.] It has been unequivocally laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgments that courts should not merely on account of the delay in making of an order of detention assume that such delay, gives rise to an inference that there was no sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority or that such subjective satisfaction was not genuinely reached. Delay, in itself, is not a conclusive factor in cases involving preventive detention. The principal consideration would be whether the delay has been adequately explained and whether such delay has resulted in breaking the live and proximate nexus between the detenu's prejudicial activities thus absolving the need or necessity to order preventive detention.

24.

In the case at hand the detenu is alleged to be involved in two crimes. The details thereof are as follows:

Crime Number and Police stationDate of occurrenceOffence allegedQuantity involvedStatus
825/2025 Peroorkada PS20.06.202522 (b) & 29, 8 (c) of NDPS Act.Methampheta mine 46.04 gmFinal report submitted
1111/2024 of Sreekaryam PS08.11.202422 (b) & 29, of NDPS Act.Methampheta mine 16.81 gmFinal report submitted
25.

It is in the conspectus of the above two NDPS cases that on 17.09.2025, a proposal along with copies of the relevant documents was submitted by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Thiruvananthapuram City, to the 2nd respondent seeking issuance of detention of the detenu under Section 3 of the PIT NDPS Act. The same was placed before the screening committee by the 2nd respondent and at the meeting held on 25.10.2025, the said proposal was considered and a report was submitted to the 2nd respondent. After due consideration and upon having arrived at an objective and subjective satisfaction that it was necessary to detain the individual, the 2nd respondent rendered Exhibit P1 detention order on 16.11.2025 and the said order was executed on 18.11.2025 while the detenu was on bail in the crime registered in connection with the last prejudicial act ie., in Crime No.825 of 2025 of Peroorkada Police Station.

26.

In the case at hand while considering the purported delay and the alleged snapping of live link between the last prejudicial activity and the order of detention, it is to be noted that the sponsoring authority has given an explanation for the delay that has been occasioned.

27.

We have independently considered the explanation regarding the delay. We note that the detenu was arrested on the last prejudicial activity ie., Crime No.825 of 2025 of Peroorkada Police station. which occurred on 20.06.2025 on the spot. The bail application was allowed on 09.10.2025. In the circumstances explained above, the contention that preventive detention was not necessary and that there had been inordinate and capable of snapping the live link, is unsustainable. The contention that the live and proximate link between the prejudicial activities and the order of detention stood snapped is not supported by any material. Contentions in the said respect put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner are hence unsustainable and rejected.

28.

What is thus required to be examined is whether the detaining authority was conscious of the existence of such bail conditions and whether, despite the same, it arrived at a subjective satisfaction that preventive detention was necessary. The detention order elaborately states the factors that weighed with the authorities while proceeding to invoke detention provisions while the detenue was out on bail. The said explanations are based on his previous antecedents in NDPS case there were compelling reasons to apprehend that detenu could dishonour the bail conditions as before. We do not find any reason to hold that the issuance of the detention order while the detenu was on bail subject to bail conditions was thus illegal or unwarranted.

29.

The next question to be considered is whether the mandatory requirements under Section 9(b) and (c) of the PIT NDPS Act were complied with while issuing Exts. P1 and P2 orders. Section 9(b) of the PIT NDPS Act mandates that, in every case where a detention order has been made under Section 3(1) of the Act, the appropriate Government shall, within five weeks from the date of detention, refer the detention order to the Advisory Board. Further, under Section 9(c), the Advisory Board is required to consider the reference and the materials placed before it and, if the detenu expresses a desire to be heard, afford him an opportunity of personal hearing. Upon such consideration, the Advisory Board must record its opinion as to whether sufficient cause exists for the continued detention of the person concerned. The Board is thus required to submit its report to the appropriate Government within eleven weeks from the date of the detenu's detention. In the case at hand, it is seen that the detention order was issued on 16.11.2025 and the reference had been made on 29.11.2025 that is well within the period of 35 days or 5 weeks as legally mandated. As regards the compliance mandated of Section 9(c) whereby the Advisory Board has to issue the opinion within 77 days that is within 11 weeks of Detention Order, it is noted that the Advisory opinion had been rendered within 57 days. Thus the contention that the mandatory requirements under Section 9(b) and (c) of the PIT NDPS Act were not complied with while issuing Exts. P1 and P2 orders is unsustainable.

30.

The final question to be considered is whether there is any unexplained/unreasonable delay in considering Exhibit P3 representation preferred by the detenue to the 1st respondent thereby causing prejudice to the detenu. We note that Exhibit P3 representation had been filed by the detenue before the 1st respondent on 30.12.2025. As per the statement filed by the Deputy Solicitor General, a decision had been taken on the representation of the detenue by the first respondent on 30.04.2026 and the Superintendent of the Kerala Prisons and Correctional Services, Poojapura, Thiruvanantapuram, had acknowledged theservice of the same on the detenu on 04.05.2026. We note that the statement filed by the 1st respondent states that the representation was rejected on 30.04.2026. The contentions raised by the petitioner on this count are twofold. Firstly, there has been absence/delay in considering the representation preferred, which has prejudicially affected the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the petitioner. Secondly, the representation has been disposed of in the most cryptic and mechanical manner without disclosing any proper application of mind. The order dated 30.04.2026 passed by the 1st respondent in the representation preferred by the detenu has been produced as Annexure R1 along with the statement filed by the 1st respondent. It would be relevant to reproduce the contents of Annexure R1 in its entirety which reads as follows:

“With reference to the representation dated 30.12.2025 by the detenu Sri. Ramesh Kumar, S/o Shri. Sasi, R/o Uthram Veedu, Near Ambady Dairy Farm, Kulakkodu Ward, Vellnadu Village ( Now residing at Narayaneeyam, Near HDFC Bank, CV Nagar, Chavadi Mukku, Sreekaryam), Thiruvaranthapuram, District, Kerala, made to the Central Government, requesting for revoking the detention order dated 16.11.2025 issued by the Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Kerala under Section 3(1) of the PIT NDPS Act, 1988. It is thereby informed that the aforesaid representation has been examined and considered along with material facts on record by the Secretary Department of Revenue on behalf of the Central Government and the same has been rejected as no merit has been found on the contentions made in the representation.” (Emphasis supplied)

On an examination of Annexure R 1 as reproduced above, we find merit in the contention of the petitioner that it is a non-speaking order lacking any substantive reasons. It only shows a routine and mechanical exercise of power without demonstrating any independent consideration of the facts or circumstances of the case of the detenu. The contention of the petitioner's counsel that Annexure R1 is nothing more than a pre-printed pro forma which could be used in virtually any matter, has some substance. There is nothing to show in the Annexure R1 that there has been a consideration of relevant aspects or that issues which ought to have been specifically addressed, have been referred to or considered by the first respondent.

31.

In addition to being cryptic and unreasoned, we note that Annexure R1 is also marred by delay as explained hereunder. The law on the point of delay in consideration of the representations made by a detenu under preventive detention is trite and settled. In Rajammal (supra) it has been laid down that if delay was caused on account of any indifference, or lapse in considering the representation, such delay will adversely affect further detention of the prisoner it is for the authority concerned to explain the delay, if any, in disposing of the representation. It has been held therein that it is not enough to say that the delay was very short and even a longer delay can as well be explained, the test thus being not the duration or range of delay, but how it is explained by the authority concerned. It is thus well established that any unexplained or inordinate delay by the detaining authority in deciding the representation violates Article 22(5), rendering the detention void.

32.

Exhibit P3 representation preferred by the detenu is dated 27.12.2025. It had been routed through the 7th respondent to the 1st respondent. Annexure R 1 disposing of Exhibits P3 is issued only on 30.04.2026 ie., after a period of more than 4 months. It was admittedly served on the detenu only on 04.05.2026. Thus between the preferring of the representation by the detenu on 30.12.2025, and the service of the reply upon him on 04.05.2026 there has occasioned a delay of 4 months.

33.

In Tara Chand (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the delay of one month and five days in communicating the representation of the detenu from the jail to the detaining authority observed as follows:

“9.

In spite of these evasive answers contained in para 21, it is clear that the representation dated February 23, 1980 of the detenu made by him through the jail authorities reached the detaining authority only on March 27, 1980. It was substantially in the same terms as the representation addressed to the Central Government for revocation of the detention under Section 11. This delay of one month and five days in communicating the representation of the detenu from the jail to the detaining authority demonstrates the gross negligence and extreme callousness with which the representation made by the detenu was dealt with by the respondents or their agents. Even after this huge delay, the representation was sent to the Collector for comments, and no intimation has been sent to the detenu about the fate of his representation dated February 23, 1980, addressed to the detaining authority. In fact, as it appears from the counter, the detaining authority refused to consider the same merely because the detenu had requested that this representation be forwarded to the Advisory Board, also. The mere fact that the meeting of the Advisory Board had been held earlier was not a valid excuse for the detaining authority in not considering the representation of the detenu at all. 10. It is well settled that in case of preventive detention of a citizen, Article 22(5) of the Constitution enjoins that the obligation of the appropriate Government or of the detaining authority to afford the detenu the earliest opportunity to make a representation and to consider that representation speedily is distinct from the Government's obligation to constitute a Board and to communicate the representation, amongst other materials, to the Board to enable it to form its opinion and to obtain such opinion. In the instant case, there has been a breach of these constitutional imperatives.” (Emphasis supplied)

34.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sushanta Kumar Banik v. State of Tripura and others [2022 SCC OnLine SC 1333] has after examining a catena decisions rendered on the point of unreasonable delay in detention matters pithily concluded as follows:

“It is manifestly clear from a conspectus of the above decisions of this Court, that the underlying principle is that if there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention & actual arrest of the detenu and in the same manner from the date of the proposal and passing of the order of detention, such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped in arresting the detenu. A question whether the delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. (Emphasis supplied)

35.

The 1st respondent has in its counter affidavit dated 06.07.2026 while producing Annexure R1 explained the delay in disposing of the representation in following terms:

“The further allegation against the Central Government is that Exhibit P3 representation of that new was not considered is incorrect and denied. It is respectfully submitted that Exhibit P3 representation received by the Central Government on 30.12.2025 and on the very same day the Central Government called for the entire reports and records of the same from the State Government. Subsequently The reminders were sent to the State Government on different dates such as 15.01.2026, 02.02.2026, 17.02.2026, 03.03.2026, 02.04.2026 and 08.04.2026. Finally on 13.04.2026 the Central Government received the report along with relevant records from the State Government. On 27.04.2026, Exhibit P3 representation was disposed of by the Central Government on 30.04.2026. The disposal order was sent to the detenue and was duly received by him on 04.05.2026. The said order produced and marked as Exhibit R1.”

It has thus been contended by the 1st respondent that the delay of more than 3 months that had occasioned in disposing the representation preferred by the detenu was only on account of the delay on the part of the State Government to forward the relevant particulars.

36.

It is settled and trite that an ‘independent consideration’ of the representation of the detenu is mandated under law. We note that Annexure R1 does not reveal such a course to have been adopted by the 1st respondent. As explained above, Annexure R 1 is more or less a boiler plate template order which has apparently been rendered mechanically. With respect to the delay and time taken for disposal of the representation, it is to be noted that Section 3 (2) of the PIT NDPS Act stipulates that when an order of detention is made by a State Government or by an officer empowered by a State Government, the State Government shall within 10 days forward the Central Government a report in respect of the order. The object of the said provision apparently is to keep the Central Government informed of the action initiated by the State Government or the officer appointed by it, invoking PIT NDPS Act which is a central statute as well as to enable the Central Government to act on representations preferred, or to be preferred by the detenu against such detention. Thus the PIT NDPS Act has an inbuilt mechanism for avoiding delay in effecting compliance with the mandates of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. In the case at hand however, a delay of around 4 months has been occasioned in disposing of the representation so preferred by the detenu and such delay has been sought to be explained out by the concerned authority as one caused due to the delay in providing requisite information by the state government/ its authorities. It is also pertinent to note that, if the authorities had been genuinely satisfied as to the necessity of detaining the detenu, the representation submitted by him under Article 22(5) ought to have been considered and disposed of with due alacrity and expedition. The fact that the said representation was kept pending before the authorities and was ultimately disposed of only after a delay of more than three months points to the fact that there was a lack of urgency in the matter of continued detention of the detenu.

37.

When constitutionally guaranteed rights of a citizen are at stake, though he may have been implicated in criminal offences, the same cannot dilute or diminish the constitutional safeguards available to him. Constitutional mandates are required to be scrupulously adhered to and cannot be lightly disregarded or rendered illusory. The inability of the Central Government and the State Government to effectively discharge their respective statutory obligations, or any attempt by either Government to shift the responsibility onto the other, cannot constitute a valid justification for the infringement or denial of fundamental rights. It is in this context that the relevant provision of the PIT NDPS Act [Section 3 (2)] assumes significance. It expressly mandates that, within 10 days of issuance of an order of detention, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the Central Government. Consequently, within 10 days from 16.11.2026 which was the date of issuance of the detention order ie., before 26.11.2026, the requisite report ought to have already been transmitted to the Central Government in compliance with the statutory mandate. Such information would have enabled a speedy and time bound disposal of the representation filed by the detenu invoking Article 22 (5). The contention that, upon receipt of a representation from the detenu, the Central Government would first call for further information, seek para-wise remarks from the State Government, and only thereafter consider the representation, cannot constitute a legally sustainable explanation for the prolonging a preventive detention for a period of three more months. Acceptance of such a contention would permit administrative inefficiency to override constitutional guarantees.

38.

In Mohinuddin @ Moin Master (supra) it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as follows:

“We say and we think it necessary to repeat that the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen, except in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws. The history of personal liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of the procedural safeguards.”

Similarly in Kamlashkumar Ishwardas Patel (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held as follows:

It has been said that history of liberty is the history of procedural safeguards. The Framers of the Constitution, being aware that preventive detention involves a serious encroachment on the right to personal liberty, took care to incorporate, in clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22, certain minimum safeguards for the protection of persons sought to be preventively detained. These safeguards are required to be “zealously watched and enforced by the Court”. Their rigour cannot be modulated on the basis of the nature of the activities of a particular person. We would, in this context, reiterate what was said earlier by this Court while rejecting a similar submission: (SCC para 4)

“Maybe that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase!) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralysed the Indian economy. But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set-up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenus.” (See: Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab [(1981) 4 SCC 481 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 853] , SCC at p. 483) ( Empsis supplied)

39.

It is incumbent upon both the Central Government and the State Government to evolve and maintain an effective administrative mechanism whereby the reports forwarded under Section 3 (2) of the PIT NDPS Act are, upon receipt, readily correlated with any representation subsequently submitted by the detenu, so as to facilitate its prompt and expeditious consideration. Any deficiency or failure in such administrative coordination, whether attributable to the Central Government or the State Government, cannot be relied upon as a ground to deprive a citizen of the invaluable protection of his fundamental rights against unlawful or continued detention. In Sushanta Kumar Banik (supra) it has been concluded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that:

“The preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and the normal methods open to a person charged with commission of any offence to disprove the charge or to prove his innocence at the trial are not available to the person preventively detained and, therefore, in prevention detention jurisprudence whatever little safeguards the Constitution and the enactments authorizing such detention provide assume utmost importance and must be strictly adhered to.”

40.

In view of the above, we find merit in the contention put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner stands negated by the inordinate delay in disposing of his representation preferred under Article 22 (5) as well as due to the mechanical and unreasonable manner of such disposal.

The cumulative effect of the above discussion is that the detention of the husband of the petitioner is not in accordance with the mandates of law and hence cannot be sustained. Exts. P1 and P2 Orders are liable to be set aside and it is hereby ordered so. The 7th respondent Superintendent of Jail, Central Jail, Poojapura is hereby directed to set the said detenu viz., Sri. Ramesh Kumar, S/o Shri. Sasi, R/o Uthram Veedu, Near Ambady Dairy Farm, Kulakkodu Ward, Vellnadu Village (Now residing at Narayaneeyam, Near HDFC Bank, CV Nagar, Chavadi Mukku, Sreekaryam), Thiruvananthapuram District, Kerala, free forthwith, if his detention is not required in any other matter. The Registry shall communicate this to the 7th respondent by email at once. The report in the sealed cover shall be returned to the learned Senior Public Prosecutor forthwith.

APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) NO. 712 OF 2026

PETITIONER EXHIBITS

Exhibit P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.HOME-SSC1/149/2025-HOME DATED 16.11.2025 OF THE 2ND RESPONDENT ALONG WITH THE RELEVANT PAGES

Exhibit P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE G.O(RT).NO. 191/2026/HOME DATED 16.01.2026

Exhibit P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED 27.12.2025 SUBMITTED BY THE DETENU BEFORE THE 1ST RESPONDENT

Exhibit P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED 26.12.2025 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE 4TH RESPONDENT

RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS

Exhibit R1 The true copy of the disposal order of the Central Government, on 30.04.2026,