Thangaraj P. vs Oothu Estate and Another

P.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.—The appellant is aggrieved against the common order of the learned single Judge dated July 14, 2000, passed in

W.P. Nos. 1984 and 9385 of 1993. We are, however, concerned with the case of the appellant, the petitioner in W.P. No. 9385 of 1993.

The appellant herein was an employee of the first respondent-Estate. The appellant was stated to have been issued with a warning notice under

Exhibit Ml, dated November 16, 1987, to the effect that he made certain illegal constructions in the land belonging to the first respondent-Estate

and that he should demolish the same. Since the appellant refused to obey the directions of the first respondent-Estate, a show-cause notice under

Exhibit M2, dated December 13, 1988, came to be issued as to why action should not be taken against him for disobeying the orders of the

management by Virtue of Standing Orders 23 (1) and 23(12). The appellant contended that the construction in the land in question was put up by

his father in the year 1950 with the permission of one Sri Hews the then Administrator of the first respondent-Estate, that when the said building

got damaged he renovated the building by spending a sum of Rs. 7,500 and that he would be able to demolish the said construction only if the first

respondent reimburses the cost of the said building. Not satisfied with the explanation of the petitioner/appellant a chargesheet was issued to the

appellant on December 17, 1988 and thereafter, after holding a full-fledged enquiry and based on the findings of the enquiry officer, by order

dated January 17, 1989, the appellant was dismissed from the services of the first respondent.

Aggrieved against the order of dismissal, the appellant raised an industrial dispute before the second respondent which came to be numbered as

I.D. No. 413 of 1989. By its award, dated December, 29 1993, the second respondent held that the non-employment of the appellant was not

justified and directed reinstatement of the appellant with continuity of service and back wages as prayed for by him. It is as against the said award

of the second respondent the first respondent preferred W.P. No. 9385 of 1993 which came to be allowed by the learned single Judge by his

order, dated July 14, 2000. Learned Judge was pleased to set aside the award of the second respondent and thereby confirmed the order of

dismissal, dated January 17, 1989.

Assailing the said order of the learned single Judge, Sri Mathi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that when the

construction of the building, according to the appellant, was permitted to be made by the then Administrator of the first respondent as early as in

the year 1950 and when the appellant made certain improvements in the said construction, there was absolutely no justification for the first

respondent to proceed against the appellant based on the said incident. In other words, according to the learned counsel, when the construction in

the disputed site was put up by the appellant''s father with the full authority of the permission granted by the then Administrator of the first

respondent, there was no scope at all for the first respondent to rely upon the said issue for the purpose of issuing a chargesheet as has been done

by the first respondent herein.

We are unable to accept the said contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. At the outset, we wish to point out that the findings of the

second respondent that the father of the appellant put up the construction in the disputed site belonging to the first respondent with the permission

of the then Administrator was proved, in our view, is a finding which has absolutely no acceptable basis at all. In this context, we find that the

second respondent Labour Court after referring to the stand of the appellant with regard to the so-called permission given by one Sri Hews, the

then Administrator of the first respondent, straight away reached the conclusion to the effect that the appellant did not put up any new building in

the place belonging to the first respondent and that his father got the permission from the then Administrator, who built the hut in the year 1959 and

that the appellant only renovated the said hut every now and then whenever it got damaged. When we put a specific question to the learned

counsel for the appellant as to on what basis the second respondent Labour Court came to give the said finding the learned counsel was not able to

refer to any acceptable evidence on record to substantiate the said finding. Though the appellant is stated to have examined two witnesses on his

side in the enquiry, viz., Karuppiah and Durairaj, we find those witnesses had only stated that the appellant did not construct any building in the

disputed site but was only utilising the same. On the other hand, in the domestic enquiry it appears that one of the defence witnesses, viz., D. W. 1

deposed to the effect that the appellant was running a grocery shop in the said hut and that he also put up new sheds and white washed the hut.

Thus the appellant was merrily utilising the property belonging to the first respondent/ estate and making monetary gain out of it by putting up

certain additional constructions on his own apparently without any authority for putting the said land belonging to the first respondent for any such

commercial purpose. Having regard to the abovesaid factors, we are constrained to hold that the finding of the second respondent. Labour Court

to the effect that the appellant''s father was permitted by the then Administrator of the first respondent was a perverse finding which had absolutely

no acceptable material evidence to support.

We also find that the second respondent Labour Court also thoroughly misled itself by stating that the appellant had every justification for putting

up the construction in the land belonging to the first respondent, inasmuch as according to the second respondent the appellant was not provided

with the required residential quarters as required under the provisions of the Plantations Labour Act and therefore there was nothing wrong in the

appellant putting the construction on his own or his abode. The second respondent Labour Court; in fact, made a sweeping observation to the

effect that in the estates it was not quite uncommon for the workers to build houses either in the land belonging to the Estate or in the poramboke

lands. As a matter of fact and also indisputably, the appellant is residing in the quarters allotted by the first respondent-Estate and continue to

reside therein even as on date. Besides, the appellant had put up some unauthorised construction in some other land belonging to the first

respondent which have been put into commercial use by him. Thus the second respondent had completely omitted to take into account relevant

circumstances, while referring to certain aspects which were totally irrelevant to the case pleaded by the parties. The second respondent has thus

totally misdirected itself while passing the award impugned in the writ petition. The order of the learned single Judge in interfering with the said

award of the second respondent was therefore fully justified in the facts and circumstances of this case.

In the above stated circumstances, learned single Judge was pleased to hold that everyone of the findings of the second respondent was not

supported by any evidence on record and also not in consonance with the provisions of the Plantations Labour Act and the Rules framed

thereunder. Learned Judge was pleased to hold as under in Para. 11 of the order:

.... I see force in this argument also since when the Act itself prescribes the basis for the provision of accommodation if such acts of misconducts

are allowed then the consequences would be that a large work force would start putting up construction all over the Estates and the petitioner

would have no control over such constructions and the consequence would be disastrous and the net result will be to encourage encroachment of

the petitioners'' property and unauthorised construction of structures by the employee in total violation of the Plantations Labour Act and the Rules.

Thus I see every force in the above contentions raised by the petitioners herein.

We find every justification in the order of the learned Judge in interfering with the award of the second respondent which, as stated earlier, was

totally a perverse one as the findings were not supported by any acceptable legal evidence. Having regard to the abovesaid conclusions, we find no

good ground to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge. The writ appeal therefore fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.