Thane Municipal Corporation vs Prabhakar Chango Shinde

The Petition raises an issue as to whether a delinquent employee of Municipal Corporation, who had admitted the allegation of misappropriation of municipal funds, can be permitted to be let off the hook by restraining the disciplinary authority from imposing any punishment on him? Respondent in the present case has admitted misappropriation of huge amount of Rs. 2,77,116/- in a short duration of 3 months in the year 2004 by not depositing in municipal accounts the amounts collected by him towards water supply from consumers. He admitted the allegation, refunded the misappropriated amount and prayed for pardon. The Municipal Corporation took a lenient view and proposed imposition of punishment of only reversion to the lower post on the Respondent. The Respondent thereafter turned around and approached the Industrial Tribunal challenging the show cause notice and secured a stay order on proposed punishment. The Industrial Tribunal has set aside the show cause notice on the ground that admission of allegations in the reply to the chargesheet was not sufficient and there ought to have been formal recording of plea of admission. During pendency of the Petition, Respondent has retired from service on 31 July 2021 after working on the promotional post. Therefore, whether Respondent can be permitted to go scot-free merely because he has retired from service is also an issue for consideration in the present petition.

Thane Municipal Corporation has filed the present Petition challenging the judgment and order dated 18 April 2011 passed by the learned Member, Industrial Court, Thane allowing Complaint (ULP) No. 44 of 2009 filed by the Respondent. By the impugned order, the Industrial Court has held that Petitioner has committed unfair labour practice under Item-9 of Schedule-IV of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. (MRTU & PULP Act). The Industrial Tribunal has accordingly quashed and set aside final notice dated 4 February 2009 issued by the Petitioner proposing to impose punishment of reversion to the lower post on the Respondent.

Petitioner is a Municipal Corporation established under the provisions of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 for the City of Thane. Respondent was appointed in the municipal service as Clerk on 14 March 1983. He was promoted to the post of A-Grade Clerk on 22 July 1993. Respondent was employed at the relevant time on the post of ‘A’ Grade Clerk in the Water Supply Department, Manpada. He was placed under suspension by order dated 29 March 2005. A disciplinary inquiry was initiated against him by chargesheet dated 15 July 2006 alleging six charges. In the first charge, it was alleged that during 1 April 2004 to 15 July 2004, Respondent recovered amounts towards water bills, but in the amount deposited with the Municipal Corporation, there was difference of amount of Rs.1,46,533/-. In the second charge, it was alleged that Petitioner deposited amount of Rs.40,000/- out of Rs.1,46,533/- only after discovery of his misconduct and promised to refund the balance amount. Accordingly, he paid Rs.40,000/- on 21 February 2005, Rs.50,566/- on 7 April 2005 and Rs.55,967/- on 16 April 2005. It was alleged that he admitted misconduct of not depositing amount of Rs.1,46,533/- in a timely manner. In the third charge, it was alleged that while working in the Water Supply Department from 1 April 2004 to 18 July 2004, Respondent did not record entries relating to receipt of payments and it was found that in every receipt book, he has made only 2/4 receipts by keeping the other receipts blank. In the fifth charge, it was alleged that Respondent committed misconduct of amount of Rs.1,46,533/-. In the sixth charge, it was alleged that in the audit report of Chief Auditor, it was later discovered that he had actually misappropriated the amount of Rs.2,77,116/-.

Respondent replied to the chargesheet on 17 July 2006 and raised the defense that he had loans on account of which certain mistakes were committed by him. He submitted that the entire amount of Rs.2,77,116/- has been paid by him to the Municipal Corporation. He requested for a pardon. The Municipal Corporation revoked the suspension on 4 July 2007. After considering the reply of the Petitioner, it was concluded that he admitted all the charges and accordingly, the Municipal Corporation proposed imposition of penalty of reversion from A-Grade Clerk to the post of Clerk and issued a show cause notice dated 4 February 2009 to the Respondent.

Respondent approached the Industrial Tribunal, Thane by filing Complaint (ULP) No. 44 of 2009 challenging the show cause notice dated 4 February 2009. The Complaint was resisted by the Petitioner by filing a Written Statement. The Industrial Court framed issues based on pleadings. The parties filed purshis not intending to lead oral evidence. By judgment and order dated 18 April 2011, the Industrial Court has allowed the Complaint filed by the Respondent and held that the Petitioner has committed unfair labour practice under Item-9 of Schedule-IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. The Tribunal has set aside the final notice of reversion dated 4 February 2009. Aggrieved by Industrial Court’s judgment and order dated 18 April 2011, Petitioner-Municipal Corporation has filed the present Petition. By order dated 26 March 2012, the Petition was admitted and interim relief was refused.

During pendency of the Petition, Respondent has retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation w.e.f. 31 July 2021. Petitioner has filed Interim Application No. 9837 of 2022 for early hearing of the Petition. The learned counsel for Respondent has complained that Respondent’s gratuity is withheld. He submitted that the Petitioner is in extreme financial difficulty since his wife is suffering from ailments. Accordingly, with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the Petition is taken up for final hearing.

Mr. Limaye, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner-Municipal Corporation has submitted that the Industrial Tribunal has grossly erred in entertaining the complaint against a mere show cause notice proposing to impose penalty on the Respondent. That the impugned order is without jurisdiction as it sought to interdict the disciplinary proceedings by challenging a mere to a show cause notice. He submits that Respondent is found to be guilty of serious misconduct of temporary misappropriation of amounts collected by him towards water supply bills. That Respondent deposited misappropriated amount after being caught. That he admitted all the charges and therefore no inquiry was necessary. He submits that despite committing grave misconduct of misappropriation, penalty of only reversion was proposed. He therefore submits that the impugned order of the Industrial Tribunal deserves to be set aside and the Municipal Corporation be permitted to impose the proposed penalty on the Respondent.

Per-contra, Mr. Nair, the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent opposes the Petition submitting that the Industrial Court has properly appreciated the entire material on record for arriving at the conclusion that there is no admission of charges in the present case. That Respondent merely explained his conduct by way of reply dated 17 July 2006, which does not contain any statement to the effect that he admitted the charges. That the Petitioner-Municipal Corporation unconditionally withdrew the suspension order on 4 July 2007. That after one year and 7 months, Petitioner turned around and issued show cause notice for punishment.

Mr. Nair submits that the impugned show cause notice is in violation of the provisions of Rule 8(5)(a) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 (MCS Rules). That mere use of the phrase 'inadvertent mistake' in the reply dated 17 July 2006 cannot be treated as admission of misconduct. That Rule 8(5)(a) requires examination of evidence and recording of distinct findings on each individual charge. That preliminary say submitted by the Respondent cannot be misconstrued as a formal defense. That there is flagrant violation of principles of natural justice as no inquiry is conducted. That therefore commission of unfair labour practice under Item-9 of Schedule-IV is clearly established. That since there is systematic failure to implement the conditions of service/contract, unfair labour practice under Item-9 is clearly established. Mr. Nair has repeatedly emphasized the financial difficulties of the Respondent and the ailments suffered by the Respondent and his wife.

Lastly, Mr. Nair submits that the petition is actually rendered infructuous on account of Respondent's retirement from service. Now it is not open to impose the proposed punishment on the Respondent. That the entire suspension period is erroneously excluded for pensionary purposes though the same is required to be treated as period spent on duty. That Respondent's gratuity is also illegally withheld. That Respondent is a handicapped senior citizen undergoing extreme financial restraints. That his wife is suffering from blood cancer and health complications requiring expenses of Rs.1.13 crores forcing him to sell his residential house. That Respondent himself suffers from heart disease. Mr. Nair accordingly prays for release of all benefits of the Respondent by dismissing the Petition.

Rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties now falls for my consideration.

While working as A-Grade Clerk with the Water Supply Department of Thane Municipal Corporation, Respondent was subjected to disciplinary inquiry on allegations of misappropriation of municipal funds. Before the issuance of the charge-sheet, the Municipal Commissioner placed the Respondent under suspension by order dated 29 March 2005 upon discovering that the Respondent had failed to deposit an amount of Rs. 1,46,533/- collected from consumers towards water bills into the account of the Municipal Corporation during the period from 1 April 2004 to 15 July 2004. Thereafter, on 21 February 2005, the Respondent deposited an amount of Rs. 40,000/- and sought further time to deposit the remaining amount. Thus, it became clear that Respondent had no dispute about non-deposit of amount of Rs.1,46,533/- and he was willing to deposit the same with the Municipal Corporation. Once Respondent’s misconduct came into light, he was placed under suspension on 29 March 2005. By the time, chargesheet was issued to him on 15 July 2006, he made further deposits of Rs.50,566/- on 7 April 2005 and Rs.55,967/- on 16 April 2005. After deposit of the entire amount of Rs.1,46,533/-, Respondent submitted his representation and admitted the allegation of failure to deposit the collected amounts from the consumers in the municipal accounts. In the meantime, it appears that the Auditor examined the reports and submitted audit report dated 13 September 2005 stating that the total amount misappropriated by Respondent was actually Rs.2,77,116/-. It appears that the Respondent thereafter remitted further amounts of Rs.95,000/- on 6 December 2005 and Rs.35,583/- on 8 December 2005.

The Municipal Corporation thereafter issued memorandum of chargesheet under Rule 8 of the MCS Rules on 15 July 2006 to the Respondent alleging six charges as enumerated above. The charges were essentially in respect of the initially discovered misappropriated amount of Rs.1,46,533/- and final misappropriated amount of Rs.2,77,116/-. Also, the allegations were levelled about the manner in which Respondent kept the receipt books blank. After receipt of the chargesheet dated 15 July 2006, Respondent submitted reply dated 17 July 2006. In his reply, Respondent admitted that he committed mistakes as alleged in the chargesheet and attempting to justify the same by citing his family problems. The relevant portion of Respondent’s reply dated 17 July 2006 reads thus:

Thus, the Respondent emphatically admitted that he committed the ‘mistakes indicated in the chargesheet’. He also prayed for pardon and gave undertaking not to commit the mistake again. The relevant portion of the reply containing request for pardon, as well as undertaking reads thus:

The Industrial Court has considered the reply submitted by the Respondent to the chargesheet and took up for consideration as to whether the statements made in the reply could be treated as confession of guilt. The Industrial Court has arrived at the conclusion that it was impermissible to issue final notice for punishment merely on the basis of reply dated 17 July 2006. It is held that guilt-plea of the Respondent was required to be recorded in the inquiry which is not done in the present case.

In my view, the Industrial Court has grossly erred in holding that reply given by the Respondent on 17 July 2006 is not admission of charges and that it was necessary to conduct inquiry for imposition of even a minor penalty. Inquiry becomes necessary only to establish charge when the delinquent employee disputes the same. The very purpose of seeking reply of the delinquent employee to the chargesheet is to examine whether it is necessary to conduct the inquiry. In a case where the charge is admitted, there is no necessity of holding any inquiry.

The inquiry in a chargesheet is conducted by examination of witnesses and by production of evidence with a view to afford an opportunity to the delinquent employee to deal with the evidence on the basis of which the charges are sought to be established. However, when delinquent employee admits the charge in reply to the chargesheet, there is no necessity of holding any inquiry.

The Industrial Court has grossly erred in holding that the ‘plea’ needs to be recorded in the inquiry to be initiated post issuance of chargesheet. The Industrial Court appears to have dealt with the case as if it is a criminal prosecution. Unlike criminal prosecution, where plea of the accused is required to be recorded by the Court in the trial, in disciplinary proceedings, it is not mandatory to hold inquiry when the charge is admitted. In disciplinarity proceedings, there are two stages where plea of the delinquent employee is sought. The first stage is at the time of service of chargesheet. If upon receipt of the chargesheet the delinquent employee admits the charge, holding of inquiry gets dispensed with. As observed above, the very purpose of service of chargesheet and seeking a reply thereon is to verify whether it is necessary to hold the inquiry. It is impermissible to directly appoint an inquiry officer with service of chargesheet under the MCS Rules. The stage of seeking reply from the delinquent employee is important and vital. In a given case, the disciplinary authority may get convinced with the reply/explanation offered by the employee and may decide, to drop the proceedings. Conversely, the employee may admit the charge rendering holding of inquiry unnecessary. The second stage is where the inquiry officer is appointed and the inquiry formally commences, at which stage the inquiry officer records the plea of the employee. At this stage also the employee can admit the charge rendering holding of further inquiry unnecessary and the inquiry officer can abandon the inquiry and submit a report to the disciplinary authority that the charge is admitted. It is not mandatory that in every case, the proceedings must be taken to the second stage. Where the charge is admitted at the first stage, the disciplinary authority can straightaway proceed to punish the employee.

It must also be borne in mind that admission of charge before the disciplinary authority may in fact assume higher weightage than admission before the inquiry officer, as the disciplinary authority has the power to punish the employee as opposed to the inquiry officer who can merely make his recommendations, which are not binding on the disciplinary authority. Therefore admission of charges before the disciplinary authority cannot be discarded by holding that the plea of admission of charges must be formally recorded by the inquiry officer.

In the present case, the Respondent has emphatically admitted the allegations levelled against him in the chargesheet. In ADM (City) v. Prabhakar Chaturvedi^{11.(1996)2 SCC 12}, the Apex Court has dealt with somewhat similar case of temporary misappropriation by the employee. It is held by the Apex Court as under:

The Division Bench of this Court in Employees State Insurance Corporation, New Delhi and another Versus. A.V. Tungare and others^{22.014 (5) Mh.L.J. 219} has discussed the law on the subject of admission made during the course of domestic inquiry and has held as under:

Thus, in ESIC Versus. A.V. Tungare, the Division Bench of this Court after surveying various judgments of the Apex Court and of this Court on the subject has held once there is admission of charges, it is not necessary to hold enquiry to establish the same. The judgment of Division Bench in ESIC Versus. A.V. Tungare, has been followed by this Court in Shri. Vishwanath Bhivaji Kudale Versus. The Chariman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board& Ors.^{33.WP-2711 of 2006 decided on 17 January 2025.} .

In my view, therefore the Industrial Court has grossly erred in setting aside the show cause notice dated 4 February 2009. The Respondent has clearly admitted all the allegations in the chargesheet. He admitted temporary misappropriation in his responses dated 4 February 2005 and 16 April 2005 which pre-dated chargesheet dated 15 July 2006. After being caught, he deposited initial discovered amount of Rs.1,46,533/- between February and April 2005. Later, it was discovered that the amount of misappropriation was actually Rs.2,77,116/-. After being caught about the additional misappropriated amount, the Respondent deposited the balance misappropriated amount on 6 December 2005 and 8 December 2005. Thus, what is stated by the Respondent on 17 July 2006 is not a statement made in a spur of the moment or confession given under duress or coercion. He was consistently admitting his mistakes right since 4 February 2005. He admitted his mistakes both expressly in writing and through his conduct by depositing the misappropriated amounts. Most importantly, he admitted the allegations even after knowing that he was being subjected to disciplinary proceedings for being punished. He did so not out of charity but with the objective of ensuring his retention in service. He succeeded in his objective and ensured that lenient punishment of only reversion was proposed. He, however, took a volte face and after the indulgent act shown by the Municipal Corporation, approached the Industrial Court. The case therefore, involves an admission of misconduct, which did not warrant the holding of a formal enquiry to establish the temporary misappropriation by leading evidence.

In fact, Petitioner-Municipal Corporation appears to be extremely lenient in dealing with the Respondent. Despite the charge of misappropriation being proved, the Municipal Corporation proposed imposition of penalty of reversion only on the Respondent. Misappropriation is a serious misconduct warranting punishment of removal/dismissal from service. Ordinarily, Municipal Corporation ought to have been strict in enforcing discipline amongst its employees. It ought to have removed/dismissed the Respondent from service after it was established that he committed misconduct of misappropriation. However, by admitting the charges, repaying the misappropriated amount, and repeatedly tendering apologies, the Respondent ensured his retention in service, as only a show-cause notice proposing the minor penalty of reversion was issued against him. However, after receiving show cause notice dated 4 February 2009, he turned around and challenged the same before the Industrial Court by filing Complaint (ULP) No. 44 of 2009. The Industrial Court grossly erred in entertaining the complaint against a mere show cause notice. A disciplinary Authority is empowered in law to punish the delinquent employee and it is not open for an industrial adjudicator to interdict the enquiry by entertaining a challenge to a mere show cause notice.

This Court has repeatedly deprecated the exercise of jurisdiction by the industrial adjudicators against mere show cause notices issued before imposing punishment orders. Mere conferring of jurisdiction to prevent unfair labour practice does not mean that the Industrial Court should routinely interfere in pending disciplinary proceedings. The adjudication of allegation of unfair labour practice in a disciplinary proceeding must ordinarily happen after imposition of penalty and after the departmental remedies are exhausted. The High Courts, conferred with plenary adjudication under Article 226 of Constitution of India, exercise restraint and caution in not interdicting the pending disciplinary proceedings. Even the Administrative Tribunals cannot ordinarily entertain challenges to pending disciplinary proceedings. The industrial adjudicators also need to exercise restraint and permit the disciplinary proceedings to be taken to their logical end. If a complaint of unfair labour practice is entertained and decided at the stage of issuance of show cause notice for punishment, the adjudication about the conduct of the delinquent employee takes place at the hands of the Industrial Court even before the disciplinary authority has an opportunity to take a decision in the proceedings. This is not the warrant for exercise of jurisdiction by the industrial adjudicators. Under the guise of exercising preventive jurisdiction, they cannot usurp the power of the disciplinary authority and proceed to decide whether the employee is guilty of charge or not and whether imposition of any punishment is warranted or not even before the disciplinary authority gets an opportunity to take a decision in the proceedings.

This Court is conscious of the fact that one of the objectives behind enacting the MRTU & PULP Act is to confer preventive jurisdiction on Labour and Industrial Courts. Section 30 of the Act confers ‘cease and desist’ jurisdiction. Under Section 30 of the Act, both the Industrial and Labour Courts are empowered to declare when an unfair labour practice is occurring and issue mandatory cease-and-desist orders to halt the violation. In case of private employments where the likelihood of victimization is higher such preventive jurisdiction can be exercised by halting the unfair labour practice which is in the process of occurrence. However, this jurisdiction cannot be overstretched to mean that the Labour or Industrial Courts can prevent the disciplinary authorities of Government or semi-government servants from exercising their inherent powers of enforcing discipline and punishing the errant employee. Industrial adjudicators ordinarily should not jump in and usurp the authority of the employer and pre-decide the fate of disciplinary proceedings.

If industrial adjudicators routinely entertain complaints against mere show cause notices proposing punishments, the State Instrumentalities would never be able to punish the delinquent employees even after the charge is held to be proved. There appears to be a consistent practice adopted by industrial adjudicators in entertaining complaints against mere show cause notices and granting stay on further action in pursuance of such notices. This results in a situation where employee continues in service and retires on superannuation due to long pendency of proceedings. Exercise of jurisdiction by industrial adjudicators against mere show cause notices tramples upon the power of the disciplinary authority to enforce discipline in its organisation. It is not that after imposition of penalty, the delinquent employee is without any remedy. He can challenge the punishment order and if he succeeds, he can be reinstated with or without backwages. In a case where charge is proved and employer wants to punish the delinquent employee, the Industrial Tribunal must stay its hands by not entertaining such complaints at interlocutory stage against mere show cause notices for imposition of punishment.

In Dagadu Vasant Mudgal Vs. MSRTC^{44.Writ Petition No. 12210 of 2024 decided on 3 September 2024}, this Court has held thus:

The outcome of Industrial Tribunal’s erroneous exercise of jurisdiction in the present case has rewarded the Respondent, who is found to be guilty of serious charge of misappropriation of municipal funds. He went on a rampage and misappropriated huge amount of Rs.2,77,116/- back in the year 2004. His misappropriation is during the short period from 1 April 2004 to 15 July 2004. In about 3 months, he misappropriated massive amount of Rs.2,77,116/-. It is only after he was caught, he sheepishly refunded the misappropriated amount out of fear of losing his job. He admitted his misconduct and prayed for pardon. The Municipal Corporation actually pardoned him by proposing to impose a lenient punishment of only reversion when infact he deserved a strict punishment of removal/dismissal from service. An employee committing misconduct of misappropriation of municipal funds cannot be retained in service. Imposition of punishment of mere reversion is like rewarding an employee who misappropriates public funds for his own gain.

In the present case, the Respondent sought to persuade the Municipal Corporation to let him off the hook by refunding the misappropriated amounts, by admitting the charges, and by seeking pardon, thereby securing the imposition of the relatively minor punishment of reversion. After ensuring that the Municipal Corporation would not remove him from service, he turned around and challenged even show cause notice for reversion and ensured that he continued to hold the post of A-Grade Clerk till his retirement on 31 July 2021. This is what happened on account of erroneous exercise of jurisdiction by the Industrial Tribunal. On account of entertainment of baseless complaint filed by the Respondent at an interlocutory stage of disciplinary enquiry, the Tribunal aided the delinquent Respondent to retire on the post of A-Grade Clerk by enjoying the said post for the next 11 long years.

Be that as it may, mere retirement of Respondent from service on 31 July 2021 cannot be a reason for retaining erroneous order passed by the Industrial Tribunal. Respondent has committed serious misconduct of misappropriation of public money. He needs to be visited atleast with the punishment, which was proposed by the Municipal Commissioner in the show cause notice dated 4 February 2009. Imposition of punishment of reversion would still entitle the Respondent to pension and other retirement benefits for the Respondent. In my view therefore the penalty proposed vide show cause notice dated 4 February 2009 must be imposed on the Respondent in the facts and circumstances of the present case where he has admitted misconduct of misappropriation of amount of Rs.2,77,116/-.

On account of grant of stay by the Industrial Tribunal during pendency of the complaint, Respondent continued working on the post of A-Grade Clerk till his retirement on 31 July 2021. He has already drawn salary and allowances of the post of A-Grade Clerk till his retirement. Imposition of punishment of reversion on him at this stage would entail reduction of his salary during the period of his reversion and also recovery of excess wages. However, since the Respondent has already shouldered duties and responsibilities of the post of A-Grade Clerk (albeit erroneously), this Court is not directing recovery of amount of excess wages drawn by the Respondent. However, his pay needs to be notionally re-fixed, after considering the punishment imposed on him, so that he does not draw higher amount of pension and other retirement benefits.

The show cause notice dated 4 February 2009 also did not specify the period during which punishment of reversion was to operate. Under Rule 5(1)(V) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, the disciplinary authority needs to specify the period during which the delinquent employee is to be brought down from lower pay scale/pay grade with further directions as to whether the punishment would have cumulative effect or not. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it would be appropriate to give cumulative effect to the punishment of reversion. Ordinarily, it is the disciplinary authority alone who can decide the exact punishment to be imposed. However, in the present case, the Respondent has already retired from service on 31 July 2021. It would therefore be apt to give a full stop to the entire episode by this Court specifying the period during which the punishment of reversion would operate. In the facts and circumstances of the present case and considering the nature of charges established against the Respondent, it would be appropriate to direct imposition of punishment of reversion to the post of Clerk on the Respondent for a period of 3 years, with cumulative effect. During this period of 3 years, Respondent would not draw increments, and the punishment would have the effect of postponement of his increments. However, at the end of period of 3 years, he would regain his promotion to the post of A-Grade Clerk.

I am not impressed by the repeated appeals made by the learned counsel for Respondent to dispose of the petition as infructuous on account of retirement of Respondent and on account of the alleged financial difficulties faced by him. It appears that Respondent is habitual in raising defenses of financial difficulties. Even while admitting the allegations vide reply dated 17 July 2006, he put forth the pretext of disability of his son. Now he has raised pretext of his own ailments as well as the ailment of his wife. Financial difficulties by an employee cannot be a ground for pardoning serious misconduct of misappropriation. Respondent has already enjoyed benefits of services on account of erroneous stay granted by the Industrial Tribunal. As observed above, Respondent deserves imposition of punishment of removal /dismissal. However, even lenient punishment of reversion was not permitted to be imposed by him by securing stay from the Industrial Tribunal. Imposition of punishment of reversion at this stage does not render the Respondent pensionless. There may be slight reduction in the amount of his pension which in my view is clearly justified considering serious misconduct committed by him. The present case would stand as an example for those who indulge in misconduct and attempt to get away with the same by misusing legal process. In my view therefore though the Respondent has retired from service, imposition of punishment on him is still warranted to enforce discipline in the workforce of the Municipal Corporation.

In view of the above discussion, I proceed to pass the following order:

With the above directions, the Writ Petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute. There shall be no order as to cost. With disposal of the Writ Petition nothing would survive in the Interim Application, and the same is disposed of.