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Judgment
Janarthanam, J.—The Appellants are accused 1 and 2 in S.T.C. No. 2 of 1986 on the file of the Special Judge (under E.C. Act), Madurai.
Accused 1 and 2 were convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three months each and a fine of Rs. 100/- in default to rigorous
imprisonment for one month for the offence u/s 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (for short ''the Act'') for refraction or violation
of the provisions as adumbrated under Clauses 10(a)(b) and 6(1) of the Tamil Nadu Scheduled Commodities (Regulation of Distribution by Card
System) Order, 1982 (for short ''the Order'').
Accused 1 is a proprietor of a provision store situate at Door No. 130, Thattheneri Main Road, Sivakami Nagar, Madurai. Accused 2 is an
employee in the said store. On 15.10.1984 at 9.30 AM, P.W.11, the Inspector of Police, C.S. CID, Madurai South inspected the shop along
with other police personnel. At that time, accused 2 was available in the shop transacting the business. During the course of inspection, it was
found out that 23 ration cards, namely, Exhibits P.2 to P.24 belonging to P.Ws.2 to 8 and others were available in the premises of the shop. That
apart, 50 litres of kerosene and 6 quintals of rice were also available. The aforesaid ration cards, rice and kerosene were seized by P.W.11 under
the cover of a mahazar, Exhibit P.1 attested by P.W.1. The ration cards, Exhibits P.2 to P.21 were registered in the Harijan Co-operative
Sangam, where P.W.9 is the salesman. The ration cards, Exhibits P.22 to P.24 were registered at Madurai Thathaneri Fair Price Shop of which
P.W.10 is the salesman.
P.W.1 returned to the station and registered the case in Crime No. 1288/84 for the alleged offence u/s 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Act for the violation of
the provisions of Clause 10(a)(b) of the Order. Exhibit P.25 is the printed F.I.R. The seized kerosene had been handed over to Jai Jawan Society,
a Governmental organization while rice bags had been sent to TNCSC Godown under Exhibit P.26 receipt. After completing the formalities of the
investigation, P.W.11 laid a report u/s 173(2), Code of Criminal Procedure for the aforesaid offences, which was taken on file in the aforesaid
Summary Trial Case.
Learned Special Judge, on consideration of the materials placed before him, found accused 1 and 2 guilty, convicted and sentenced them as
stated above, giving rise to the present appeal.
Learned Counsel Mr. M. Venkataraman appearing for the Appellants would submit that since the mahazar witness P.W.1 and other witnesses
excepting P.W.11, the Inspector of Police, Civil Supplies CID, turned hostile wholesale to the prosecution, the testimony of P.W.11 alone is not
sufficient and adequate enough to fasten or mulct criminal liability upon accused 1 and 2 inasmuch as P.W.11 performed the dual role of the ''first
informant'' as well as the ''Investigating Officer'' and this sort of infirmity is bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case and in support
of such a submission, implicit reliance is placed upon the decision in Singaravelu v. State 1985 L.W. (Crl.) 336
Mr. R. Shanmughasundaram, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State would repel such a submission and further state that
a learned Judge of this Court, who decided the case reported in Bhagwan Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan, subsequently revised his opinion in
Criminal Appeal No. 403 of 1983 (unreported) and therefore it is that the earlier view taken by him, is of no consequence. He would further state
that learned Judge while revising his earlier opinion, correctly applied the ratio of the decision, rendered by the apex of the Judicial Administration
of this country in Bhagwan Singh. v. State of Rajasthan and in this view of the matter, he would say that the submission of learned Counsel for the
Appellants cannot at all hold water.
The question involved appears to be rather so moot and knotty, which requires to be decided by delving deep into the matter by referring to
certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Order, apart from considering the question in the light of the submissions of either
Counsel.
There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure defining either ''first information'' or ''first information report''. What all the Code
contains is the definition of a ''complaint'' u/s 2(d) and it runs as under:
""Definitions"" - In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires,--
(d) ''complaint'' means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person,
whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.
Explanation - A report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable
offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant.
As per the definition, a ''complaint'' means after all '' an allegation''. Such an allegation may be ''oral'' or'' in writing'' to a Magistrate. It is to be done
with a view to his taking action under this Code. It is not necessary that such allegation discloses the name of the person, who happened to commit
the offence. What is required is that an offence had been committed. It specifically states that such a complaint does not include ''a police report''.
The Explanation appended therein points out that the report submitted by a police officer regarding the commission of a non-cognizable offence by
way of fiction of law is to be deemed as a complaint and the police officer by whom such a report is made, is by the same fiction, to be regarded
as the complainant. In respect of commission of a cognizable offence, after due investigation, a report is filed u/s 173(2) Code of Criminal
Procedure
It is also pertinent to note at this juncture the definition of ''investigation'' u/s 2(1) of the Code and according to this definition, ''investigation''
includes all the proceedings under that Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate
who is authorized by a Magistrate in this behalf.
It is of signal importance to note that a mandate is cast u/s 154, Code of Criminal Procedure to reduce into writing an information relating to a
congnizable offence by a Station House Officer and he is empowered to investigate upon the receipt of such information u/s 156, Code of Criminal
Procedure Section 157 of the Code provides for investigation otherwise than in accordance with the receipt of information u/s 154. The Station
House Officer is required to send a report to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance, upon receipt of an information u/s 154, Code of
Criminal Procedure or otherwise as had been provided for u/s 157. In either case, after the completion of the investigation, he can submit a report
u/s 173, Code of Criminal Procedure. As such there is a mandate cast on the Station House Officer to investigate the case where he received
information u/s 154 or otherwise. In such state of affairs, it cannot be stated that the Officer in charge of a police station, who records the first
information cannot at all investigate a case. If it is the intention of the Code that such an Officer should not at all investigate the case, it could have
been expressly stated so; but instead what has been stated is, he had been empowered to take investigation.
As already indicated, though the phraseologies ''first information'' as well as ''first informant'' were not defined in the Code, yet the word
''information'' had been used in various provisions of the Code. For instance, the word ''information'' is specifically referred to in Section 154 of
Code of Criminal Procedure. The word ''first'' is not at all used preceding the word ''information''. The ''information'' referred to in Section 154 is
usually referred to as the ''first information'', despite significant omission and absence of the word ''first'' preceding the word ''information''. The
phraseology ''first information'' incorporated legally and judicially recognized is the basis upon which investigation should be and ordinarily is
commenced by the police under Chapter XII of the Code. The information contemplated is in the nature of a complaint or accusation, or at least
information of a crime with the object of setting the law (Sic) motion. In every trial, it is of very gre(Sic) importance that it should be known to the
judicial officer before whom the case is ultimately tried, what were the facts given out immediately after the occurrence and on what materials the
investigation commenced. The significance of the ''first information'' is traceable to the notorious tendency to improve upon the original statement of
facts to strengthen the case as it proceeds and sometimes to add to the persons originally named as the offenders and in this view of the matter, it is
of great importance to know what was said at first.
No doubt the first information cannot at all be used as a substantive piece of evidence and it may be used only for the purpose of
corroboration u/s 157 of the Evidence Act by the prosecution or for contradiction by the defence u/s 145 or for the purpose of impeaching the
credit of the witnesses u/s 155(3) of the Evidence Act. The importance of such an information can very well be understood in the light of the
provisions, as adumbrated u/s 162, Code of Criminal Procedure Since the first information swings the wheel of law into motion and investigation is
commenced, any statement recorded during the course of investigation will fall within the purview of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and such a statement is inadmissible in evidence and that apart, the same can be utilised as a previous statement either for the purpose
of corroboration or for contradicting the maker thereof. If any statement is recorded previous to the commencement of the investigation, such
statement cannot fall within the ambit and purview of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the net result, in such a situation, will be
that such a statement is practically admissible in evidence. It is also to be understood that all information, given first in point of time to the Station
House Officer, cannot at all be considered, as the first information setting the wheels of law in motion. It is only such of those information which are
authentic, in the sense of the source being specifically traceable and that apart, such information is relatable to the commission of a cognizable
offence, leave alone whether the offender is known or not known, can alone be termed as the ''first information''.
In this context, the word ''relating'' used in Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is pregnant with significance and of paramount
importance. The word ''relating'' indicates that there need not be satisfactory proof that a crime had been committed. It would be enough if the
information is suggestive of a reasonable suspicion that a cognizable offence has been committed. This sort of a view is further strengthened by the
phraseology ''reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered u/s 156 to investigate'' in Section 157, Code of Criminal
Procedure To sum up, if there is an information given first in point of time to a Station House Officer from an authentic source relating to the
commission of a cognizable offence or suggestive of a reasonable suspicion that a cognizable offence has been committed, then the investigation
can commence on the registration of a case on such information and such an information, for all practical purpose, be ''first information''.
In the backdrop of what should be construed as the ''first information'', learned Additional Public Prosecutor, before venturing to make the
submission on the main ground of attack as stated above, would however resort to make a subsidiary submission that the ''first information''
marked as Exhibit P.25 in this case can, by no stretch of imagination, on the facts and circumstances of the case, be stated to be the ''first
information'' in the eyes of law and if at all it can be given the status of a statement recorded during the course of investigation falling within the
purview of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He would further submit that the first information in the case on hand cannot be
anyone other than ''credible information'' stated to have been received by P.W.11, Inspector of Police, Civil Supplies CID at the earliest point of
time before ever be proceeded to make inspection of the premises of the said shop and that should be construed as the ''first information''. No
doubt he would submit that such an information had not been duly recorded by him. The fact that such an information was not reduced into writing
will not at all make any difference, inasmuch as that in subsequently dealing with the information so furnished the police officer concerned, namely,
P.W.11 failed to do what the Code directed to do, will not in anyway change the character of that information. In this view of the matter, he would
contend that P.W.11 could not at all be construed to be the first in formant, who happened to investigate the case and filed a final report u/s
173(2), Code of Criminal Procedure subsequently and once such a conclusion is reached, the so-called dictum laid down by a learned Judge of
this Court in Singaravelu v. State 1985 L W (Crl.) 336 that the complainant himself should not be the investigating officer and in any event, it is an
infirmity which is bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case, thereby giving the benefit of doubt to the accused, cannot at all be
applied to the facts of the case, leave alone the tenability or otherwise of such a proposition, on the face of the decision of the apex of the judicial
administration of this country, as referred to above. He was rather anxious in making such a submission that he should not be mistaken that he was
agreeing with the proposition so laid in the aforesaid decision by a learned Judge of this Court.
In such a situation, it becomes so moot a point to decide as to whether ''credible information'' stated to have been received by P.W.11, which
has been specifically referred to in Exhibit P.25, is the ''first information'' of the case. The answer to such a question, according to me on the facts
and circumstances of the case, cannot be any one else other than an emphatic ''no''. The reason is rather obvious. I am not finding fault that such an
information was not at all reduced into writing. In the eye of law, the first information can be either ''oral'' or be reduced ''into writing''. That
information being oral cannot at all make any difference. But what is significantly absent is the authentic source of information. Nothing had been
indicated by P.W.11, while recording Exhibit P.25 the source from which he got the information. For the sake of emphasis, it may be stated, for
the ''information'' to fall under the grove of ''first information'', the test to be passed relates to the test of its authenticity. In other words, the
information must be capable of being traced to a specific individual, who would take the responsibility for the same, so that, should the information
subsequently turn out to be false, the informant could be proceeded against. In this view of the matter, ''credible information stated to have been
received by P.W.11, though related to prospect of suspicion of commission of a cognizable offence may not be termed as the ''first information'' as
it lacks its authentic source.
In order to highlight this aspect of the matter, an useful reference may be made to the decision in Gurusami Naidu alias Chinnasami Naidu Vs.
Villis Guruswami Naidu, . In that case, one G went to the police station and told the S.I. and the C.I. that his cousin (also G) had been shot and
that he had been brought to the hospital. The S.I. did not take down this statement of G in writing; he merely made an entry of it in the General
Diary and proceeded (Sic)o the hospital with the C.I. to see the injured man. The Sub-Magistrate, who was brought by the S.I. on the suggestion
of the doctor recorded a dying declaration from the injured man in the presence of the S I. and the C.I. Half an hour later, the S.I. recorded
another statement from the injured man. The police investigated the case and taking the view that it was false prosecuted the injured man u/s 211,
I.P.C. In this case u/s 211, I.P.C., the injured man''s statement to the S.I., in the hospital was treated as the F.I.R. and marked, obviously as the
basis of the charge u/s 211, I.P.C. In revision it is contended that the Courts below were in error in treating the injured man''s statement to the S.I.,
as the F.I.R in the case, that the real F.I.R. in the case was the unrecorded statement of G at the police station, that the injured man''s statement to
the S.I, fell within the mischief of Section 162, Code of Criminal Procedure and was not therefore available to the prosecution to be used against
the injured man in the case against him u/s 211, I.P.C., as a false charge preferred by him within the meaning of this latter section. There is
considerable force in the contention. The fact, that G did not say at the station who the offenders were or give any inkling about them, is not a
circumstance, which alters the character of that information. In quite a large number of cases the complainant does not know the names of the
offenders. If A lays information that his house has been burgled the previous night, that would certainly be information relating to the commission of
a cognizable offence within the meaning of Section 154, Code of Criminal Procedure, notwithstanding that the complainant is unable to say who
the offenders were or even what all articles he has lost. It is suggested that G, the informant, made himself scarce after giving the information. The
inability or the failure of the station house officer to reduce to writing the information does not take away from its character as a report relating to
the commission of a cognizable offence. It is also suggested that in the information there was no indication as to whether the injured man was
voluntarily shot or it was an accident. Whether an alleged offence is the result of an accident or the voluntary act of some one else are
circumstances which can be properly ascertained only during the actual investigation. An enquiry the object of which is to discover whether the
information is true or false is really the starting point of an investigation. Mere gossip or rumour or hearsay would not fail within the scope of
Section 154, Code of Criminal Procedure because it is really not ''information'' at all. Gossip and rumour are not statements relating to a crime;
they are statements about statements relating to a crime; they involve no assertion about the crime and have no shape form. But if someone goes to
a police-station and definitely tells officer in charge that a cognizable-offence has been committed and that statement is made with a view to
inducing the police officer to enquire into the matter there can be no reason to refuse to call it ''information'' within the meaning of Section 154.
Code of Criminal Procedure. That in subsequently dealing (Sic)ith the information so furnished the police-officers concerned failed to do will not in
any (Sic) (Sic) the character of that information (Sic) a particular information amounts to an F.I.R. or not is essentially a question of fact and in the
present case the matter is plain. The statement of the injured person to the S.I. on the basis of which he was convicted was doubtlessly a statement
u/s 162, Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore not available to be used against him. The revision petition is allowed.
Let me now embark upon a discussion of the rival submission hinging upon the question as to whether the first informant and the investigating
officer cannot at all be one and the same individual and in such a situation whether such an infirmity is bound to reflect on the credibility of the case
of the prosecution. Learned Counsel for the Appellants, as already stated, placed implicit reliance on the decision reported in 1985 L W (Crl.) 336
. In that case, a person was accused of an offence u/s 75 of the Madras City Police Act. The occurrence having happened in the very presence of
the Sub-Inspector of Police, he happened to lay the first information report and investigated the case himself and filed a final report u/s 173(2)
Code of Criminal Procedure.
It is in that context, learned Judge observed that the complainant himself could not be an investigating officer and in any event, it is an infirmity
which is bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case, consequence of which was that the benefit of doubt has to be given to the
accused. As adverted to earlier, learned Additional Public Prosecutor would draw my attention to the very same learned Judge revising his opinion
subsequently in Criminal Appeal No. 403 of 1983 dated 22-10-1986 (unreported) after making reference to the decision of the Supreme Court
reported in Bhagwan Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan,
In order to appreciate the dictum laid down by the Supreme court, it is but necessary to state the foundational facts of the case. The incident
giving rise to the prosecution against the Appellant took place within an area in the State of Rajasthan lying within a 10 mile belt along the border of
that State adjoining the State of Uttar Pradesh. There was at the material time in force, Rajasthan Food grains (Restrictions on Border
Movements) Order, 1959 which imposed a bail on transport of food grains to any place within the area of this 10 mile belt from any place outside
that area except under and in accordance with a permit issued by the State Government or by any officer authorised by the Government in this
behalf. This order was issued u/s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and any contravention of this provision was punishable u/s 7 of that
Act. The prosecution case was that on the night between 13th and 14th November 1966, Head Constable Ram Singh and four other police
constables, viz., Kishan Singh, Fateh Singh, Hira Lal and Sunder Singh, all attached to police station Sewar, were on patrolling duty in the area of
the 10 mile belt with a view to preventing smuggling of grains from Rajasthan to Uttar Pradesh. They were at a place about 5 to 6 furlongs away
from the order on the way leading from Village Bilothi in Rajasthan to Village Nagla Khoobi in Uttar Pradesh when at about 5 a.m. in the morning
of 14th November, 1966 they noticed that a cart driven by two buffaloes was coming from the side of Bilothi and proceeding in the direction of
Nagla Khoobi. The cart was loaded with 6 bags of gram weighing about 14 to 15 maunds. One Ram Raj was driving the cart while the Appellant
was sitting in the cart on the bags of gram. Head Constable Ram Singh and his companions stopped the cart and checked it and on finding that it
carried six bags of gram, Head Constable Ram Singh asked the Appellant to produce the permit for transport but the Appellant could not produce
any such permit. The Appellant entreated Head Constable Ram Singh to let him go and offered to pay him a bribe of Rs. 40 or Rs. 50. Head
Constable Ram Singh refused to accept the bribe whereupon the Appellant took out a bundle of currency notes of Rs. 510 from the ''Antan'' of his
dhoti and offered them to Head Constable Ram Singh as bribe. Head Constable Ram Singh declined to accept the bribe offered by the Appellant
and seized the currency notes of 510 under a seizure memo Ex.P-1 in the presence of the other four police constables. He also seized the six bags
of gram found on the cart under a seizure memo Ex.P.2 and arrested the Appellant as well as Ram Raj who was driving the cart. He then prepared
a report Ex.P-4 and sent it to the police station, Sewar with police constable Hira Lal. The six bags of gram which were seized under a seizure
memo, Ex.P-2 were then taken to the police station and weighed there and their weight was noted down under a memo Ex.P-3. Head Constable
Ram Singh also lodged a First Information Report Ex.P-5 at the police station in which he showed himself as the informant or complaint and the
Appellant and Ram Raj were shown to have committed an offence u/s 161 of the I.P.C. for offering Rs. 510 as bribe to him. Head Constable Ram
Singh thereafter investigated the case, but it appears that sometime in the beginning of April, 1967 it came to his notice that he was not authorised
to do so and he thereupon forwarded the papers to the Deputy Superintendent of Police on 4th April, 1967. The Deputy Superintendent of Police
then re-investigated the case and ultimately filed the charge-sheet against the Appellant and Ram Raj u/s 165-A of the Indian Penal Code in the
Court of the Special Judge, Bharatpur. The prosecution examined in proof of its case the Head Constable and other police constables who
deposed substantially in favour of the prosecution. Believing the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, learned Special Judge, who tried the case,
convicted the accused, u/s 165-A IPC and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for four months and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- or in
default of payment of fins to suffer further imprisonment for 15 days. The accused further agitated the matter by preference of an appeal before the
High Court of Rajasthan. The High Court however agreed with the view taken by the Special Judge and dismissed the appeal. He further agitated
the matter before the Supreme Court with the Special Leave of that Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering the appeal
with Special Leave obtained expressed their views in paragraph 5 (at pages 715 and 716), which are as follows:
Now, ordinarily this Court does not interfere with concurrent findings of fact reached by the trial Court and the High Court on an appreciation of
the evidence. But this is one of those rare and exceptional cases where we find that several important circumstances have not been taken into
account by the trial Court and the High Court and that has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice calling for interference from the Court. We may
first refer to a rather disturbing feature of this case. It is indeed such an unusual feature that it is quite surprising that it ""should have escaped the
notice of the trial Court and the High Court. Head Constable Ram Singh was the person to whom the offer of bribe was alleged to have been
made by the Appellant and he was the informant or complainant who lodged the first information Report for taking action against the Appellant. It
is difficult to understand how in these circumstances Head Constable Ram Singh could undertake investigation. In fact, Head Constable Ram
Singh, being an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, was not authorised to investigate the case but we do not attach any
importance to that fact, as that may not affect the validity of the conviction. The infirmity which we are pointing out is not an infirmity arising from
investigation by an officer not authorised to do so, but an infirmity arising from investigation by a Head Constable who was himself the person to
whom the bribe was alleged to have been offered and who lodged the First Information Report as informant or complainant. This is an infirmity
which is bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case.
From the foundational facts in the Supreme Court case, it is rather crystal clear that the Head Constable was himself the person to whom the bribe
was alleged to have been offered and who lodged the first information report as an informant or complainant and in such a context, Their Lordships
observed that is an infirmity, which is bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case. The Head Constable, first informant, in the context
of the situation of the case, is rather a person aggrieved and the fact that such an aggrieved person registered the case and further investigated the
matter cannot be stated to be free from suffering the taint of any bias or prejudice against the person proceeded against by him. It is only in such a
context, such an observation had been made by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court.
Pertinent it is to note at this juncture that an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence may be given by a person aggrieved
or by anyone inclusive of a Station House Officer acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. If a coignizable offence is committed on
the very face of a station house Officer, there is no legal prohibition for him to act as the first informant and lay the information setting the wheels of
law in motion and himself take up the further investigation of the case.
At this juncture, an useful reference may be made to certain provisions of the Order. Clause 2(i) defines ''Inspecting Officer'' and the definition
is a means definition. According to Sub-clause (iii), any police officer not below the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector is an Inspecting Officer.
Clause 13 deals with the power of entry, seizure, search etc. by any Inspecting Officer and it is in the following terms:
Power of entry, seizure, search, etc.
If any Inspecting Officer has reason to believe that any contravention of his Order has been committed or is being committed or is about to be
committed, such officer or any other officer authorised by the Collector in his behalf, may--
(a) inspect any book, account, family card or other document or any stock of essential commodity in the possession or under the control of any
person;
(b) seize any such account or stocks or family cards;
(c) stop and search any person, motor vehicle or any vehicle or receptacle used or intended to be used for the movement of the essential
commodity;
(d) enter and search any premises or place or go down ;and
(e) seize the stock of any scheduled commodity along with the packages, coverings or receptacles in which such scheduled commodity ""is found or
the animals, vehicles, vessels or other conveyances used in carrying such scheduled commodity and thereafter send to the Collector of the district
concerned a report in writing as required u/s 6A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Central Act 10 of 1955);
Provided that the officer conducting the inspection or search shall give a receipt for what is seized immediately after the seizure is effected.
(2) The Competent Officer or any officer authorized under Sub-clause (1) may requisition the services of any Police Officer or of any other officer
of the State Government to assist such officer in the lawful exercise of any power vesting in him under this clause and it shall be the duty of every
officer so requisitioned to comply with such requisitions.
(3) Subject to the provisions of Sub-clause (1) of this clause the provisions of Sections 100 and 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(Central Act II of 1974), relating to search and seizure shall, so far as may be, apply to searches and seizures under this clause.
On the face of such salient provisions as adumbrated in the order as well as in the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is no prohibition for a
Police Officer like P.W.11 in the cadre of the Inspector of Police to lay first information and investigate the case himself and file a final report u/s
173(2) Code of Criminal Procedure P.W.11, on the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot at all be construed to be a person really aggrieved
as the Head Constable in the Supreme Court case to whom offer of bribe had been made. P.W.11, being a public servant, acted in accordance
with law in inspecting the premises of the shop, making search and seizure of the rice, kerosene and ration cards, registered the case and filed a
final report. In such state of affairs, it cannot be stated that the investigation of the case by P.W.11, who happens to be the first information is
bound to affect credibility of the prosecution case.
No doubt true it is that barring the testimony of P.W.11, as respects the search, seizure etc., there is practically no evidence emerging from any
independent quarter whatever as the rest of the witnesses cited by the prosecution turned hostile wholesale. The evidence of P.W.11 cannot at all
be brushed aside merely on the ground of his being a police officer. His evidence has to be sifted, scanned and analysed as the testimony of any
other witness and in the process of such scanning if it transpires that his evidence is suffering from certain infirmities and inherent improbabilities and
material contradictions, then it is legitimately open to the Court not to attach so much of evidentiary value to his testimony and throw the case of the
prosecution lock, stock and barrel and acquit the accused by giving him the benefit of reasonable doubt. It is also to be remembered that it is not
necessary for the proof of any case, any particular number of witnesses is necessary. Section 134 of the Evidence Act prescribes that no particular
number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact and this section recognizes the golden rule that what is required is only
the quality of evidence and not the quantity. Even a solitary testimony of a witness, without suffering from any of the infirmities, as indicated above,
is enough to prove the case of the prosecution for the purpose of mulcting or fastening criminal liability upon a person accused of an offence.
In the backdrop of the principles as stated above, the evidence of P.W.11, if approached, is not suffering from any of the infirmities. Despite
surging waves of questions hurled during the course of cross-examination, he appeared to have stood as a rock without his testimony as respects
the searched seizure being detracted to any extent whatever thereby lifting the credibility of the case of the prosecution.
In view of what has been stated above, it cannot be stated that the conviction and sentence of the Appellant, as had been done by the Court
below, are not sustainable in law.
Learned Counsel for the Appellant at this juncture, would intrude and submit that the Appellants may be given the benevolence of either one of
the two G.Os., namely (1) G.O. Ms. No. 180, Home (Prisons-IV) Dept., dated 28-1-1989; and (2) G.O. Ms. No. 781, Home (PR-C) Dept.,
dated 11-4-1990,thereby their substantive sentence may be remitted without their undergoing the ordeal of surrendering before the authorities
concerned and seeking remission to which course, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has no objection. The substantive sentence is therefore
ordered to be remitted.
In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The conviction and sentence are confirmed. However, for the reasons stated above,
the Appellants need not undergo the ordeal of surrendering before the authorities concerned and pray for remission of the substantive sentence.