Thakur Dass vs Harijan Sudhar Samiti

G.S. Singhvi, J.—Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the order passed by the learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Karnal.

In a suit for injunction filed by the plaintiff petitioners in the Court of Sub Judge 1st Class, Karnal, learned trial Court passed an order on 30.12.1992 partly accepting the request made by the plaintiff petitioners for grant of temporary injunction. After service of notice, learned trial Court passed order dated 5.6.1993 and disposed of the application filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC by passing the following order:

"Present: Sh. Vinod Vaid, Advocate, for the plaintiff.

Sh. S.K. Gaba, Advocate for the defendants No. 1 to 7,11 and 12.

This order shall dispose of an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC filed by the plaintiffs.

Heard. Statement of the counsel for the plaintiff recorded in which he has stated that he will not make any construction to obstruct the water flow besides godown. He will put only lintel on the walls. Keeping in view the statement of the counsel for the plaintiff, the earlier order dated 23.12.1992 is modified. The plaintiff shall make only there construction as stated in his statement. The flow of water course will not be obstructed till the decision of the suit. The application is disposed of accordingly."

The plaintiffs/petitioners moved an application before the trial Court for issue of direction or police help for implementation of order dated 5.6.1993. He pleaded that despite a specific order of injunction passed in his favour, the respondents were obstructing his efforts, to put lintel on the walls which had already been constructed. This request of the petitioners was opposed by the respondents who pleaded that the petitioners were making an attempt to block the flow of water and that would causing grave injury to the public at large. Respondents also pleaded that proceedings u/s 133 of Cr. P.C. have been initiated against the petitioners. The Municipal Committee, Karnal who had earlier issued sanction in favour of the petitioners has now passed resolution that the sanction of the site plan already given to the petitioners be withdrawn.

After considering the rival contentions, learned trial Judge has declined the request of the petitioners for grant of police help.

The only argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the petitioners are interested to put lintel on the walls in pursuance of the injunction order passed by the Court and do not want to raise any other construction. He states that on putting lintel on the walls already in existence there, flow of the water will not be blocked in any manner. He further states that no further construction will be undertaken by the petitioners/plaintiffs. Learned counsel for the respondents strenuously argued that in the garb of the injunction order passed by the Court, the plaintiff/petitioners will be raising other construction and they will create serious complication for the people living in the area. Learned counsel argued that land on which the plaintiff/petitioners have raised construction belong to the Municipal Committee and in fact, the petitioners had manipulated the earlier resolution of the Municipal Committee by which sanction was granted in their favour. Learned counsel has made a statement that the Municipal Committee has already taken disciplinary action against the Building Inspector and thereafter passed resolution on 31.3.1994. According to the learned counsel passing of an order for police help would give undue advantage to the petitioners for raising unauthorised constructions.

After having given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and after having perused the order passed by the learned trial Court on 5.6.1993 as also the order dated 11.5.1994,I am of the view that once the order passed by the learned trial Court on 5.6.1993 has acquired finality, that order has to be given effect to, not only by the defendants but also by other parties including Municipal Committee. What the learned trial Court had ordered on 5.6.1993 was nothing more than to permit the plaintiff/petitioner to put lintel on the walls. The trial Court did not permit the petitioners to raise any other construction. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also made a categorical statement at the bar that the plaintiffs/petitioners will not raise any construction other than the one permitted by the trial Court vide order dated 5.6.1993.

In my opinion, the learned trial Court was unnecessarily influenced by the fact that the Municipal Committee, Karnal has passed resolution dated 31.3.1994 seeking to cancel the sanction issued in favour of the petitioners earlier and the proceedings u/s 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been initiated against the petitioners. Whatever action the Municipal Committee, Karnal may take in regard to sanction of plan issued in favour of the petitioners, there can be no manner of doubt that the order passed by the trial Court on 5.6.1993 has to be carried out without any obstruction from any body. There is no denying that the efforts were being made by the respondents to obstruct the putting of lintel by the petitioners. In this fact situation, the learned trial Court was not justified in refusing the request of the petitioners for police help. In fact, it was the duty of the trial Court to have taken all steps and to pass appropriate orders, which could enable the plaintiffs to give effect to its earlier order dated 5.6.1993. Learned trial Court has ignored the basic rule of law, namely, that final order passed by the competent Court is binding on all.

Consequently, the Impugned order dated 11.5.94 is set aside. The learned trial Court shall issue appropriate instructions to the local police to help the petitioners in putting their lintel in terms of the order dated 5.6.1993. It is, however, made clear that the plaintiff/petitioners shall not raise any other construction over the disputed site. If at all the plaintiffs/petitioners make any attempt to raise any other construction, it shall be open to the Municipal Committee, Karnal and all other law enforcing agencies to take appropriate measure to prevent the petitioners from doing so. It shall also open to the respondents to move the Trial Court for appropriate directions if they find that the petitioners are taking undue advantage of the order dated 5.6.1993 for raising other constructions.