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Judgment
COMPLAINANT /Respondent purchased a Terex Vectera vehicle manufactured by the Petitioner through opposite party no.2 - the dealer - on 29.11.2007. According to the complainant/Respondent certain technical defects appeared in the vehicle immediately after purchase. On examination of the vehicle, manufacturing defects were detected and the vehicle was lying idle in the residence of the complainant. It was alleged in the complaint that the Petitioner and the Dealer could not fix the defects in the vehicle. Thus, legal notice was issued. No remedial steps were taken by the Petitioner. Aggrieved by this, Complainant/Respondent filed the complaint before the District Forum seeking a direction to the Opposite Parties including the Petitioner to either rectify the defects or to replace the vehicle with a new one and to pay compensation and costs. Petitioner, after being served, entered appearance and took the stand that there were no manufacturing defects in the vehicle. District Forum allowed the complaint and directed the Opposite Parties including the Petitioner to replace the vehicle with a new one or to pay the sale price of the vehicle as per the purchase bill. Rs.3,000/- were awarded by way of compensation. Opposite parties were directed to comply with the order within 30 days failing which the sale price was to carry interest @ 15% p.a. from the date of judgment till realization.
PETITIONER , being aggrieved, filed the appeal before the State Commission. The State Commission simply endorsing the finding recorded by the District Forum dismissed the appeal by observing as under:- ''The District Forum has observed that as per the job card itself there had been major defects in the vehicle and the replacement of the parts were made accordingly by once but thrice within seven months of the purchase of the vehicle. The District Forum further observed that there is nothing on record to substantiate the allegation of the appellant that the vehicle was not handled properly by the complainant. In our opinion also as per job card the main parts of the vehicle had been replaced. There appears to be an inherent mechanical defect in the vehicle itself. "
Petitioner, being aggrieved, filed the Revision Petition No.4121 of 2011 before this Commission which was allowed vide order dated 22.05.12. The matter was remitted back to the State Commission for deciding the appeal afresh by observing as under:- "State Commission is the final court of fact which is required to note down the contentions of the respective parties and arrive at a decision by recording reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at. The State Commission endorsed the finding of the District Forum by observing ''in our opinion also as per job card the main parts of the vehicle had been replaced; there appears to be an inherent mechanical defect in the vehicle itself. "
Mechanical defects are different from the manufacturing defects. The State Commission has not referred to any piece of evidence which had been produced by either of the parties. In our considered opinion the order of the State Commission is non-speaking and accordingly the same is set aside. Case is remitted back to the State Commission to decide it afresh in accordance with law.
ON remand, the State Commission vide order dated 23.07.12 again dismissed the appeal observing as under:- "It appears from the order dated 12.09.11 that the entire evidence as available on the record of the District Forum had been duly considered by the State Commission. Once the State Commission endorses the findings and discretions used by the District Forum, there is no justification for referring the entire evidence and arguments of the counsel for the parties again while deciding the appeal. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has now tried to raise some new legal issues which had neither been raised earlier before this Commission or even before the National Commission, nor the same are part of the pleadings. Even otherwise, the complaints and the appeals as well are required to be decided summarily under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. "Since the earlier order dated 12.09.2011 has been passed after due consideration of the facts and evidence on record, we find no ground for taking any other contrary view. The appeal is dismissed accordingly as having no merits. The compliance of the order of the District Forum if not made, the same may now be made within 30 days. However, the Appellant shall be at liberty to withdraw the amount if any deposited by them before the District Forum or any other Forum in the present matter. "
FEELING aggrieved, Petitioner has filed the present Revision Petition. We have heard the Ld. Counsel for the parties at length. The State Commission, being the first Court of appeal is the final Court of fact. Against the order of the State Commission passed in first appeal, only a revision lies under Section 21(b) of the Act. In the revisional jurisdiction, this Commission can interfere only if there is an error in exercise of jurisdiction. Being the final Court of fact, the State Commission is required to notice the contentions raised on behalf of the respective parties and arrive at a decision by recording reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at. Recording of reasons is fundamental to the decision making. It informs the litigant parties with the reasons for the decision taken. The requirement of recording reasons guarantees consideration by the authorities, introduces clarity in the decisions and minimizes the chances of arbitrariness in decision making. The decision of the State Commission is subject to the Appellate/Revisional jurisdiction of this Commission and the reasons thereof recorded would enable the higher Court to effectively exercise the Appellate/Revisional jurisdiction. Order passed without reasons is like a still born child. The State Commission in its earlier order had simply endorsed the finding of the District Forum by observing, "In our opinion also as per the job card the main parts of the vehicle have been replaced. There appears to be an inherent mechanical defect in the vehicle itself ". In our order dated May 22, 2012 by which the earlier order of the State Commission was set aside, it was pointed out that mechanical defects are different from the manufacturing defects. That the State Commission had not referred to any piece of evidence which has been produced by either of the parties. The order of the State Commission was held to be a non speaking order and case was remitted back to it to decide it afresh in accordance with law by passing a speaking order. The State Commission instead of showing due deference to the opinion expressed by the superior Court and instead of passing a speaking order has again disposed of the appeal by passing a non-speaking order by endorsing the finding of the District Forum. Reading of the impugned order of the State Commission leaves us with the impression that according to the State Commission, there is no requirement of recording of the reasons while endorsing the finding of the fora below as the cases under the Consumer Protection Act are required to be decided in a summary manner. The State Commission has justified its order dated Sept 12, 2011 by observing that the order had been passed after due consideration of the facts and evidence on record whereas, in fact, neither in the order dated Sept.12, 2011 nor in the impugned order, has the State Commission noted or considered any of the contentions raised by the parties or the evidence put on record. This approach is neither justified nor acceptable. We had indicated in our order that mechanical defects are different from the manufacturing defects. In spite of indication given in our earlier order, the State Commission has not chosen to record a finding as to whether there was any manufacturing defect in the vehicle sold by the petitioner to the respondent. Being the Court of subordinate jurisdiction, it was incumbent upon the State Commission to comply with the order of the superior Court and pass a speaking order. The order passed by the State Commission amounts to impertinence as it violates the judicial discipline requiring the subordinate Court to comply with the order of the superior Court. Insofar as the Courts/Tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are concerned, it was/is always understood that the recording of reasons is a principle of natural justice. Order passed without recording reasons is liable to set aside. Hon ''ble Supreme Court in the case of A.K. Kraipak and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors, (1969) 2 SCC 262, more than 40 years back held that even in administrative matters which involve civil consequences, it was necessary to record reasons in support of the decision taken. The relevant observation made in A.K. Kraipak ''s case is reproduced hereunder: "17. This takes us to the question whether the principles of natural justice apply to administrative proceedings similar to that with which we are concerned in these cases. According to the learned Attorney General those principles have no bearing in determining the validity of the impugned selections. In support of his contention he read to us several decisions. It is not necessary to examine those decisions as there is a great deal of fresh thinking on the subject. The horizon of natural justice is constantly expanding. The question how far the principles of natural justice govern administrative enquiries came up for consideration before the Queens Bench Division in In re : H.K. (An Infant) (1967) 2 Q.B.617 Therein the validity of the action taken by an Immigration Officer came up for consideration. In the course of his Judgment Lord Parker, C.J. observed thus: "But at the same time, I myself think that even if an immigration officer is not in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, he must at any rate give the immigrant an opportunity of satisfying him of the matters in the sub-section, and for that purpose let the immigrant know what his immediate-impression is so that the immigrant can disabuse him. That is not, as I see it, a question of acting or being required to act judicially, but of being required to act fairly. Good administration and an honest or bona fide decision must, as it seems to me, require not merely impartiality, nor merely bringing one ''s mind to bear on the problem, but acting fairly; and to the limited extent that the circumstances of any particular case allow, and within the legislative framework under which the administrator is working, only to that limited extent do the so-called rules of natural justice apply, which in a case such as this is merely a duty to act fairly. I appreciate that in saying that it may be said that one is going further than is permitted on the decided case because heretofore at any rate the decisions of the courts do seem to have drawn a strict line in these matters according to whether there is or is not a duty act judicially or quasi-judicially. "
IN the same case Blain, J. observed, thus: "I would only say that an immigration officer having assumed the jurisdiction granted by those provisions is in a position where it is his duty to exercise that assumed jurisdiction whether it be administrative , executive or quasi-judicial , fairly, by which I mean applying his mind dispassionately to a fair analysis of the particular problem and the information available to him in analyzing it. If in any hypothetical case, and in any real case, this Court was satisfied that an immigration officer was not so doing, then in my view mandamus would lie. "
In State of Orissa V. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and Ors. MANU/SC/0332/1967: (1967) IILLJ 266SC. Shah, J. speaking for the Court, dealing with an enquiry made as regards the correct age of a government servant, observed thus: We think that such an enquiry and decision were contrary to the basic concept of justice and cannot have any value. It is true that the order is administrative in character, but even an administrative order which involves civil consequences as already stated, must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the State ... ... ... "
THERE is a plethora of case law on the subject. We may refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench in S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594, wherein the Supreme Court held as under: "35.The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is subject to the appellant jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would enable this Court or the High Courts to effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory power. But this is not the sole consideration. The other considerations which have also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimize chances of arbitrariness in decision-making. In this regard a distinction has been drawn between ordinary courts of law and tribunals and authorities exercising judicial functions on the ground that a Judge is trained to look at things objectively uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency whereas an executive officer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency.
Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. "
In Director, Horticulture Punjab and Ors. Vs. Jagjivan Parshad (2008) 5 SCC 539, the Hon ''ble Supreme Court went to the extent of saying that reasons introduce clarity to the order and failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The failure to record reasons makes it impossible for the higher Courts to perform their appellate functions or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of decisions. Right to reason is an indispensable part of sound judicial system. Relevant observations of the Supreme Court in para 5 to 8 are reproduced below. "5. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative of an application of its mind, all the more when its order is amenable to further avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons has rendered the High Court ''s judgment not sustainable. 6. We find that the writ petition involved disputed issues regarding eligibility. The manner in which the High Court has disposed of the writ petition shows that the basic requirement of indicating reasons was not kept in view and is a classic case of non-application of mind. This Court in several cases has indicated the necessity for recording reasons. 7. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen V. Amalgamated Engg. Union (1971) 1 All ER 1148 observed: (All ER p.1154h) "The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration. " In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree 1974 1 CR 120 it was observed: Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. 8. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx ", it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking-out. The "inscrutable face of the sphinx " is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance (See: Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank v. P.C. Kakkar, MANU/SC/0110/2003:2003IILLJ181SC. "
THE Hon ''ble Supreme Court in Ramphal Vs. The State of Haryana and Ors., (2009) 3 SCC 258 went a step further and held that, "reason is heartbeat of every conclusion. Without the same, it becomes lifeless ". Supreme Court in "M/s Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan & Others, (2010) 9 SCC 496 " held that the judicial and quasi-judicial courts/authorities are required to pass speaking orders. In the said case, this Commission had dismissed the revision petition vide its order dated 31.08.2007 by passing following order:- "Heard. In view of the concurrent finding of the State Commission, we do not find any force in this revision petition. The Revision Petition is dismissed. "
SUPREME Court after considering the entire case law came to the conclusion that it is mandatory for the courts and quasi-judicial authorities to record reasons in support of conclusion arrived at. Supreme Court set aside the order passed by this Commission and remitted the case back to this Commission for deciding the matter by passing a reasoned order in the light of the observations made. Supreme Court summarized as under: "51. Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds: a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts. h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants'' faith in the justice delivery system. j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or ''rubber-stamp reasons'' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process. m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny.(See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737). n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions ". o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due Process ". "
Rajasthan State Commission has been passing non- speaking orders. We have set aside at least 100 such orders and remitted the cases to the State Commission to pass reasoned orders. In spite of this, the State Commission has chosen to pass the impugned order. It continues to pass non-speaking orders. We direct the State Commission to pass speaking orders as per law laid down by the Supreme Court and the directions issued by us. We hope that in future we shall not get any non-speaking order from the State Commission and the State Commission shall pass the orders keeping in mind the directions issued by this Commission and the law laid down by the Hon ''ble Supreme Court. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order is set aside and the case is remitted back to the State Commission to decide it afresh in accordance with law laid down by the Hon ''ble Supreme Court by passing a speaking order. The parties, through their counsel or in person, are directed to appear before the State Commission on 28.05.2013. A copy of this order be sent to the Registrar of the State Commission, Rajasthan with a direction to place it before the State Commission for its perusal.