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Judgment
(Per : Jai Krishna Upadhyay, J)
The instant criminal appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 28.05.1987 passed by IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Etah in Sessions Trial No. 378 of 1986 arising out of Case Crime No. 475 of 1985, Police Station Kasganj, District Etah convicting and sentencing the appellant Udai Bhan under Section 302 IPC to undergo life imprisonment and accused Tej Singh and Mehtab Singh were sentenced to undergo life imprisonment under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.
According to the prosecution narrative recorded in the written report (Ex. Ka-1) submitted by the informant Prem Kumar (PW-1), the incident occurred in the intervening night between 7th and 8th July 1985 at around 2:00 AM in Village Pathraki, Police Station Kasganj, District Etah. The deceased, Dal Chand, aged about 65 years (father of the informant), along with his wife Smt. Shyama Devi and daughter Savitri Devi, was sleeping on cots inside the enclosure (gher) where a lantern was lit. The informant was sleeping on a separate cot nearby. On hearing the barking of dogs, the informant, his mother, and his sister woke up and saw three persons entering from the northern side towards his father's cot. They were identified as co-villagers Tej Singh (armed with a lathi), Mehtab Singh (armed with a spear), and Uday Bhan Singh (armed with a country-made pistol). When the informant and his family tried to stop them, Tej Singh exhorted Uday Bhan Singh, stating that Dal Chand was harassing them through continuous litigation and should be finished off. Thereupon, Uday Bhan Singh extended his hand and fired a gunshot from his country-made pistol at Dal Chand's chest, causing his death. Upon the family raising an alarm, the assailants ran away towards Village Behta. Shankar (PW-2) and Hari Singh, who were allegedly loading mangoes near a tree on the roadside, claimed to have seen the accused fleeing in the light of their torches. The deceased Dal Chand, Tej Singh, and Mittu were real brothers born to Kalyan Singh. While Tej Singh and Mittu were born to one mother, Dal Chand was born to another. Following the death of Kalyan Singh, agricultural land was mutated in the names of all three brothers. However, Tej Singh and Mittu challenged Dal Chand's parentage, claiming he was not the son of Kalyan Singh, and initiated litigation which was pending before the High Court at Allahabad. Due to enmity and greed over agricultural land, the accused allegedly murdered Dal Chand. The informant stated that due to fear of the assailants in the night and rain, he could not go to the police station immediately.
On the basis of the written report (Ex. Ka-1) presented by Prem Kumar, chick FIR No. 475 of 1985 under Section 302 IPC was registered at Police Station Kasganj on 08.07.1985 at 6:45 AM by Head Moharrir.
Investigating Officer Sub-Inspector, Babu Ram (PW-3) took over the investigation, copied the FIR and GD entries into the case diary, recorded statements of witnesses, and reached the spot. He conducted inquest proceedings over the body of the deceased (Ex. Ka-4) and prepared the accompanying documents, including Chalan Nash (Ex. Ka-5), Photo Nash (Ex. Ka-6), letter to R.I. (Ex. Ka-7), letter to C.M.O. for post-mortem (Ex. Ka-8), and sample seal (Ex. Ka-9). The body was sent to the District Hospital Mortuary, Etah where post-mortem of the body of the deceased was conducted by PW-4. He recorded that death occurred due to shock and hemorrhage resulting from ante-mortem injuries.
The Investigating Officer collected blood-stained string (baan) from the cot, a cardboard wad (tikli) (Ex. Ka-10), blood-stained and simple earth (Ex. Ka-11), seized the burning lantern under Supurdginama (Ex. Ka-12), and inspected the torch of witness Hari Singh (Ex. Ka-13). He prepared the site plan (Ex. Ka-14) and recorded statements of witnesses. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet (Ex. Ka-15) was submitted against all three accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.
The case was committed to the Court of Sessions and registered as Sessions Trial No. 378 of 1986. Charges were framed by the VIth Additional Sessions Judge, Etah under Section 302 IPC against Uday Bhan Singh, and under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC against Tej Singh and Mehtab Singh. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
Trial proceeded and in order to prove its case on behalf of prosecution, four witnesses, namely, PW-1 Prem Kumar, PW-2 Shankar, PW-3 S.I. Babu Ram and PW-4 Dr. G.C. Agrawal were examined.
In documentary evidence, several documents were proved as Ext-1 to Ext-18.
PW-1, Prem Kumar, informant, testified that on account of persisting litigation over agricultural land between accused Tej Singh and his father Dal Chand, the accused persons came to their gher in the intervening night between 7th and 8th July 1985. He stated that his father Dal Chand, mother Smt. Shyam Devi, and sister Savitri Devi were sleeping on separate cots in front of a thatched room, and he was sleeping on another cot nearby. A lantern was burning at the spot. On hearing dogs bark, his family woke up and saw Tej Singh (armed with a lathi), Mehtab Singh (armed with a spear), and Uday Bhan Singh (armed with a country-made pistol) approaching his father's cot. On the exhortation of Tej Singh that Dal Chand should be killed as he was harassing them with litigation, Uday Bhan Singh fired a shot from his country-made pistol from close range into his father's chest, who died instantly. Upon their alarm, Shankar (PW-2) and Hari Singh saw the accused escaping towards Village Behta in torchlight. PW-1 got the report written by Ram Swaroop and lodged it at 6:45 AM at P.S. Kasganj (Ex. Ka-1).
PW-2, Shankar, testified that on the night of the incident, he along with Hari Singh (whom he engaged on wages) was standing near a Pipri tree on the road with mangoes, waiting for a truck to load them. At about 2:00 AM, hearing dogs barking and noises, he saw accused Uday Bhan Singh, Mehtab Singh, and Tej Singh running from the direction of Dal Chand's Gher, crossing the road, and escaping towards Village Behta. They identified the accused in torchlight. Uday Bhan had a pistol, Mehtab had a spear, and Tej Singh had a lathi. In his cross-examination, PW-2 admitted that there was a mango grove of one Latoori Singh, 2 to 2.5 furlongs North of the spot and claimed the accused ran towards the South-West. He denied suggestions that no such grove existed or that his mother had any dispute in which Kalyan Singh had given evidence against them.
PW-3, S.I. Babu Ram, proved the registration of Chick FIR (Ex. Ka-2) and GD entry (Ex. Ka-3). He detailed the steps taken during investigation, including recording statements of the informant, Head Moharrir, and one Mihi Lal. He proved the preparation of the inquest report (Ex. Ka-4), police papers (Ex. Ka-5 to Ka-9), recovery memos of blood-stained cot string, wad, soil, lantern, and torch (Ex. Ka-10 to Ka-13), as well as the site plan (Ex. Ka-14) and charge-sheet (Ex. Ka-15).
PW-4, Dr. G.C. Agrawal, Medical Officer, conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of the deceased on 08.07.1985 at 5:10 PM (Ex. Ka-16). He estimated the time since death as about half a day old (within 24 hours). Rigor mortis was present in both upper and lower extremities. He opined that death occurred due to shock and hemorrhage resulting from an ante-mortem firearm injury. PW-4 specifically recorded and testified that blackening, scorching, and tattooing were completely absent around the wound.
After the closure of prosecution evidence, the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. They denied all incriminating circumstances and claimed complete innocence, stating that they were falsely implicated due to severe land litigation. Accused Tej Singh specifically stated that his father Kalyan Singh married only once (with Mohini) and that only he and Mittu were born to Kalyan Singh. He asserted that the deceased Dal Chand was not Kalyan Singh's son. Dal Chand had filed a suit under Section 176 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms (UP ZA & LR) Act claiming a share in the land, but failed. Consequently, due to this deep-seated rivalry, the informant falsely implicated Tej Singh and his two sons (Uday Bhan Singh and Mehtab Singh) by fabricating a false FIR and procuring biased witnesses.
The accused led no evidence in defence.
The learned trial court upon scrutiny of the evidence on record concluded that the case of prosecution was proved beyond reasonable doubt against the accused appellants and recorded conviction and sentenced them, as mentioned here-in-above. Hence, this appeal.
At the outset it is pertinent to note here that the appeal against Tej Singh and Mahtab Singh has already been abated vide order dated 13.03.26 and only appellant no. 3 namely, Udai Bhan is surviving.
We have heard Sri Yogesh Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant no. 3 namely Uday Bhan Singh, Sri Amit Sinha, learned AGA for the State and perused the record of the trial court.
Assailing the impugned judgment on various grounds, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the trial suffers from several infirmities that has been overlooked by the trial Court and, therefore, the impugned judgment is not sustainable in the eye of law. It has further been contended that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the manner of occurrence beyond reasonable doubt as there exist material contradictions and discrepancies in the testimony of witnesses which cast doubt on the case of the prosecution. It has been submitted by the learned counsel by the appellant that there is delay in registration in the FIR as the alleged incident dates back to the intervening night of 07/08-07-1985 at about 2:00 am and the FIR was lodged on 08.07.1985 at 6:45 am. He further submits that there is only one eye witness of the alleged incident i.e. PW-1 and his statement is contaminated by serious contradictions. PW-1 explicitly asserted that Udai Bhan Singh fired at the deceased from point-blank / close range. However, PW-4 (Doctor) categorically testified that blackening, tattooing, and scorching were completely absent, which conclusively refutes close-range firing. He also pointed out that as per the FIR the family could not travel to the police station at night due to heavy rain, yet claims they were all sleeping outdoors in an open Gher, rendering the story highly suspicious. PW-2 was not the eye witness and only chance witness. PW-2's claim of waiting on a road at 2:00 AM to load mangoes is wholly unnatural. His statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded after an unverified delay of 5 days, proving he was planted later by the prosecution. The prosecution failed to examine the most crucial witnesses Smt. Shyam Devi and Savitri Devi, mother and sister of the informant respectively who were sleeping on cots right beside the deceased inside the Gher next to the deceased. The deliberate non-examination of these most natural eye-witnesses creates a fatal gap in the prosecution case. Lastly, he submitted that the incident occurred in the darkness of night and was committed by unknown persons not by the appellant herein. The appellant was only named in the FIR due to enmity and civil dispute.
Learned AGA for the State, on the other hand, has submitted that the judgment of conviction and order has been rightly passed. No interference is required by this Court as the prosecution has been able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that the FIR has been lodged promptly. The appellant is named in the FIR. PW-1 is the eye witness of the incident. His testimony is consistent during trial. Minor medical variations cannot outweigh positive ocular evidence. Therefore, it has been argued that guilt of the appellant has been satisfactory proved by the evidence adduced during the course of trial and there is no infirmity in the judgment of conviction of the trial court.
We have carefully considered the rival contentions made by the learned counsel for the parties, scrutinized the testimony of witnesses and gone through entire record including the impugned judgment and order.
The prosecution case, as deposed by PW-1, is that Appellant No. 3 (Uday Bhan Singh) extended his hand and fired at the chest of Dal Chand from close range. In cases of close-range firing by a firearm, charring, blackening, and tattooing around the entry wound are essential physical characteristics. However, the medical officer (PW-4) explicitly testified that blackening, scorching, and tattooing were totally absent on the deceased's body. Where ocular evidence asserts a close-range shooting, but medical evidence positively rules out close firing due to the absence of blackening or tattooing, the testimony of the sole eye-witness becomes doubtful. Medical evidence here directly contradicts the core ocular version.
In the case of Ram Narain Singh v. State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 497, Supreme Court held that:
"Where the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution is totally inconsistent with the medical evidence or the evidence of the ballistic expert, this is a most fundamental defect in the prosecution case and unless reasonably explained it is sufficient to discredit the entire case.
In Mohinder Singh v. State [1950 SCC 673: AIR 1953 SC 415: 1950 SCR 821] this Court observed in similar circumstances as follows:
"In a case where death is due to injuries or wounds caused by a lethal weapon, it has always been considered to be the duty of the prosecution to prove by expert evidence that it was likely or at least possible for the injuries to have been caused with the weapon with which and in the manner in which they are alleged to have been caused. It is elementary that where the prosecution has a definite or positive case, it is doubtful whether the injuries which are attributed to the appellant were caused by a gun or by a rifle."
It is obvious that where the direct evidence is not supported by the expert evidence, then the evidence is wanting in the most material part of the prosecution case and it would be difficult to convict the accused on the basis of such evidence. While appreciating the evidence of the witnesses, the High Court does not appear to have considered this important aspect, but readily accepted the prosecution case without noticing that the evidence of the eyewitnesses in the Court was a belated attempt to improve their testimony and bring the same in line with the doctor's evidence with a view to support an incorrect case."
In Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat [(1983) 2 SCC 174 Supreme Court held that:
"Ordinarily, the value of medical evidence is only corroborative. It proves that the injuries could have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more. The use which the defence can make of the medical evidence is to prove that the injuries could not possibly have been caused in the manner alleged and thereby discredit the eyewitnesses. Unless, however the medical evidence in its turn goes so far that it completely rules out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner alleged by eyewitnesses, the testimony of the eyewitnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground of alleged inconsistency between it and the medical evidence."
In the case of Mani Ram v. State of U.P., 1994 Supp (2) SCC 289 Supreme Court reiterated that:
" Apart from the above facts it may be pointed out that Prabhoo Nath, PW 2 admitted in cross-examination that soon after the appellants emerged from the sugarcane field and when the appellant Santram challenged Basdeo, he started running and at that point of time the appellant Mani Ram was standing at a distance of 60-70 yards towards east-west and the appellant Agya Ram who was standing at distance of about 4-5 feet from Mani Ram chased Basdeo and both of them fired at him from their kattas while the deceased was running. This statement clearly goes to show that the deceased was fired at from behind when he was running and the appellants Mani Ram and Agya Ram were chasing him. That being so the bullet or pellet injuries should have been caused on his back or at least somewhere behind his shoulder but as stated earlier according to the medical evidence and the post-mortem report injury 7 was caused by a firearm. A perusal of injury 7 will distinctly go to show that there were multiple gunshot wounds on an area 17 × 13 cms on right shoulder and front of upper arm and outer part but there was no injury either on the back or anywhere behind the shoulder. There is no other gunshot injury except injury 7. Neither the doctor who first examined the injured Basdeo nor the doctor who performed the post-mortem found any injury on the back or back portion of the shoulder to lend support to the evidence of the sole eyewitness Prabhoo Nath. It is well settled by long series of decisions of this Court that where the direct evidence is not supported by the expert evidence then the evidence is wanting in the most material part of the prosecution case and, therefore, it would be difficult to convict the accused on the basis of such evidence. If the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is totally inconsistent with the medical evidence this is a most fundamental defect in the prosecution case and unless this inconsistency is reasonably explained it is sufficient not only to discredit the evidence but the entire case. In the present case as noticed above the evidence of the solitary witness Prabhoo Nath is wholly inconsistent with the medical evidence and, therefore, it is difficult to accept him as an eyewitness to the occurrence and therefore it would not be safe to base the conviction on the solitary evidence of such a witness. There is no other evidence to support the prosecution case. Consequently, the conviction of the appellants deserves to be set aside."
Next, in the case of Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259 Supreme Court stated that:
"The position of law in cases where there is a contradiction between medical evidence and ocular evidence can be crystallised to the effect that though the ocular testimony of a witness has greater evidentiary value vis-à-vis medical evidence, when medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable, that becomes a relevant factor in the process of the evaluation of evidence. However, where the medical evidence goes so far that it completely rules out all possibility of the ocular evidence being true, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved."
In the case of Pruthiviraj Jayantibhai Vanol v. Dinesh Dayabhai Vala, (2022) 18 SCC 683 Supreme Court reiterated that:
"Ocular evidence is considered the best evidence unless there are reasons to doubt it. The evidence of PW 2 and PW 10 is unimpeachable. It is only in a case where there is a gross contradiction between medical evidence and oral evidence, and the medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable and rules out all possibility of ocular evidence being true, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved. In the present case, we find no inconsistency between the ocular and medical evidence. The High Court grossly erred in appreciation of evidence by holding that Muddamal No. 5 was a simple iron rod without noticing the evidence that it had a sharp turn edge."
From the above-mentioned principles settled by the Supreme Court it is thus a settled proposition of law that where ocular evidence is directly and irreconcilably in conflict with clear medical evidence, rendering the prosecution story improbable, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused.
Heading towards another contention of the prosecution, we find that as per the FIR and PW-1's testimony, Smt. Shyam Devi (wife of the deceased) and Savitri Devi (daughter of the deceased) were sleeping on cots immediately adjacent to the deceased inside the gher at the time of occurrence. They were the most immediate, natural eye-witnesses who would have seen the entire event unfold. The witnesses could have materially asserted the Court in determining who was present, whether the appellant was visible and how the incident unfolded and there happened immaterial thereafter. The prosecution offered no explanation whatsoever for withholding these two material witnesses. While the prosecution is not required to examine a multiplicity of witnesses, the failure to examine independent or natural material witnesses who were indisputably present at the scene creates a severe adverse inference against the prosecution. 29. In the case of Habeeb Mohd. v. State of Hyderabad, (1953) 2 SCC 231, Supreme Court held that:
"In our opinion, not only does an adverse inference arise against the prosecution case from his non-production as a witness in view of Illustration (g) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, but the circumstance of his being withheld from the court casts a serious reflection on the fairness of the trial."
In the case of State of U.P. v. Jaggo, (1971) 2 SCC Apex Court stated that:
"It is true that all the witnesses of the prosecution need not be called but it is important to notice that the witness whose evidence is essential to the "unfolding of the narrative" should be called. This salutary principle in criminal trials has been stressed by this Court in the case of Habeeb Mohammad v. State of Hyderabad [(1953) 2 SCC 231 : AIR 1954 SC 51 : 1954 SCR 475 : 1953 SCJ 678 : 1954 SCA 514] for eliciting the truth. The absence of Ramesh from the prosecution evidence seriously affects the truth of the prosecution case. Lord Roche in Stephen Senivaratne v. King [AIR 1936 PC 289: 39 Bom LR 1: 164 IC 321] referred to the observations of Jenkins, C.J. and said that the witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution is based must be called by the prosecution whether the effect of their testimony is for or against the case for the prosecution."
In the case of Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing, (2001) 6 SCC Supreme Court reiterated that:
"It is true that if a material witness, who would unfold the genesis of the incident or an essential part of the prosecution case, not convincingly brought to fore otherwise, or where there is a gap or infirmity in the prosecution case which could have been supplied or made good by examining a witness who though available is not examined, the prosecution case can be termed as suffering from a deficiency and withholding of such a material witness would oblige the court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution by holding that if the witness would have been examined it would not have supported the prosecution case. On the other hand, if already overwhelming evidence is available and examination of other witnesses would only be a repetition or duplication of the evidence already adduced; non-examination of such other witnesses may not be material. In such a case the court ought to scrutinise the worth of the evidence adduced. The court of facts must ask itself — whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was necessary to examine such other witness, and if so, whether such witness was available to be examined and yet was being withheld from the court. If the answer be positive then only a question of drawing an adverse inference may arise. If the witnesses already examined are reliable and the testimony coming from their mouth is unimpeachable the court can safely act upon it, uninfluenced by the factum of non-examination of other witnesses."
Relying on the case of Darya Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1965 SC 328 the Supreme Court in the case of Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 held that:
"If the eyewitness(s) is deliberately kept back, the court may draw inference against the prosecution and may, in a proper case, regard the failure of the prosecutor to examine the said witnesses as constituting a serious infirmity in the proof of the prosecution case."
Therefore, it is a settled principle of law that where material witnesses who were naturally present at the scene of crime are withheld by the prosecution without any reasonable explanation, an adverse inference must be drawn that their evidence, if produced, would have been unfavorable to the prosecution. In the instant case non-examination of Smt. Shyam Devi (wife of the deceased) and Savitri Devi (daughter of the deceased) who were sleeping on cots immediately adjacent to the deceased inside the gher at the time of occurrence is drawing adverse inference to the case of prosecution.
So far as the argument of delay in lodging the FIR is concerned, we are of the opinion that, the incident had happened in the intervening night of 7/8 th July 1985 at 2:00 am and the FIR was lodged in the same morning at 6:45 am. It was the time of night and also distance of the police station from the place of the incident was about 6 km. Therefore, it cannot be said that FIR was delayed but what is crucial here to observe is that the informant attempted to justify the delay in proceeding to the police station at night by asserting that it was raining heavily, but on the other hand the prosecution insists that four family members were sleeping outdoors in an open gher. These two assertions being inconsistent cast serious doubt on the alleged narrative of prosecution.
Regarding the truthfulness of the testimony of PW-2 (Shankar), we believe that he had not witnessed the incident. His explanation that he was waiting near a tree on the road at 2:00 AM in the night to load mangoes onto a truck is completely uncorroborated and seems to be unnatural. Notably, statement of PW-2 was recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. five days after the incident, without offering any explanation for this delay. The unexplained 5-day delay in recording the statement of an alleged chance witness strongly indicates that PW-2 was introduced later as a setup by the prosecution.
On appraisal of the entire evidence, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of surviving appellant No. 3 (Udai Bhan Singh) beyond reasonable doubt. The conflict between ocular and medical evidence, the non-examination of key material witnesses, the reliance on a delayed testimony of the alleged chance witness, and the existence of deep land enmity surrounding the parties create substantial and reasonable doubt.
In the view of the facts and circumstances discussed above, we are of the opinion that prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond the reasonable doubt. Hence, the benefit of doubt would have to be extended to the accused-appellant no. 3, Udai Bhan Singh, Consequently, the appeal deserves to be allowed regarding appellant no. 3, Udai Bhan Singh and the judgment of the trial court is liable to be set aside.
Accordingly, the criminal appeal is hereby allowed and the judgment and order dated 28.05.1987 passed by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Etah in Sessions Trial No. 378 of 1986 is set aside. Appellant No. 3, Uday Bhan Singh, is acquitted of all charges framed against him. He is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds are canceled, and sureties are discharged.
Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the lower court record be transmitted forthwith to the Chief Judicial Magistrate / Trial Court concerned for immediate compliance.
