Tej Partap Singh vs Union of India (UOI) and Others

Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.—The petitioner has impugned the letter of respondent No. 1 dated 27th March 2002 making a demand on the petitioner in respect of misuse charges and revised ground rent charges as well as penalty and interest in respect of plot No. 48, Block No. 148, 23 Bharakamba Road, New Delhi.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, has confined his grievance to the issue of revised ground rent charges in view of the fact that the petitioner had never impugned the misuse charges, penalty and interest earlier imposed since 1993 and in fact, had even given an undertaking to pay the said amount. In view thereof, it is not necessary to go into other issues.

The only contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is that in terms of a policy decision of the respondents dated 11th January 1995, the petitioner is entitled to a moratorium period instead of the revision of ground rent in view of there being stay orders from government/local authorities. This is in terms of para 3(c) of the said policy decision, the relevant extract of which is as under:

"3. REVISED GROUND RENT (RGR):

(a) Revised ground rent will be charged @ 2-2/2% of the notional premium i.e. Premium arrived upon by multiplying the land area with land rates applicable at the time of the crucial date.

(b) Revised ground rent as above will be applicable immediately upon the completion of 3 years from the date of communication of terms for conversion, sanction of the plan or from the date of completion/occupation of the building, whichever is earliest.

(c) Where the lessee is unable to proceed with the construction due to a court case or any stay order from Govt./local authority, the Moratorium from BGR will be given for the period during which such a stay/ban remains operative. However, lessee will continue to pay ground rent as applicable before revision during this period."

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the case of the petitioner is not covered in the first part of that clause dealing with inability to proceed with construction due to a court case since the Supreme Court itself had passed orders permitting the petitioner to construct. However, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the case of the petitioner for moratorium period is covered in the second part of the clause dealing with a situation where there is any stay order from Government/local authority.

A reference has been made to the letter dated 3rd May 1989 of the L&DO stating that they had no objection for getting the plans for construction of the building sanctioned from NDMC subject to the condition that the same is done after all dues are paid. This letter is sought to be construed as a stay order by learned counsel for the petitioner.

A reference has also been made to the show cause notice dated 28th August 1992 issued under the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act in respect of unauthorized construction on the plot in question.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the petitioner suffered as a consequence of the requirement to obtain permission from the Urban Land Ceiling Authority imposed vide the letter dated 24th November 1988 since the permission was granted only on 2nd July 1992 in terms of the order passed on the aid date and subject to the terms and conditions of the said order. The letter dated 24th November 1988 provided hat the construction of the commercial building would not start unless the exemption was granted under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.

I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The reading of the permission granted on 24th November 1988 shows that the petitioner was required to pay certain premiums, misuse charges, damages for unauthorized construction and had to also obtain the permission from the competent authority for exemption from land ceiling apart from the other conditions of the said letter. This cannot be construed as a stay order from the Government/local authorities. The mere fact that the permission was granted by the competent authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 only on 2nd July 1992 cannot thus permit the petitioner to claim benefit under para 3(c) of the policy decision dated 11th January 1995.

In order for the petitioner to avail of the moratorium period in respect of the revision of the ground rent, the petitioner must strictly fall within para 3(c) and unless there is a stay order from the Government/local authority, the petitioner cannot avail of the moratorium period. A show cause notice issued for any alleged unauthorised construction which was also sought to be relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, cannot, thus fall within the same parameter. A reading of the said clause as a whole would show that the moratorium is meant for cases where a lessee is unable to proceed with the construction due to a court case or any stay order from the Government/local authority and the moratorium period would operate during the time period when such stay/ban would remain operative. In the present case, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any such stay order or ban from the Government/local authorities. The time period spent by the petitioner in obtaining necessary permission cannot be counted under this clause.

In view of the aforesaid, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is dismissed accordingly.