Tata Hydro Electric Power Supply Company vs Tata Hydro Companies Employees Union and Others

B.N. Srikrishna, J.—Rule returnable forthwith.

Mr. C.U. Singh waives service for Respondent No. 1. Mr. M.S. Paranjape waives service for Respondent No. 3

Respondent No. 2 is deleted from the writ petition on the oral application of Mr. Kulkarni, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners, Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 need not be served as they are formal parties.

By consent, Rule is called out for final hearing and heard.

Normally, it is not the practice of this Court to interfere in interlocutory matters where substantial justice is done. Contrary to normal practice, it has become necessary to interfere with the impugned ex-parte order as I am satisfied that the order was made either in ignorance of or total defiance of the law laid down on the subject of granting of ex-parte orders, by a judgment of this Court in Dalal Engineering Pvt. Ltd. v. Ramrao Bhaurao Sawant & Ors. 1991 2 CLR 808 (to which I was a party.)

There were repeated complaints voiced in several matters arising under the provisions of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, that ex-parte orders with drastic and far reaching consequences were being made by Industrial and Labour Courts, for the asking. The issue was considered in depth in Dalal Engineering Pvt. Ltd. case (supra) and detailed guidelines were laid down as to when and in what manner ex-parte orders should be made. The President of the Industrial Court was also directed to frame suitable regulations on the subject after consultations with the Labour Bar. Such regulations have been framed by the Industrial Court. Notwithstanding all these, the learned Judge of the Industrial Court, Bombay, appears to have hastily made an ex-parte dated 3rd February, 1996, for which there was apparently no basis whatsoever. Mr. C.U. Singh, learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent, points out that, on an earlier occasion, on a Complaint made by a Union by name, General Labour Union, for the same reliefs, before the Industrial Court, wherein identical ad-interim relief had been given and that the said Complaint came to be dismissed following the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Shramik Utkarsha Sabha v. Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. & Ors. 1995 1 CLR 607. Thereafter the workmen concerned moved the present Complaint (ULP) No. 189 of 1996 before the Industrial Court through the representative union under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act (Respondent No. 1 herein).

A perusal of the impugned ex-parte order disclosed no imperative necessity for one. My attention has been invited by Counsel on both sides to Regulation 115 of the Industrial Court Regulations, 1975, which has been brought into force from 2nd July 1992 and governed the procedure to be followed by the Industrial Courts while dealing with an application for ex-parte interlocutory orders. Rule 3 of Regulation 115 provides as under :-

"(3) Subject to Section 31, the Court will not ordinarily grant ex-parte ad-interim injunction or order :

Provided that the party seeking such ex-parte ad-interim relief should state what steps it has taken to give notice to the other party about such application and in case when no such notice of injunction is given or has reached the other party, to state in the Application itself the grounds as to why it has not done so, and about the exigencies of the matter, and in such a case, if satisfied, the Court may pass an exparte, ad-interim injunction or the order, in exceptional circumstances.

Provided also that the Court shall also state the grounds why such order is required to be passed without a hearing or issuing advance notice to the other side."

From a perusal of the impugned order at page 268, it appears to me that the learned Judge either was not aware of the statutory provision of Regulation 115(3) or ignored them. In either case, what was done is highly irregular and needs to be interfered with.

At the cost of repetition, it may be pointed out that the Regulations governing the procedure and practice of the Industrial Courts are framed in exercise of the delegated Statutory powers vested in the Industrial Court u/s 33 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 and such Regulations validly framed, have statutory force and are required to be mandatorily followed by the Industrial Courts as governing the practice and procedure before it. It is unfortunate that the learned Judge of the Industrial Court made the impugned order without advertence of mind to any of these aspects. An ex-parte interlocutory order, like capital punishment, is justified made only in the rarest of rare cases, and that too for explicit reasons in writing. Anything else, is wholly irregular and unjustified.

I believe, I have reiterated the legal principles involved sufficiently, succinctly and intelligibly, so that such errors in the exercise of jurisdiction are scrupulously avoided in future.

Mr. Kulkarni, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, makes a grievance that the learned Judge has made a hurried operative order on 23rd February 1996 condoning the delay in presentation of the Complaint and then proceeded on long leave. This too, appears to be somewhat irregular. The privilege of making operative orders and supplying the reasons therefore post facto, is that of the Apex Court. If every learned Judge tries to arrogate this privilege to himself, administration of justice would become difficult. The learned Judge of the Industrial Court would do well to bear in mind that his order should be capable of judicial scrutiny by a Superior Court. This Court is reluctant to interfere in orders of condonation of delay provided there is some discernible reason for the condonation of delay. From a perusal of the impugned order dated 23rd February, 1996 it is not possible to fathom the reasons which moved the learned Judge to make the order. However, it is unnecessary for me to further delve into this aspect of the matter, since I am acceding to the request of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that liberty be given to the petitioners to challenge the order as and when the learned Judge is pleased to make the reasons therefore available to them. Hence, I am not interfering with the said order for the present with liberty reserved to the petitioners to challenge it later, if they so desire.

In the result, the impugned order dated 3rd February, 1996 made by the learned Judge of the Industrial Court, Bombay, is hereby quashed and set aside. The learned Judge of the Industrial Court before whom Complaint (ULP) No. 189 of 1996 is pending, shall hear the application for interim relief and dispose it of within a period of seven days from the date on which the writ of this Court is received by him.

In the meanwhile, it is made clear that the facilities of residential accommodations and provisions of tea, snacks, coffee, lunch, dinner, etc., to the concerned employees shall be continued until further orders on the interim relief application by the Industrial Court.

Rule accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs.

Issuance of certified copy of this judgment is expedited.

Writ to do down forthwith.