High CourtsSingle Bench(1969) 10 P&H CK 0015

Tarlochan Singh vs The State of Punjab and Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 14 October 1969 · Citation: (1970) ACJ 409

HON’BLE JUDGES
H.R. Sodhi, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
F.A.O. No. 134 of 1967

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Judgment

12 paragraphs · 969 words

H.R. Sodhi, J.—These are two connected F.A. Os. No. 134 of 1967 and No l of 1968, against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Punjab, made on 23rd June, 1967. allowing a compensation of Rs. 23,000/- to Tarlochan Singh minor. It is alleged that on 1st August, 1966, at about 9.30 a.m., bus No. PNJ 8550, owned by the Punjab Roadways, Chandigarh, which is a State owned undertaking, and '' driven by John Respondent, crushed the left leg of the Appellant who was at the time of the accident in his village Sukhrampur on Chandigarh-Rorwroad. The bus, it is said, was being driven rashly and negligently at a very high speed by the driver and it ran over the left leg of Tarlochan Singh. The leg had to be amputated from above the knee which according to medical evidence, has rendered the Appellant incapacitated, helpless and invalid for life. It may be stated that the Appellant at the time of accident was only 4f years old and his father cultivates agricultural land. A claim application was preferred by the child through his father as guardian. The Respondents resisted the application and the following issues were framed:

1.

Is the General Manager, Punjab Roadways, Chandigarh, a necessary party?

2.

Was the accident due to. any rash and negligent act of the driver of the vehicle involved ?

3.

Has the case been compromised by the father of the Applicant injured and if so is the Applicant estopped from claiming any compensation ?

4.

Did the Applicant''s father receive rupees one hundred from the driver, and if so, what is its effect ?

5.

What is the quantum of compensation due if any and from whom ?

6.

Relief.

2.

The Tribunal inspected the spot in course of the inquiry before it. It was found by it that the road on which the accident took place was such where the children usually played and greater vigilance was, therefore, called for on the part of the drivers of vehicles. It has been held by the Tribunal that the driver was driving the vehicle negligently at such a fast speed that he could not control it immediately when he came across the child with the result that before the could stop it, it struck against the child. Some sort of compromise between the driver and Geja Singh father of the Appellant was alleged to have been arrived at soon after the accident, but the Tribunal has not held the same to be leading to the conclusion that Geja Singh had abandoned his claim for compensation or that he could legally do so on behalf of his minor child. It was accordingly held under issue No. 3 that the document produced as a compromise-deed did not disentitle the Appellant from claiming compensation for the injuries caused to him. As regards the quantum of compensation, it has been assessed at Rs. 23,000/-.

3.

The Appellant has filed the present appeal (F.A.O. 134 of 1967) claiming an enhanced amount of compensation, whereas the State has filed F.A.O. 1 of 1968 challenging its liability to pay any compensation whatsoever.

4.

After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, t am of the opinion that no exception can be taken by either of the parties to the award given by the Tribunal and both the appeals must be dismissed

5.

The sole question that has been agitated before me is that of quantum of compensation. It is not disputed that the minor child of 4 1/2 years will have to depend all his life on an artificial leg which too must be changed at least after every five years and that one change costs Rs. 300/-. It may be that the cost increases in due course but it is not likely to be less than Rs. 300/- in any case. The Tribunal has, in the case of the Appellant, held his normal span of expected life to be 55 years which, in my opinion, is quite reasonable. Normally, a person lives-much more and the family history of the Appellant also indicates that his grandfather who is 70 years of age is still alive. Be that as it may, in the circumstances in which the child has been placed, it is reasonable to-expect that he would live at least upto the age of 55 years and to assess compensation on that basis. Neither of the counsel could object to the grant of Rs. 3,000/- under this head. Rs. 5,000/- has been allowed as compensation for the pain, suffering and discomfort caused as a result of the amputation which has imposed a permanent disability on the Appellant. This amount is fairly reasonable and the counsel for the parties-did not controvert the amount so awarded The only question that requires determination is whether a sum of Rs. 25/- per month payable for the remaining 50 years of his expected span of life is reasonable or not. Neither of the counsel has pointed out as to why this amount is either less or excessive, Counsel for the State has only feebly urged that the amount is rather excessive whereas counsel for the Appellant states that it is less. In the absence of any cogent reasons advanced by the counsel, it is not possible to say how the Tribunal has erred in calculating this amount. A sum of Rs. 25/- per month is necessary to maintain a person who has been disabled for the remaining life and it cannot be said that he would not have earned a sum of Rs. 15,000/- in the whole of his life if he had not incurred the physical disability because of the amputation of the leg.

6.

For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in either of the appeals and both stand dismissed.