Tarbalbir Singh vs State of Punjab

Surinder Singh, J

The present petition has been filed by Tarbalbir Singh Petitioner with a prayer for quashing of the complaint, charge-sheet and the proceedings consequent thereto pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Taron. The complaint under Sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, as amended, was filed in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Tarn Taran against the Petitioner and Naresh Kumar with the allegation that the Food Inspector inspected the premises of the Firm of the Petitioner on 22nd April, 1982, where Naresh Kumar was present and was found in possession of 65 bottles of Duke Whisky. A sample of the Whisky was obtained by the Food Inspector and was converted into three equal parts which were stoppered, sealed and labelled. One of these samples on being sent to the Public Analyst, Punjab, was found to possess alcoholic strength of 78.45� proof against the declared alcoholic strength 750 proof. The article in question was, therefore, stated to be misbranded. On the complaint being filed in Court, the Petitioner along with his co-accused was ordered to be summoned.

The main point which has been urged in this case by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the complaint filed by the Govt. Food Inspector (as reproduced in Para 1 of the present petition) does not even prima facie bring out a case for an offence u/s 16(l)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act because of the simple reason that the said Act lays down no standard for alcoholic strength of liquors. The point is not res integra. In Criminal Miscellaneous No. 5600-M of 1981 (Chaman Lal and Ors. v. The State of Punjab Cr. M. 5600-M of 1981) decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 22nd July, 1982, it was held that admittedly no standard of alcoholic strength has been prescribed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. In fact, in the list of various articles of food enumerated in the Rules, alcoholic preparations did not figure at all. It was, therefore, observed by the learned Judge that the very foundation of the charge against the Petitioners in that case fell to the ground. I agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge in the said case.

The learned Counsel for the State is unable to meet the argument relied upon in the abovementioned case. However, it is submitted that as mentioned in Para 5 of the reply, the Petitioner had violated Rule 36 of the Rules framed under the Act and a case of mis-branding was established. I fail to see even a remote application of the said Rule to the facts of the present case. Rule 36 only prescribes the dimensions of the type used for a declaration to be made on the label. The complaint filed in this case makes no reference to any such allegation.

There is another infirmity in the complaint and the summoning order. It is well-settled that in the case of a firm, only such a person can be , summoned to face a charge who is responsible for the conduct of the business of the Firm or in its manufacturing process. There being no such I allegation in respect of the Petitioner, the trial Court could not summon him in the complaint.

Consequently, the complaint filed by the Government Food Inspector in which the Petitioner has been summoned, is quashed in so far as the Petitioner is concerned.