High CourtsSingle Bench(2015) 02 P&H CK 0018

Tara Chand and Others vs State of Haryana

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 21 February 2015

HON’BLE JUDGES
Rakesh Kumar Jain, J.
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
CM Nos. 4522-23-CI of 2013 in RFA No. 39 of 1995 and CM Nos. 4524-25-CI of 2013 in RFA No. 41 of 1995

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Judgment

42 paragraphs · 2,017 words

Rakesh Kumar Jain, J.

CM-4522-CI-2013 in RFA-39-1995 and CM-4524-CI-2013 in RFA-41-1995

1.

Applications are allowed, as prayed for.

CM-4523-CI-2013 in RFA-39-1995 and CM-4525-CI-2013 in RFA-41-1995

2.

This order shall dispose of two applications bearing CM No.4523-CI of 2013 in RFA No.39 of 1995 titled as "Tara Singh v. State of Haryana" and CM No.4525-CI-2013 in RFA No.41 of 1995 titled as "Jeevna v. State of Haryana" as the prayer made in both the applications is the same. However, the facts are extracted from CM No.4523-CI of 2013 in RFA No.39 of 1995.

3.

The brief facts of the case are that vide notification dated 14.08.1987, issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (here-in-after referred to as the �Act�) followed by notification dated 12.08.1988, issued under Section 6 of the Act, land measuring 54 acres 1 kanal 1 marla of village Safidon, District Jind was acquired for public purpose, namely, for the establishment of Grain Market, Safidon.

4.

The land Acquisition Collector (here-in-after referred to as the "Collector''), vide his award dated 10.08.1990, classified the acquired land into two categories i.e. Chahi/Barani/Roshli (401 kanal 11 marlas) and Gair Mumkin (15 kanal 7 marlas), total 416 kanal 18 marlas (52 acres 18 marlas) and awarded compensation @ Rs. 80,000/- per acre for Nehri, Chahi, Barani and Roshli land and Rs. 1,00,000/- per acre for Gair Mumkin land.

5.

The applicant-appellants, unsatisfied with the award of the Collector, filed objections under Section 18 of the Act before him, who further referred them to the Civil Court for adjudication. The Reference Court, vide its award dated 05.09.1994, re-assessed the market value of the acquired land @ Rs. 109/- per square yard irrespective of its kind.

6.

The award of the Reference Court dated 05.09.1994 was challenged by the State of Haryana as well as the present applicant- appellants. A bunch of appeals, filed by the claimants/land owners and the State of Haryana, including the present applicant-appellants, bearing RFA Nos.39 and 41 of 1995, were decided by a common order by this Court on 01.07.1997 by which the appeals filed by the State of Haryana and Market Committee, Safidon were allowed and the appeals filed by the land owners were dismissed, as a result thereof, the award of the Collector was upheld and that of the Reference Court was set aside.

7.

After the LPA of the land owners filed in other cases were dismissed, they preferred appeals before the Supreme Court and the Civil Appeal No.6602 of 2000 titled as "Tarlok Chand v. State of Haryana" was allowed by the Supreme Court on 31.07.2001 and the case was remanded back to the High Court for a fresh decision.

8.

After the remand, this Court decided the batch of appeals, having RFA No.1823 of 1990 titled as "Tarlok Chand and another v. State of Haryana" as the lead case, on 30.03.2009 and assessed the compensation of the acquired land @ Rs. 109/- per square yard.

9.

In this background, the applicant-appellants have now filed these applications under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (here-in-after referred to as the "CPC") in both the cases for re-calling of the order dated 01.07.1997 and for extending benefit of the judgment dated 30.03.2009 passed in RFA No.1823 of 1990 to them as well.

10.

Counsel for the applicant-appellants has submitted that though the applicant-appellants had not further challenged the order dated 01.09.1997 by which appeals filed by the State of Haryana and the Market Committee, Safidon against the award of the Reference Court in their favour were allowed and the appeals filed by the land owners for further enhancement of compensation were dismissed but as the amount of compensation has been re-assessed by this Court in respect of the same acquisition vide judgment dated 30.03.2009, therefore, they are also entitled to the same compensation. In support of his submission, he has relied upon a judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Shiv Dhan Singh Vs. Union of India (UOI), .

11.

Additionally, it is also submitted that RFA No.40 of 1995 titled as "Rattan v. State of Haryana" was also decided by the learned Single Judge after remand on 30.03.2009 despite the fact that no appeal was filed by that claimant before the Supreme Court and there was no order of remand in his favour. It is also submitted that when the respondent-State came to know about this fact, they even filed a review application which was also dismissed by this Court on 16.08.2010.

12.

As a matter of fact, the review application was not dismissed rather the application seeking condonation of delay of 314 days in filing the review application was dismissed by this Court and as a result thereof, the review application and other applications were also dismissed.

13.

On the other hand, counsel for the respondent-State has submitted that the judgment relied upon by counsel for the applicant- appellants in Shiv Dhan Singh''s case is not at all applicable as in that case, the appellants had conceded that they are not seeking re-determination of the amount of compensation as their case is not covered by any of eventualities as are contained in Section 28-A of the Act. It is further submitted that even otherwise Section 28-A of the Act is not applicable as it would not apply after the decision of the High Court under Section 54 of the Act. In this regard, he has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Bant Ram (dead) by L.Rs., . It is further submitted that Section 28-A of the Act would apply to the award of the Reference Court provided no objection is filed by the aggrieved person under Section 18 of the Act. In this regard, he has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Babua Ram and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Another, . He also cited the following judgments on the aforesaid two propositions:-

1.

D. Venkamma and Others Vs. Special Tehsildar (LA) Unit-IV, Janagareddigudem, W.G. District, Elugu, A.P., ;

2.

U.P. State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. and Others, ;

3.

Bhagti (Smt) (Deceased) through her Lrs. Jagdish Ram Sharma Vs. State of Haryana, ;

4.

The Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land Owning Society Ltd., Bhatinda Vs. Union of India and others, ;

5.

State of Maharashtra Vs. Manakchand Pyarmal and Others, ;

6.

Hukam Chand and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, ;

7.

Kendriya Karamchari Sehkari Greh Nirman Samiti Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. and Another, ;

8.

Tota Ram v. State of U.P. and Ors., 1997(6) SCC 280;

9.

Vishav Bandhu Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2002(3) R.C.R. (Civil) 600;

10.

Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. Hansoli Devi and Others, ; and

11.

Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese and another Vs. Land Acquisition Collector and another, .

14.

Counsel for the respondent has also argued that the order passed by this Court, allowing the appeal filed by the State of Haryana and the Market Committee, Safidon on 01.09.1997, has attained finality as the said order has not been challenged by the applicant-appellants before the higher forum, much-less before the Hon''ble Supreme Court, therefore, it cannot be re-opened on the ground of parity, as claimed in Shiv Dhan Singh''s case (supra).

15.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the available record with their able assistance.

16.

There is no quarrel with the proposition of law that in respect of the application filed under Section 28-A of the Act, the award would be the award of the Reference Court and the application could be maintained by the land owner who had not filed the objections under Section 18 of the Act and has no applicability to an award rendered by the High Court under Section 54 of the Act.

17.

The facts are also not much in dispute as the award of the Reference Court dated 05.09.1994, assessing the market value of the acquired land @ Rs. 109/- square yards, was further challenged by the State of Haryana, Market Committee, Safidon and also by the claimants but the appeals filed by the State of Haryana and the Market Committee, Safidon were allowed and the appeals filed by the land owners for further enhancement of the compensation were dismissed. The award of the Collector was thus maintained and the award of the Reference Court was set aside.

18.

If the applicant-appellants were really aggrieved against the said order, passed under Section 54 of the Act by this Court on 01.07.1997, they could have easily challenged it before the Apex Court and for that matter, they had to file appeal against the order dated 01.07.1997 passed by the learned Single Judge. No such appeal has admittedly been filed and the matter came to a halt insofar as the present applicant-appellants are concerned, however, the other claimants preferred their appeals, the Apex Court set aside the order dated 01.07.1997 in their cases and remanded the cases in which another Coordinate Bench of this Court, vide its order dated 30.03.2009, assessed the market value of the acquired land @ Rs. 109/- per square yard.

19.

Once the order dated 01.07.1997 had attained finality qua the present applicant-appellants, it cannot be re-opened by way of an application, as has been filed in the present case and the decision in Shiv Dhan Singh''s case (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the applicant-appellants, is not at all applicable. In the said case, the appeal filed by the claimants under Section 54 of the Act was dismissed by the High Court in limine and further appeals filed before the Supreme Court were dismissed on the ground of delay. There was no decision on merits either by the High Court or by the Supreme Court and thus it was held that the order passed by the High Court had not merged in the order of the Supreme Court. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court further referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhag Singh and Others Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh through the land acquisition collector, Chandigarh, but in that case, the issue was only with regard to payment of court fee. There is a reference in that order of various judgments relied upon by the respondents therein that where the claimants had failed to seek determination in their appeals independently, the mere fact that in some other cases compensation has been enhanced will not furnish a ground for re-opening of determination of the amount of compensation which had become final. The said judgments, noticed in para 15 of the order of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Shiv Dhan Singh''s case (supra), are as under:-

1.

Babua Ram and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Another, ;

2.

G. Krishna Murthy and others v. State of Orissa, (1995) 2 S.C. 733;

3.

D. Krishna Veni and Another Vs. State of Orissa and Others, ;

4.

Union of India and another Vs. Pradeep Kumari and others, ;

5.

Hukam Chand and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, ;

6.

Ramesh Singh (died) By LRs and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, ; and

7.

Bai Shakriben (dead) by Natwar Melsingh and Others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Another, .

20.

In view thereof, I am of the considered opinion that the applicant-appellants are not entitled to seek re-opening of their case for the determination of compensation as the matter had attained finality as far back as on 01.07.1997 and no plausible reason has been given by them for not challenging the said order dated 01.07.1997 before the Apex Court. Moreover, if this course is allowed to be adopted, then there would be no end to it and all the old cases, already attained finality, would be re-opened only on this ground.

21.

In view thereof, I do not find any merit in both the applications and hence, the same are hereby dismissed.