High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 09 CAL CK 5686

Tapasi Rana vs Atindra Nath Sen & Ors.

Calcutta High Court · Decided on 30 September 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Md. Shabbar Rashidi, J
RESULT
Disposed Of
CASE NUMBER
C.O. 2164 of 2011

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

76 paragraphs · 5,986 words

Md. Shabbar Rashidi, J.:-

1.

The instant application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against a judgment and order dated February 28, 2011 passed in Misc. Appeal No. 130 of 2009.

2.

By the impugned judgment and order, the learned first appellate court dismissed Misc. Appeal No. 130 of 2009 affirming the judgment and order dated January 13, 2009 passed by the learned trial court in J. Misc Case No. 6 of 1999. By such order, the learned trial court had allowed J. Misc Case No. 6 of 1999 holding the petitioner no. 1 therein, to entitled to pre-empt 0.0254 acres in plot No. 1398 and 0.0060 acres in plot No. 1402, which was affirmed by the impugned judgment and order by the learned first appellate court.

3.

At the time of hearing, learned senior advocate for the petitioner submitted that there are two sets of petitioners having separate and independent rights. Opposite party no. 1 series have their right independent of the rights of opposite party no. 2 to 12. It was submitted that there are two sets of right holders who had filed J. Misc. Case No. 6 of 1999 jointly. They jointly deposited the consideration money together with statutory compensation. According to learned senior advocate for the petitioner, such a joint petition by two sets of separate right holders is not permissible in terms of the provisions of Section 8 and 9 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955.

4.

Learned senior advocate for the petitioner further contended that the accused here in applying for the pre-emption of the plot sold to the petitioner, however, the learned trial court as well and the learned first appellate court allowed partial pre-emption in respect of specific plot nos. 1398 and 1402. The other plots were which were sold to the petitioner were not allowed to be pre-empted and such prayer was rejected. Learned senior advocate for the petitioner submitted that the pre-emptor only pre-empts the sale deed and does not re-purchase, therefore, a partial pre-emption is not permissible. According to learned senior advocate, there can only be complaint of pre-emption of a particular deed and not a part thereof. In support his contention, learned senior advocate for the petitioner relied upon 1963 SCC OnLine SC 265 (Bhagwati Prasad Sah and Others v. Bhagwati Prasad Sah and Anther) and (2019) 19 SCC 767 (Barasat Eye Hospital and Others v. Koustabh Mondal).

5.

Learned senior advocate for the petitioner further submitted that the provisions of Section 8 of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 can be pressed into service when a property is sold to persons other than a co-sharer. When there was no co-sharer, such provisions cannot be applied. Learned senior advocate for the petitioner further submitted that pre-emption by adjoining owner is not maintainable in absence of a co-sharer. To such proposition, the learned senior advocate relied upon 2013 SCC OnLine Cal 22821 (Subal Mondal v. Gopal Chandra Mondal) and an unreported order passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in C.O. 62 of 2018 on January 16, 2018 (Monoranjan Senapati v. Chabi Karan & Anr.).

6.

The learned senior advocate for the petitioner also submitted that according the provisions of the Section 8 of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, a right of pre-emption is available to a person having common boundary with the plot in question. In the present case, the land sold to the petitioner and that belonging to opposite party no. 1 is separated by a pathway. Therefore, right of pre-emption is not available to such petitioner in the ground of vicinage. Petitioner no.1 cannot be said to be an adjoining land owner within the meaning of Section 8 and 9 of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. The learned trial court as well as the learned first appellate court erred in holding that petitioner no. 1 was adjoining land owner of the property sold to the petitioner.

7.

Per contra, learned advocate for the opposite parties submitted that since several plots were sold out by a single transaction and a single deed, a joint application for pre-emption was filed on behalf of the opposite parties. It was further contended that there is no bar in law in filing of a joint application for pre-emption. The learned trial judge as well as learned first appellate judge rightly allowed the prayer for pre-emption.

8.

Learned advocate for the opposite parties submitted that usually partial pre-emption is not tenable in respect of a transaction on the ground of co-sharer, however, when several plots have been transferred by the single deed, a prayer for pre-emption can be allowed in favour of a pre-emptor having longest common boundary. Moreover, a single deposit by several claimants and a common application for pre-emption is permissible. In support of his contention, learned advocate for the opposite parties relied upon 1986 (1) CLJ 170 (Sadhan Chandra Samanta & Others v. Jaladhi Bala Dasi & Anr.).

9.

The learned advocate for the opposite parties further submitted that for maintaining an application for pre-emption, the pre-emptor is not required to be full owner of the adjoining plot. The opposite party no. 1 owned a land which had the longest common boundary with the plot sought to be pre-empted. To such proposition, learned advocate for the opposite parties cited the authority of 2000 (1) CHN 505 (Smt. Bula Kundu v. Sri Nirmal Kumar Kundu and Anr.).

10.

It was further contended by the learned advocate for the opposite parties that the application for pre-emption of the petitioner was allowed by the learned trial court upon consideration of evidence adduced on behalf of the parties. Subsequently, in an appeal, the findings of learned trial court were affirmed by the learned first appellate court on appreciation of the evidence and materials on record. Such concurrent findings on facts of learned trial court as well as learned appellate court should not be interfered with in the present supervisory jurisdiction by this court. In support of such contention, learned advocate for the opposite parties placed reliance upon 2016 (3) CHN (CAL) 61 (Arindam Joardar v. Tarun Raha) and (2009) 6 SCC 194 (Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup and Others).

11.

The learned advocate for the opposite parties also submitted that a right of pre-emption is available on a bastu land. Learned advocate relied upon the authority of 2016 (2) CHN (Cal) 489 (Sanjay Halder v. Budhan Rajak). Learned advocate for the opposite parties also submitted that when several plots are sold to a stranger through a single deed, a partial pre-emption by the adjoining land owner is permissible in law. In support of such contention, learned advocate for the opposite party relied upon 1977 (2) CLJ 480 (Satish Chandra Kuila v. Kalipada Maity & Ors.).

12.

Relying upon the authority of 2007 (1) CHN 50 (Bahastulla Sk. V. Abdul Gafur Sk.), learned advocate for the opposite parties contended that a land owner, even without having common boundary can get an order of pre-emption. What is required for a successful pre-emption is that the pre-emptor owns land which is adjoining to the land sought to be pre-empted.

13.

‘Kha’ Schedule properties previously belonged to one Kedar Nath Singha. He had three sons namely Dijendranath, Dipendranath and Devendranath. After the demise of Kedar Nath Singha, Kha Schedule property came to be allotted in the share of Dijendranath by dint of a deed of settlement. The said Dijendranath was survived by his seven sons and four daughters. The aforesaid sons and daughters of Dijendranath sold specifically demarcated portions of plot no. 1398, 1397 and 1403 by registered sale deed dated October 20, 1998 in favour of the petitioners herein.

14.

Opposite party no. 1 sought to pre-emption on the ground of vicinage being owner of plot no. 1401 and 2 decimals in plot no. 1402. Opposite party no. 2 to 12 were the owners of plot no. 1404 and as such sought for pre-emption of the lands sold to the petitioners, on the ground of being the adjoining land owners.

15.

Accordingly, the opposite parties filed J. Misc. Case No. 6 of 1999 jointly. It was specifically stated in such application for pre-emption that the application was filed jointly and the consideration money together with the statutory 10% thereof, may be treated as deposit on behalf of the opposite party whom the learned court considered entitled for pre-emption upon disposal of pre-emption Case. It was also prayed in the alternative that, if the application is allowed proportionately, in favour of the two sets of applicants, the deposit would be treated as proportionate deposit by both sets of applicants.

16.

J. Misc. Case No. 6 of 1999 was taken up for consideration and on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties therein, the learned trial court allowed the Misc. Case in favour of opposite party no. 1, having the longest boundary with the lands sought to be pre-empted. In the judgment and order passed in J. Misc. Case No. 6 of 1999, the learned trial court came to conclusion that plot no. 1401 was the only plot which was adjacent to the plot nos. 1398 and 1402 and accordingly, the learned trial court held that opposite party no. 1 (petitioner no.1 in Misc. Case) was entitled to pre-empt. Such finding of the learned trial court was upheld by the learned appellate court in Misc. Appeal No. 130 of 2009, by the impugned judgment and order.

17.

The instant proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed at the behest of the pre-emptee (appellant in Misc. Appeal No. 130 of 2009) challenging the legality and propriety of the impugned judgment and order passed in Misc. Appeal No. 130 of 2009. The ground of attack taken by the petitioners are based mainly on two grounds, namely

i.

A joint petition for pre-emption was filed by two sets of applicants having distinct rights and a common deposit of the consideration money with statutory compensation, according to the petitioner was not permissible in law.

ii.

Law provides for Pre-emption of a sale and not of a land. A partial pre-emption of certain plots of land where there are several lands involved in the deed in question, could not have been granted unless all the properties in the deed was sought to be pre-empted.

18.

The right of pre-emption flows from Section 8 and 9 of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. It would be apposite to set out the relevant provisions of law for proper appreciation of the disputes involved in the present proceeding

“8.

(1) If a portion or share of a holding of raiyat is transferred to any person other than a co-sharer in the holding, the bargadar in the holding may, within three months of the date of such transfer, or any co-sharer raiyat of the holding may, within three months of the service of the notice given under sub-section (5) of section 5, or any raiyat possessing land adjoining such holding may, within four months of the date of such transfer, apply to the Munsif having territorial jurisdiction, for transfer of the said portion or share of the holding to him, subject to the limit mentioned in section 14-M on deposit of the consideration money together with a further sum of ten per cent, of that amount:

Provided that if the bargadar in the holding, a co-sharer raiyat and a raiyat possessing land adjoining such holding apply for such transfer, the bargadar shall have the prior right to have such portion or share of the holding transferred to hi, and in such a case, the deposit made by other shall be refunded to them:

Provided further that where the bargadar does not apply for such transfer and a co-sharer raiyat and raiyat possessing land adjoining such holding both apply for such transfer, the former shall have the prior right to have such portion or share of the holding transferred to him, and in such a case, the deposit made by the latter shall be refunded to him:

Provided also that as amongst raiyats possessing lands adjoining such holding preference shall be given to the raiyat having the longest common boundary with the land transferred.

(2)

Nothing in this section shall apply to-

(a)

a transfer by exchange or by partition, or,

(b)

a transfer by bequest or gift 7[or heba-bil-ewaz], or,

(c)

a 1* * * mortgage mentioned in section 7, or,

(d)

a transfer for charitable or religious purposes or both without reservation of any pecuniary benefit 2[for any individual, or,]

(e)

a transfer of land in favour of a bargadar, inspect of such land if after such transfer, the transferee holds as a raiyat land not exceeding one acre (or 0.4047 hectare) in area in the aggregate.

Explanation. - All orders passed and the consequences thereof under sections 8, 9 and 10 shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter IIB.

(3)

Every application pending before a Revenue Officer at the commencement of section 7 of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972, shall, on such commencement, stand transferred to, and be disposed of by, the Munsif having jurisdiction in relation to the area in which the land is situated and on such transfer every such application shall be dealt with from the stage at which it was so transferred and shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act, as amended by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972.

9.

(1) On the deposit mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 8 being made, the Munsif shall give notice of the application to the transferee, and shall also cause a notice to be affixed on the land for the information or persons interested. On such notice being served, the transferee or any person interested may appear within the time specified in the notice and prove the consideration money paid for the transfer and other sums, if any, properly paid by him in respect of the land including any sum paid for annulling encumbrances created prior to the date of transfer, and rent or revenue, cesses or taxes for any period. The Munsif may after such enquiry as he considers necessary direct the applicant to deposit such further sum, if any, within the time specified by him and on such sum being deposited, he shall make an order that the amount of the consideration money together with such other sums as are proved to have been paid by the transferee or the person interested plus ten per cent of the consideration money be paid to the transferee or the person interested out of the applicant. The Munsif shall then make a further order that the portion or share of the holding be transferred to the applicant and on such order being made, the portion or share of the holding shall vest in the applicant.

(2)

When any person acquires the right, title and interest of the transferee in such holding by succession or otherwise, the right, title and interest acquired by him shall be subject to the right conferred by sub-section (1) of section 8 on a co-share raiyat or a raiyat possessing land adjoining the holding.

(3)

In making an order under sub-section (1) in favour of more than one coshare raiyat or raiyat holding adjoining land, a the 1[Munsif] may apportion the portion or share of the holding in such manner and on such terms as he deems equitable.

(4)

Where any portion or share of a holding is transferred to the applicant under sub-section (1), such applicant shall be liable to pay all arears of revenue in respect of such portion or share of the holding that may be outstanding on the date of the order.

(5)

The Munsif shall send a copy of his order as modified on appeal, if any, under sub-section (6) to the prescribed authority for correction of the record-of-rights.

(6)

Any person aggrieved by an order of the Munsif under this section may appeal to the 2[District Judge] having jurisdiction over the area in which the land is situated, within thirty days from the date of such order and the District Judge shall send a copy of his order to the Munsif. The fees to be paid by the parties and the procedure to be followed by the District Judge shall be such as may be prescribed.

(7)

Every appeal pending before an Additional District Magistrate at the commencement of section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972, shall, on such commencement, stand transferred to, and he disposed of by, the District Judge having jurisdiction in relation to the area in which the land is situated and on such transfer, every such appeal shall be dealt with from the stage at which it was so transferred and shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act, as amended by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972.

10.

On an order under section 9 being made -

(1)

the right, title and interest of the raiyat and on the transferee or of the person mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 9 who acquires any right, title and interest in the holding shall vest in the raiyat whose application for transfer has been allowed by the Revenue Officer or by the Munsif or, after the commencement of section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms (amendment) Act, 1971, by the Additional District Magistrate, or, after the commencement of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972, by the District Judge, on appeal:

Provided that the transferee or the person mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 9 shall have the right to take away the crops which he might have grown on the land before the date of the order;

(b)

the raiyat whose application has been so allowed shall be liable for any revenue accruing from the date of the order.”

19.

Section 8 of the Act of 1955 clearly lays down that a right of pre-emption accrues, if a portion or share of a holding of raiyat is transferred to any person other than a co-sharer in the holding. Such right devolves upon a (i) ‘Bargadar’ or (ii) a co-sharer riyat or (iii) raiyat possessing land adjoining such holding in such order of preference. It is not in dispute that the lands in question were sold to the petitioner who is not co-sharer in the holding. In the present case, no Bargadar or co-sharer in the holding came up claiming right of pre-emption. The two sets of raiyats claiming to possess land adjoining such holding which was sold out.

20.

The third provisio of Section 8 of the Act of 1955 contemplates a situation that as amongst raiyats possessing lands adjoining such holding, preference shall be given to the raiyat having the longest common boundary with the land transferred. The judgment and order passed by the learned trial court as the impugned judgment and order has clearly held that opposite party no. 1 was the raiyats possessing lands adjoining the sold lands and therefore allowed the application for pre-emption.

21.

Section 9 (1) of the Act of 1955 provides for the claim of right of pre-emption by adjoining raiyat upon deposit of the consideration money together with a further sum of 10 per cent, of that amount. The provision also provides that upon making an order allowing the application for pre-emption, the concerned court shall make an order that the amount of the consideration money together with such other sums as are proved to have been paid by the transferee or the person interested plus ten per cent of the consideration money be paid to the transferee. Therefore, a transferee is entitled to the consideration money, other sums as directed by the court together with ten per cent thereof and nothing more.

22.

Moreover, Section 9 (3) of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 also provides that in making an order under sub-section (1) in favour of more than one co-sharer raiyat or raiyats holding adjoining land, the Munsif may apportion the portion or share of the holding in such manner and on such terms as he deems equitable. In the provision of the Act of 1955, there appears no specific bar that a joint application by the raiyats holding land adjoining the transferred land and claiming pre-emption rights therein, cannot be filed. The only thing that is to be considered by the court while deciding an application for pre-emption is whether the consideration money together with ten per cent thereof has been deposited.

23.

In Sadhan Chandra Samanta (supra), it was held that,

“7.

In the instant case, the transfer in favour of stranger purchaser of a share in the holding in question gave rise to right of pre-emption in favour of owners of adjoining plots. In other words, both the applicants under Section 8 became entitled to claim right to relief arising out of the same act or transaction. If they had filed separate applications under Section 8 common question of law and facts would have arisen. Secondly, in such an event the court would be called upon to decide of the two who had possessed land having the longest common boundary with the land transferred. Therefore, even if separate applications under Section 8 were filed, it would have been necessary to analogously try the same and also to decide who had the preferential right to pre-empt the transfer in favour of the stranger purchaser. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was no mis-joineder by reason of the 2 applicants jointly making the application under section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. Alternatively, such joinder did not affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court.”

24.

Therefore, in consideration of the afore gone discussions, provisions of Section 8 and 9 of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 as well as the ratio of Sadhan Chandra Samanta (supra), I am of the opinion that there is nothing wrong if several claimants join hands and file a joint petition for pre-emption supported by a single deposit. The impugned judgment and order does not call for any interference on such score.

25.

No case has been made out by the petitioner that either set of the applicant was not the full owner of the lands adjoining the transferred lands. The case of Bula Kundu (supra) notes that even a co-sharer of the land adjoining the transferred land can maintain an application for pre-emption.

26.

So far as applicability of Section 8 and 9 of the Act of 1955 in respect of homestead (BASTU) land, in Sanjay Halda (supra), a Coordinate Bench held to the following,

“7.

The next point that was argued that the learned Trial Court held that pre-emption is not applicable in connection with bastu land. Learned First Appellate Court took a different view. Section (1) subsection (2) of West Bengal Land Reforms Act speaks that the applicability of the said act is extended to whole of the West Bengal except the area excluded in the said section. Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act does not contain the overriding clause so as to exclude the applicability of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act in a case covered under the said act. Definition of the land has seen a radical change and now it means land of every description which includes home state as well. If the definition of the raiyat remained unchanged in that case the arrangement that is a bastu land could have helped the opposite party. However, Learned First Appellate Court held that the bastu land is also under the coverage of land and in view of the application for pre-emption of section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, pre-emption of bastu land is also maintainable.

8.

On perusal of the impugned order passed by the learned Courts below, I am not in agreement with the finding of the learned Trial Court so fas “bastu land” is concerned and I have no hesitation to say that the learned First Appellate Court has appreciated the evidence led by both parties in its proper perspective and has come to correct conclusion, which does not warrant any interference.”

27.

As to the point no (ii) with regard to partial pre-emption, it is evident from the words and phrases used in Section 8 of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, that a right of pre-emption can be claimed by a Bargadar, or a co-sharer or a person owning land adjacent to the transferred land. If several plots are transferred by a single deed and a person has his land adjacent to one or few of such transferred land, in such contingency, the claim of pre-emption is bound to fail as the person claiming such right does not own lands adjacent to all the plots involved in the transaction. If such proposition is appreciated, in every sale, the vendors may tend to include stray properties, in order to negate the right of pre-emption. The issue came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Satish Chandra Kuila (supra). The Hon’ble Division Bench decided the issue to following terms,

“4.

Mr. Muter next contended that the impugned order must also fail as paru??? pre-emption is not permissible in law. Mr. Muter contended that as pre-emption was allowed only in respect of some plots excluding the afore said four plots, the learned Munsif was not justified in passing the order of pre-emption in respect of a portion of the holding. In such circumstances, according to Mr. Mitter, pre-emption should have been allowed in respect of the entirety of the lands. It may be pointed out at this stage that by allowing partial pre-emption, Mr. Mitter's client has not suffered in any way. On the contrary, sucn order for partial pre-emption excluding the aforesaid four plots has enured to the benefit of the petitioner because no order for preemption has been passed against him in respect of the said four plots. But apart from this, it appears to us that on the ground of vicinage order of preemption should be made in respect of those plots which really are contiguous to the plots of the applicant. It is quite evident that the concept of vicinage is of recent origin and in the Bengal Tenancy Act such concept was not introduced. Mr. Mitter relied on two decisions of this court reported in (1937-38) 42 CWN 288 Surabala v. Rukmini, and (1934-35) 38 CWN 654 Beharilal v. Pulinbehari, for the aforesaid proposition that partial pre-emption is not permissible in law. We may point out that such decisions can be clearly distinguished from the facts and circumstances of the instant case and apart from anything else, the question of vicinage had not been considered in those decisions inasmuch as the pre-emption on the ground of vicinage was not known in the Bengal, Tenancy Act.”

28.

Bhagwati Prasad Sah (supra) is a judgment rendered where right of pre-emption was claimed by a co-sharer. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the view that

“16.

To summarize: A right of pre-emption is annexed to full ownership of property of co-sharers. It is not attached to property held on subordinate tenure, such as leases etc. It is an incident of the co-sharer’s property operating both as right and as a burden in different situation. It is a right of substitution taking in the entire bargain. It must take the whole or nothing. It does not matter if the inability take the whole arises out of a voluntary act or out of legal limitation inherent in the nature of the property transferred. It is reciprocal operation, that is, if the situation was reversed and the vender became the pre-emptor, he should be in a position to pre-empt the co-sharer’s “whole bargain. The two doctrines which may, for convenience, be referred to as “entire bargain” and “reciprocity” cannot operate unless both the co-sharers are full owners of their respective properties. Akar or a house standing on a free hold land is subject to the right of pre-emption, but a house on a leasehold land stand on a different footing. As there is no right of pre-emption in respect of a land held on a subordinate tenure, the right of pre-emption can not be enforced, against the house either as the pre-emptor cannot be substituted for the entire bargain. The right must fall also on the ground that the super structure disannexed from the land would be movable property and it is well settled that the right of pre-emption cannot be enforced in respect of moveables.”

29.

In the case at hand, the claim of pre-emption has been made on the basis of adjoining land owner. The principle of “whole bargain” and “reciprocity” as noted in Bhagwati Prasad Sah (supra) was in respect of the co-sharer and not in respect of the contiguous adjacent land owners.

30.

Moreover, in the case of Bhatulla Sk. (supra), it was noted that,

“14.

I am fully in conformity with the reasoning given by the learned Judge in the decision of Bula Kundu with regard to the scope and ambit of section 8 of the said Act. From the language of section 8 it is clear that any raiyat possessing land adjoining the plot of land which is intended to be transferred may claim pre-emption. There is no necessity of the adjoining land owner to have a common boundary line with regard to the portion of the plot of land which is sought to be trasferred.”

(Emphasis supplied)

29.

The original application for pre-emption being J. Misc Case No. 6 of 1999 was filed by the opposite parties jointly under the provisions of Sections 8 and 9 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 as well as alternatively under Section 24 of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act. It was contended that the provisions of Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act were not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case and, as such, the application for pre-emption so filed on behalf of the petitioner ought to have been rejected. In Sk. Abdul Gaffar (supra), a Division Bench of this Court was of the view that:-

“8.

The effect of the aforesaid amendment during the pendency of this appeal has made the application for pre-emption under section 24 of the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act infructuous, inasmuch as, on 18th July, 1983, the date of filing of application for pre-emption in this case, the respondent had no right to claim pre-emption under the West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act according to the said amendment. As laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Laxmi Narayan Guin v. Niranjan Modak, reported in AIR 1985 SC 111, an appeal is a continuation of the suit and notwithstanding the fact that the suit was decreed before enactment of the new law, such new law having been given retrospective operation from a date prior to the filing of the present proceedings for pre-emption, the same should be disposed of in accordance with the new law.”

30.

Therefore, in view of the ratio laid down in Sk. Abdul Gaffar (supra), the prayer of the opposite parties and the findings of the learned First Appellate Court in the impugned judgment and order do not call any interference.

31.

So far as the contours of the present proceeding and jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is concerned, in the case of Sneh Gupta (supra), it was noted that

“41.

The High Court moreover was exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. While exercising the said jurisdiction, the High Court had a limited role to play. It is not the function of the High Court while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction to enter into the disputed question of fact. It has not been found by the High Court that the findings arrived at by the learned Additional District Judge were perverse and/or in arriving at the said findings, the learned Additional District Judge failed and/or neglected to take into consideration the relevant factors or based its decision on irrelevant factors not germane therefor. It could intervene, if there existed an error apparent on the face of the record or, if any other well-known principle of judicial review was found to be applicable. (See Yeshwant Sakhalkar v. Hirabat Kamat Mhamai [(2004) 6 SCC 71].”

32.

Similarly, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Arindam Joardar (supra) refused to interfere with the concurrent finding of the facts arrived at by the Court of law.

33.

Subal Mondal (supra) was also rendered in a case where the right of pre-emption was claimed by a co-sharer. In such case, it was held by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court that

“19.

On plain reading of said sub-section 4 of section 5 of the Act of 1955 it is clear that in the case of transfer of a portion or share of such a plot of land by one to which the provisions of pre-emption under section 8 apply then notice was required to be issued to all the co-sharers of said plot of land who are not parties to the transfer and also for affixing a copy thereof on different places mentioned therein. It is thus palpable that if there is no co-sharer in the plot of land there is no question of issuing any notice under section 5(4) as well as for exercising any right of pre-emption by anybody. It has already been established that pre-emptor Gopal Chandra Mondal was not a co-sharer of the land of Sankar Nath Mondal and that there was no co-sharer in the land of Sankar Nath Mondal which was purchased by him from common owner Akshay Kumar Mondal. If that be the position then pre-emptor Gopal Chandra Mondal cannot exercise the right of pre-emption under section 8 of the Act of 1955 even though he was an adjacent land owner of the plot of land, a portion of which was sold out by Sankar Nath Mondal to the petitioner pre-emptee by a kobala dated 25th of August, 2003. It appears that learned Lower Court of appeal failed to take note the principles of applicability of the right of pre-emption under section 8 when there was no co-sharer in the plot of land, in its true perspective. As a result, the order impugned is liable to be set aside.”

34.

Monoranjan Senapati (supra) was also rendered in the case of a claim of pre-emption on the basis of co-ownership. In such case, the previous owner of the land had sold out specifically demarcated portion of her property in favour of two persons. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court noted that if the subsequent purchaser could not claim to be a co-sharer of the original owner, the purchaser from the subsequent purchaser could not have elevated his status than that of his vendor.

35.

The original application for pre-emption was filed by the opposite parties jointly upon deposit of the consideration money together with 10% thereof. Therefore, the ratio laid down in Barasat Eye Hospital (supra) is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

36.

On the basis of the discussions made hereinbefore, I find no merit in the present proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. There appears nothing to interfere with the findings of the learned First Appellate Court in the impugned judgment and decree. The same is hereby affirmed.

37.

With the aforesaid observations, C.O. 2164 of 2011 is, accordingly, disposed of. Connected application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

38.

Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on priority basis upon compliance of all formalities.