Tajinder Singh vs State of J & K

Can an adoption duly recognised by decree of a Civil Court can be ignored by the Revenue Authorities. This is the question posed in this

Letters Patent Appeal preferred under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.

One Sampuran Singh was an allottee of evacuees land. This land come to be allotted to him under Cabinet Order No; 578C of 1954. The

appellant Tajinder Singh came forward with a plea that he is adopted son of Sampuran Singh and therefore, he is entitled to his rights. This plea of

his found favour with the Divisional Commissioner, Jammu exercising the powers of Dy. Custodian General. This officer observed that the question

of adoption having been decided by the Civil Court cannot be over looked by the departmental authorities. Harnam Singh respondent, who was all

along challenging the status of Tajinder Singh as the adopted son, preferred a revision before the J&K Special Tribunal, Jammu. The Special

Tribunal remanded the matter back. An observation was made that the factum of adoption has to be established by evidence and a decree

obtained by the appellant declaring him to be the adopted son can always be reexamined by the departmental authorities. This view expressed by

the Special Tribunal was challenged in this court in writ petition. The writ petition stands dismissed. It is in these circumstances, an appeal has been

preferred.

It is not in dispute that there exist a decree and the validity of this decree was challenged by Harnam Singh. He filed a civil suit. This suit came to

be dismissed on 12101998. The appellant who is figured as defendant in the suit urged that he is to be treated as adopted son of Sampuran Singh

and his wife Mooli. It was urged that the factum of adoption was not denied by plaintiff Harnam Singh. Therefore, the decree establishing his right

as adopted son could not be challenged. With regard to the rights of respondent Harnam Singh, the observations made by the civil court while

dismissing the suit on 12101988 are as under :

Under section 3A of Agrarian Reforms Act displaced persons allotted evacuee land shall be deemed as occupancy tenants thereof, and shall be

so recorded. Deceased Mooli and her husband Sampuran Singh being displaced person and the land under consideration being evacuee is not

denied. Mst Mooli had died on 0407'985 as has been recorded in the death register, a copy whereof is on record of this case. As Mooli,

therefore, had become the occupancy tenant of the land allotted to her in her life time by operation of the law itself. Now as the deceased had

become occupancy tenant in her life time so after her death the right of occupancy had to devolve in terms of section 67 Tenancy Act. Such being

the position of law the plaintiff herein would not have inherited the land allotted to Mst. Mooli and got possession thereof even if there had been no

adoption made by her.

With regard to factum of adoption the claim of Harnam Singh was again negatived. What was said in this regard is reproduced below:

Now coming to the next argument of the learned defence counsel, perusal of the plaint shows that it has not at all been alleged by the plaintiff that

the defendant No. 1 was never adopted by Mst. Mooli. The mere fact that the decree was collusive and was granted by the court in shortest

possible time is no ground for declaring the same as null and void being fradulent. On that score also the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable.

If above is the situation then so far as Harnam Singh is concerned he is bound by result of the civil suit initiated by him. He did not challenge the

view expressed by the trial court in any appellate forum. The decree by which the suit of Harnam Singh was dismissed, having attained finality has

put an end to this controversy so far as Harnam Singh is concerned. This however, did not happen. As indicated above the Deputy Custodian

General placed reliance on the decree recognizing the factum of adoption of appellant Tajinder Singh and the question arises whether this can be

brushed aside.

We are of the opinion that the personal rights of the parties stood determined by the law of adoption. The fact that there was a decree

recognizing the fact that the appellant Tajinder Singh was an adopted son of Sampuran Singh has not been challenged so far. Harnam Singh made

a futile attempt. The suit filed by him in this regard was dismissed. He was satisfied with that. Under these circumstances the determination of the

rights of Tajinder Singh visavis his having been adopted attained finality. It would be against all cannons of judicial interpretation to let the revenue

authorities to again reexamine the validity of the decree. If any authority for this proposition is required then a reference can be made to the

decision given by the Supreme Court of India in the case reported as State of Haryana Vs. Karnal Coop Society, AIR 1974 SC 1.

The counsel appearing for Harnam Singh submitted that the appellant had challenged the proceedings in a civil court. He sought an injunction

also. He was unsuccessful in this regard. It is also urged that the writ petition was filed belatedly. It be seen that these questions were not raised

before the learned Single Judge, therefore, they are not being taken into consideration. We are accordingly of the opinion that the appeal must

succeed on the short ground that the decree passed by the civil court recognizing the appellant as the adopted son of Sampuran Singh must be

shown full respect. Subordinate Revenue hierarchy cannot be allowed to rejudge the validity of this decree. This is more so when Harnam Singh

respondent made a futile attempt to challenge the same in a suit filed by him.

It be seen that a judgment in rem binds every one. A Full Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court in case State of Haryana Vs. Vinod Kumar

(Air 1986 P & H 407 has observed as under:

Broadly speaking there are two types of judgments/orders, namely, judgments in rem and judgments in personam. The former binds the whole

world whereas the latter binds only the parties. The judgments/orders in rem are the ones passed by the authorities or the courts exercising the

jurisdiction such as insolvency, admiralty and matrimonial. The jurisdiction exercised by the authorities under the Punjab Act is not of such a nature

that the orders passed under it would bind the public at large. Obviously they are the judgments/orders in personam. The fundamental principle as

to their nature is that they only bind the parties to it or the persons named therein. So far as the person who is neither a party nor named in such an

order is concerned, the order in the eye of law is ineffective and nonest and as such he is under no obligation to take proceedings to get it set aside.

Strictly speaking the terms 'void' or voidable' when used qua a judgment or an order would be relevant when a person is a party or named in the

judgment or the order because it is only such a person who can take proceedings to get it declared void or set aside as the case may be. On the

other hand a person who is not a party would have no right to get the order set aside or declare it void as the order would be binding on the

persons who are party or named therein and his remedy would be only to get a declaration that the order was ineffective and nonest so far as he is

concerned x x x.

Judgment in rem is an adjudication pronounced upon the status of some particular subject matter by a Tribunal having competent jurisdiction and

including all persons, not merely the parties to the proceedings, from saying that the status of the thing adjudicated upon was not such as declared

by the adjudication. The factum of adoption determines the status of the man. He is planted in a new family. He looses his right in the family in

which he is born. A declaration made regarding this status would be binding on all. This would be mare so Harnam Singh respondent who had

challenged the status of appellant and was unsuccessful.

In view of the above the order passed by the J&K Special Tribunal is set aside and that of the Divisional Commissioner with powers of Dy.

Custodian General is restored. Appeal allowed in the manner indicated above.