Tafijul Hoque vs Mobarak Hossain & Ors.

Arjun Ray Mukherjee, J.

MAT 1105 of 2026 and MAT 1106 of 2026 involved a similar question of law and as such, were heard analogously.

These two intra-Court writ appeals are directed against a common order dated June 22, 2026 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.A. 12941 of 2026 and WPA 13361 of 2026.

In WPA 12941 of 2026, the appellant in MAT 1105 of 2026 was the respondent no. 9, Pradhan of Jalalpur Gram Panchayat [hereinafter referred to as ‘the said Gram Panchayat’] and the respondent nos. 1 to 15 were the writ petitioners, being the members of the said Gram Panchayat, before the learned Single Judge. In WPA 13361 of 2026, the appellant in MAT 1106 of 2026 was the writ petitioner, being the Pradhan of the said Gram Panchayat and the respondent nos. 10 to 24, members of the said Gram Panchayat, were the respondents before the learned Single Judge.

By a common judgment and order dated 22.06.2026, the learned Single Judge, having found the issues involved in both the writ petitions to be interrelated, disposed of both the writ petitions.

The operative portion of the said judgment, by which WPA 13361 of 2026 was disposed of, is as follows:

The operative portion of the said judgment, by which WPA 12941 of 2026 was disposed of, is as follows:

28 members in the said Gram Panchayat were elected in the 2023 Panchayat elections.

The respondent nos. 1 to 15 in MAT 1105 of 2026 / writ petitioners in WPA 12941 of 2026 / members of the said Gram Panchayat [hereinafter referred to as ‘the requsitionists’] vide letter dated 22.05.2026, addressed to the Block Development Officer, Chanchal – II [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Prescribed Authority’] within the meaning of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Panchayat Act’], brought a ‘no confidence motion’ under Section 12[2] thereof for removal of the appellant in MAT 1105 of 2026 / the Pradhan of the said Gram Panchayat [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Pradhan’].

The Prescribed Authority issued a notice dated 29.05.2026 fixing the date of the meeting for removal of the Pradhan on 09.06.2026.

Subsequently, the Prescribed Authority issued another notice dated 08.06.2026, whereby the meeting was postponed until further order on the basis of the information furnished by the Inspector – in – Charge, Chanchal Police Station, informing that adequate police force could not be made available on 09.06.2026.

In WPA 13361 of 2026, the Pradhan alleged that two members had not attended three consecutive meetings of the Panchayat despite service of notice upon them, for which they were required to be removed from their membership in terms of Section 11 of the Panchayat Act. The learned Single Judge, as already stated in the foregoing paragraph, directed the Sub-Divisional Officer to consider and dispose of the representation of the Pradhan, made in this behalf, in accordance with law, within the specified time mentioned therein.

In WPA 12941 of 2026, the requisitionists sought for a direction upon the Prescribed Authority to fix the date of the meeting in terms of Section 12[2] of the Panchayat Act and to conclude the proceeding within the stipulated time-frame. The learned Single Judge, as stated in the preceding paragraph, directed the Prescribed Authority to convene the meeting within 10 days from the date of communication of the order and further directed to take the proceeding to its logical conclusion within the stipulated time frame laid down in the Panchayat Act.

Pursuant to the order dated 22.06.2026, passed by the learned Single Judge in connection with the writ petition WPA 12941 of 2026, the Prescribed Authority issued a notice dated 24.06.2026 fixing the meeting on 03.07.2026. The meeting for removal of the Pradhan was finally held on 03.07.2026 i.e. after a lapse of 42 days from the date of notice of motion dated 22.05.2026.

Both the appeals were taken up for consideration on 13.07.2026 and by an order, the Bench, inter alia, passed the following directions:

Pursuant to the above direction, the requisitionists / respondents filed an affidavit in opposition in connection with the stay application.

The following paragraphs of the said affidavit are relevant for adjudication:

Now, the question which falls for our consideration is, whether the learned Single Judge erred in directing the Prescribed Authority to hold the meeting beyond the statutory time limit prescribed, and whether the ground for postponement fell within the exceptions under Section 12(4).

Before we proceed further, it is necessary to state the provisions of Section 12 of the Panchayat Act:

Section 12[4] of the Panchayat Act has two parts – the first part clearly mandates a mandatory time limit for holding a meeting, which shall not be later than ‘fifteen working days’ from the date of receipt of the motion by the Prescribed Authority. We shall discuss in the succeeding paragraphs, the intention of the legislature in using the expression ‘shall not be later than’, in the first part of Section 12[4] of the Panchayat Act. The latter part of Section 12[4] speaks about two contingencies i.e. the meeting so convened shall not be either adjourned or cancelled except [i] in pursuance of an order or direction of a competent court or [ii] for any other reason beyond the control of the Prescribed Authority.

The principles as to whether the provisions of a statute is mandatory or directory are well settled. The intention of the legislature and not the language in which such intent is clothed, is the relevant factor.

In Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P., reported in (2007) 8 SCC 338, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, observed as follows:

In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 772, the Hon’ble Apex Court, inter alia, held the following:

Keeping in mind the aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court, let us now examine the provisions of Section 12[4] of the Panchayat Act, to ascertain whether such provision is mandatory or directory.

As soon as a notice of motion is issued to remove a Pradhan, the clock starts ticking, inasmuch as, on the one hand the sword of Damocles starts hanging over the Pradhan, who had been elected democratically and would naturally want to complete his term, and on the other hand, the majority members who lost confidence in the Pradhan for whatever reason, sign a motion in terms of Section 12[2] of the Panchayat Act, expressing their lack of confidence in him and desire to remove him. Therefore, the fate of the Pradhan is to be tested in a meeting which is required to be held upon being convened by the Prescribed Authority. It is needless to mention here that, those members who signed the motion /the requsitionists, having lost confidence in the Pradhan, also started to fervently wait for their desired object of removing the Pradhan, who, according to them, ought to be removed for the better functioning of the gram panchayat, or for any other reason.

In these circumstances, the Pradhan will try to prove his majority in order to avoid removal, whereas, the requisitionists will try to prove that the majority wants to remove the Pradhan who, according to them, is unfit to lead the gram panchayat. Therefore, we must be mindful of the fact that the respective substantive rights of the Pradhan and requsitionists under the statute will be affected, if a speedy and proper mechanism is not followed. Here, ‘time’ becomes the most important and decisive factor. The answer to the question as to why ‘time’ is germane, lies in the fact that delay in holding the meeting within the time prescribed by the statute, may give an undue advantage to the Pradhan or cause disadvantage to the requisitionists, depending on the situation. If the meeting is delayed, the endeavour of the Pradhan to regain confidence of the members may be fulfilled with the passage of time. He may have adequate room to solicit their support and lure them to vote for him and support him at the meeting. The requisitionists having majority wanted to carry through the motion. Thus, delay may frustrate their unity. We must, in this connection, keep in mind that once a race has started between two racers, meant to be completed within a fixed time limit, changing the time period afterwards, not only gives an undue advantage to one of the racers, but as a whole, it vitiates the entire race. Moreover, if the motion is brought and the meeting is not held, the working of the gram panchayat comes to a standstill. Without support of the members, no work can be accomplished by the gram panchayat.

There is another aspect of the matter. The people (voters) have not been mentioned in these provisions, but their rights are also substantially affected in such circumstances. Those residents, within the territorial jurisdiction of the said Panchayat in respect of which the motion to remove the Pradhan is pending, have a right to have a suitable Pradhan, duly elected under Section 9 of the Panchayat Act by their elected representatives. They have a hope that under the Pradhan’s leadership, the Panchayat will work effectively and within the framework of the Panchayat Act, for betterment of the locality. Once the members lose confidence in the Pradhan, he does not have a right to continue in office. All that remains, is a removal in a meeting usually by raising of hands. The gram panchayat suffers in the midst of creation of rival groups. Thus, the motion has to be tested at the earliest, and positively within the statutory period prescribed in this regard.

Moreover, the time frames under Sections 12(2) to 12(4) have to be read harmoniously with Section 12(10). The entire process from receipt of the requisition and up to the removal, must be completed within 30 days from the motion.

Therefore, the legislature has fixed the time limit to do certain things within certain time frames and neither the Court nor the Executive is empowered to extend such time, thereby, rewriting the statute. Such a course is not permissible in law. Once the legislature in Section 12[4] of the Panchayat Act has couched the time frame with a negative word, ie, ‘which shall not be later than’ fifteen working days from the date of receipt of the motion by the prescribed authority’, the intention must be declared to be ‘mandatory’ [emphasized by us].

In M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramalappa reported in [1961] 2 SCR 295, the Supreme Court held that “negative words are clearly prohibitory and are ordinarily used as a legislative device to make a statute imperative.”

In Lachmi Narain v. Union of India reported in AIR 1976 SC 714, the Supreme Court observed that, if a provision is couched in prohibitive or negative language, it can rarely be directory and the use of peremptory language in a negative form is per se indicative of the intent that the provision is to be mandatory.

The Supreme Court in its decision in Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal reported in (2003) 2 SCC 577, had the occasion to reiterate that when negative words are used, the Courts will presume that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions are mandatory in character.

Therefore, if we look at the aforesaid provisions under the statute, keeping in mind the rights of the Pradhan vis-à-vis the requsitionists, any delay in concluding the meeting would have a cascading effect not only on the opposing groups, but also on the people who elected them with the expectation of better administration. In other words, the purpose and object of Section 12[4] would be defeated and the intention of the legislature would be unfulfilled, if the time for holding the meeting is extended by court, except under the two specific contingencies mentioned in the statute itself.

Therefore, in our view, the time limit under Section 12[4] is mandatory, unless one of the two exceptions can be imported to the act of postponement.

Now, let us examine the latter provision of Section 12[4] of the Panchayat Act. This provision contains two contingencies, under which the meeting can be either adjourned or cancelled, namely:-

The first part of the latter provisions of Section 12[4] does not require any elaborate explanation. The legislature, by this provision, has empowered the Court to adjourn or cancel a meeting in an appropriate case.

The second part of the latter provision of Section 12[4] requires examination in order to ascertain under what circumstances and to what extent the Prescribed Authority may adjourn or cancel the meeting citing ‘reason beyond his control’.

Therefore, the Prescribed Authority must not exercise his power for an ‘unauthorised purpose’. It means that the exercise of statutory power cannot be for a purpose foreign to that for which it is intended in law. Any action taken by the Prescribed Authority in conscious violation of the law, to the prejudice of another or any depraved inclination to disregard the rights of others, is liable to be set aside. [emphasized by us]

Before we proceed further, we must be mindful that passing an order for an ‘unauthorised purpose’ constitutes ‘malice in law’. What is ‘malice in law’ has been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 437:

The right to remove a Pradhan by a vote of no confidence is a statutorily recognised right and it is based on democratic principles. Non-compliance of such provisions by the Prescribed Authority, violates such democratic process.

The State respondents, namely, the Prescribed Authority as also the Officer-in-Charge, Chanchal Police Station, were parties to the appeal. While the appeal was admitted and an interim order was granted, we had afforded the respondents an opportunity to file affidavits. Neither the Prescribed Authority nor the Officer-in-Charge, Chanchal Police Station have come up with any affidavit-in-opposition disclosing that the ground reality and the law-and-order situation, necessitated police protection during the meeting. Thus, an inference can be drawn that no such situation existed. There is nothing on record to show that, either the Prescribed Authority or the Chanchal Police Station had reasons to substantiate that the situation was beyond the control of the Prescribed Authority and postponement of the meeting was imperative and covered by the second contingency under Section 12(4) of the Panchayat Act.

The issue as to whether the provisions of Section 12(4) of the Panchayat Act are mandatory or not is longer res integra. A Coordinate Bench of this Court [where one of us was a member] in Pradhan, Nurpur Gram Panchayat and Another vs. Gobinda Ghosh and Others reported in 2026 SCC OnLine Cal 8718, had occasioned to deal with an identical issue. It was, inter alia, held:

Unfortunately, the decision in Pradhan, Nurpur Gram Panchayat and Another [supra] was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge.

It does not appear that the decision of the learned Single Judge passes the twin tests of ‘why’ and ‘what’. A judicial decision must meet, the ‘why’ connoting the ‘reason’ for sustaining the ‘what’, which is the ‘conclusion’. Reference may be made in this regard to the decision reported in 2024 [4] SCC 696 [Asma Lateef & Anr. Vs. Shabbir Ahmad & Ors.].

The decision of the learned Single Judge is also not in consonance with Section 12[4] of the Panchayat Act. The learned Single Judge has completely misconstrued the law and failed to appreciate the legislative intent behind the incorporation of the expression that the meeting shall not be held later than ‘fifteen working days’ from the date of receipt of the motion by the Prescribed Authority.

The judgments passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in MAT 653 of 2021 [Selina Bibi Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.] and MAT 992 of 2022 [Pravati Murmu &Anr. Vs. Sabina Hasda & Ors.] also do not come to the aid of the requisitionists.

In Selina Bibi [supra], the meeting was adjourned due to the restrictions imposed by the State in view of the Covid–19 pandemic situation. This, in our view, certainly amounts to ‘reasons beyond control’ for which a meeting can be adjourned by the Prescribed Authority.

In Pravati Murmu [supra], no ratio has been laid down and therefore, the said judgment cannot be treated as a binding precedent. The facts are also not available. We are unable to consider the circumstances under which the court allowed the meeting which was held at an extended date.

In the instant case, as it appears from the notice dated 08.06.2026 and also from the affidavit filed by the requisitionists, the Prescribed Authority, who is also the Block Development Officer, Chanchal-II Development Block, could not hold the meeting since adequate police force was not made available. In the present determination allotted to us, we have found that in other appeals also, identical pleas were taken by the Prescribed Authority to either cancel or postpone the meeting.

The Prescribed Authority is the Block Development Officer and he is the administrative head of his Block. It is unfortunate that an administrative head of a Block is unable to perform his statutory duty for lack of police assistance. This cannot be an excuse for not performing statutory duties. The apprehension of the Prescribed Authority of law-and-order problems at the time of the meeting or afterwards, must be based on some materials on record. ‘Police assistance’ is not a pre-condition for holding a meeting under Section 12(4). The Prescribed Authority can neither rewrite the statutory provision and nor can he choose not to perform his / her statutory duties on flimsy grounds. If it is found that there is an apprehension of law-and-order problem in the block, an inference may be drawn that the administration of the Block is not running well. The statute also does not provide for police assistance. Unless, subjective satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority that, the situation at the meeting will lead to violence and he will be unable to hold the meeting in fear of violence, are available from the records, we cannot hold that inability of the police to provide assistance, is a valid ground, available in law, to postpone the meeting.

It is also surprising to note that the Officer-in-charge of the concerned police station refused to accede to the request of the Block Development Officer. We express our displeasure and anguish to that effect. The entire action/decision of the police authority as well as the Prescribed Authority / Block Development Officer are highly reprehensible. The intention of the legislature cannot be defeated in the casual manner adopted by the Prescribed Authority.

It is to be remembered that, the legislature has empowered the Prescribed Authority to cancel or adjourn the meeting for ‘any other reason beyond his control’. That does not mean that the Prescribed Authority can use such power as a device to adjourn or cancel a meeting in every case. Since, the first part of Section 12(4) is mandatory in nature the Prescribed Authority must keep in mind that all endeavours are required to be taken by him to conclude the meeting within the time frame given by the statute. The latter part of Section 12(4) of the Panchayat Act, can be invoked only in exceptional circumstances, such as flood or covid pandemic, other natural calamities, violence or other circumstances of like nature, which are beyond the control of the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority must substantiate existence of such reasons either in his cancellation or adjournment order or from contemporaneous records, demonstrably disclosing the genuine reason(s) which forced him to postpone the meeting. Moreover, the postponement in this case, was until further orders. i.e. indefinitely, without fixing another convenient date.

In view of the above, we declare that the first part of Section 12(4) to be mandatory, ie, if the two contingencies, contained in the latter part of Section 12(4) do not arise. The same provision is directory, if any of the contingencies as stipulated in the latter part of Section 12(4) arises, provided the Prescribed Authority, before cancelling or adjourning the meeting, satisfies himself that there exists a genuine reason, which according to him is beyond his control. In such event, he is permitted to adjourn or cancel the meeting. It is made clear that absence of police assistance cannot be a ground to cancel or adjourn a meeting. The Prescribed Authority is bound by law and he cannot raise vague issues like law-and-order problem to justify non-compliance of the statutory provisions, without recording with corroborative evidence that the law-and-order situation is beyond his control, likely to cause bloodbath.

It is needless to mention here that the requisitionists have a right to remove the Pradhan. In case the meeting is cancelled at the instance of the Prescribed Authority, they have a right to bring another motion in accordance with law and in such event, the Prescribed Authority is under a bounden duty to comply with the provisions of the Panchayat Act within the statutory period and without delaying the situation for no cogent reason.

Before we conclude, we would like to remind ourselves of the proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of UP Vs. Johri Mal reported in 2004 (4) SCC 714 on the scope of judicial review of an administrative decision.

Paragraph 28[iii] of the said judgment is reproduced herein below:

In the instant case, the power exercised by the Prescribed Authority was for an unauthorised purpose, and therefore, the notice dated 08.06.2026 issued by the Prescribed Authority, whereby the meeting was postponed, is illegal for the reasons stated hereinabove. Hence, the notice dated 08.06.2026 is quashed. The order impugned is also set aside. The consequential steps taken pursuant to the order impugned are set aside. The election of the new Pradhan is set aside. The appellant will be reinstated as Pradhan.

We grant liberty to the requisitionists to bring another motion in accordance with law and it is directed that the Prescribed Authority shall strictly comply with the provisions of law and convene the meeting within the time fixed by the statute.

We direct the Registrar General of this Court to send a copy of this judgment to the Principal Secretary, Panchayat and Rural Development, Government of West Bengal, all the District Magistrates and the Director General of Police, West Bengal to take necessary steps and to ensure strict adherence to the provisions of Section 12(4) of the Panchayat Act by the Prescribed Authority.

The appeals stand disposed of.

No order as to costs.

Urgent photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on compliance of all necessary formalities.