T. Raghava Pillai and others vs Syed Valli Peeran

Anantanarayanan, J.—I may very briefly refer to the undisputed facts first. These are two orders of eviction passed by the Registrar of the

Court of Small Causes, at Madras, in proceedings before him for summary eviction under S. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882.

The orders are very cryptic, and are merely to the effect that both parties were heard in person. This is followed by a direction for delivery by the

specified date. Presumably the order is under S. 43 of the Act, and the Court was satisfied that the respondent was entitled to apply under S. 41

and to obtain orders of eviction in both instances. Learned Counsel for revision petitioners has submitted an argument, with which I do not agree

that S. 9 of the Madras City Tenants'' Protection Act will place an embargo on a judgment of this kind, being pronounced within the time specified

under that section. Though the City Tenants'' Protection Act does refer to the sections relating to summary eviction under the Presidency Small

Cause Courts Act there is no provision of law in either Act that such eviction cannot be ordered, because the person sought to be evicted (tenant)

may apply for his right of purchase of the site for value under S. 9, on the contrary, the normal interpretation would be that the two procedures are

independent of each other. However that might be, the facts remain that the revision petitioners (defendants) resisted the eviction sought for upon

certain pleas, which I am deliberately refraining from analysing at the present stage. It seems clear from the record that after these written

statements were filed, Learned Counsel for the parties were absent on the date of hearing, and the parties alone were present. The Court appears

to have heard the parties alone and then to have passed the order, which is the subject-matter of the revisions. Admittedly, the procedure is a

summary one, and no elaborate judgment of Court need be expected in such a matter. Even so, I am quite unable to accept the actual orders, as

legally adequate or conforming to the principles of natural justice. When the evictions sought for were resisted on grounds appearing in the written

statements, orders of Court, however, summary they may be, will have to be passed only upon consideration of those grounds. Certainly the Court

is free to reject them as unsubstantial, but the interests of justice require that however brief the order of judgment might be, it should be an

indication of the application of the judicial mind to the facts of the instant cage before the Court to its merits. The observations of Jagadisan J., in

K.S.R. Acharya Vs. Mrs. Halima Meeran, are in point here, though that ruling related to a judgment in a New Trial Application. The learned Judge

observed:

The New Trial Court must say in its judgment what is the question of law raised before it and then give its opinion either that it is not a question of

law or if it is a question of law, it is not well founded.

In my view, so long as there is an order hat can be the subject of the exercise of the revisional power of this Court and it is made by a

subordinate Court of Tribunal, and further it is not an order ex parte, but one on the merits, it must bear on the face of it evidence of the application

of the judicial mind to the merits. The Court cannot merely rest upon its subjective satisfaction and give the decision alone, without any reference to

the grounds for that decision. Accordingly, I allow the two revisions, set aside the orders of the Court, and remand the applications for ejectment

for disposal by the Court in the light of the observations now made. There will be no order as to costs.