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Judgment
On behalf of respondent 2, appearance has been put by the learned Government Pleader Sri G. Krishna Reddy. Respondent 1 is served but nobody has appeared. I have heard the Counsel for the petitioner-Bank Sri B.R. Aswatharam.
This revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure arises from the order dated 22-2-1999 passed by the VIII Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore on an application made before it for refund of the Court fee according to law. As the original suit which was originally numbered as O.S. No. 3008 of 1994 which was later on renumbered as O.A. No. 780 of 1995 on the file of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore, that suit was compromised and the matter was settled and the claim was decreed under compromise decree. As such the Bank filed the memo for refund of the Court fee before the Debt''s Recovery Tribunal (Presiding Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal).
Tribunal has no jurisdiction to pass an order for refund of the Court fee. Thereafter, the plaintiff-Bank was advised to move the Civil Court for refund of half of the Court fee where the suit has originally been filed and later on under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, it had been transferred to the Tribunal or decision. The Civil Court held that as the suit had been transferred to the Tribunal, as such it had no jurisdiction to pass an order for refund of the Court fee on the application moved by the revision petitioner in view of Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act.
Taking this view, the Civil Judge opined that it had no jurisdiction to pass an order for refund of 50% of the Court fee though, the claim in the suit has been decreed and decided in terms of compromise. This order was passed by the Civil Judge on 22-2-1999. From this order, the Syndicate Bank has come up in revision as the learned Counsel for the petitioner informs that the Bank is likely to suffer loss to the tune of lakhs, if he is made shuttle cock running from this Court to that Court for refund of Court fee and refund is not made of the amount legally made with reference to the Court Fees Act. The learned Counsel submitted that this Court can under inherent powers direct the refund of 50% of the Court fee to the Bank. He submitted that the powers are wider and revisional jurisdiction may be exercised, in this case, in the present situation where the party has been placed to the situation of shuttle cock or the pendulum of the clock. No doubt, Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 provides as under:
"Bar of jurisdiction.-On and from the appointed day, no Court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court, and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified in Section 17".
Section 18 as held by this Court in the case of K. Kunhambu and Another v Vijaya Bank, Bangalore, 1996(7) Kar. L.J. 94, is empowered to deal and entertain cases for recovery of debts and matters ancillary thereto and Civil Court''s jurisdiction is barred. Therefore, there is no doubt that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for refund of Court fee with reference to the proceedings or suit relating to recovery of debts due from the party as its jurisdiction has been barred. But the question is, where should the petitioner go when Court Fees Act provides for the refund of the Court fee with reference to cases where the matter has been settled by compromise. Should he be deprived of this statutory benefit? Depriving the statutory benefit on technicalities may amount to depriving of the justice. Justice to people and to assurance is basic principle and part of basic structure under the Constitution and our approach needs be justice oriented and i.e., justice according to law of the Land. That the Tribunal when opined that it had no jurisdiction as it was acting under the Central Act, to direct the refund of the Court fee under Section 66 of the Court Fees Act, it appears that its attention was not invited to Section 3 of the Court Fees Act read with Section 66 of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 and Rules, 1960. I am quite sure had its attention been invited, the Tribunal would have passed the suitable order in the interest of justice to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. It will be appropriate in this juncture to quote Section 3 of the Karnataka Courts Fees and Suits Valuation Act. The relevant clauses (ii) of Section 3 reads:
"In this Act unless context otherwise requires then-
"Court"means any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court and includes a Tribunal or other authority having jurisdiction under any special or local law to decide questions affecting the rights of parties".
Section 66 of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 and Rules, 1960 provides for refund on settlement before hearing. Section 66 of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act reads as under:
"Section 66. Whenever by a agreement of parties.- (a) any suit is dismissed as settled out of Court before any evidence has been recorded on the merits of the claim; or (b) any suit is compromised ending in a compromise decree before any evidence has been recorded on the merits of the claim; or (c) any appeal is disposed of before the commencement of hearing of such appeal;
half the amount of all fees paid in respect of the claim or claims in the suit or appeal shall be ordered by the Court to be refunded to the parties by whom the same have been respectively paid".
Explanation to Section 66 is not material, as such it is not being quoted herewith.
A reading of Section 66 will clearly reveals that in the situation mentioned and covered by either of the clause (a), (b) or (c), half of the Court fee in respect of the claim or claims in the suit or in the appeal has to be refunded to the parties by whom the same has been paid, but on the order in respect thereof being passed by the Court. The expression "Court" used in Section 66 has to be taken as defined in Section 3(ii) because it is a well-settled principle of Law of Interpretation that the terms defined in the Act have to be interpreted and have to be taken to mean as defined in the Act. The definition of Court as quoted above clearly indicates that the definition is not exhaustive that it only means Civil, Revenue or Regular Court. The difinition clause further provides that it includes Tribunal constituted under a special or local law to decide questions affecting the rights of the parties. This inclusive definition as given in Section 3(ii) includes Tribunal within the framework of expression Court for the purpose of Section 66 and therefore, the power is vested under this Act in the Tribunal to pass suitable order for refund of the Court fee. There being no specific provision debarring, the Court or Tribunal from exercising powers under Section 66 of the Karnataka Court Fees Act neither in the Recovery of Debts Due Act nor under Court Fees Act, really it was within the framework and jurisdiction of the Tribunal to have passed the order as per law applicable when deciding the rights of the parties relating to debts due and ancillary matters.
It is a well-settled principle of law when power is given to certain things, the ancillary powers also flow to do justice with reference to that matter. The Civil Court''s jurisdiction, no doubt, at such, has rightly been held by the Civil Court to have been barred. But, the Debts Due Recovery Tribunal''s jurisdiction was not barred and it had full jurisdiction to direct the refund of 50% of the Court fee under Section 66 if the applicant before it had established that his case is covered by either of clause (a), (b) or (c) of Section 66. Really, the Tribunal when decreeing the claim by compromise, while passing the order, he should have considered the question relating to refund of 50% of Court fee under Section 66. And those orders were required to be passed in the interest of justice to avoid abuse of the process of the Court keeping in view Rule 18 of Debt Recovery Procedural Rules which confers power on the Tribunal to make such orders to give such directions as been necessary and expedient to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process and to secure ends of justice. In view of Rule 18, really the petitioner should have again approached the Tribunal for passing suitable orders under Section 66 of the Karnataka Court Fees Act read with Section 3(ii) of the Karnataka Court Fees Act which empowers the Tribunal to pass the order for such refund of the Court fee in the matter before it where and when it has been or is decided by compromise.
Anyway, Subject to the above observations as I am of the opinion that Civil Court has ceased to have jurisdiction, the Civil Judge was justified in rejecting the application and the proper course for the applicant-Bank is to approach the Tribunal with a fresh application in the light of the observations made by this Court in the earlier part of this order. The Tribunal has not been a party in this case, but the learned Government Counsel is no doubt present.
The revision petition as such is dismissed but exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Tribunal is directed to reconsider the matter of its jurisdiction if the petitioner makes the application before the Tribunal under Section 66 of the Karnataka Court Fees Act read with Section 3(ii) and it will pass suitable orders.