Syndicate Bank vs SSP Tradex (P) Ltd. And Ors.

P.K. Bhasin, J

Today, the learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that even though the Bank has lost in its challenge against the order dated 4.1.2017 passed by this Tribunal whereby the Bank was directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 2 crores with the Registrar of this Tribunal, before the Hon'ble High Court in WP(C) No. 296/2017 and further that its review petition also stands rejected by the Hon'ble High Court, the Bank is in the process of seeking legal opinion whether to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court or not. Therefore, the learned Counsel submits that the matter may be adjourned for some days so that in the meanwhile the Bank will take some decision which will be communicated to this Tribunal and, thereafter, this Tribunal may pass any appropriate orders. On the issue of non-compliance of the direction of this Tribunal while granting an interim protection as a condition for stay of the operation of the impugned direction of the DRT, the learned Counsel for the Bank has submitted that this kind of non-compliance only entails vacation of the interim protection and nothing beyond that.

In my view, as far as the consequence of withdrawal of interim protection is concerned, it goes without saying that it is one of the consequences which has to follow the non-compliance of the condition of stay. However, that is not the end of the matter. If a litigant starts saying after getting interim relief conditional upon his satisfying some conditions imposed by the Court/Tribunal that the only consequence for non-compliance of the condition of stay is withdrawal of the interim protection, then the sanctity of any direction passed by any Tribunal/Court would be lost, which cannot be permitted.

In this regard, I may refer to a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India, VII (2007) SLT 440 : 111 (2007) CLT 296 (SC) : (2007) 8 SCC 449, wherein under almost similar circumstances interim injunction was granted by the Court subject to compliance of certain condition of deposit by the borrower and that condition was not complied with. Similar stand, as is being taken by the appellant in the present case, was taken that since in the order granting interim stay to the defaulting borrower it was mentioned that in the event of non-compliance of the condition of stay, the stay would stand vacated, no further consequence could follow.

It was, however, argued on behalf of the Bank before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that non-compliance of even the condition imposed on a litigant while granting some interim relief amounts to contempt of Court and further that the defaulting litigant loses its right to be heard in the matter.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court took the following view in paras 25 and 26 of its judgment:

"25. In the leading case of Hadkinson v. Hadkinson the custody of a child was given to the mother by an interim order of the Court, but she was directed not to remove the child out of jurisdiction of the Court without the prior permission of the Court. In spite of the order, the mother removed the child to Australia without prior permission of the Court. On a summons by father, the Court directed the mother to return the child within the jurisdiction of the Court. Meanwhile, an appeal was filed by the mother against that order. A preliminary objection was raised by the father that as the appellant was in contempt, she was not entitled to be heard on merits. Upholding the contention and speaking for the majority, Romer, L.J. observed: (All ER p. 572C)

".... I am clearly of the opinion that the mother was not entitled, in view of her continuing contempt of Court, to prosecute the present appeal and that she will not be entitled to be heard in support of it until she has taken the first and essential step towards purging her contempt of returning the child within the jurisdiction."

In a concurring judgment, Denning, L.J. also stated: (All ER p. 575 C-D)

"The present case is a good example of a case where the disobedience of the party impedes the course of justice. So long as this boy remains in Australia, it is impossible for this Court to enforce its orders in respect of him. No good reason is shown why he should not be returned to this country so as to be within the jurisdiction of this Court.

He should be returned before Counsel is heard on the merits of this case, so that, whatever order is made, this Court will be able to enforce it. I am prepared to accept the view that in the first instance the mother acted in ignorance of the order, but nevertheless, once she came to know of it, she ought to have put the matter right by bringing the boy back. Until the boy is returned, we must decline to hear her appeal."

That, however, does not mean that in each and every case in which a party has violated an interim order has no right to be heard at all. Nor will the Court refuse to hear him in all circumstances. The normal rule is that an application by a party will not be entertained until he has purged himself of the contempt. There are, however, certain exceptions to this rule. One of such exceptions is that the party may appeal with a view to setting aside the order on which his alleged contempt is founded. A person against whom contempt is alleged must be heard in support of the submission that having regard to the meaning and intendment of the order which he is said to have disobeyed, his actions did not constitute a breach of it."

So, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had also clarified that there could be exceptions and one of the exceptions could be where the litigant not complying with the direction of the Court appeals against the order of the Court before a higher forum. In the present case, the Bank has already availed of that remedy but failed before the Hon'ble High Court and not only that, it also failed in its attempt to have the order of the Hon'ble High Court reviewed. In these circumstances, the appellant cannot avail of that exception carved out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the facts and circumstances, I am of the view that the appellant Bank has lost its right to be heard and, consequently, this appeal is dismissed for disobeying the direction of this Tribunal.