Syed Jaffar vs Syed Ahmed

This petition is directed against the order dated 24-9-1979, passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, VI Court, Bangalore City, in C.C. No. 608 of 1979, dismissing the complaint as being not maintainable.

The facts of the case are that the complainant-petitioner herein filed a private complaint against one Syed Ahmed alleging that he has converted a part of the residential premises into a non-residential premises and that he has also sub-let a portion of the same illegally. He has further alleged that one Wahidunnisa Begum is the landlady of the premises in question and that the complainant is employed by her and he has been authorised to file the complaint. It is under these circumstances that the complainant alleged that the accused has committed offences punishable under Ss. 11(3) and 23(2) of the Rent Control Act, 1961 (which will hereinafter be called the Act) .

The accused raised a preliminary objection that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a complaint by a private person for such offences In other words, the objection of the accused was to the effect that a private party, as in the instant case the complainant cannot file a complaint, as it is the Controller or any other officer authorised by the State Government in that behalf who only can prosecute any person for contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. After hearing both the sides, the learned Magistrate upheld the preliminary objection of the accused and accordingly did not entertain the complaint. It is the legality and correctness of the said order that is being challenged by the complainant in this petition.

Sri Mohamed Saifulla, learned Counsel for the petitioner, raised the following points:

(i) That the learned Magistrate has erred in rejecting the complaint in as much as he has not properly understood the scope of S. 51-A of the Act. Elaborating his submission what he submitted was that there is no prohibition for any person other than the Controller or any other officer authorised in that behalf by the State Government to maintain a complaint for contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. He further submitted that the same could be spelt out from the reading of the section itself which has envisaged that the Controller or any other officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf, may prosecute any person for contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or any rule made thereunder. The very fact that the legislature thought it fit to incorporate ''may'' clearly indicates that there is no prohibition for a private party other than the officers mentioned therein to maintain the complaint.

(ii) The next attack is that there are other offences in the Act which would not lie within the purview of the Rent Controller in which case, it cannot be said that it was the Controller who could always file a complaint even in respect of the contravention of the provisions of the Act that would not squarely fall within his jurisdiction. Elaborating this submission also Sri Mohamed Saifulla, drew the attention of the Court to some of the provisions the contravention of which would really amount to an offence and which would not fall within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller, namely, Sections 15, 18, 5, 21-A(3), 23(2), 25(2) and 26(3), 28(2)(b), 39, 40, 43, 47(3) and 53(2).

(iii) Lastly he submitted that there is no provision in the Act enabling the Rent Controller to receive a complaint, to process it, and thereafter to file the same in the Court.

On the other hand, Sri G.M. Rego, learned Counsel for the respondent-accused, supported the reasonings of the learned Magistrate and commended the same for acceptance. The learned State Public Prosecutor, while reiterating the reasoning of the learned Magistrate, brought to the notice of the Court the reasons and objects for the legislature to amend the provisions of S. 51 of the Act by incorporating S. 51-A, to press his contention that it is the Controller or any officer authorised by the Government in that behalf who alone could maintain a complaint for contravention of any of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.

Now, let us consider whether there is any substance in the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner which are fully enumerated above.

S. 51-A of the Act reads thus:

"The Controller or any other officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf, may prosecute any person for contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or any rule made thereunder."

It may be mentioned here that this amendment is inserted by Act 14 of 1969 before the said amendment, there was no provision in the Act authorising the Controller or any other officer authorised by the State Government in that behalf to prosecute for the contravention of the provisions of the Act. Therefore, it was open to the aggrieved party to prosecute for the contravention of the provisions of the Act. So whether it is the landlord or the tenant whoever be the aggrieved, could always approach the Court and seek punishment of the person who has contravened the provisions of the Act. This is clear from a perusal of some of the penal provisions of the Act before amendment of S. 51-A. Reference may be made in this behalf to a few of them, namely, S. 4(3) which is also retained under the present Act. This is with regard to the landlord not intimating the vacancy within the stipulated time in which case on conviction he was liable to be punished with fine under the said section. Similarly S. 5(2) is also a penal provision. S. 6(2) is another penal provision. S. 11(3) is again a penal provision for prohibiting conversion of a residential building into a non-residential building except with the permission in writing of the Controller. This is so in respect of all the penal provisions mentioned above before the amendment. What is amended is only incorporating a new provision, namely, S. 51-A. It is therefore to be seen whether the new provision has taken away the right of an aggrieved individual to prosecute the transgressor under the provisions of the Act for being punished by a competent Court. As already stated, even at the cost of repetition, the provisions of S. 51-A enables the Controller or any other officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf to prosecute any person for contravention of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. It has to be seen that the word ''may'' used in S. 51-A does not give a plain meaning that the Controller or any other person authorised by the State Government including any person who is aggrieved could maintain a complaint before the Magistrate. If that is so, there was absolutely no reason us to why the legislature thought it fit to incorporate a new provision enabling the Controller or any other officer authorised by the State Government also to file a complaint along with the person aggrieved. As could be seen from the statement of objects and reasons placed before the Legislature in the nature of a Bill, this aspect of the matter has been made clear. This is what is stated in the statement of objects and reasons, as far as incorporation of the new section is concerned:

"It is further considered necessary that the Controller must have power to evict as well as to prosecute for contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or any rule made thereunder. Hence, new S. 10A after S. 10 and S. 51A after section 51 are contemplated."

As could be gathered from the said object and reasons, it appears to me that the Government wanted to put an end to frivolous complaints against the persons alleging that they have contravened the provisions of the Act or the Rules. It is well known that if the landlord is unable to get eviction of the premises for any of the reasons enumerated in Sec. 21 of the Act, he could coerce the tenant by resorting to the methods which are not conducive to the proper harmony between them namely, even resorting to file a complaint whether it is a false or otherwise. It is with the above object that the legislature thought it fit to incorporate the new provision enabling the authorities in power to prosecute for the contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder thereby prohibiting a person whether he has got a right or not to make allegations and to seek for prosecution of a person on some pretext or the other. This appears to be the main reason behind the enactment of this provision. The word ''may'' would, therefore not in my opinion include any other aggrieved private person as contended by the learned Counsel Sri Saifulla. Otherwise, the very purpose of enacting the provisions of S. 51A would be redundant, because it would have been always open for the aggrieved party to have a complaint maintained and there is absolutely no necessity to bring in any statutory authority also to file a complaint for the contravention of the provisions of the Act. This would certainly be redundant in which case it does not appear to be the object of the legislature at all. On the other hand, the object appears to be to empower only the authority mentioned in Section 51A to institute proceedings for the contravention of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.

The next contention of the learned Counsel that the said statutory authority, namely, the Controller or any other person authorised by the Government in that behalf would have no power to receive the complaint and to investigate into the matter and thereafter to file a charge sheet before the Magistrate, is also devoid of any merits. It is true that there is no provision in, the Act enabling the Controller to receive the complaint and thereafter to investigate and to file a charge sheet before the Magistrate. The procedure that has been contemplated in this Act is not in the nature of a complaint being filed before the police and thereafter the police to investigate under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and then, if they are satisfied that there is a prima facie case, to file a charge sheet for any of the offences. On the other hand if any of the contraventions is brought to the notice of the competent authority under the Act, it is for the Controller to present a complaint before the Magistrate just like a party aggrieved presenting a private complaint before a Magistrate. It is true that mere absence of the powers to the Controller to receive a complaint and to investigate does not mean that he has no power under the Act to present a complaint before the Magistrate. Hence, I am of the opinion, that there is no illegality in the impugned order and, therefore it does not call for interference.

In the result, for the reasons stated above, this petition fails and is dismissed.