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Judgment
D. K. Seth, J.—The order dated 491996 by which the nomination of the petitioners were cancelled, was under challenge. By an interim order dated 1391996 the operation of the said order has been stayed. The respondents have filed application for vacating the said interim order.
Sri Haidar Hussain, learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that the order dated 491996 was passed without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. Therefore, the said order is bad. Secondly, he says that the petitioners name were duly recommended by the District Inspector of Schools in terms of para6 of the Scheme of Administration, on the basis of suggestions made by the Manager. The said names were sent to the Deputy Director of Education, by the District Inspector of Schools by letter dated 10th May, 1996. Relying on para 6 of the Scheme of Administration he contends that the petitioners were duly nominated in terms of the Scheme of Administration.
Learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand contends relying on para 3 of the Scheme of Administration that the name of five persons interested in education or educationist are to be recommended by the District Inspector of Schools alongwith notice for holding the election. Out of the said five names recommended, the Deputy Director of Education, shall nominate three members in terms of para 6 of the Scheme of Administration. According to him paras 3 and 6 are to be read together. Therefore, subsequent sending of the names on the basis of suggestion of the Manager by letter dated 10th May, 1996 can not be sustained. Therefore, the order dated 491996 is legal and valid.
Learned Standing Counsel supports the contentions of the learned Counsel for the respondents and submits that there is no scope for the Manager to make any recommendation either to the District Inspector of Schools or to Deputy Director of Education. Therefore, according to him the impugned order is legal and valid and the interim order cannot be sustained.
Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties it appears that in terms of para 3 of the Scheme of Administration the name of the person interested in education or educationist, recommended by the District Inspector of Schools, ought to be sent alongwith notice of election. In terms of para 6 of the said five recommended name three members are to be nominated by the Deputy Director of Education. The nomination is therefore, made on the basis of recommendations of the District Inspector of Schools. A plain reading of the said provision of the Scheme of Administration which is Annexure2 to the petition, as translated at the bar, does not postulate any scope for suggestion or recommendation by the Manager either to the District Inspector of Schools or to the Deputy Director of Education. The said provision has been incorporated to enable the Education authorities of the State to represent itself. Therefore, there is no scope for any suggestion by the Management of any name. It is an independent provision enabling the Government authorities to have its representation in the Management. Then again the District Inspector of Schools has no option but to Recommend five names out of which three persons are to be nominated so as to enable the Deputy Director of Education to have a scope of choice from amongst five names.
The District Inspector of Schools, cannot act on the basis of suggestion of the Manager. According to the reading of the Scheme of Administration, recommendation can be made only by the District Inspector of Schools. There is no scope for suggestion by the Management about the �name of the persons to be nominated by the authorities. In that event it would be giving lever to the management itself and the provision for nomination by the authorities would stand frustrated.
In the present case from the order dated 491996 it appears that subsequently by letter dated 1051996 three names different from the names sent earlier by letter dated 921996 were forwarded by the District Inspector of Schools and those three members were nominated by the Deputy Director of Education. These three members are the present petitioners whose name were suggested by the Manager. While forwarding the second letter dated 1051996, it is observed in the impugned order, that the District Inspector of Schools did not talley the names from his earlier recommendations and had acted on the basis of suggestions made by the Manager without applying his mind. Therefore, the recommendations made on 1851996 out of the recommendations made on 1051996 was cancelled.
In terms of para3 of the Scheme of Administration, the District Inspector of Schools do not have any authority to send any subsequent names for making any subsequent recommendations. The recommendations is to be made alongwith notice of election which he had made by his letter dated 921996, he can not change the same at the subsequent stage at the behest of the Manager. Once he has suggested the name prior to holding of election, the recommendation appears to be final and has to be forwarded to the Deputy Director of Education. He could not have altered the same. The use of the expression that such notice ought to have been sent at the time of sending notice of election clearly indicates that the District Inspector of Schools had no alternative but to act on the basis of recommendations made on 9 21996.
I, therefore, do not find that the order impugned suffers from any infirmity, particularly, in view of the fact that the petitioners do not have any right, by reason of the subsequent recommendation made by the District Inspector of Schools on the suggestion of the Manager which would altogether frustrate the Scheme of Administration, which conceived of the representation of the Government authorities. Therefore is no infirmity or illegality in the said order. In that view of the matter the interim order dated 1391996 is vacated.
After the above order is passed it appears that nothing remains to be decided. In asmuch as the above order has decided the merit of the writ petition as well.
In that view of the matter the writ petition itself is also dismissed, in terms of the above order.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
Let a copy of this order be given to the learned Counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges within a week.