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Judgment
This petition under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 (corresponding to Section 482 of CrPC, 1973) has been filed by the applicant, being aggrieved by the order dated 23.01.2026 passed in Criminal Revision No.869/2025 by th learned XIX Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal, District Bhopal (M.P.), affirming the order dated 12.12.2025 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal (M.P.), in connection with Crime No.32958/2022 registered at Police Station Van Parikshetra, Bhopal. By the said orders, the application filed by the applicant under Section 503 of BNSS, 2023, seeking interim custody of the vehicle i.e. Hyundai Grand i-10 bearing Registration No. MP-28-CA-3944, was dismissed.
The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are that as per the prosecution case, the wildlife trophy was being transported by the petitioner along with co-accused in the aforesaid seized vehicle. The aforesaid Trophy was a licensed trophy since 1971 registered in the name of the petitioner’s father; However the Petitioner’s father has since passed away, the allegation against the accused is that he was on the way to sell said Trophy and the vehicle i.e. Hyundai Grand i-10 bearing Registration No. MP-28-CA-3944, was allegedly used in the commission of the offence. The applicant/accused was arrested in connection with Crime No.32958/2022 dated 08.11.2025, registered at Police Station Van Parikshetra, Bhopal, for offences punishable under Sections 2, 39, 40, 44, 49, 50, 51 and 52 of Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and Section 52 of Indian Forest Act, 1927. After seizure, the said vehicle was kept in the custody of Police Station Van Parikshetra, Bhopal. The applicant moved an application under Section 503 of BNSS, 2023 seeking release of the vehicle on interim custody, which was opposed by the respondent on the ground that confiscation proceedings under Section 52 of Indian Forest Act, 1927 had already been initiated by the competent forest authority. Upon consideration of the submissions and material available on record, the learned trial Court rejected the application, holding that once confiscation proceedings are initiated, the criminal Court cannot exercise the power to grant interim custody of the seized vehicle.
3 . Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the seizure of the vehicle in question i.e. Hyundai Grand i-10 bearing Registration No. MP-28-CA-3944 is fundamentally flawed and legally unsustainable. It is contended that the seized material does not satisfy the statutory definition of “forest produce” and, therefore, invocation of Section 52 of Indian Forest Act, 1927 is without jurisdiction. It is further submitted that the applicant along with the co-accused was allegedly found in possession of a wildlife trophy while travelling in the said vehicle, which was subsequently seized by the Forest Department. However, provisions of the Forest Act have been mechanically invoked without proper application of mind. It is also submitted that the vehicle in question is registered in the name of the applicant’s father, who has since expired, and no offence under the Forest Act is made out against the applicant. The applicant has thus been falsely implicated without any cogent basis.
It is further submitted that after the seizure of the vehicle, the applicant moved an application under Section 503 of BNSS, 2023 seeking release of the vehicle on interim custody. The said application was opposed on the ground that confiscation proceedings under Section 52 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 had already been initiated by the competent authority. The learned trial Court, vide order dated 12.12.2025, rejected the application holding that once confiscation proceedings are initiated, the criminal Court lacks jurisdiction to grant interim custody of the seized vehicle. Being aggrieved, the applicant preferred a criminal revision, which was dismissed th by the learned XIX Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal vide order dated 23.01.2026, affirming the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal. It is submitted that both the Courts below failed to appreciate that the alleged wildlife trophy was not recovered from the vehicle, but from a hotel room, and therefore no direct or proximate nexus exists between the vehicle and the alleged offence. In the absence of such nexus, the continued detention of the vehicle is arbitrary, illegal and unjustified.
It is further contended that rejection of interim custody solely on the ground of initiation of confiscation proceedings is contrary to settled law. It is contended that the confiscation proceedings are illegal, as the foundational requirement that the vehicle was used in the commission of a forest offence is not satisfied. The vehicle was neither used for the commission of any offence nor for transportation of any wildlife article.
It is further submitted that the vehicle is a mechanical asset and, if kept in police custody for an indefinite period, its condition will deteriorate and its value will substantially diminish. Since the trial is likely to take considerable time, the vehicle deserves to be released to the applicant on supurdginama. Reliance is placed on Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that seized vehicles should not be allowed to remain in custody for long periods and ought to be released on interim custody subject to appropriate safeguards.
Learned Panel Lawyer for the State opposes the petition and supports the impugned orders. It is submitted that the vehicle in question was used in the commission of the alleged offence involving transportation of a wildlife trophy, and therefore has been rightly seized. It is contended that confiscation proceedings under Section 52 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 have already been initiated by the competent authority and once such proceedings are pending, the criminal Court has no jurisdiction to grant interim custody of the seized vehicle. It is further submitted that release of the vehicle at this stage may adversely affect the confiscation proceedings.
Heard the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.
The limited question that arises for consideration is whether the provisions of the Forest Act apply in this case and whether the Courts below were justified in rejecting the application for interim custody of the seized vehicle solely on the ground that confiscation proceedings under Section 52 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 had been initiated?
A perusal of the entire record reflects that the provisions of the Forest Act have been invoked in the present case on the basis of definition clause under Section 2(4) of the said Act, wherein animal skin is included within the ambit of “forest produce" and for violation of which there is a provision of punishment under section 26. For proper appreciation of the controversy involved, Section 2(4) and Section 26 and of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 is reproduced herein below:
“Section- 2(4) “forest-produce” includes—
(a)the following whether found in, or brought from, a forest or not, that is to say:— timber, charcoal, caoutchouc, catechu, wood-oil, resin, natural varnish, bark, lac, mahua flowers, mahua seeds [kuth] and myrabolams, and
(b)the following when found in, or brought from, a forest, that is to say:—
(i)trees and leaves, flowers and fruits, and all other parts or produce not hereinbefore mentioned, of trees,
(ii)plants not being trees (including grass, creepers, reeds and moss), and all parts or produce of such plants,
(iii)wild animals and skins, tusks, horns, bones, silk, cocoons, honey and wax, and all other parts or produce of animals, and
(iv)peat, surface soil, rock, and minerals (including limestone, laterite, mineral oils, and all products of mines or quarries);
Section - 26. Acts prohibited in such forests.—(1) Any
person who—
(a)makes any fresh clearing prohibited by section 5, or
(b)sets fire to a reserved forest, or, in contravention of any rules made by the [State Government] in this behalf, kindles any fire, or leaves any fire burning, in such manner as to endanger such a forest; or who, in a reserved forest—
(c)kindles, keeps or carries any fire except at such seasons as the Forest-officer may notify in this behalf;
(d)trespasses or pastures cattle, or permits cattle to trespass;
(e)causes any damage by negligence in felling any tree or cutting or dragging any timber;
(f)fells, girdles, lops, taps or burns any tree or strips off the bark or leaves from, or otherwise damages, the same;
(g)quarries stone, burns lime or charcoal, or collects, subjects to any manufacturing process, or removes, any forest-produce;
(h)clears or breaks up any land for cultivation or any other purpose;
(i)in contravention of any rules made in this behalf by the [State Government] hunts, shoots, fishes, poisons water or sets traps or snares; or
(j)in any area in which the Elephants’ Preservation Act, 1879 (6 of 1879), is not in force, kills or catches elephants in contravention of any rules so made; shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both, in addition to such compensation for damage done to the forest as the convicting Court may direct to be paid. ..…”
The question is whether “animal skins” included in the definition clause will still be in effect after the enactment of 1972. Section 66 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 clearly provides that every other Act relating to any matter contained in this Act and in force in a State shall, to the extent to which that Act or any provision contained therein corresponds, or is repugnant, to this Act or any provision contained in this Act, stand repealed. At this stage, it would be apposite to reproduce Section 66 of Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, which reads as under:
“66. Repeal and savings.—(1) As from the commencement of this Act, every other Act relating to any matter contained in
this Act and in force in a State shall, to the extent to which that Act or any provision contained therein corresponds, or is repugnant, to this Act or any provision contained in this Act, stand repealed:
Provided that such repeal shall not,—
(i)affect the previous operation of the Act so repealed, or anything duly done or suffered thereunder;
(ii)affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability, acquired, accrued or incurred under the Act so repealed;
(iii)affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against the Act so repealed; or
(iv)affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture and. Punishment may be imposed, as if the aforesaid Act had not been repealed.
(2)Notwithstanding such repeal,—
(a)anything done or any action taken under the Act so repealed, (including any notification, order, certificate, notice or receipt issued, application made, or permit granted) which is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act as, if this Act were in force at the time such thing was done or action was taken, and shall continue to be in force, unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under this Act;
(b)every licence granted under any Act so repealed and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to have been granted under the corresponding provisions of this Act and shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, continue to be in force for the unexpired portion. of the period for which such licence had been granted.
(3)For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that any sanctuary or National Park declared by a State Government under any Act repealed under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be a sanctuary or National Park, as, the case may be, declared by the State Government under this Act and where any right in or over any land in any such National Park which had not been extinguished under the said Act, at or before the commencement of this Act, the extinguishment of such rights shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
[(4) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby further declared that where any proceeding under any provision of section 19 to 25 (both inclusive) is pending on the date of commencement of the Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 1991 (44 of 1991), any reserve forest or a part of territorial waters comprised within a sanctuary declared under section 18 to be a sanctuary before the date of such commencement shall be deemed to be a sanctuary declared under section. 26A]”
Upon the commencement of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, the provisions of any other law relating to matters covered under the said Act, to the extent of inconsistency or repugnancy, ceased to apply. In other words, upon the commencement of the said Act, any corresponding law or provision relating to matters covered by the Act stood repealed to the extent of such inconsistency. Section 66 of the Act of 1972 clearly mandates that any law dealing with wildlife protection which is inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of the Act stands repealed to that extent. From the date the said Act came into force, any existing State law dealing with matters covered by the Act is to be treated as repealed insofar as its provisions are similar to, inconsistent with, or contrary to the provisions of the said Act. The Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, being a special enactment, prevails over general laws on the subject. Accordingly, by the operation of section 66 of the said Act, the provisions of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, insofar as they relate to wildlife matters, particularly Section 2(4) (animal skin) and Section 26 would not be applicable.
The question then arises whether the learned Magistrate committed any error in rejecting the application of release of the vehicle on interim custody. Since, the penal provisions of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 will not apply in this case, therefore provision regarding confiscation under section 52 of Indian Forest Act, 1927 will not apply. Therefore, the Learned Magistrate is competent to decide the application of Supurdginama but committed a mistake in rejecting it on the ground that he has no power because confiscation proceedings have been initiated by competent authority. It is now clear that, in the present case, only the provisions of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 would apply. The next question, therefore, is whether the petitioner can be granted custody of the vehicle on Supurdginama under the provisions of the said Act. Pertinently, State of M.P. Vs. Madhukar Rao, 2008 (14) SCC 624 affirmed the decision of the High Court in Madhukar Rao v. State of MP, (2000) 1 MP LJ 289 (FB) wherein Justice D.M Dharmadhikari, writing for the Full Bench, opined that the provision of Section 39(1)(d) of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, providing for absolute vesting of seized property with State Government, without a finding by the Competent Court that the property was being used for the commission of an offence, runs afoul of the Constitutional provisions. It is succinctly observed in Para 18,
“18… If the argument on behalf of the State is accepted a property seized on accusation would become the property of the State and can never be released even on the compounding of the offence. The provisions of Clause (d) of section 39 have to be reasonably and harmoniously construed with other provisions of the Act and the Code which together provide a detailed procedure for the trial of the offences. If, as contended on behalf of the State, seizure of property merely on accusation would make the property to be of the Government, it would have the result of depriving an accused of his property without proof of his guilt. On such interpretation Clause (d) of section 39(1) of the Act would suffer from the vice of unconstitutionality. The interpretation placed by the State would mean that a specified officer under the Act merely by seizure of property of an accused would deprive him of his property which he might be using for his trade, profession or occupation. This would be serious encroachment on the fundamental right of a citizen under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to carry on his trade, occupation or business.”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Madhukar Rao, (Supra), has categorically held that the mere initiation or pendency of confiscation proceedings does not take away the jurisdiction of the criminal Court to consider and grant interim custody of seized property. It has been further held that both proceedings are independent in nature and the criminal Court retains the power to pass appropriate orders regarding custody of vehicle pending trial.
Moreover, in Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat , (2002) 10 SCC 283, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:
"In our view, whatever be the situation, it is of no use to keep such-seized vehicles at the police stations for a long period. It is for the Magistrate to pass appropriate orders immediately by taking appropriate bond and guarantee as well as security for return of the said vehicles, if required at any point of time. This can be done pending hearing of applications for return of such vehicles."
In the present case, the Courts below have rejected the application solely on the ground of initiation of confiscation proceedings under the provisions of Indian Forest Act, 1927, without examining the legal position settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Madhukar Rao (supra). Such an approach cannot be sustained in law.
Considering the law laid down by Apex Court for release of vehicle, the impugned orders dated 12.12.2025 passed by the Chief Judicial th Magistrate, Bhopal and order dated 23.01.2026 passed by the XIX Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal are hereby set aside. It is directed that the vehicle i.e. Hyundai Grand i-10 bearing Registration No. MP-28-CA-3944 be released to the applicant on supurdginama, subject to producing the original registration, sale-letter and such necessary documents, on satisfying the following conditions :-
The applicant shall furnish separate solvent surety of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs Only) for the vehicle in question to the satisfaction of the trial Court on an undertaking to produce the said vehicle before the trial Court as and when required.
The applicant shall get the vehicle photographed showing the registration number as well as the chassis number of the vehicle. Such photographs shall be taken in the presence of the responsible officer, who will be deputed by the trial Court and to be kept in the file of the case.
The applicant shall undertake not to transfer the ownership of the vehicle and shall not lease it to anyone and not make or allow any changes in it so as to make it unidentifiable.
The applicant will not allow the vehicle to be used in any anti-social activities.
With the aforesaid directions, this petition stands disposed off.
Copy of this order be sent to the learned trial Court concerned for information and necessary compliance.