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Judgment
S.C. Das, J.—Heard learned counsel, Mr. Arijit Bhowmik for the petitioners and learned Addl. P.P., Mr. R.C. Debnath for the State respondent. This is a petition u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 praying for exercising inherent power of this Court to prevent abuse of process of Court and to secure the ends of justice, and consequently prayed for quashing the F.I.R. of Legunga PS Case No. 22 of 2012 under Sections 284 and 419 of the Indian Penal Code and all consequential proceedings pursuant to the registration of the said F.I.R. which has been subsequently registered as PRC No. 389 of 2012, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class(Court No. 7), Agartala.
It is submitted by learned counsel, Mr. Bhowmik for the petitioners that petitioner No. 2, Indrajit Debbarma (informant) lodged an F.I.R. with the O/C, Legunga PS alleging that petitioner No. 1 (accused) sold certain medicines to him and some other villagers, validity of which already expired, and thereby the people were cheated.
2.1. On the basis of the F.I.R., police registered the case for commission of offence punishable under Sections 284 and 419 of IPC and after investigation submitted charged sheet against petitioner No. 1 (accused) and the case is pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No. 7.
2.2. It is contended by learned counsel, Mr. Bhowmik that an offence u/s 419 of IPC is a compoundable offence but an offence u/s 284 of IPC, though is punishable to the extent of six months imprisonment or fine to the extent of Rs. 1,000/- (rupees one thousand) or with both, the offence is not compoundable in nature, After the case was instituted the petitioners along with other witnesses, at the intervention of the local people including the Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat, amicably compromised the case, and therefore the criminal proceeding in the Court of the Magistrate against petitioner No. 1 has become redundant and further proceeding with the case will be only a futile exercise of the process of the Court.
2.3. It is further submitted by learned counsel, Mr. Bhowmik that a non-compoundable offence cannot be compounded in exercise of powers u/s 320 of Cr.P.C. by the Magistrate but while the matter has already been compounded and no fruitful purpose will be served in further dragging of the case, the petitioners approached this Court u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. to exercise the inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of the Court and to uphold the ends of justice. It is submitted that this Court is well empowered u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash an F.I.R. or a criminal proceedings if it is found and the Court is satisfied that no fruitful purpose will be served in taking up trial of the case pursuant to the police report since the parties have amicably settled the dispute and compounded the offence and since the offence is of minor character.
2.4. In support of his contention learned counsel, Mr. Bhowmik has referred the following case laws including Report No. 237 of the Law Commission of India:
(i)
Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in : 2010 (12) Scale 461
.
(ii)
Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in : 2012(10) SCC 303
.
(iii)
Shiji @ Pappu & Ors. Vs. Radhika & Anr. reported in : : AIR 2012 SC 499 : 2011 (12) Scale 588
.
(iv)
Dimpey Gujral Vs. Union Territory reported in : : AIR 2013 SC 518 : 2013 Cri. L.J. 520
.
(v) Rajesh Kwatra & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. passed in Criminal Misc. No. M-37208 of 2011 (O & M), decided on 15.05.2012.
Learned Addl. P.P., Mr. R.C. Debnath with all his fairness has submitted that the offence u/s 284 of IPC is a minor offence but it is not compoundable as per Section 320 of Cr.P.C.
Referring to the decisions in the cases of Dimpey Gujral (supra) and
Ashok Sadarangani & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in : AIR 2012 SC 1563
, learned Addl. P.P. has submitted that this Court is well empowered u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing a criminal proceeding in a given case where it is found that proceeding further of the case will ultimately serve no fruitful purpose and will be a futile exercise of the process of the Court. He has contended that ordinarily a non-compoundable offence cannot be compounded but the power u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. has to be exercised only in exceptional cases for fair ends of justice.
The Supreme Court in the case of
Ram Lal & Anr. Vs. State of J & K reported in (1999) 2 SCC 213
has observed that compounding of offence must be inconsonance to Section 320 of Cr.P.C. In para. 3 of the judgment the Court held--
We are unable to follow the said decision as a binding precedent. Section 320 which deals with "compounding of offences" provides tow Tables therein, one containing descriptions of offences which can be compounded by the person mentioned in it, and the other containing descriptions of offences which can be compounded with the permission of the court by the persons indicated therein. Only such offences as are included in the said two Tables can be compounded and non else. Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 imposes a legislative ban in the following terms:
(9) No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section.
In the case of
Ishwar Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in : AIR 2009 SC 675
, the Supreme Court has held that in non-compoundable offences, though the parties compromised the case among themselves the offence cannot be compounded according to law and Court may take into consideration the circumstances of compounding of the offence while awarding sentence. In para. 15 of the judgment the Court held thus:
In our considered opinion, it would not be appropriate to order compounding of an offence not compoundable under the Code ignoring and keeping aside statutory provisions. In our judgment, however, limited submission of the learned counsel for the appellant deserves consideration that while imposing substantive sentence, the factum of compromise between the parties is indeed a relevant circumstance which, the Court may keep in mind.
Law is settled that compounding of offences may be allowed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. An offence compounding of which is not allowed by Section 320 of Cr.P.C., ordinarily a Court of law cannot entertain such a compromise petition.
The power vested in this Court u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary power to prevent abuse of the process of Court and secure the ends of justice. If the Court is satisfied that because of the compounding of a non-compoundable offence it will be a futile exercise of further proceeding with the case, this Court in exercise of its power u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. may quash an F.I.R. or a consequential criminal proceeding.
In the case of
Mrs. Shakuntala Sawhney Vs. Mrs. Kaushalya Sawhney & Ors. reported in (1980) 1 SCC 63
. His Lordship Justice Krishna Iyer has observed--
The finest hour of justice arrives propitiously when parties, despite falling apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.
No doubt, in all criminal cases of major punishment for extreme cruelty, compounding of offence cannot be entertained but compromise in a civil dispute having criminal facet and in matrimonial dispute may be encouraged and entertained.
In the case of
B.S. Joshi & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675
, the Apex Court has laid down the concept of compounding of a non-compoundable offence. The Court held that, if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of F.I.R. or the criminal proceedings becomes necessary, Section 320 of Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing the criminal proceeding. The Court has held that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can quash criminal proceedings or F.I.R. or a complaint and Section 320 of Cr.P.C. does not limit the power of the High Courts.
In the cases of
Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2008) 4 SCC 582
and
Nikhil Merchant Vs. CBI reported in (2008) 9 SCC 677
, the Apex Court taking note of the settlement arrived between the parties quashed the criminal proceeding on the ground that continuous proceeding after the compromise arrived between the parties would be a futile exercise. In both the reported case it was a dispute of civil nature having criminal facet.
The Division Bench of the Apex Court in Cyan Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 8989 of 2010, referring to its earlier decisions in B.S. Joshi (supra), Nikhil Merchant(supra) and
Manoj Sharma Vs. State & Ors. Reported in (2008) 16 SCC 1
, referred the matter to a larger Bench and the three-Judges Bench of the Apex Court in
Gyan Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303
, has categorically held that the law laid down in B.S. Joshi (supra), Nikhil Merchant (supra) and Manoj Sharma (supra) was correctly decided. The Apex Court in paras. 48 and 49 of the judgment held--
A five-Judge Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in
Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2007) 4 CTC 769
was called upon to determine, inter alia, the question whether the High Court has the power u/s 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings or allow the compounding of the offences in the cases which have been specified as non-compoundable offences under the provisions of Section 320 of the Code. The five-Judge Bench referred to quite a few decisions of this Court including the decisions in
Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551
, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 ,
State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699
,
Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee (1990) 2 SCC 437
,
B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana (2003) 4 SCC 675 and Ram Lal 1992 SCC 213
and framed the following guidelines: (Kulwinder Singh''s case, CTC pp. 783- 84, para. 21)
21......." (a) Cases arising from matrimonial discord, even if other offences are introduced for aggravation of the case.
(b) Cases pertaining to property disputes between close relations, which are predominantly civil in nature and they have a genuine or belabored dimension of criminal liability. Notwithstanding a touch of criminal liability, the settlement would bring lasting peace and harmony to larger number of people.
(c) Cases of dispute between old partners or business concerns with dealings over a long period which are predominantly civil and are given or acquire a criminal dimension but the parties are essentially seeking a redressal of their financial or commercial claim.
(d) Minor offences as u/s 279 , IPC may be permitted to be compounded on the basis of legitimate settlement between the parties. Yet another offence which remains non-compoundable is Section 506(II) , IPC, which is punishable with 7 years imprisonment. It is the judicial experience that an offence u/s 506 IPC in most cases is based on the oral declaration with different shades of intention. Another set of offences, which ought to be liberally compounded, are Sections 147 and 148 IPC, more particularly where other offences are compoundable. It may be added here that the State of Madhya Pradesh vide M.P. Act No. 17 of 1999 (Section 3) has made Sections 506(II) IPC, 147 IPC and 148 IPC compoundable offences by amending the schedule u/s 320 Cr.P.C.
(e) The offences against human body other than murder and culpable homicide where the victim dies in the course of transaction would fall in the category where compounding may not be permitted. Heinous offences like highway robbery, dacoity or a case involving clear-cut allegations of rape should also fall in the prohibited category. Offences committed by public servants purporting to act in that capacity as also offences against public servant while the victims are acting in the discharge of their duty must remain non-compoundable. Offences against the State enshrined in Chapter VII (relating to army, navy and air force) must remain non-compoundable.
(f) That as a broad guideline the offences against human body other than murder and culpable homicide may be permitted to be compounded when the court is in the position to record a finding that the settlement between the parties is voluntary and fair.
While parting with this part, it appears necessary to add that the settlement or compromise must satisfy the conscience of the court. The settlement must be just and fair besides being free from the undue pressure, the court must examine the cases of weaker and vulnerable victims with necessary caution.
To conclude, it can safely be said that there can never be any hard and fast category which can be prescribed to enable the court to exercise its power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. The only principle that can be laid down is the one which has been incorporated in the section itself i.e. "to prevent abuse of the process of any court" or "to secure the ends of justice."
It was further held as under: (Kulwinder Singhs case, CTC pp. 78485 paras. 23 & 25)
No embargo, be in the shape of Section 320(9) Cr.P.C., or any other such curtailment, can whittle down the power u/s 482 Cr.P.C.
The only inevitable conclusion from the above discussion is that there is no statutory bar under Cr.P.C. which can affect the inherent power of this Court u/s 482 . Further, the same cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the court has the wide power to quash the proceedings even in non-compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar u/s 320 Cr.P.C., in order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice. The power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised ex debito Justitiae to prevent an abuse of process of court. There can neither be an exhaustive list nor the defined parameters to enable a High Court to invoke or exercise its inherent powers. It will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. has no limits. However, the High Court will exercise it sparingly and with utmost care and caution. The exercise of power has to be with circumspection and restraint. The court is a vital and an extraordinary effective instrument to maintain and control social order. The courts play role of paramount importance in achieving peace, harmony and everlasting congeniality in society. Resolution of a dispute by way of a compromise between two warring groups, therefore, should attract the immediate and prompt attention of a court which should endeavour to give full effect to the same unless such compromise is abhorrent to lawful composition of the society or would promote savagery.
11.1. In paras. 60 and 61 of the judgment the Court held thus--
We find no incongruity in the above principle of law and the decisions of this Court in
Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee (1990) 2 SCC 437
,
Dharampal v. Ramshri (1993) 1 SCC 435
, Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. (1999) sec. 146,
Ishwar Singh v. State of M.P. (2008) 15 SCC 667
,
Rumi Dhar (Smt.) v. State of W.B. (2009) 6 SCC 364
and
Ashok Sadarangani v. UOI (2012) 11 SCC 321
. The principle propounded in
Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee (1990) 2 SCC 437
that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override express bar provided in law is by now well settled. In
Dharampal v. Ramshri (1993) 1 SCC 435
the Court observed the same thing that the inherent powers u/s 482 of the Code cannot be utilized for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Similar statement of law is made in Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. In
Ishwar Singh v. State of M.P. (2008) 15 SCC 667
the accused was alleged to have committed an offence punishable u/s 307 IPC and with reference to Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence punishable u/s 307 IPC was not compoundable offence and there was express bar in Section 320 that no offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code. In
Rumi Dhar (Smt.) v. State of W.B. (2009) 6 SCC 364
although the accused had paid the entire due amount as per the settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded with for commission of offences under Sections 120-B /420 /467 /468 /471 IPC along with the bank officers who were being prosecuted u/s 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding that the Court would not quash a case involving a crime against the society when a prima facie case has been made out against the accused for framing the charge.
Ashok Sadarangani v. UOI (2012) 11 SCC 321
was again a case where the accused persons were charged of having committed the offences under Sections 120-B , 465 , 467 , 468 and 471 IPC and the allegations were that the accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged property documents as collaterals and utilized such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening letters of credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank to negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court was alive to the reference made in one of the present matters and also the decisions in
B.S. Joshi (2003) 4 SCC 675
,
Nikhil Merchant (2008) 9 SCC 677
and
Manoj Sharma (2008) 16 SCC 1
and it was held that
B.S. Joshi (2003) 4 SCC 675
, and
Nikhil Merchant (2008) 9 SCC 677
dealt with different factual situation as the dispute involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the case under consideration in
Ashok Sadarangani (2012) 11 SCC 321
was more on the criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in
Ashok Sadarangani (2012) 11 SCC 321
supports the view that the criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different footing.
The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or F.I.R. or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences u/s 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim''s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil favour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.
In the case of Shiji @ Pappu & Ors.(supra) in para. 13 of the judgment the Supreme court held thus:
It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable u/s 320 , Cr.P.C. is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power u/s 482 , Cr.P.C. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by the parties before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution u/s 482 , Cr.P.C. on the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences are not compoundable u/s 320 , the High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court u/s 482 , Cr.P.C. are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 , Cr.P.C. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power u/s 482 , Cr.P.C. by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power u/s 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence, for, it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition u/s 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.
In the case of Dimpey Gujral(supra) the Supreme Court relying on Gyan Singh(supra) allowed quashing of F.I.R. in a case registered under Sections 147 , 148 , 149 , 323 , 307 , 452 and 506 of IPC.
What emerges form the discussions made above is that the High court in exercise of its power vested u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. may direct quashing of an F.I.R. or a criminal proceeding because of the compounding of the offence where the Court is satisfied that no fruitful purpose will be served in further proceeding with the case.
In the present case, the F.I.R. was registered under Sections 284 and 419 of IPC. Section 419 is compoundable in nature. Section 284 prescribes punishment of imprisonment of six months and fine of Rs. 1,000/- (rupees one thousand). The offence is minor in character. All the affected parties signed compromise letter effected in the presence of village Pradhan and other responsible persons. Additional affidavit filed by the parties consists of a copy of the compromise letter signed by all the affected parties. Under such circumstances, I am of considered opinion that further proceeding with the trial of the case will serve no fruitful purpose at all, and I think, this is a fit case where this Court can exercise power u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. and quash the F.I.R. and the consequent criminal proceeding.
Accordingly, the F.I.R. of Legunga PS Case No. 22 of 2012 under Sections 284 and 419 of IPC and the consequent PRC Case No. 389 of 2012 under the same penal sections, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class (Court No. 7), Agartala is quashed consequent upon the compromise between the parties.
Send back the L.C. record along with a copy of this judgment. The criminal petition, accordingly, stands disposed of.