Surjit Singh vs State of Punjab and anr.

V. Ramaswami, C.J., (Oral)

It is stated that against the decision in L.P.A. No. 281 of 1981, Special Leave Petition No. 6593 of 1981 was filed in the Supreme Court, which was dismissed on January 31, 1983, i.e., after April 30, 1982, and thus the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 30(2) of the land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. The only question for consideration now is whether the petition for special leave to appeal pending before the Supreme Court should be considered to be a proceeding pending within the meaning of Section 30 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. We have no doubt that it is a proceeding pending. Article 136 of the Constitution has vested in the Supreme Court power to entertain an appeal in its discretion by granting special leave from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any case or matter passed or made by any Court or tribunal in the territory of India Thus, the Supreme Court could have entertained an appeal from the judgment of this Court in L.P.A. No. 281 of 1981. The petition filed invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution is, therefore, clearly a proceeding pending within the meaning of section 30. The mere fact that it is a discretion vested in the Supreme Court to grant special leave, it could not be said that the proceeding were not pending. In fact even the admission of letters patent appeal is in the discretion of the High Court and on that ground the pending of the letters patent appeal cannot be considered to be not a proceeding within the meaning of section 30 of the Amending Act. We are therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 30(2) of the Amending Act and accordingly we direct the amendment of the decree as prayed for in the petition. There will be an order accordingly.