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Judgment
Applicant - Surinder Bansal has filed this application
under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. seeking special leave to appeal.
Briefly stated, facts of the case are that complainant -
Surinder Bansal had brought a criminal complaint under Section 138 of
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
against accused Satpal on the allegations that at request of the accused,
complainant granted a friendly loan of Rs.1,00,000/- to him on
17.11.2009 and Rs.30,000/- on 20.11.2009 against receipt dated
20.11.2009 issued by son of accused Rajiv Kumar; that it was assured
that complainant would receive back the said amount in one year
without any hassle; that the complainant asked the accused to return the
said friendly loan at which accused in order to discharge his liability
towards the complainant issued cheque bearing No.016642 dated
1.12.2010 for Rs.25,000/-, cheque No.016644 dated 1.12.2010 for
Rs.25,000/-, cheque No.016645 dated 1.12.2010 for Rs.25,000/- and
cheque No.016646 dated 1.12.2010 for Rs.30,000 all drawn on Central
Bank of India, Urban Estate, Ambala City; that the complainant
presented those cheques to his banker i.e. State Bank of India, Model
Town, Ambala City on 7.12.2010, which in turn forwarded the cheques
to banker of accused namely Central Bank of India for encashment but
the cheques were returned uncashed with memo of the bank dated
8.12.2010 having endorsement "Funds Insufficient"; that the
complainant was informed accordingly, at which he served legal notice
dated 29.12.2010 upon the accused on last known two addresses but
accused refused to receive the legal notice and those were returned with
the remarks "GHAR WALON NE LENE SE INKAAR KIYA" (family
members refused to take); that the accused did not make payment within
the stipulated period, as such the complainant had filed a complaint
before Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Ambala.
After recording of preliminary evidence, accused was
summoned. Notice of accusation under Section 138 of the Act was
served upon him, to which, he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
During the course of evidence, complainant Surinder
Bansal got his statement recorded as CW1 submitting his affidavit
Ex.CW1/A reiterating his version as contained in the complaint
tendering Ex.C1, Ex.C3, Ex.C5 and Ex.C6 cheques in question, Ex.C2,
Ex.C4, Ex.C7 and Ex.C8 memos of bank, bank payment receipt Ex.C9,
bank statement Ex.C10, Ex.C11 legal notice, Ex.C12 and Ex.C13 postal
receipts, Ex.C14 and Ex.C16 registered envelopes, Ex.C15 postal
acknowledgement card, Ex.C17 statement of account and copy of
cheque No.938708 for Rs.1,00,000/- drawn on Allahabad Bank as
Ex.C18.
With that the evidence of complainant was closed.
Statement of accused was recorded under Section 313
Cr.P.C. in which the accused while denying the incriminating
circumstances appearing against him submitted that he was innocent and
had been falsely involved in the case. He denied having taken any
money from the complainant or being liable to pay any amount to him,
rather he took up a stand that he and his son gave ten security cheques
each to the complainant on the assurance for getting the Agency of tea
leaves with the complainant and complainant has played fraud upon him
by misusing the security cheques.
During his defence evidence, the accused examined
Devinder Kumar as DW1, who tendered his affidavit Ex.DW1/A
corroborating the version of accused. Accused further examined
Ms.Arvinderjeet Kaur, Criminal Ahlmad of the Court of JMIC, Ambala
as DW2, who had brought the file titled as "Surinder Bansal Versus
Amit Vashishat" regarding cheque amount of Rs.1,40,000/-, in the said
case proving cheque of Rs.85,000/-. She had also brought the file of
case titled "Surinder Bansal Versus Gagandeep Rawat", proving cheque
amount of Rs.60,000/-, wherein the alleged amount had to be given on
15.5.2011, 29.4.2013 and 16.4.2013. Harsh Kumar appeared as DW3,
who tendered his affidavit Ex.DW3/A, in which he lend support to the
case of accused.
Accused further tendered in evidence documents Ex.D1 to
Ex.D8.
Thereafter, the defence evidence of accused stood closed.
After hearing arguments, the learned trial Magistrate
dismissed the complaint under Section 138 of the Act. The main reasons
given for arriving at such conclusion are as follows:
(1) To prove legal enforceable pecuniary liability of the
accused towards him, the complainant had relied upon
Ex.C10 allegedly an acknowledgement of loan given by son
of accused Satpal namely Harsh Kumar and another son of
accused namely Rajiv Kumar having acknowledged the
receipt of the friendly loan. The trial Magistrate had
observed that though DW3 Harsh Kumar had admitted his
signatures on Ex.C10 stating it to be statement of account
of his father but he had no where admitted that it is the
acknowledgement of the alleged cheque amount and further
according to the trial Magistrate the ink and writing of the
amount as well as signatures of Rajiv Kumar were different
from that Harsh Kumar and in Ex.C10, no where expressly
or impliedly, it is mentioned that sons of accused had
received the cheque amount, therefore Ex.C10 could not be
treated as valid admission or acknowledgement of the
cheque amount as alleged transaction in the present case is
surrounded by suspicious circumstances for the following
reasons:
(i) The complainant had submitted that he had given a
friendly loan to the accused but evidence on record
shows that it was not so and complainant is a money
lender advancing loans to different persons on
different occasions. It being so , he was expected to
maintain the proper account books/ledger etc., which
he had not done.
(ii)The loan had not been given in presence of any
witness.
(iii)The loan transaction is neither supported by any
documentary evidence nor by any oral testimony.
(iv) Failure of the complainant to show that he had
capacity to lend such huge amount to accused. The
complainant in his cross-examination stating that he
had received loan of Rs.1 lac from Ashok Kumar
vide Ex.C17 and Ex.C18 though Ex.D2 reveals that
complainant had shown his ignorance regarding
taking of loan from Ashok Kumar. It seems highly
unusual and strange that complainant borrowed
money from Ashok Kumar and lent the same to the
accused without interest. Reference was made to
Hon''ble Apex Court judgment titled K. Prakashan
Versus P.K. Surendern 2007(4) RCR(Crl.) 588
which was a case when it was observed that
complainant himself had not sufficient funds and
used to borrow the same from others. The complaint
was dismissed.
(2) Material inconsistency in the statement of complainant
inasmuch he had alleged different facts on different occasions
in his deposition vide Ex.D1 and Ex.D7.
(3) Failure of the complainant to show the alleged loan
amount in his income tax returns more particularly when he
himself has claimed that it was a loan which was paid after one
year i.e. in the next financial year.
(4) The amounts on cheques having been written in
different ink and by different pen pointing out that there was
possibility of misuse of blank cheques. The alleged loan
transaction and execution of the cheques in question are
surrounded by suspicious circumstances. Benefit of doubt
going to the accused.
(5) Presumption under Section 139 of the Act being
rebuttable.
(6) The defence version being probable.
(7) The trial Magistrate had come to the conclusion
that complainant had failed to prove that cheques in question
had been issued by the accused in discharge of his legal
enforceable debt/liability, therefore, benefit of doubt to the
accused and he was acquitted.
The complainant felt aggrieved and he had knocked at the
door of this Court by moving an application under Section 378 (4)
Cr.P.C . for grant of special leave to appeal against the judgment of
acquittal.
I have heard learned counsel for the applicant and I find
that no ground is there to grant special leave to appeal. I do not find any
illegality and irregularity in the judgment passed by the learned trial
Court. Rather it is based upon proper appraisal and appreciation of
evidence and correct interpretation of law.
Therefore, no ground is made out to grant special leave to
appeal in this case. The application is, therefore dismissed accordingly.
