Tribunals and CommissionsDivision Bench(2024) 12 NCLT CK 1306

Suresh Narayan Singh vs Tayo Rolls Limited

National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench · Decided on 17 December 2024

HON’BLE JUDGES
Bidisha Banerjee, Member (Judicial) · Balraj Joshi, Member (Technical)
CASE NUMBER
I.A. (IB) No. 69/KB/2020 and I.A. (IB) No. 33/KB/2020 and I.A. (IB) No. 167/KB/2020 in CP (IB) No. 701/KB/2017

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Judgment

216 paragraphs · 13,478 words

COMMON ORDER

Per: Coram

1.

This Court convened through hybrid mode.

2.

The I.A.s along with the Intervention Petition are interrelated and are taken up for consideration analogously.

Brief facts of the case

3.

The underlying Company Petition in C.P. (IB) No. 701/KB/2017 was filed by Mr. Suresh Narayan Singh, the Operational Creditor against Tayo Rolls Limited, the Corporate Debtor, to initiate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”), under section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016, which was admitted vide order dated 05 April 2019.

4.

Initially, Ms. Vinita Agarwal had been appointed as the Interim Resolution Professional. Thereafter, Committee of Creditors (“CoC”) passed a resolution in the 5th CoC meeting held on 27 July 2019 with 82.24% voting share to replace the IRP and appoint Mr. Anish Agarwal as the Resolution Professional. The same was approved by this Adjudicating Authority vide order dated 30 October 2019.

I.A. (IB) No. 69/KB/20201

5.

The I.A. has been filed by Suresh Narayan Singh, authorised representative of 284 workers of the Tayo Rolls Limited, seeking the following prayers:

a)

Adjudication of claims of Creditors specially the Petitioner and the JBVNL and assignment of voting rights percentage in accordance with the same;

b)

Restoration of time lost without CIRP under the two RPS;

c)

Determination of eligibility of the RP in view of purported disciplinary action initiated by the IBBI and the observations made by this Hon’ble Bench in some other matter against him;

d)

Any other direction that the Hon’ble Bench may deem fit and proper for the proper adjudication of issue.

I.A. (IB) No. 33/KB/20202

6.

The I.A. has been filed by Suresh Narayan Singh, authorised representative of 284 workers of the Tayo Rolls Limited, seeking the following prayers:

a)

To direct the RP to constitute the CoC strictly in accordance with law, removing the JBVNL from the CoC and also to re-examine the claims of various other creditors shown in his minutes of 9th CoC meeting;

b)

To allow or direct the Workmen to furnish their formal resolution plan for takeover of the Company;

c)

Direction of the RP to allow the professional appointed by the Workmen to visit the plant of Jamshedpur and other properties to take stock of the Corporate Debtor, its revival constraints, valuation of assets and properties, SWOT analysis which are sine qua non for any takeover in the present situation;

d)

Determination of eligibility of the RP in view of his failure to commence the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor and various proceedings against him;

e)

Any other direction that the Hon’ble Bench may deem fit and proper for the proper adjudication of issue.

I.A. (IB) No. 167/KB/2020

7.

The I.A. has been filed by Suresh Narayan Singh, authorised representative of 284 workers of the Tayo Rolls Limited, seeking the following prayers:

“ a) Cancellation of Expression of Interest issued and published by the RP;

b)

Direction to correct and issue a fresh Expression of Interest;

22We are considering this I.A. as numbered in the e-filing portal, the hardcopy of the same has been

numbered as I.A. 69/KB/2020

c)

Any other direction that the Hon'ble Bench may deem fit and proper for the proper adjudication of issue.”

8.

Submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the workmen in I.A. (IB) No. 33/KB/2020 I.A. (IB) No. 69/KB/2020 and I.A. (IB) No. 167/KB/2020:

I.A.(IBC) 33/KB/2020

8.1

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Arcelor Mittal vs. Satish Kumar Gupta3 has acknowledged certain mandatory steps that are pre-requisite for CIRP and that the CIRP begins at section 23 of the Code. The said steps are covered under section 17, 18(1), 20, 21, 22, 25, 28 and 29 of the Code and have not been initiated or concluded by the Resolution Professional. As such, the matter has not reached the stage of CIRP under section 23 of the Code.

8.2

The present RP upon his appointment has reshuffled the claims without disclosing any reasons and admitted a claim of Rs. 366 Crore of JBVNL, thereby increasing its voting share to almost 90%. By doing so, the RP got a resolution for publication of Expression of Interest (EOI) passed without even making any information memorandum which is a sine qua non to section 29 of the Code. The RP has not prepared a statement of assets and liabilities as stipulated under section 18(1).

8.3

The Corporate Debtor, in its Audited Balance Sheet for the FY 2016-17 under para 38, page 109 under the heading Exceptional Item has disclosed that it had undertaken negotiations for onetime settlement of vendor liabilities and as a consequence of such settlement it has written back Rs.351.48 lakhs in the Audited Balance Sheet. As such, the list of creditors shown in the progress reports of the RPs appear to be doubtful including the TRL Krosaki Refractories Ltd.

8.4

The dues of JBVNL have been reflected in the Audited Balance Sheet for the FY 2015-16 of the CD for Rs.218 crore which is disputed and the same has been shown at Page 15, para 15 under the heading 'Contingent Liabilities and Major Obligations'.

8.5

The aforesaid dues as contingent liability which is contingent on the outcome of the Courts' Order and as such not an 'admitted debt’ as contemplated under Section 3(11) and (12) of the IBC, 2016. However, the previous RP treated the same as a debt crystallized and assigned voting of right of 53% to the said State Electricity Board erroneously.

8.6

Against a purported claim of Rs.440.53 crore by the JBVNL a claim of Rs.366.30 crore has been admitted by the new RP without any reference to Rs.34.14 crore being the only admitted liability as opposed to Rs.218 crore, which is classified as contingent liability by the previous RP on the basis of some legal opinion. The present RP has failed to disclose any such basis for consideration for Rs.366.30 crore as admitted liability of the JBVNL.

8.7

By definition and intent of the legislation delayed payment surcharge of Rs.208.00 crore can't be an admitted debt to be considered as part of the claim.

8.8

Further, pursuant to para 5.5 as amended by Jharkhand State Gazette Notification4 No-214 Dated 16/04/2007 of (Electricity Supply Code) Regulations, 2005 notified as per the power conferred by Clause (x)of sub-section (2) of Section 181 read with Section 50 of the Electricity Act 2003, a new investor who may take over the CD is not obliged to make any payments to the JBVNL. JBVNL has only one choice to recover the same from the erstwhile TAYO management and/or the Tata Steel Ltd. This proposition of law is also endorsed by the Hon'ble High Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

8.9

In light of the aforesaid scenario, the Workmen propose to take over the CD and pray for an in-principle approval of this Hon'ble Bench for the same.

8.10

The CD has 350 acres of land at Jamshedpur and several properties located in the townships viz. registered office at Jamshedpur, a guest house at Kolkata etc. The Applicants propose to sell/transfer/ assign 150 acres of surplus land which have not been used for the last 40 years, which will fetch enough resource for revival of the CD.

8.11

The workmen propose to pay all the legitimate dues of the creditors including the dues of TRL Refractories of Rs.40 odd lakh and also propose to pay around 25 to 50% of the dues of workmen and employees initially which may be around another Rs.2 crore.

8.12

With the investment of an amount of around Rs.200 crore, all the remaining employees who are not superannuated and/or have become invalid to continue in the employment may be engaged profitably.

8.13

That the Workmen have assigned the task of preparation of project report for revival of the CD to a set of Chartered Accountants with a set of competent professionals with further assignment to talk to Bankers or investor and/or private financiers to finance the remaining amount of term loan and the working capital requirement of the CD for starting the operation or for handling the operation in future as the case may be.

I.A (IBC) 69/KB/2020

8.14

The Adjudicating Authority in its Order dated 05/04/2019 has accepted the claim of the Petitioners for Rs.2,19,83,760/- on account of wages and Rs.21,98,37,600/- as compensation aggregating to Rs.24,18,21,360/- and as such the same was an admitted claim. However, the previous RP had accepted only Rs. 20.72 Crore and allotted a vote share of 32.45% without specifying any reason whatsoever. The previous RP also failed to add our PF claim on the Corporate Debtor which is with the trust constituted by the CD.

8.15

The Corporate Debtor has declared in the Audited Balance Sheet for the FY 2016–17 under the head Exceptional Items at para 38 under sub-heading "Write back of liabilities" under clause (ii), wherein it is stated that

"During the year ended 31st March, 2017, the Company has undertaken negotiations for one time full and final settlement of vendor liabilities. Consequent to such settlement, a write back of excess liabilities over the settled amount aggregating to Rs. 351.48 lakhs and has been recognized as an exceptional item."

8.16

The new RP has revised the claim of Workmen & Employees of CD at Rs.28 crore. To fix our claim the RP purportedly sought legal opinion from two "legal luminaries" without any knowledge or authorisation of the COC. Further, no explanation was given for rejection of basis of our claim thread base explained to him. He was explained that in view of default of the CD under sub-section 6 of Section 25(O) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the CD is liable to pay the entire amount of Rs.190 crore and the PF amount of around Rs.15.74 crore with interest on the same. Now, if this is the claim of Workmen & Employees legally accrued under law i.e., Industrial disputes Act, 1947 then the same amount can be claimed under IB, 20l6, too. There can't be two different claims under the two laws nor there any such stipulation in the IBC, 2016. By misinterpreting Section 53 purportedly the RP has calculated the claim only from October, 2016 to 05/04/2019 which is erroneous in as much as Section 53 of IBC, 2016 only determines the priority of payments to be made in the event of liquidation however, any remaining dues can be paid under 53(1)(f) of IBC,2016. It is also apparent that in the event of liquidation of the CD, the claim of Workmen and the Employees of the CD accrued under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 cannot get extinguished inasmuch as there no such contemplation in IBC.

8.17

The Workmen also provided the new RP an Order of the Hon'ble High Court, Ranchi passed in WP 3166 of 2018 filed by the Workmen in which the single Bench of the said Hon'ble High Court agreed with the proposition of law that Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 would supersede Section 238 of the IBC, 2016 and referred the matter to Larger Bench given the serious public interest involved in it. The RP failed to explain how he could ignore a judicial Order on the same.

8.18

The have further referred an Order of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Meenakshi Mills case (1992) 3 SCC 336 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically stated that Chapter VB of the I D Act, 1947 inserted by amendment Act of 32 of 1976 has been inserted to give effect to the Directive Principles of State. It is trite that IBC, 2016 has not been enacted to give effect to the Directive Principles of State and hence here is hardly any doubt that Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would supersede the IBC, 2016 in case of a conflict. Further, there is no apparent conflict between the two enactments inasmuch as both operate in different spheres. However, the RP failed to pay any heed to this and also failed to explain on what ground his "legal experts" had opined that IBC would supersede on all purported inconsistent sections of I D Act, 1947?

8.19

the RP further failed to explain that even if he took the liability commencing from October, 2016 and ending on 05/04/2019 how he could exclude the value of compensation of Rs.21.98 crore admitted by the Adjudicating Authority, NCLT in NO its Order dated 05/04/2019 without any demur from CD and the amount which has now been disclosed at Rs.15.74 crore

8.20

The Hon'ble Bench cannot pass an Order for Liquidation merely on elapse of 270 days of time without the commencement of the Insolvency Resolution Process for reasons not under controi of the COC where it is apparent that the COC has not been allowed to exercise its discretion or commercial judgment or by reason of majority of any Creditor.

I.A. (IBC) 167/KB/2020

8.21

The Deed of Conveyance 5 dated 18.03.1969 being a government grant under Government Grants Act, 1895 categorically mentions that the said Deed of Conveyance for 350 acres of land was made in favour of TATA Steel Ltd. for setting up of (i) Alloy Tool and Special Steel Plant (i) Roll Foundry Project.

8.22

All the above projects are owned by the Corporate Debtor and as such it is clear that the said land was granted for the Corporate Debtor i.e Tayo Rolls Ltd to set up its projects and also for further expansion of the same in future.

8.23

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its order in (2015) 15 SCC 55 also acknowledges the same on the admitted position of the TATA STEEL.Para 7 and 43 of the said Order read as follows:

"7.

Admittedly, the Appellant herein utilized an extent of about 200 acres of the abovementioned 350 acres of land for setting up (i) Alloy Tool and Special Steel Plant (i) the Rol Foundry Project, the specified purpose for which the GRANT-I was made to the Appellant."

"43.

Clause (xiv) stipulates that in the event of the appellant failing to use the land for the specified purpose within a period of one year from the date of the lease (Grant ), the same may be terminated and the and the appellant be evicted from the lands without notice. It is undisputed fact that the appellant was given the land in dispute for the purpose of establishing "alloy tool and special steel plants and the roll foundry" project. This is the purpose specified under the Grant. Admittedly, the appellant utilised 200 acres of the land out of 350 acres of land for the establishment of the said project. The question is whether Clause (xiv) obligates the appellant to utilise every inch of the 350 acres for the "specified purpose within the period of one year". Whether the appellant is liable to be evicted from a portion of the land on the ground that portion of the land is not physically utilized for the Specified purpose?"

8.24

The three units of the Corporate Debtor i.e., Rolls, Foundry and Pig Iron Plant are covered in almost 100 acres of the said 350 acres. The colony occupies another 50 acres out of which Tata Steel occupies 29 acres albeit without authority or misusing its status of being majority shareholder of the Corporate Debtor. If the road, warehousing etc are included the Corporate Debtor occupies more than 150 acres of the said land out of the said 350 acres.

8.25

Tata Steel Ltd. has set up another plant in the name of style of Tata Growth Shop as part of Tata Steel Ltd. albeit without any such authority in another almost 50 acres of land. The remaining 150 acres has never been used which has been proposed to be cancelled by the AIADA vide a letter dated 01/09/2000 which matter finally went to Supreme Court and decided in favour of Tata Steel Ltd. i.e the Petitioner/ Appellant in (2015) 15 SCC 55.

8.26

Condition No. 4 of Deed of Conveyance dated 18/03/1969 contains various "covenants" between the parties. Clause (xiv) stipulates that the land shall be used by the Appellant for the specified purpose within a period of one year from the date of the lease failing which the lease may be terminated and the Appellant evicted from the land and without notice. The said clause reads as follows:

“"4.(xiv) That the lessee shall use the land for the specified purpose within a period of one year from the date of the lease, failing which the lease may be terminated and the lessee evicted from the lands without notice. In case extension is required it can be granted within the discretion of the lessor."

8.27

It is apparent that had that land belonged to Tata Steel Ltd, the same would have been cancelled for its failure to set up any business within one year as stipulated in the conditions therein referred hereinabove. That the same has also been acknowledged by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its order6 in (2015) 15 SCC 55.

8.28

The RP has declared only 50 acres of land in favour of Corporate Debtor, illegally allowing 300 acres of land to Tata Steel Ltd., completely ignoring those documents ostensibly to favour Tata Steel Ltd., to misappropriate CD's 300 acres of land to the gross prejudice of the Corporate Debtor, the Workmen, the JBVNL and other creditors and also the State of Jharkhand and AIADA with completely motivated reasons. In view of the above, the Expression of Interest is liable to be declared null and void in the interest of justice and equity.

9. Summary of the submissions on behalf of the Resolution Professional in I.A.(IBC) 33/KB/2020 , I.A.(IBC) 69/KB/2020 and I.A.(IBC) 167/KB/2020 :

I.A.(IBC) 33/KB/2020 and I.A.(IBC) 69/KB/2020

9.1

The Corporate Debtor was held liable to pay the revised bills of JBVNL (erstwhile Bihar Electricity State Board) along with Delayed Payment Surcharge vide order7 dated 02.05.2013 passed by the Hon’ble Jharkhand High Court in CWJC 852 of 2000 R.

9.2

The Certificate Officer, vide order8 dated 12.12.2015 in Certificate Case No. 38/14-15 filed under the Bihar and Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act 1914, had ordered JBVNL to serve a fresh bill upon the Corporate Debtor herein for its outstanding dues and further ordered the amount of Rs. 48,06,74,070/- to be kept in abeyance, which was over and above the demanded payable sum. Accordingly, the revised bill9 was issued by JBVNL on 24.12.2015 for an amount of Rs. 2,18,03,67,289/- and the amount of Rs. 48,06,74,070/- continued to be kept in abeyance.

9.3

On 22.04.2019, JBVNL filed its claim in Form B and claimed a sum of Rs. 4,40,53,35,190/- out of which the erstwhile RP initially admitted a sum of Rs. 2,18,03,67,289/-. Subsequently in the 2nd CoC Meeting, the admitted claim of JBVNL was reduced to Rs. 34,13,54,771/- and the claim of the workers was admitted to the tune of Rs. 20,72,34,906/-.

9.4

Thereafter, upon replacement of the RP, the present RP i.e the respondent herein, in the 7th CoC expressed the intention to re-verify the claims of the CoC. Accordingly, the RP in the 9th CoC Meeting held on 19.12.2019 revised the claims of the CoC members. The claim of JBVNL was revised to Rs. 3,66,30,17,046/- and the claim of the workers was revised to Rs. 28,88,92,223.65.

9.5

The issue of revised claims and voting shares of the CoC was discussed in the 10th CoC Meeting and the complete details qua the grounds for such revision and the calculation thus arrived at has been provided in the said Minutes of the 10th CoC Meeting.

9.6

It is noteworthy that in the 10th CoC Meeting, there was no representation on behalf of the workers despite service of notice to the same.

9.7

The workers of the Corporate Debtor had filed collective claim of Rs. 190,04,38,183.54/-. Such claim was on account of various heads including outstanding salary, leave encashment, leave travel concession. medical year, bonus pay and gratuity. However, the calculation of categories of such claims was done by the workers until the schedule date of retirement of each worker. Thus, the workers had filed a claim even in respect of the future period for which they were yet to render any service. The erstwhile Resolution Professional, Ms. Vineet Agarwal, had admitted claim of the workers only up to Rs. 20,72,34,906/-. Upon appointment of the present Resolution Professional, the workers resubmitted their claims before the Resolution Professional which was recalculated and revised. Accordingly, the Resolution Professional increased the claims of the workers upon due verification, admitting a total claim of Rs. 28,88,92,223.65/-. This admitted amount includes the entire claim of the workers until the date of commencement of the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor (i.e., 5th April, 2019).

9.8

None of the heads/sub- categories under which the workers have raised their claim and/or the amounts claimed thereunder have been disputed by the Resolution Professional. The claim has been fully accepted until the CIRP commencement date as aforesaid, and only the claim in respect of the period of post commencement of the CIRP has been rejected. Therefore, there is no illegality whatsoever in respect of the workers' claim which has been admitted correctly to the permissible extent in accordance with law.

9.9

Insofar as JBVNL's increased claim is concerned, it is evident that JBVNL made requests to the present RP upon his appointment for re-verification of these claims and also provided various document and materials to the Resolution Professional including the aforesaid orders of the High Court at Jharkhand, the order of the Certificate Officer and the revised bills raised by JBVNL upon the Corporate Debtor pursuant thereto.

9.10

It is on the basis of this information that the Resolution Professional admitted the clam of the JBVNL to tune of Rs. 366,30,17,046/- (Rupees Three Hundred and Sixty Six Crores Thirty Lakhs Seventeen Thousand and Forty Six Only) which includes Rs. 218,03,67,289/- (Rupees Two Hundred and Eighteen Crores Three Lakhs Sixty Seven Thousand Two Hundred and Eighty Nine Only) on account of the aforesaid fresh bill dated 24th December, 2015 along with delayed payment surcharge @ 0.4% per week on and from the date of fresh bill (ie24.12.2015) until the date of commencement of CIRP (i.e. 5th February, 2019). The delayed payment surcharge has been calculated in terms of the Tariff Order dated 28th February, 2019 passed by the Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission, a copy of the relevant page whereof (i.e. page 188) is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure Q. The Resolution professional craves leave to refer and rely upon the entire tariff order at the time of hearing, if necessary. This is the correct calculation of the claim of JBVNL unlike the admission of a mere sum of Rs. 34 Crores which was erroneously done by the previous Resolution Professional.

9.11

The Resolution Professional submitted that all necessary steps as per law has been followed in CIRP and the same does not suffer from any violation or infraction. Also, the admission of claims and constitution of CoC has been done correctly and legally. He denied that the mandatory actions prerequisite for the CIRP has not been initiated and/or concluded. He also denied that he did not prepare the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of the Corporate Debtor. He further denied that the proceedings in the matter have not reached the stage of Section 23 i.e., CIRP. He also submitted that all regulations and mandated timelines as mandated by the Code have been followed.

I.A. (IBC) 167/KB/2020:

9.12

By the lease deed dated 18.03.1969, the Government of Bihar has leased out in favour of Tata Steel Ltd. about 350 Acres of land for industrial purposes, for a period of 99 years. The Corporate Debtor is a subsidiary of Tata Steel Ltd an vide the deed of sub-lease10 dated 07.10.1969, a sub-lease for 50 Acres was granted to the Corporate Debtor by Tata Steel Ltd. In this manner, Tata Steel Ltd. became the lessee of the Government of Bihar for the entire 350 Acres of land and the Corporate Debtor became a sub-lessee in respect of the 50 Acres out of the aforesaid 350 Acres.

9.13

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) in respect of the Corporate Debtor commenced on 5th April, 2019. The 50 Acres of land of the Corporate Debtor was not experiencing any business activity as the business of the Corporate Debtor had become non-operational as far back as September 2016. The remaining 300 Acres of land continues to be under occupation of Tata Steel Ltd. and appears to be used for various industrial activities.

9.14

The said 50 Acres of land of the Corporate Debtor has been referred to and disclosed in the Expression of Interest as well as the Information Memorandum prepared by the Resolution Professional in respect of the Corporate Debtor's CIRP.

9.15

Based upon such information, JBVNL submitted a Resolution Plan for taking over the Corporate Debtor. In this plan it has been inter alia proposed that the State of Jharkhand (i.e. the State which was carved out as a separate state from the State of Bihar in the year 2000 and which presently owns the said 350 acres of land) would execute a direct lease in favour of the Corporate Debtor in respect of the said 50 Acres of land. This Resolution Plan was passed by the Committee of Creditors and is pending approval by this Adjudicating Authority in I.A. No. 357 of 2020.

9.16

In view of the aforesaid, it is evident that the rights of the Corporate Debtor are confined to the said 50 Acres of land. The Corporate Debtor does not have any right, title or interest in respect of the remaining 300 acres of land which is being used and enjoyed by Tata Steel.

10. Analysis and Findings:

10.1

Heard the parties on various dates at length and perused the record.

10.2

Following issues arise for consideration:

i.

Was JBVNL’s claim a contingent liability? If not, when was it crystallised? How does such crystallisation, if at all affect the limitation for the purpose of filing the claim before the RP;

ii.

Is the payment proposed to be to made to JBVNL as per the amended para 5.5 under Jharkhand State Gazette Notification11 No-214 Dated 16/04/2007 of (Electricity Supply Code) Regulations, 2005;

iii.

Is the revised quantum of claims of JBVNL and the workmen as admitted by the present RP correct in law;

iv.

Was CIRP conducted as per law by the RP;

v.

How much area was leased to the Corporate Debtor vide the grant under Government Grants Act, 1895;

10.3

The foremost contention of the workmen in the present applications is that the claim of JBVNL as admitted by the present RP is not sound in law. According to the workmen, the said claim falls under the category of ‘contingent liability’ and ought not to have been admitted by the RP.

10.4

It is seen that the Corporate Debtor, in its audited balance-sheet for the F.Y. 2015-16, has listed the dues of JBVNL as "Contingent Liabilities and Major Obligations" with inter alia the following observation:

“(i)

Consequent to t/he order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its order dated Apri15, 2009, upholding the decision of the Patna High Court wrt a direction to BSEB to rework the rates of fuel surcharge, BSB has adjusted Rs.23.23 crore against the Coal Claims of Rs.100 crore and modified the rate of fuel Surcharge for the financial Year 1998-99 to 158.79 P/Kwh against the earlier notified rate of 164.83 P/Kwh of the financial year 1998-99, thus giving a benefit of 6.04P/Kwh to the consumers. However, this benefit will be passed on to the Consumers on receipt of Coal claim of Rs.100 crore by BSEB from the Coal Companies. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has, however, given liberty to the consumers to approach the High Court to challenge the correctness of this adjustment ad the terms of such adjustment and also stated that the other pending issues on fuel surcharge can be taken up by the consumers before the High Court. The Hon'ble Jharkhand High Court had passed its order against the Company. Thereafter, the Company has filed a Letter Patent Appeal (LPA) before the Division Bench of the Jharkhand High Court. The Division Bench in its interim order, directed Company to pay the principal amount by 31 August, 2015 (this was paid by Tayo even before the order) and 50% of DP to be payable in 3 equal monthly instalments beginning from August 31, 2015 and to furnish a Bank Guarantee for balance 50% of DPS. The Company also had to renew the Bank guarantee of of Rs.3.72 crores which was given at the time of disconnection of electricity in the year 2013. Against the interim order, the company has filed Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted stay on the payment of DPS till final decision in LPA by the Jharkhand High Court.

(ii)

In the year 2000, your Company had filed a writ petition in Hon 'ble Jharkhand High Court challenging the applicability of 1999 Tariff schedule (HTSS category) to 1993 Electricity Tariff on Tayo. Hon'ble Jharkhand High Court on May 02, 2013, had dismissed Company’s Petition and confirmed the applicability of 1999 Tariff schedule on TAYO. Consequent to the adverse judgment of Hon ble High Court, with regard to applicability of electricity tariff to the Company from January 2000 till March 2013, the Jharkhand State Electricity Board (JSEB) has issued a rectified energy bill dated June 10, 2013 for Rs.272.03 crore which includes delayed payment surcharge of Rs.208.00 crore and the fuel surcharge of Rs.5.96 crore. The Judgment dated May, 2, 2013 was challenged on various grounds by way of LPA before the Hon'ble Jharkhand High Court which was admitted on merit. Meanwhile the Jharkhand State Electricity Board has initiated a Certificate proceeding against the Company, Board of directors and its Officers for recovery of Rs.263.61 crore, which was challenged before the Certificate Officer. On December 12, 2015, the Certificate Officer in his order absolved the Directors and Officers from their liability to the extent of Certificate amount and ordered the JSEB to raise fresh Bill Twithin 15 days and the Company to pay the same. Pursuant to the order of the Certificate officer, the JSEB had raised abill of Rs.218 crore which was also challenged by the Company in the Hon'ble High Court. The High Court in its interim order mentioned that no coercive action shall be taken against the Company during the pendency and final disposal of the LPA at High Court. These LPAs are still pending at Hon 'ble Jharkhand High Court. “

10.5

It is clear that the Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand vide order dated 02.04.2013 in WPC 852 of 2000 had clearly held that the tariff schedule scheduled by the Bihar State Electricity Board dated 24th September 1999 was applicable to the petitioner i.e the Corporate Debtor herein and that the Petitioner therein was liable to pay delayed payment surcharge on the rectified bill issued by the Board i.e JVBNL.

10.6

The review petition filed against the aforesaid order was dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand on 17.07.2013. Further, the second writ filed by the Corporate Debtor being WPC 3801 of 2013 was also dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand on 22.05.2015 on the grounds that JBVNL had already initiated proceedings being Certificate Case No. 38/14-1512 against the Corporate Debtor under Bihar & Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914.

10.7

Furthermore, the directions given by the Certificate Officer in Certificate Case No. 38/14-15 are also extracted hereinafter:

Exhibit reproduced from the original judgment
Exhibit reproduced from the original judgment
10.8

It is seen that subsequent to the orders in WPC 852 of 2000 and WPC 3801 of 2013, the Corporate Debtor had filed two Letter Patent Appeals being LPA No. 217 of 2013 and LPA 405 of 2015. LPA 405 of 2015 has been dismissed vide order dated 07.09.202213.

10.9

Upon passing of the Certificate Order by the Certificate Officer in Certificate Case No. 38/14-15, the liability of the Corporate Debtor towards JBVNL to the extent indicated therein, became established and no longer remained a ‘contingent liability’ as claimed by the workmen. Further, upon the issuance of fresh bill dated 24.12.2015 by JBVNL, the same became crystallised. In pursuance of the said order passed by the Certificate Officer, JBVNL issued the revised bill14 on 24.12.2015 for an amount of Rs. 2,18,03,07,289/-. As directed by the Certificate Officer in the preceding order, the amount to be kept in abeyance i.e Rs. 48,0674,070/- was mentioned in the revised bill.

10.10

Further, during the course of arguments, the learned Counsel on behalf of the workmen claimed that the Resolution Professional has admitted Rs.366.30 Crore of Jharkhand Bidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (“JBVNL”) against the claim of Rs.440.53 Crore which arose during 2000 to 2013 and is barred by limitation. The learned Counsel referred to the order passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand in CWJC No. 852 of 2000 on 02 May 2013 which was filed by Tayo Rolls Limited. The Learned Counsel submitted that once the order was passed on 2013, the limitation stated which as per section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 is only two years. The order of CIRP was passed on 05 April 2019 ie. after 6 years from the date of the order of the Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand.

10.11

In this regard, it becomes pertinent to refer to section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (“the Act”) which is as follows:

56. Disconnection of supply in default of payment.

(1)

Where any person neglects to pay any charge for electricity or any sum other than a charge for electricity due from him to a licensee or the generating company in respect of supply, transmission or distribution or wheeling of electricity to him, the licensee or the generating company may, after giving not less than fifteen clear days notice in writing, to such person and without prejudice to his rights to recover such charge or other sum by suit, cut off the supply of electricity and for that purpose cut or disconnect any electric supply line or other works being the property of such licensee or the generating company through which electricity may have been supplied, transmitted, distributed or wheeled and may discontinue the supply until such charge or other sum, together with any expenses incurred by him in cutting off and reconnecting the supply, are paid, but no longer: Provided that the supply of electricity shall not be cut off if such person deposits , under protest, -

(a)

an amount equal to the sum claimed from him, or

(b)

the electricity charges due from him for each month calculated on the basis of average charge for electricity paid by him during the preceding six months, whichever is less, pending disposal of any dispute between him and the licensee.

(2)

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no sum due from any consumer, under this section shall be recoverable after the period of two years from the date when such sum became first due unless such sum has been shown continuously as recoverable as arrear of charges for electricity supplied and the licensee shall not cut off the supply of the electricity:

10.12

On perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that section 56(2) only operates in cases where the consumer has neglected to pay the charge of the electricity consumed by it and does not apply to other cases such that of deficiency in service and dispute in the bills.

10.13

In Prem Cottex vs. Uttar haryana bijli vitran nigam ltd.&ors. 15 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

“23.

Coming to the second aspect, namely, the impact of Subsection (1) on Subsection (2) of Section 56, it is seen that the bottom line of Subsection (1) is the negligence of any person to pay any charge for electricity. Subsection (1) starts with the words “where any person neglects to pay any charge for electricity or any some other than a charge for electricity due from him”.

24.

Subsection (2) uses the words “no sum due from any consumer under this Section”. Therefore, the bar under Subsection (2) is relatable to the sum due under Section 56. This naturally takes us to Subsection (1) which deals specifically with the negligence on thepart of a person to pay any charge for electricity or any sum other than a charge for electricity. What is covered by section 56, under subsection(1), is the negligence on the part of a person to pay for electricity and not anything else nor any negligence on the part ofthe licensee.”

“26.

The matter can be examined from another angle as well. Subsection(1) of Section 56 as discussed above, deals with the disconnection of electric supply if any person “neglects to pay any charge for electricity”. The question of neglect to pay would arise only after a demand is raised by the licensee. If the demand is not raised, there is no occasion for a consumer to neglect to pay any charge for electricity. Subsection (2) of Section 56 has a nonobstante clause with respect to what is contained in any other law, regarding the right to recover including the right to disconnect. Therefore, if the licensee has not raised any bill, there can be no negligence on the part of the consumer to pay the bill and consequently the period of limitation prescribed under Subsection (2) will not start running. So long as limitation has not started running, the bar for recovery and disconnection will not come into effect.”

10.14

Further in K.C. Ninan vs. Kerala State Electricity Board and Others16, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

134.

The period of limitation under Section 56(2) is relatable to the sum due under Section 56. The sum due under Section 56 relates to the sum due on account of the negligence of a person to pay for electricity. Section 56(2) provides that such sum due would not be recoverable after the period of two years from when such sum became first due. The means of recovery provided under Section 56 relate to the remedy of disconnection of electric supply. The right to recover still subsists.

10.15

It is clear from the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court that the right to recover arrears/dues on part of JBVNL will not be curtailed by virtue of section 56(2) of the Act, which merely relates to the remedy of disconnection of the electricity supply. Further, section 56(2) of the Act will only operate in scenarios where the bills/dues have been disputes. In the instant matter, it is seen that the electricity bills in case of the Corporate Debtor have been a matter of dispute since 2000 and although the Hon’ble Jharkhand High Court on 02.05.2013 has passed a decision on the subject matter, the litigations carried on until the passing of the order by the Certificate Officer in Certificate Case No. 38/14-15. Subsequent to the said certificate order, a revised bill was issued on 24.12.2015 and it is only then that the demand and the corresponding right of recovery arose.

10.16

Since the delay/failure on part of the Corporate Debtor was not a result of neglect on its part but disputes in the amount of the said bill, the provision of section 56(2) shall not hinder the right of recovery of the dues of JBVNL.

10.17

Lastly, it is clear that the Corporate Debtor has acknowledged the Certificate Order dated 12.12.2015 in its Annual Statements for the F.Y. 2016-1717 and the LPAs pointed out therein have been dismissed afterwards, the same would amount to valid acknowledgment in terms of section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 giving rise to a fresh limitation period which would then culminate on 28.03.2020. Since the claim was filed on 22.04.2019, the same was filed within limitation period.

Applicability of / clause 5.5 of (Electricity Supply Code) Regulations, 2005

10.18

According to the workmen, pursuant to para 5.5 of (Electricity Supply Code) Regulations, 2005 as amended by Jharkhand State Gazette Notification18 No-214 Dated 16/04/2007, a Resolution Applicant who assumes control of the Corporate Debtor is not responsible for fulfilling the obligations of the outgoing management.

10.19

Para 5.5 of the Regulations is reproduced hereinafter:

5.5

If the applicant, in respect of an earlier agreement executed in his name or in the name of a firm or company with which he was associated either as a partner, director or managing director, has any arrears of electricity dues or other dues for the premises where the new connection is applied for and such dues are payable to the licensee, the requisition for supply may not be entertained by the licensee until the dues are paid in full. But if the old consumer who had committed default in payment of the dues has left the premises for good and the concerned premises has come in legal possession of a new occupant through transfer or purchase of the concerned property and where the new incumbent is not connected with the previous owner/occupant in any manner applies for re-connection of the electrical line in the same disconnected premises, in that event the distribution licensee shall be obliged to order reconnection without realization of the arrear dues of concerned premises from the new incumbent, as the purchaser of the premises would not be held liable to meet the liability of the previous consumer in order to secure reconnection.

10.20

There is no quarrel on this issue as 5.5 is not in conflict with the “ Clean slate” syndrome of the insolvency regime where the claims lodged by the electricituy supply utility would be subject to payment under the laid down mechanism . Further the regulation lays down the mandate with respect to securing reconnection of electricity connection on an application made by such new occupant like the SRA who has no relation with the previous management and is well provided for under section 29A which provides that SRA cannot be a related party of the Corporate debtor.

10.21

It is also pertinent to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in K.C. Kinan (supra) in the matter which are as follows:

“341…….i.The implication of the expression “as is where is” basis is that every intending bidder is put on notice that the seller does not undertake responsibility in respect of the property offered for salewith regard to any liability for the payment of dues, like servicecharges, electricity dues for power connection, and taxes of the local authorities…”

10.22

While the decision of the Apex Court pertains to sale of a property on an “as is where is” basis, the same principle can be applied to the case of a resolution plan. When a resolution plan is submitted by a prospective resolution applicant (PRA), it is understood that such PRA has notice of all the dues and liabilities of the Corporate Debtor, including that of electricity dues, if any and has agreed to pay the same in terms of the resolution plan. As such, the claim of the workmen that the dues of JBVNL can only be recovered from the erstwhile management of the Corporate Debtor is without basis.

On calculation of JBVNL’s claim:

10.23

The next contention of the workmen is that the voting share allotted to JBVNL by the RP is without sound reasoning. In this regard, it is seen that in the Minutes19 of the 1st CoC Meeting, an amount of Rs. 2,18,03,07,289/- was admitted by the erstwhile RP out of the total claim of JBVNL for Rs. 4,40,53,35,190/-. However, in the 2nd CoC Meeting20, the claim of JBVNL was reduced to Rs. 34,13,54,771/-.

10.24

Thereafter subsequent to the replacement of the RP, JBVNL vide letter21 dated 05.11.2019 requested the present RP to re-verify its claim. Accordingly, the present RP, in the 7th CoC Meeting mentioned22 that he would be re-verifying all claims. In order to do the same, the CoC passed resolution approving the appointment of Mr. Vineet Agarwal as process advisor and Magnus Legal Services LLP to provide legal assistance by 100% votes. This implies that the decisions to re-verify the claims and the appointment of the aforesaid personnel were both assented to by the workmen herein.

10.25

As per the Minutes of the 9th CoC Meeting23, it is seen that since the re-verification of claims was a technical issue the Resolution Professional further appointed other professionals to assist him in the matter. The relevant portion of the Minutes is reproduced hereinafter:

“e. That the CoC noted that the re-verification of claim of the workmen is the technical issue, therefore, the Resolution Professional appointed one more Advocate practicing in the Labour Laws and Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. 2016 'Mr.Abhijit Banerjee' and practising in the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, New Delhi for the verification of claim of the workmen other than the opinion of Mr.Vikash Kumar Sinha (labour law Consultant), realising the technicality and complexity of the claim of the workmen to finally come to the conclusion of claim filed by the workmen. The Resolution Professional along with the Legal Advisor Magnus Legal Services LLP explained the claim of workmen and applicable laws like Industrial Dispute Act, IBC, 2016 relating to this matter along with the relevant documents such as various orders of Courts/Tribunals in favour and against the workmen to Mr. Abhijit Banerjee for the Legal Opinion. After the legal opinion provided by Mr. Abhijit Banerjee, the Resolution Professional discussed with Process Advisor Mr. Vineet Aggarwal and Legal Advisor Magnus Legal Services LLP for the re verification of the claims. The amount of claim admitted and shared in the meeting. The CoC member took the note on same was also taken for voting.”

10.26

The process followed by the RP and the aforesaid personnel in re-verification of all the claims including that of the workmen is clearly outlined in the Minutes of the 9th CoC Meeting. Furthermore, the reason for re-evaluation of JBVNL’s claim is also mentioned clearly in the said Minutes. The relevant portions of the Minutes in respect thereof are extracted hereinafter:

Exhibit reproduced from the original judgment
Exhibit reproduced from the original judgment
10.27

As such, it is clear that the increase in admitted claim of JBVNL by the RP was correct, transparent and as per the provisions of the Code. The contention of the workmen regarding the voting share of JBVNL being incorrect, arbitrary and clandestine therefore does not stand.

On calculation of workmen’s claims:

10.28

The workmen had submitted a claim of Rs. 190 Crore in addition to the provident fund (PF) dues to the tune of Rs. 15.74 Crore. As on date, the total amount of admitted claim by the present RP is Rs. 28 Crore (Approx) and the PF dues have not been included in calculation of the said admitted claim.

10.29

According to the workmen, the RP has committed an error in failing to take into account the provident fund dues of the workmen while computing the admitted claim and in process reducing the voting percentage of the workmen.

10.30

In this regard, it is to be noted that any amount due from the Corporate Debtor in terms of Provident fund contribution is in fact, due to the Provident Fund Trust and not directly to the workmen.

10.31

Even though the PF dues have not been included in the admitted claims of the workmen, the Resolution Plan proposes to make 100% payment in respect of the admitted claim of the Provident Fund Trust which is mentioned to be Rs. 0.14 Crore or 14 Lakh. The change in the quantum of such unpaid contribution will not impact the voting percentage of the workmen in the CoC. The allegation regarding the constitution of the CoC to this extent is unsustainable.

10.32

The workmen have further claimed that the quantum of claims admitted by the present RP is incorrect and that the Corporate Debtor is liable to pay the entire amount due to the workmen till their superannuation pursuant to section 25(O)(6) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

10.33

The Adjudicating Authority while admitting the Corporate Debtor into CIRP accepted the claim of the workmen for Rs. 2,19,83,760/- as default of wages and Rs. 21,98,37,600/- as compensation, aggregating to a sum of Rs. 24,18,21,360/-. The workmen had filed a claim for Rs. 190 Crore with the erstwhile RP who had initially admitted the claim for a sum of Rs. 24,18,21,360/- and rejected the rest of the claim. Subsequently, the present RP, after re-verifying the claims of the workmen, increased the admitted claim to Rs. 28 Crore (Approx.)

10.34

As admitted by the Corporate Debtor in its audited balance sheets for the F.Y. 2016-1724, the Corporate Debtor had filed a closure application under section 25-O of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which was refused by the state authorities on 27.10.2016.

10.35

The Corporate Debtor, being aggrieved by said order had filed before the Hon’ble High Court, Jharkhand a writ petition being WP(L) No. 6690 of 2016. During the

24Annexure C to I.A.(IBC) 69/KB/2020, Page 142 pendency of the same, CIRP was initiated against the Corporate Debtor by this Adjudicating Authority vide order dated 05.04.2019 when the moratorium also commenced.

10.36

According to the submissions of the workmen, the said writ petition being WP (L) No. 6690 of 2016 was subsequently dismissed by Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 19.08.2019 following which no other application was filed before the Labour, Employment and Training Department, Jharkhand state. The workmen contend that considering the same, its default under section 25(O) has become absolute after one year and the workmen still being the employees of the Corporate Debtor are entitled to an amount till their superannuation.

10.37

In order to adjudicate upon this issue, it becomes pertinent to refer to section 25(O) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which is reproduced as follows:

25-O. Procedure for closing down an undertaking.—(1) An employer who intends to close down an undertaking of an industrial establishment

to which this Chapter applies shall, in the prescribed manner, apply, for prior permission at least ninety days before the date on which the intended closure is to become effective, to the appropriate Government, stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking and a copy of such application shall also be served simultaneously on the representatives of the workmen in the prescribed manner: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to an undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or for other construction work.

(2)

Where an application for permission has been made under subsection (1), the appropriate Government, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen and the persons interested in such closure may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the general public and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refused to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.

(3)

Where an application has been made under sub-section (1) and the appropriate Government does not communicate the order granting or refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date on which such application is made, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said period of sixty days.

(4)

An order of the appropriate Government granting or refusing to grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), be final and binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order.

(5)

The appropriate Government may, either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (2) or refer the matter to a Tribunal for adjudication: Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference.

(6)

Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made within the period specified therein, or where the permission for closurehas been refused, the closure of the undertaking shall be deemed to be illegal from the date of closure and the workmen shall be entitled to allthe benefits under any law for the time being in force as if the undertaking had not been closed down.

(7)

Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions ofthis section, the appropriate Government may, if it is satisfied that owingto such exceptional circumstances as accident in the undertaking ordeath of the employer or the like it is necessary so to do, by order, directthat the provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply in relation to suchundertaking for such period as may be specified in the order.

(8)

Where an undertaking is permitted to be closed down under subsection(2) or where permission for closure is deemed to be granted under sub-section (3), every workman who is employed in that undertaking immediately before the date of application for permission under this section, shall be entitled to receive compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.]”

10.38

It is further relevant to refer to the order dated 19.08.2019 passed by the Hon’ble High Court, the relevant portion of which is reproduced hereinafter:

“From perusal of 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it is evident that life of such refusal order is only one year. Thus, this order has lost its force by efflux of time framed by statute itself. Be that as it may, since the impugned order has become stale or lost his life due to passage of statutory period and as such, present writ petition has become infructuous and accordingly, the same is, hereby, dismissed.”

10.39

It is clear from the aforesaid provision and the order dated 19.08.2019 that once issued, the order of the government refusing the closure of the undertaking becomes binding on all the parties and remains in force for one year from the date of such order.

10.40

In the instant matter, since the state government’s order dated 27.10.2016 lost its force due to efflux of time, a follow-up for closure was required to be made by the Corporate Debtor, which as per records, has not been made. Further, there is no record regarding the retrenchment of the workmen afterwards. As such, from legal point of view, the workmen continue to be employed by the Corporate Debtor till date and ought to be paid their salaries and other benefits accordingly.

10.41

Considering the same, the salary along with the ancillary benefits due to them will need to divided into two parts i.e salary dues for pre-CIRP period and salary dues pertaining to the CIRP period. For pre-CIRP period (October 2016 to 05.04.2019), the claim was made to the RP in Form D, as required. However, salaries payable to workmen for the CIRP period, if at all, will be covered under CIRP costs. As such, the calculation of salary dues by the present RP in respect of the workmen is as per law.

10.42

It is to be noted that the salary which would accrue to the workmen for the CIRP period are uncrystallised future/contingent liabilities as on the CIRP commencement date and a claim regarding the same cannot be admitted beforehand by the RP i.e prior to constitution of CoC. The same therefore, shall have no bearing on the voting shares of CoC members. As such, the constitution of CoC on the basis of the pending dues till the time the CIRP started was done as per law by the RP.

10.43

Further, regarding the inclusion of salaries due for the CIRP period, it becomes relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar Jain and Ors. v. Sundaresh Bhatt and Ors.25 wherein the Apex Court has held that:

“It cannot be disputed that as per Section 5(13) of the IB Code, “insolvency resolution process costs” shall include any costs incurred by the resolution professional in running the business of the corporate debtor as a going concern. It is also true that Section 20 of the IB Code mandates that the interim resolution professional/resolution professional is to manage the operations of the corporate debtor as a going concern and in case during the CIRP the corporate debtor was a going concern, the wages/salaries of such workmen/employees who actually worked, shall be included in the CIRP costs and in case of liquidation of the corporate debtor, dues towards the wages and salaries of such workmen/employees who actually worked when the corporate debtor was a going concern during the CIRP, being a part of the CIRP costs are entitled to have the first priority and they have to be paid in full first as per Section 53(1)(a) of the IB Code. Therefore, while considering the claims of the concerned workmen/employees towards the wages/salaries payable during CIRP, first of all it has to be established and proved that during CIRP, the corporate debtor was a going concern and that the concerned workmen/employees actually worked while the corporate debtor was a going concern during the CIRP. The wages and salaries of all other workmen/employees of the Corporate Debtor during the CIRP who actually have not worked and/or performed their duties when the Corporate Debtor was a going concern, shall not be included automatically in the CIRP costs. Only with respect to those workmen/employees who actually worked during CIRP when the Corporate Debtor was a going concern, their wages/salaries are to be included in the CIRP costs and they shall have the first priority over all other dues as per Section 53(1)(a) of the IB Code. Any other dues towards wages and salaries of the employees/workmen of the corporate debtor shall have to be governed by Section 53(1)(b) and Section 53(1)(c) of the IB Code. Any other interpretation would lead to absurd consequences and violate the scheme of Section 53 r/w Section 5(13) of the IB Code. If any other interpretation, more particularly, the interpretation canvassed on behalf of the appellants is accepted, in that case, the wages/salaries of those workmen/employees who had not worked at all during CIRP shall have to be treated and/or included in the CIRP costs, which cannot be the intention of the legislature.” (Para 9)

“In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, it is held as under: i) that the wages/salaries of the workmen/employees of the Corporate Debtor for the period during CIRP can be included in the CIRP costs provided it is established and proved that the Interim Resolution Professional/Resolution Professional managed the operations of the corporate debtor as a going concern during the CIRP and that the concerned workmen/employees of the corporate debtor actually worked during the CIRP and in such an eventuality, the wages/salaries of those workmen/employees who actually worked during the CIRP period when the resolution professional managed the operations of the corporate debtor as a going concern, shall be paid treating it and/or considering it as part of CIRP costs and the same shall be payable in full first as per Section 53(1)(a) of the IB Code;” (Para 14)

10.44

It has been admitted by both parties on several occasions that the Corporate Debtor became inoperative since October 2016 and has remained so throughout the CIRP period. As such, the possibility of all the workmen working during the CIRP period does not arise and only the salary dues of working workmen, if any, would be included in the CIRP Costs. It is seen in Item No. 9 of the Minutes of 9th CoC Meeting26, that unpaid wages for the CIRP period to the tune of Rs. 3,41, 85,408/-have been included in CIRP Costs.

10.45

It also becomes pertinent to refer to the recent decision of Hon’ble NCLAT in Era Labourer Union of Sidcul, Pant Nagar, through its secretary vs. Apex Builsys Ltd.27, wherein the Appellate Authority has held as follows:

“It is clear that the closure/lockout notice which was issued on 31.07.2017 much prior to initiation of the CIRP and the closure and lockout notice was nothing to do with the CIRP process. Challenge to the closure and lockout notice cannot be raised before the Adjudicating Authority who is not competent to adjudicate the said issue which arises out of the provision of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Hence, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal is of the view that the Adjudicating Authority did not commit any error in not entertaining the challenge to the closure notice dated 31.07.2017”.( Para 19)

“…..The non-acceptance of the claim by the liquidator was challenged before the Adjudicating Authority and the Adjudicating Authority while deciding the application of the Appellant was fully entitled to give its reason to not accept the claim of the Appellant. There is no dispute that after the closure dated 31.07.2017, Pant Nagar unit was closed. Hence, no illegality has been committed by the Adjudicating Authority in not accepting any claim of salary and bonus subsequent to 31.07.2017.” (Para 20)

“ In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the view that no error has been committed by the Adjudicating Authority in rejecting the IA No. 2545 of 2021 filed by the Appellant where Appellant has sought to challenge the closure dated 31.07.2017 and transfer order dated 20.06.2017. Insofar as the claims of the Appellant, the liquidator has accepted the claim. Non-verification of the claim subsequent to 31.07.2017 when the Pant Nagar factory remain closed cannot be interfered with by this Tribunal in the present Appeal. We, thus, do not find any merit in the Appeal. The Appeal is dismissed.” (Para 29)

10.46

Keeping in line with the aforementioned decision, we are of the opinion that the claims admitted by the present RP in respect of the workmen are correct and as per law.

Non-Obstante Clause of IBC and Industrial Dispute Act, 1947:

10.47

It is claimed by the workmen that since as per the Meenakshi Mills case28, Chapter VB of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 was inserted to give effect to directive principles of state, the statute of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 will supersede IBC 2016. In Meenakshi Mills case (supra), it was held that any restriction so imposed which has the effect of promoting or effectuating a directive principle can be presumed to be reasonable restriction in public interest.

10.48

In the instant, it is seen that the Corporate Debtor’s application for closure of the company was refused by the state government vide order dated 27.10.2016. However, the said order had lost effect after one year as given in the statute itself. The same has been confirmed by the Hon’ble High Court, Jharkhand. The steps taken by the RP in admitting part of the workmen’s claims is as per IBC and at the same time not inconsistent with the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. There is no conflict between the two statutes in the instant matter.

10.49

In regard to ‘conflict’ between two ‘special statutes’, we find it relevant to refer to the decision of the National Company Law Apellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in Mr. P. Eswaramoorthy Liquidator of M/s. Senthil Papers and Boards Private Limited vs. The Deputy Commissioner ofIncome Tax (Benami Prohibition)29 wherein the following was held:

“58.

If one finds, `two or more enactments', operating in the same field and each containing a `Non-obstante Clause', stating that its provisions will have effect `not-withstanding anything inconsistent' therewith, contained in any other `Law', for the time being in force', then, one is to see the `Purpose' and `Policy', underlying `two enactments', and `language', used in them.

59.

A `Non-obstante Clause', may be used as a `Legislative Device', to `Modify', the `ambit' of `provision' or `Law', mentioned in `Non- obstante Clause'.

60.

Ordinarily, there is a `Close Approximity', between the `Non-obstante Clause', and `enacting part' of the `Section', and `Non-obstante Clause', may throw some light, as to the `Scope' and `Ambit' of `enacting part', in case of its `ambiguity' (vide Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Comp. App (AT) (CH) (INS.) No. 188 of 2022 & Comp. App (AT) (CH) (INS.) No. 189 of2022 Bose & Anr., reported in AIR 1952 SC Page 369, Page 390), but, when `enacting part', is cleared its `Scope', cannot be cutdown or `enlarged', by `resort' to `Non-obstante Clause'.

61.

A `Conflict', between the `two Special Acts', which both contain `not-withstanding clauses', can also be `resolved', bylooking, which is more `special', than the `other', in addition to the consideration that the `Conflict', arose because of a`provision' added later in the `act', which is more `special'.

10.50

Further, the Apex Court in K Kishan vs. M/S Vijay Nirman Company Pvt. Ltd30 has held that:

“22)

We also accept Mr. Banerji’s submission that the Appellate Tribunal was in error in referring to Section 238 of the Code. Section 238 of the Code would apply in case there is an inconsistency between the Code and the Arbitration Act in the present case. We see no such inconsistency [….].”

10.51

Both the statutes operate in different spheres and the overlap between the same has not resulted in any conflict between the two, the question of one overriding the other does not arise. The RP via his actions has in no way interfered with any remedy that may be available to the workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for which they may approach the appropriate Authority.

On leasehold right of the Corporate Debtor over the 350 acre of land:

10.52

The workmen in I.A. 167/KB/2020 have claimed that the entire stretch of 350 acres of land which formed the subject matter of the government grant under Government Grants Act, 1895 via Deed of Conveyance 31 dated 18.03.1969 belongs to the Corporate Debtor herein and that the RP has erroneously declared only 50 acres of land in favour of Corporate Debtor, thereby mis-appropriating 300 acres of land to the gross prejudice of the Corporate Debtor and the workmen.

10.53

In this regard, the first document to be relied on is the aforesaid deed of conveyance dated 18.03.1969 which makes it clear that the government grant was given to Tata Steel Ltd.(then known as TATA Iron and Steel Company Limited) for setting up of (i) Alloy Tool and Special Steel Plant (i) Roll Foundry Project. As such the principal leasehold agreement was executed in favour of Tata Steel Ltd. and not the Corporate Debtor herein.

10.54

Next is the sub-lease agreement32 dated 07.10.1969 which was executed between the Corporate Debtor (then known as Tata Yodogawa Ltd.) herein and Tata Steel Ltd. whereby the Corporate Debtor was given exclusive possession of 50 Acre out of the aforesaid 350 Acres land for industrial purposes. The said sub-lease agreement makes it further clear that the sub-lease of the Corporate Debtor was limited to 50 Acres only.

10.55

It is seen that the workmen have relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its order in (2015) 15 SCC 55, specifically paragraphs 7 and 43. Upon reading of the same, it becomes clear that the Hon’ble Apex Court while allowing the appeal, has upheld Tata Steel Limited’s lease-hold right to the 350 acre of land. Paragraph 44 therein also make it clear that the grant was given to TATA Steel Ltd. and as such the leasehold rights with respect to the entirety of 350 Acres belongs to TATA Steel Ltd. the relevant portion of Paragraph 44 is reproduced hereinafter for reference:

“ (ii) The land in dispute was transferred to the Appellant for a specific purpose under GRANT-I. The Appellant did in fact establish the industry for the establishment of which the GRANT-I was made and has been successfully running the industry for the last about 40 years (approximately). For the said purpose, the Appellant utilised a substantial portion of the land covered by the GRANT and therefore, it cannot be said that the Appellant did not utilise the land for the purpose specified under the GRANT-I. Such a GRANT was made for a consideration (Salami of Rs. 24,48,670/-) apart from an annual rent for the land which the Appellant has admittedly been paying.”

10.56

From the aforesaid documents, it is abundantly clear that only 50 Acre of land over which the Corporate Debtor enjoys leasehold rights shall form part of its assets and the claim of the workmen regarding the leasehold - rights of the remaining 300 acres of land belonging to the Corporate Debtor is without any legal footing.

Compliance of the provisions of the Code

10.57

The workmen have claimed that the erstwhile RP as well as the present RP have failed to comply with several provisions of the Code including sections including sections 17, 18(1), 20, 22, 25, 28 and 29. According to the workmen, the mandatory actions under the aforesaid sections form the pre-requisites to the start of CIRP under section 23 and due to the non-compliance of the same, the CIRP under section 23 has not been initiated at all. The workmen in this regard have placed reliance on the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Arcelor Mittal vs. Satish Kumar Gupta33.

10.58

As per the workmen’s claims, the Resolution Professional failed to seize control of the Corporate Debtor's assets and properties, leaving Tata Steel Ltd. in control of the entire 350 acres of land, the buildings, plant and machinery, residential colonies, the registered office, and all other movable and immovable assets. This is in violation of Sections 17 (1) and (2), 18 (1) (a) (iii), (d) and (f), 20 (1), 25 (2) (a) (c) (e) (g), and 29 of the Code read with relevant regulations.

10.59

It has been contended that the Resolution Professional has also failed to prepare an information memorandum under section 18 of the Code and further to commence the Insolvency Resolution Process violating the mandate of 18 (I) (a), (b), (c), 20 (2) (c) of the Code.

10.60

At this juncture it is useful to refer to section 23 of the Code which is reproduced hereinafter:

23. Resolution professional to conduct corporate insolvency resolution

process. - (1) Subject to section 27, the resolution professional shall conduct the entire corporate insolvency resolution process and manage the operations of the corporate debtor during the corporate insolvency resolution process period:

[Provided that the resolution professional shall continue to manage the operations of the corporate debtor after the expiry of the corporate insolvency resolution process period, until an order approving the resolution plan under sub-section (1) of section 31 or appointing a liquidator under section 34 is passed by the Adjudicating Authority.]

(2)

The resolution professional shall exercise powers and perform duties as are vested or conferred on the interim resolution professional under this Chapter.

(3)

In case of any appointment of a resolution professional under sub-sections (4) of section 22, the interim resolution professional shall provide all the information, documents and records pertaining to the corporate debtor in his possession and knowledge to the resolution professional.

10.61

Further, the relevant portion of Arcelor Mittal (supra) has been reproduced hereinafter:

“73.

After admission of the application under Section 7 by the Adjudicating Authority, the scheme of the Code is as follows:

(i)

Under Sections 13 to 15, a moratorium is declared; a public announcement of the initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process and call for submission of claims is made; and an Interim Resolution Professional is to be appointed under Section 16 of the Code. This action is to be completed by the Adjudicating Authority within a period of 14 days from the insolvency commencement date, i.e., the date of admission of the application under Section 7 by the Adjudicating Authority.

(ii)

Under Section 17, the corporate debtor’s affairs are to be managed by the Interim Resolution Professional so appointed, and the Board of Directors of the corporate debtor shall stand superseded. The officers and managers of the corporate debtor are now to report to the Interim Resolution Professional, who has the authority to act on behalf of the corporate debtor.

(iii)

Under Section 18(1), some of the important duties of this Interim Resolution Professional are set out, which are to collect all information relating to the financial position of the corporate debtor and, most importantly, to constitute a Committee of Creditors. That this has to be done at the very earliest, is clear from the scheme of the corporate insolvency resolution process which, as has been stated earlier, cannot exceed the maximum period of 270 days from the date of admission of the financial creditors’ application.

(iv)

Under Section 21, the Interim Resolution Professional is to constitute this Committee of Creditors after collating all claims received against the corporate debtor and after determination of the financial position of the corporate debtor, both of which need to be done at the very earliest. This Committee of Creditors is to comprise of financial creditors of the corporate debtor. All decisions of this Committee of Creditors are to be taken by a majority vote of not less than 51% of the voting share of each financial creditor.

(v)

Under Section 22, the first meeting of the Committee of Creditors is to be held within 7 days of its constitution in order to appoint a Resolution Professional. The Committee of Creditors either continues the Interim Resolution Professional or replaces the Interim Resolution Professional by a majority vote of 66%. The application to replace the Interim Resolution Professional is then to be sent to the Adjudicating Authority, who is to forward the same to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (hereinafter referred to as the “IBBI”) for confirmation. Upon such confirmation, the Adjudicating Authority then appoints the Resolution Professional. In case the IBBI does not confirm the name of the proposed Resolution Professional within 10 days of receipt of the same, the Adjudicating Authority is then to direct the Interim Resolution Professional to continue to function as the Resolution Professional until such time as the IBBI confirms the appointment of the Resolution Professional.

(vi)

It is this Resolution Professional who is then to conduct the corporate insolvency resolution process, which really begins at this stage (see Section 23). Section 25 then lays down some of the duties of this Resolution Professional, which are to continue the business operations of the corporate debtor, subject to the prior approval of the Committee of Creditors over the matters stated in Section 28. One of the important duties of the Resolution Professional under Section 25 is to invite prospective resolution applicants to submit resolution plans.

(vii)

Under Section 29, the Resolution Professional is to prepare an information memorandum giving relevant information, as may be specified by the IBBI, to persons interested in formulating a resolution plan.

(viii)

Section 30 is an important provision in that a resolution applicant may submit a resolution plan to the Resolution Professional, who is then to examine the said plan to see that it conforms to the requirements of Section 30(2). Once this plan conforms to such requirements, the plan is then to be presented to the Committee of Creditors for its approval under Section 30(3). This can then be approved by the Committee of Creditors by a vote of not less than 66% under sub-section (4). What is important to note is that the Committee of Creditors shall not approve a resolution plan where the resolution applicant is ineligible under Section 29A, and may require the Resolution Professional to invite a fresh resolution plan where no other resolution plan is available. Once approved by the Committee of Creditors, the resolution plan is to be submitted to the Adjudicating Authority under Section 31 of the Code. It is at this stage that a judicial mind is applied by the Adjudicating Authority to the resolution plan so submitted, who then, after being satisfied that the plan meets (or does not meet) the requirements mentioned in Section 30, may either approve or reject such plan.

(ix)

An appeal from an order approving such plan is only on the limited grounds laid down in Section 61(3). However, an appeal from an order rejecting a resolution plan would also lie under Section 61.

(x)

As has been stated hereinbefore, the liquidation process gets initiated under Section 33 if, (1) either no resolution plan is submitted within the time specified under Section 12, or a resolution plan has been rejected by the Adjudicating Authority; (2) where the Resolution Professional, before confirmation of the resolution plan, intimates the Adjudicating Authority of the decision of the Committee of Creditors to liquidate the corporate debtor; or (3) where the resolution plan approved by the Adjudicating Authority is contravened by the concerned corporate debtor. Any person other than the corporate debtor whose interests are prejudicially affected by such contravention may apply to the Adjudicating Authority, who may then pass a liquidation order on such application.”

10.62

In Arcelor Mittal (supra), the Apex Court has stated that the Resolution Professional, upon to his/her appointment in the first CoC Meeting under section 22, conducts the CIRP then on, as per section 23 of the Code. Till that point in time, the IRP conducts its preliminary duties under sections 13 to 22. Be that as it may, in order to make the CIRP effective the steps mentioned under sections 13 to 22 become necessary to be carried out.

10.63

Coming to the specific claims of the workmen regarding Tata Steel Ltd.’s control of the entire 350 acres of land, it is clear at this point that TATA Steel Limited, being the principal lessee was entitled to the possession and usage of the 350 acres of land barring the 50 acres over which the Corporate Debtor has exclusive possession and leasehold rights. As such, the RP, in allowing so, has not contravened the provisions of Sections 17 (1) and (2), 18 (1) (a) (iii), (d) and (f), 20 (1), 25 (2) (a) (c) (e) (g) as alleged by the workmen.

10.64

Lastly, regarding the preparation of the information memorandum, it is seen that the Resolution Professional, in the 7th CoC Meeting 34 held on 11.11.2019 had mentioned to the CoC members that since upon his appointment, the present RP had not received any additional information regarding the same, the RP was going to continue with the IM prepared by the previous RP. It is mentioned therein that the CoC members had received the IM of the Corporate Debtor. The said 7th CoC meeting was also attended by Mr. A.K. Shrivastava as a representative on behalf of the workmen.

10.65

In light of the said minutes of the 7th CoC Meeting, it is clear that IM had been prepared by the RP. As such, the allegations regarding non-compliances of the provisions of the Code are unsustainable.

11.

In view of the aforesaid findings and facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the CoC has been correctly constituted and the process of CIRP has also been duly conducted as per law. In result we conclude that the prayers sought by the Applicants in the present applications cannot be granted and accordingly, I.A. 33/KB/2020, I.A.69/KB/2020 and I.A. 167/KB/2020 are hereby rejected.

12.

The Registry is directed to email copies of the order forthwith to the learned Counsel on record and the Liquidator for information.

13.

Certified copies of this order may be issued, if applied for, upon compliance of all requisite formalities.

14.

Files be consigned to the record.

Footnotes

  1. 1.We are considering this I.A. as numbered in the e-filing portal, the hardcopy of the same has been numbered as I.A. 33/KB/2020
  2. 3.(2019) 2 SCC 1
  3. 4.Annexure B to I.A.
  4. 5.Annexure C to I.A. (IBC) 167/KB/2020
  5. 6.Annexure D to I.A. (IBC) 167/KB/2020
  6. 7.Annexure C to the Reply Affidavit in I.A. (IBC) 33/KB/2020
  7. 8.Annexure D to the Reply Affidavit in I.A. (IBC) 33/KB/2020
  8. 9.Annexure E to the Reply Affidavit in I.A. (IBC) 33/KB/2020
  9. 10.Annexure A to the reply to I.A. (IBC) 167/KB/2020
  10. 11.Annexure B to I.A.
  11. 12.Annexure D to the Reply in I.A. (IBC) 33/KB/2020, Pages
  12. 13.Annexure P to Reply in I.A. 69/KB/2020
  13. 14.Annexure E to the Reply in I.A. (IBC) 33/KB/2020, Page no 79.
  14. 15.Civil Appeal No.7235 Of 2009. Decided on 05.01.2021
  15. 16.2023 SCC OnLine SC 663
  16. 17.Annexure C to the I.A. 69/KB/2020, Page 51
  17. 18.Annexure B to I.A.
  18. 19.Annexure G to the Reply in I.A. (IBC) 33/KB/2020.
  19. 20.Annexure H to the Reply in I.A. (IBC) 33/KB/2020
  20. 21.Annexure J to the Reply in I.A. (IBC) 33/KB/2020
  21. 22.Page 125 to the Reply in I.A. (IBC) 33/KB/2020
  22. 23.Annexure L to the Reply in I.A. (IBC) 33/KB/2020
  23. 25.(2022) ibclaw.in 23 SC
  24. 26.Page 302 of the I.A.69/KB/2020
  25. 27.(2024) ibclaw.in 599 NCLAT
  26. 28.(1992) 3 SCC 336
  27. 29.
  28. 30.CIVIL APPEAL NO. 21824 OF 2017
  29. 31.Annexure C to I.A. (IBC) 167/KB/2020
  30. 32.Annexure B to IVN. P. 2/KB/2021
  31. 33.(2019) 2 SCC 1
  32. 34.Page 130 of the Reply in I.A. (IBC) 69/KB/2020