Suresh Nand Juyal (dead) through LRs and Another vs State of U.P. and Another

Ravi S. Dhavan and A.B. Srivastava, JJ.—Messrs. Suresha Nand Juyal and Mahesha Nand Juyal. both sons of Madhwa Nand Juyal, filed the present writ petition challenging the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the State of Uttar Pradesh for the land which was to be acquired for the benefit of the Respondent No. 2 for the purposes of a store house and a godown. The two Petitioners otherwise brothers were Joint holders of the land in question. The Petitioner No. 1 had retired from the army on a monthly pension of Rs. 279 and was an ex-military personnel. During the pendency of the writ petition, he died. The substitution of his heirs has been permitted

This is a case which in the overall circumstances, shows the misutilisation of sovereign powers by the State of Uttar Pradesh in attempting to wrest from a citizen from the back door what could not be received on an entry from the front door. The Respondent No. 2, on record, was a lessee of the Petitioners. It is a statutory body. The lease was reduced to a document, a copy of which is appended as Annexure 1. It is dated 15 December, 1978. The lease initially, was for a period of five years and there was an option to renew it further for another term. It was extended for another term and consideration in pursuance of the lease as rent lay in deposit upto October, 1988 with the Central Office of this Respondent at Dehradun and this is witnessed by the Annexure-RA-1.

Thus, there is no issue on record that the Respondent No. 2 was the tenant of the Petitioners. Also not in issue is the fact that of the very premises which the Respondents were in occupation as tenants, they resorted to acquiring the property when a notification dated 25 August, 1987 was issued exercising powers under Sections 6, 9 and 17(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, pursuant to the notification u/s 4 of the Act, dated 7 May, 1986 by taking recourse to emergency provisions for the acquisition of the very land of which the Petitioners were the owners and the Respondents lessees. Thus, on these two basic facts, there is no controversy that the land which was subjected to acquisition proceedings by the Respondents was the very land where the Respondent No. 2 had the status of a lessee.

The Respondents made a request that the lease be extended. The Petitioners did not agree to the proposal. As this inevitably meant that the Respondent No. 2 would have to unwind its occupation from the premises of the Petitioners and the lease had to be determined by efflux of time upon its own clauses and conditions. The Respondents took recourse to a step by which, in effect, they intended to transpose themselves from the status of lessees to that of an owner. This matter with simple facts is an example of misutilisation of sovereign powers by the State of U.P. and that also in a rush and hurry of the nature which cannot be nor has been Justified. On the record, the fact that there was a lease between the Petitioners and the Respondents is an accepted situation. That the Respondent No. 2 had deposited rent as late as October, 1988 is also a matter of record. While the Respondent No. 2 was a tenant, any engagement and communications this Respondent had with the State of U.P. to suggest that the land of the Petitioners be acquired, was a mala fide action. On this, the record is glaring and naked. While the Respondent No. 2 was a lessee or a tenant, as the document dated 15 December, 1978, recorded this status, during the period of tenancy the notifications under Sections 4, 6, 9 and 17 of the Act were issued. And that also to acquire the property and asset of an ex-military personnel in the poverty of the meagre pension and coming from an area where men serve the nation away from their lands, because they in their environs and region are in generality poor. If this is how the properties of citizens will be extracted out of their hands where a State organisation first walks into a property as a tenant and then eyes on it to become its owner by the use of absolute and dominant powers, then this may be an exercise which may be good as long as it is under contemplation, but not a matter which a court can condone.

A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of State of Uttar Pradesh which has been affirmed by an Ahalmad in the office of Special Land Acquisition Officer, Pithoragarh. in reference to the possession, a very vague statement has been made to the effect that the record of memo of possession could not be sent to the Executive Engineer, soon after the delivery of possession on 17.12.1988. This only implies that whereas the possession may have been recorded, but in so far as giving effect to it came, the record had not seen the Central Office of the Executive Engineer at Dehradun.

The court cannot permit the State to change its status from tenants to owners by misutilising sovereign powers by either requisitioning the property or acquiring it and that also in a rush by further misusing the emergency powers which are reserved under the Act for very special purposes. As the nation steps into a new World to function in an open economy and the State itself is shedding its business ventures, as far as possible, contracts with citizens shall have to be honoured. Should the State occupy lands and houses of citizens in pursuance of a covenant and contract, then the State would have to honour its contractual obligations and not wriggle out of them by the muscle of sovereign powers, in usurping properties. The equity of a contract is to be honoured.

In these circumstances, with the facts admitted, the Issues in this writ petition are the subject matter of interpretation of land acquisition proceedings, which this Court certifies as misutilisation and abuse of sovereign powers and, thus, the order dated 17 December, 1986 and the notification dated 25 August, 1987, u/s 6, 9 ad 17(3) (appended as Annexures ''4'' and ''5'' to the writ petition) Including the notification u/s 4 of the Act, dated 7 May 1986, are quashed.

This Court, on the certiorari sought certifies that as the status of the Respondent No. 2 was always of a lessee, the possession of this Respondent stands divested from the date the lease expired and, thus, it remains with the Petitioners and upon the land acquisition proceedings being quashed, shall continue to remain with the Petitioner.

The petition is allowed with costs.