SURESH KUMAR MONGA vs Bajaj Auto Ltd.

IS the mere apprehended hazard or jeopardy to life by an automobile accident compensable in the consumer jurisdiction? Whether the computation of his monetary claim for compensation for loss and injury by the complainant alone necessarily governs the pecuniary jurisdiction of the redressal agencies under the Act? These are the somewhat unusual though significant issues arising in this complaint at the very threshold.

FOR the limited purpose of deciding the preliminary issue of pecuniary jurisdiction of the case, it is unnecessary to delve deeply into the facts or merits. It suffices to mention that the complainant purchased a Bajaj Super Scooter on 23rd of October, 1991 from M/s. Norton Motors who are stated to be the agents of the Bajaj Auto Ltd. for a sum of Rs. 16,388/- . The said vehicle was duly registered in the name of the complainant and thereafter used by him, and the core of the grievance is that the functioning of the said scooter was extremely unsatisfactory. The allegation is that the same had earlier met with a serious accident on the 18th of October, 1991 and after repairs the same was palmed of on the complainant as a brand new vehicle. It is the case that when the complainant discovered this fraud sometime in the month of April 1993, he parked the scooter at his residence and had not used it since than and by that time it had run 9124 K. Ms, according to the milometer. On the aforesaid factual foundation, a detailed claim of Rs. 8,65,163/- has been raised on a twin classification of liquidated damages and unliquidated damages, including therein Item No. 5 under the latter head which deserves notice in extenso: "Damage for daily hazard and jeopardy caused to life of complainant, wife and 2 years old daughter (from the date of purchase to the date of knowledge of sale of second hand scooter (from 23.10.91 to 15.4.93) : Rs. 5,40,000/- Inevitably the complaint has first been listed on the threshold ground of pecuniary jurisdiction.

Mr. Rajiv Raina, learned Counsel for the complainant faced with an up-hill task had sought to contend that the quantum of compensation including the afore-quoted amount of Rs. 5,40,000/- was justifiable. With considerable ability & flourish, it was submitted that the horizons of the consumer jurisdiction were ever widening and even apprehended injuries or the threat of accident occasioned by an unsatisfactory vehicle should be brought within the grant of compensation under Section 14(1) of the Act. Whilst conceding that herein no actual physical injury whatsoever has been suffered, yet the alleged mental harassment or suffering was sought to be quantified at the afore-mentioned high figure.

THE aforesaid submission brings to the fore an issue of not infrequent occurrence in the quantification of compensation awardable in the nascent consumer jurisdiction. Though by analogy the question may be covered by the principles of the measure of damages in the Law of Torts, it is obvious that as regards the compensation for loss or injury caused by the negligence of the opposite party under Section 14 of the Act, the matter is in a virgin field. It consequently, deserves examination in some depth. Perhaps as a matter of the larger approach to the question, it is best to recall that the consumer jurisdiction is essentially a summary and expeditious one. Deeply, complicated questions of fact and law which require voluminous or expert testimony to be tested in crucible of lengthy cross-examination has by authoritative precendent been now held to be beyond the pale of this field. The deeper nuances of the Law of Torts on the measure of damages may be attracted by way of analogy, but are not necessarily applicable stricto-sensu in this field. The issue herein has to be viewed in the broader and larger perspective of the reliefs gran table under Section 14 of the Act. The relevant clause(d) of Sub-section (1) of the said Section may, therefore, be first noticed in extenso: 14(1) (d): "Finding of the District Forum; (1) If, after the proceeding conducted under Section 13, the District Forum is satisfied that the goods complained against suffer from any of the defects specified in the complaint or that any of the allegations contained in the complaint about the services are proved, it shall issue an order to the opposite party directing him to do one or more of the following things, namely:- (a) to (c) XX XX XX XXX XXX XXX (d) to pay such amount as may be awarded by it as compensation to the consumer/or any loss or injury suffered by the consumer due to the negligence of the opposite party."

INEVITABLY pride of place has to be given to the language of the statute within the consumer jurisdiction. Now a plain reading of Clause (d) would indicate that on a fair construction what Parliament has intended is an actual loss, or an actual injury, factually suffered by the consumer for which alone compensation is to be granted in the event of the negligence of the opposite party being a common factor. The qualification of the amount is, therefore, to be rested on the terra-firma of foundational fact and not on the slippery and errie ground of mere mental apprehension. To virtually repeat for emphasis, the loss or injury visualised by the statute is an actual loss or injury and not merely a fortitious likelihood of a mentally apprehended injury only. Though on the language of the statute, the position appears to be crystal clear, the same result emerges, if reference is made to the analogous field of the measure of damages in the Law of Tort. There under also the damages are awardable only for actual loss occasioned by the direct and proximate result of the Tortious Act. It suffices to refer to the following authoritative statement of the law in Halsbury's Law of England, Third Edition, Volume 37 in para 204 at page 120 : "204, Causation : Only such damages are recoverable as are the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the Tortious act. The law has regard to the proximate cause. A plaintiff, on whom the burden of proving damage lies, discharge the onus if he shows that, on a balance of probabilities, the Tortious Act caused or materially contributed to the injury or damage."

One might as well stray into the American Jurisprudence on the point. Reference may be made to the following enunciation in the Corpus juris Secundum, Volume 86 at page 941: "In determining liability for a tortious injury, the law looks only to the act or omission from which the result follows in direct sequence without the intervention of a voluntary independent cause and declines to permit further investigation into the chain of events and, unless the act complained of is the proximate cause of the injury, there is no legal liability. The rule is one of universal application."

NEARER home, one may turn with particularity to compensation or damages in automobile accident governed by the Fatal Accidents Act. In AIR 1979 Punjab and Haryana at page 50 "Lachhman Singh and Others v. Gurmit Kaur and Others", the Full Bench to which one of us was a party had concluded as under : "(1) The compensation to be assessed is the pecuniary loss caused to the dependents by the death of the person concerned, and no compensation is to be assessed on any extraneous consideration like love, affection, mental agony or any such similar consideration, solatium is alien to the concept of compensation."

IN the somewhat summary jurisdiction, it seems unnecessary to over elaborate the matter. It is somewhat plain that in view of the aforesaid discussion, the issue must go against the stand taken on behalf of the complainant. On the language of the statute, on larger principle and on the weight of precedent, the answer to the question posed at the out-set has to be rendered in the negative. It is held that the mere apprehended hazard or jeopardy to life by an automobile accident is not compensable in the consumer jurisdiction under Section 14 of the Act.

Once the aforesaid conclusion is arrived at, it is obvious that the complainant's quantification of damage of daily hazard or jeopardy caused to his life and that of his wife and two years old daughter to the tune of Rs. 5,40,000/- is unsustainable. That being so, the claim would slide far below the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Commission, which is now for a sum exceeding Rs. five lacs only. Inevitably, the complaint, therefore, would not fall within the jurisdiction of this Commission and is only entertainable by a competent District Forum.

THOUGH the aforesaid finding concludes the matter against the complainant, we must in all fairness notice Mr. Raina's alternative submission that the computation of the compensation by the complainant was conclusive and must be accepted unreservedly on its face value for the purposes of jurisdiction. It was submitted on the analogy of precedent under the Court Fees Act that the plaintiffs valuation in respect of his claim would alone determine the computation of Court fee and the consequent jurisdiction of the Court. The submission aforesaid undoubtedly would bring some credit to the ingenuity of the learned Counsel for the complainant, but on closer appraisal is obviously falacious. What deserves highlighting is the fact that the questions of Court fee are wholly alien to the beneficient consumer jurisdiction, As is by now well-known, the payment of Court fees is an anathema in this field. Once that is so the considerations which govern the matter of the valuation of a claim by the plaintiff and the computation of the Court fee etc. are thus utterly irrelevant within this field. Doing so, would be bringing in all the technicalities of those provisions within the consumer field, which is intended to be freed therefrom through the thin guise of interpretation. If, as it is manifest, the Court Fees Act and the Suit Valuation Act are not at all applicable to this field, all precedents under the said statutes would be equally inapplicable. It is consequently unnecessary to advert to the well known case of AIR 1958 Supreme Court 245 "S. Rm Ar, Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar" which inevitably has been followed by the Full Bench in 1971 Punjab Law Reporter 716 "Gurdial Singh v. Balwinder Singh and Others".

IN the somewhat nascent consumer jurisdiction, it is the repeated experience of the redressal agencies that because of the absence of any Court fees, the litigants inflate and enhance their claim of compensation to suit the jurisdiction, which they may choose to avail. If it were once to be held that the complainant's evaluation of his monetary claim of compensation is conclusive in the consumer jurisdiction, it can work to sizeable public mischief. Herein, because of the absence of any Court fee, it is obviously the bounden duty of the redressal agencies themselves to scrutinise the reasonableness of the monetary claim raised by the complainant. It seems unnecessary to elaborate this matter because either in express terms or by necessary implication, the National Commission in a series of judgment has dis-approved of inflated claims being raised IN order to bring matters within its pecuniary jurisdiction. It would suffices to notice the latest enunciation of the rule which is the culmination of a long line of earlier precedents. IN II (1993) CPJ 230 (NC) "Gian Prakash v. M.T.N.L. & Ant." Justice V.B. Eradi, President speaking for the National Commission has in no uncertain terms observed as follows:- "We are in full agreement with the view taken by the State Commission that on the very facts in the complaint petition, the valuation of the relief claimed in the complaint that Rs. 1,02,617/- is manifestly grossly inflated and there is every reason to believe that it has been purposely done to enable the complainant to institute the case before the State Commission because of the fact that no Court fee is payable for institution of complaints preferred under the Act. The complaining consumers should not resort to this practice of inflating claims. Such a tendency has got to be strictly discouraged and what has been done by the State Commission is precisely correct. We confirm the order of the State Commission and dismiss this appeal. No costs."

It is plain that the aforesaid ratio covers the matter on all fours. In view of the above, the answer to the second question is rendered in the negative. It is held that the computation of his monetary claim for compensation of loss and injury by the complainant alone does not conclusively govern the pecuniary jurisdiction of the redressal agencies under the Act. In the wake of the aforesaid conclusion, the alternative submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant must fail.

TO finally conclude, this complaint is plainly not within the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Commission and is hereby directed to be returned for presentation to the competent District Forum or to seek any other relief as the complainant may be advised. Complaint rejected.