Suresh and Another vs UOI and Another

S. Ravindra Bhat, J.—Issue Rule. Ms. Rachna Srivastava, learned counsel waives notice of Rule. With consent of counsel for parties, the matter was heard for disposal. In these proceedings, the claim of the petitioners is that their request of allotment of alternative site should be considered and a consequential order that they should be given one such site/plot. The petitioners were owners to the extent of 3/16 share of a land measuring 12-7 bighas which was acquired by a Notification under the Land Acquisition Act in 1984. The Award in this case was made on 19.9.1986. The petitioners'' share of the compensation was assessed at Rs. 3454.43 each which was disbursed subsequently. It is contended that in furtherance of a public notice dated 30.11.1993, the petitioners applied for allotment of an alternative site in view of the respondents'' policies on 8.3.1986. It is contended that such applications were to be made on or before 12.11.1996; the petitioners, therefore, allegedly applied within time.

The respondents replied to the petitioners sometime in 2000 and contend that their applications were made belatedly. They adverted to an application dated 21.4.1998 and stated that since the petitioners applied long after the designated date and period, their application could not be considered.

Learned counsel for the petitioners, in addition to placing reliance on the averments in the pleadings also submitted that the respondents acted arbitrarily since the application was sent by registered post on 8.3.1996. It was contended that the respondents'' rejection is based on false premises and it did not see the light of the day since the petitioners applied under the Right to Information Act in 2005. After receipt of such applications, he was permitted inspection of the relevant records and supplied with copies of the respondents'' letters. Learned counsel contended that in these circumstances, the respondents, without considering the merits of the application for alternative plot could not have rejected it merely on the ground of delay.

Ms. Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the pleadings in counter affidavit. It was contended that according to the Notification, desirous applicants wanting allotment of site were to apply within the time stipulated. The Notification pertained to land acquired upto 31.12.1988. The, petitioners should have applied well before the date stipulated i.e. 12.11.1996. On the contrary, they chose to apply in April 1998. Reliance was placed upon column 12 of the application dated 16.4.1998 to say that the petitioners applied for the first time and had not applied earlier. It was contended that this gave a lie to the petitioners'' assertion of having applied within the time on 8.3.1996.

The right to apply for an alternative plot, it has been held, is not a vested right; it arises from the extent of policies and rules. A Full Bench of this Court in Ramanand Vs. Union of India and Others, held that with the advent of the DDA (Disposal of Nazul Land) Nazul Rules, 1981, applications are to be considered under Rule 6 read with Section 22 of the Delhi Development Act, on the specific heads prescribed. In this case, the acquisition was made in 1984. Nevertheless, having regard to the previous understanding, the authorities deemed it appropriate to extend eligibility of a class of land owners whose lands were acquired under the Act, on or before 31.12.1988 for alternative plots. The dispute here is not as to the petitioners'' eligibility; it is whether they applied within the time prescribed. The compensation in the petitioners case was assessed on 13.11.1985. The have urged that the application for alternative site was made on 8.3.1996, which is contested. The respondents assert, with equal vehemence that the application was actually made in 1998.

Having regard to the nature of the claim, it is evident that the claim made is a tenuous one. A careful consideration of the application admittedly made on 16.4.1998 would show that it was made for the first time. The petitioners categorically replied to the query in column 12 (as to whether they have applied earlier) in the negative. In these circumstances, on the evidence available, the reasonable conclusion to be inferred is that the petitioners applied for the first time on 16.4.1998. Since they did not apply within time, they cannot now complain of illegality. Being aware of time-limits expressly set for consideration of claims for benefits under the States'' policies, the petitioners cannot complain about the consequence of their indolence.

Having regard to the tenuous nature of the right, as it depends on the policy of the executive agency at the relevant time, I am of the opinion that the stand projected by the respondents in this case cannot be termed arbitrary or unreasonable. Another aspect of the matter is that the copies of the documents available and indeed filed by the petitioners disclose that the respondents had intimated them about rejection of their application on 29.7.1999. The petitioner''s explanation that such a letter was supplied much later in 2005, in my opinion, is not credulous. They took no steps to approach the Court on an earlier occasion. Therefore, these petitions are also belated. In view of the above findings, the petitions have to fail. They are accordingly dismissed without any costs.