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Judgment
K. V. Jayakumar, J.
This writ petition is preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
This writ petition is instituted seeking to quash Ext.P11 order of the Commissioner, Malabar Devaswom Board, dated 08.09.2026. The petitioners state that they are the members of the Trustee Board of Kadakkara Sree Dharmasastha Temple. According to them, they were appointed as Non-hereditary trustees as per the order of the 5th respondent, Assistant Commissioner, dated 03.03.2026 for a period of two years vide Ext.P2 order. Their term would expire on 03.03.2028. The petitioners further state that they took charge as Non-hereditary trustees in the said temple on 07.03.2026.
The petitioners contend that the 6th respondent, Sri. C. M. Gopinathan, the former Chairman of the Trustee Board, has raised complaints against their appointments on various grounds. According to him, the 1st petitioner is a businessman and the others are active politicians and therefore disqualified for appointment to the post of non-hereditary trustees. The said Gopinathan has also preferred a writ petition before this Court as W.P.(C) No.8369/2026, seeking a direction not to appoint the petitioners as non-hereditary trustees. Later, the said writ petition was closed in view of the issuance of Ext.P2 order.
The 6th respondent again approached this Court and preferred W.P.(C) No.9371/2026 challenging Ext.P2 order. Initially, a stay was granted by this Court. However, by order dated 10.04.2026 (Ext.P3), this Court has vacated the interim stay granted. The petitioners further submitted that, during the pendency of the second writ petition, the 6th respondent approached the Commissioner and preferred a revision petition as R.P. No.11/2026 challenging Ext.P2 order. The petitioners have placed on record a true copy of the revision petition as Ext.P4. W.P.(C) No.9371/2026 was disposed of by this Court by judgment dated 01.06.2026 with a direction to the Commissioner to take up the revision petition and to pass appropriate orders within a period of two months. Ext.P5 is a copy of the said judgment.
Before the Commissioner, the petitioners have filed written submissions. They have also submitted Ext.P6, a true copy of the audit report pertaining to the year 2024-2025. The petitioners contend that in Ext.P6 report, the Audit Department had only called for objections/explanations from the petitioners. The petitioners have filed their objections to the report before the Commissioner. Ext.P7 is the true copy of the objections filed by the petitioners.
The 6th respondent has filed Ext.P8 argument note before the Commissioner. As directed by the Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner has filed Ext.P9 report before the Commissioner with regard to the veracity of the allegations levelled against the petitioners. The Commissioner has considered the matter in detail and found that the allegations of political allegiance of the petitioners are incorrect. However, the Commissioner found that the appointment of the petitioners as non-hereditary trustees in the temple is irregular.
It is in the afore context, the petitioners approached this Court seeking the following relief:
“(i)To issue a Writ of certiorari or any other appropriate order or direction calling for the records leading to Exhibit P11 and quash the same;
We have heard the submissions of Sri. K. Mohanakannan, the learned counsel for the petitioners, and Smt. R. Ranjanie, the learned Standing Counsel for the Malabar Devaswom Board.
Sri. K. Mohanakannan, the learned counsel for the petitioners, would submit that Ext.P11 order was issued by the Commissioner in total disregard of Ext.P1 notification. He submitted that the petitioners are not active politicians, as contended by the 6th respondent.
The learned counsel further submitted that no surcharge or recovery proceedings were initiated against the petitioners under the provisions of the Kerala Local Fund Audit Act, 1994. Therefore, they cannot be mulcted with the liability in respect of the audit for the year 2024-2025 merely because of the fact that the petitioners were the former members of the Temple Festival Committee. The learned counsel pointed out that in Ext.P6 audit report, two months' time was granted for filing objections. The said time would expire on 07.09.2026. Before the finalisation of the audit and considering the allegations made in Ext.P6 audit report dated 07.07.2026, the Commissioner has passed Ext.P11 order. The learned counsel would then point out that the Commissioner, being the revisional authority, cannot reappraise the evidence.
In response, Smt. R. Ranjanie, the learned Standing Counsel for the Malabar Devaswom Board, has raised a preliminary objection that the remedy available to the petitioners is a revision before the Government under Section 99 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (for short, ‘HR & CE Act’). The learned Standing Counsel pointed out that the writ petition is premature as the petitioners approached this Court without exhausting the available alternative and efficacious remedy.
Before further discussion, it is useful to extract Section 99 of the HR & CE Act, which reads thus:
Section 99. Power of State Government to call for records and
pass orders.- (1). The State Government may call for and examine the record of the Board or Commissioner or any Deputy or Assistant Commissioner, or any Area Committee or of any trustee in respect of any proceeding, not being a proceeding in respect of which a suit or an appeal to a Court is provided by this Act, to satisfy themselves as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein; and, if, in any case, it appears to the State Government that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, they may pass orders accordingly:
Provided that the State Government shall not pass any order prejudicial to any party unless he has had a reasonable opportunity of making his representations.
(2)The State Government may stay the execution of any such decision or order, pending the exercise of their powers under sub-section (1) in respect thereof.”
Section 99 of the HR & CE Act empowers the State Government to call for and examine the record of the Board or the Commissioner or any Deputy or Assistant Commissioner or any Area Committee or of any Trustee with regard to the legality, correctness and propriety of any decision taken by those authorities.
The proviso to the said Section makes it clear that the State shall not pass any order without affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing. Subclause (2) states that the State Government may pass interim orders staying the execution of the orders challenged before it.
Admittedly, the impugned order passed by the Commissioner is a revisable order. The petitioners have approached this Court without exhausting the legal remedies available to them.
In Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P.1, the Apex Court laid down the principles to be followed by the writ Court in cases where there is an alternative remedy available. Paragraph 27 of the said case reads thus:
“ 27. The principles of law which emerge are that:
27.1.The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well.
27.2.The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person.
27.3.Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where : (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged.
27.4.An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case, though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law.
27.5.When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion.
27.6.In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.” (emphasis supplied)
In PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank2, a bench of three honourable judges of the Apex Court observed in paragraphs 29 and 30 as under:
“29.It could thus clearly be seen that the Court has carved out certain exceptions when a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution could be entertained in spite of availability of an alternative remedy. Some of them are thus:
(i)where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question;
(ii)it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure;
(iii)it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and
(iv)when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice.
30.It has, however, been clarified that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance.”
We find that the petitioners have approached this Court without exhausting the alternative remedy available to them under Section 99 of the HR & CE Act. It appears that the notice issued to the Chairman, Trustee Board, with regard to the irregularities noted in the audit has not so far been finalised by the Board.
On careful consideration of the submissions advanced, we are of the view that the relief claimed in the writ petition cannot be granted. The writ petitioners may approach the State Government and prefer a revision petition, if so advised. We direct the Malabar Devaswom Board to keep in abeyance the execution of Ext.P11 order for a period of thirty days from today so as to enable the petitioners to pursue the statutory remedy available to them.
The writ petition is disposed of with the above observation.
