Surendra Prasad vs The State Of Jharkhand

a fresh order rejecting reconsideration. The present challenge is therefore directed not merely against the original punishment in isolation but also against its continued enforcement despite the subsequent judicial findings which strike at the very substratum of the charge.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent Nos. 2 and 4, relying upon the counter affidavit, submitted that the writ petition is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed. It was contended that the departmental proceeding originated from the investigation directed by this Court in W.P.(PIL) No. 803 of 2009 and from the C.B.I. charge-sheet alleging that the petitioner had countersigned twelve fake bitumen invoices bearing the same assignment number, thereby facilitating pecuniary advantage to the contractor and corresponding loss to the State.

The respondents submitted that the petitioner failed to ensure return of the requisite number of empty bitumen drums, which according to them indicated lesser utilization of bitumen and showed his involvement in the irregular execution of the work. Resolution No. 1680 dated 26.03.2002 required the contractor to procure packed bitumen from IOC/BPCL/HPCL, and the petitioner, despite being an Assistant Engineer, countersigned the invoices without verifying their truthfulness. The bills were thereafter prepared by the Junior Engineer on the basis of such invoices and illegal payment was made to the contractor.

It was further submitted that a regular departmental proceeding under Rule 55 was conducted by the Inquiry officer, the charges were reported as proved, the enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner along with the second show-cause notice, and his reply was duly examined. Since the petitioner did not place any new fact sufficient to disprove the charges, the disciplinary authority-imposed reduction to the minimum pay of the pay scale and proportionate recovery of the Government loss. According to the respondents, the punishment is commensurate with the gravity of the proved misconduct and there was no violation of the principles of natural justice.

The respondents also relied upon the earlier dismissal of W.P.(S) No. 7453 of 2013 and submitted that criminal and departmental proceedings operate in distinct fields. Relying upon Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679, they contended that the standard of proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities, whereas the criminal charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically obliterate a finding of misconduct recorded in a departmental enquiry.

Finally, the respondents contended that the Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2016 contain no provision for reconsideration or revision of a punishment already imposed merely because the employee has subsequently been acquitted in the criminal case. On that basis, the petitioner's fresh representation was rejected by Letter No. 26(S) dated 03.01.2025, and the respondents maintain that such rejection is lawful. Findings

Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon consideration of the writ petition, counter affidavit and the documents on record, the principal controversy is whether the punishment can lawfully continue after the departmental finding was reached without proof of the foundational evidence and the criminal appellate court subsequently negated the essential ingredients of the identical allegation. The following issues arise for consideration:

In regard to the first issue, the counter affidavit states that the Inquiry officer conducted the proceeding and reported the charge as proved, but it does not answer the central allegation that no departmental witness was examined to prove the invoices, the C.B.I. documents, the alleged shortage, the petitioner's duty or the alleged loss. The mere existence of a charge-sheet or an investigation report is not substantive proof. A departmental enquiry may not be governed by the strict technical rules of the Evidence Act, but it remains a quasi-judicial proceeding and its conclusion must rest upon some evidence having a rational nexus with the charge.

In Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an inquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function and that material collected during investigation does not become evidence merely because it is placed before the inquiry officer. The contents of the documents must be proved through witnesses, particularly where the charge depends upon disputed facts, knowledge and intention. Applying the said principle, the departmental finding against the petitioner is unsustainable because the central documents and allegations were never proved by any witness capable of being cross-examined. For ready reference the relevant paragraph is quoted herein below:

The issue of examination of oral witness has been dealt repeatedly by the Hon’ble Apex Court right from the case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank [(2009) 2 SCC 570] and further reiterated in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Saroj Kumar Sinha [(2010) 2 SCC 772]. However, it has been seen in many cases that the authorities have not yet understood the importance of evidence of oral evidence. Thereafter, again in the case of Satyendra Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3325 and Jai Prakash Saini v. Managing Director, U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd. reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 505, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the importance of examining the oral witnesses to prove the documents.

The respondents rely upon the petitioner's countersignature as sufficient proof. However, the act of countersigning is admitted only as a technical endorsement following physical verification; the misconduct alleged by the department required proof that the petitioner was under a duty to authenticate the source of the invoices and knowingly facilitated a false claim. Neither component was proved in the enquiry. In the absence of a notified duty and evidence of knowledge, the conclusion of complicity is only an inference built upon another unproved inference.

The allegation regarding empty bitumen drums also cannot cure the evidentiary defect. The pleadings indicate that the contractual mechanism contemplated recovery from the contractor for non-return of drums. The respondents have not shown that any technical measurement, stock verification or accounts evidence was produced before the Inquiry officer to prove lesser consumption of bitumen or to connect such alleged shortage with the petitioner. The road work itself was reported to be in good condition and no deficiency in quality was established.

In regards to the second issue the proposition that departmental and criminal proceedings are distinct is unexceptionable. Mere acquittal does not automatically invalidate every disciplinary action. The respondents are, however, not entitled to treat this general proposition as an absolute rule divorced from the facts. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1618, held that where the charges, evidence and circumstances are identical and the criminal court, after full consideration of the prosecution evidence, finds that the charge has failed, the writ court may interfere if allowing the disciplinary finding to stand would be unjust, unfair and oppressive. Relevant paragraph is extracted hereinbelow:-

The present matter falls within the above exception. The criminal appeal concerned the very same invoices, the same contractor, the same work and the same allegation of conspiracy and wrongful payment. This Court, after examining the evidence, recorded that beyond countersigning the invoices there was no material to infer that the petitioner knew them to be forged; and further before 2008, no duty was cast upon the engineers to verify the authenticity and source of such invoices; and that conspiracy to facilitate clearance of the bills was not proved. These findings do not merely reflect a higher criminal standard of proof; rater they also negate the existence of the duty and knowledge which constitute the foundation of the departmental charge.

The respondents' reliance upon Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) is therefore incomplete. That decision recognizes the independence of the two jurisdictions, but it also recognizes the significance of an acquittal where both proceedings rest on the same factual and evidentiary foundation.

Further, in the present case, the departmental enquiry is not supported by independent evidence different from the criminal case. On the contrary, it rests upon the C.B.I. material which was neither independently proved in the enquiry; nor found sufficient to establish the petitioner's involvement in the criminal appeal.

The plea that the charges were framed under Rule 55, whereas the criminal case involved offences under the Penal Code and Prevention of Corruption Act; does not create a real factual distinction. The labels and legal consequences differ, but the factual imputation remains identical: knowing countersignature of forged invoices, facilitation of payment and conspiracy with the contractor. Once the appellate court found that knowledge, verification duty and conspiracy were not proved, the disciplinary authority could not mechanically continue the punishment without demonstrating any independent departmental evidence supporting misconduct.

In regard to the third issue, the order directing proportionate recovery is unsupported by a reasoned quantification. No evidence has been shown regarding the exact quantity of bitumen allegedly not used, the value thereof, the amount recoverable under the contract, the share of responsibility of each officer, or the causal connection between the petitioner's act and the alleged loss. Recovery from salary and pensionary benefits cannot be founded upon a generalized allegation of loss, particularly when the contractor was the party responsible for procurement and the contractual deductions were recoverable from his bills.

The second show-cause process also does not validate an enquiry otherwise based on no evidence. A delinquent employee cannot be expected to disprove charges which the department has not first established through evidence. The disciplinary authority's observation that the petitioner failed to produce a new fact merely reverses the burden but does not amount to an independent consideration of the evidentiary deficiencies pointed out in his defence.

For the aforesaid reasons, the respondents' objections based on separate standards of proof and absence of a statutory review provision cannot sustain the impugned action. The departmental finding suffers from a basic no-evidence defect, while the subsequent criminal appellate judgment directly displaces the factual assumptions of duty, knowledge and conspiracy. Allowing the punishment and recovery to continue would therefore be arbitrary, unfair and oppressive. Relief

Accordingly, in W.P.(S) No. 4395 of 2025 the Memo No. 7434 dated 28.10.2015 and in W.P.(S) No. 4521 of 2025 the Memo No. 7335 dated 23.10.2015 imposing reduction to the minimum of the pay scale and proportionate recovery, together with the enquiry report and the subsequent order contained in Letter No. 26(S) dated 03.01.2025 rejecting reconsideration, deserve to be, and, is hereby, quashed and set aside.

This Court holds that the petitioner is entitled for all consequential reliefs what has not been given to him due to the impugned order of punishment, which has been quashed in the preceding paragraphs.

Accordingly, the respondents are directed to verify the records of the case to quantify the consequential reliefs and pass necessary order and extend the same to the petitioner within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

Accordingly, both the writ petitions are allowed. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, may also stand disposed of. (Deepak Roshan, J.)