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Judgment
Order
In the present appeal, an application has been filed by appellant/applicant No. 5, who was convicted vide judgment and order dated 23.05.2023 for offence under Sections 147, 148, 323/149, 460/149 and 302/149 of the IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life, seeking permission for renewal of his passport and, consequently, a direction to the Passport Authority to renew and issue the passport.
The case of the appellant/applicant No.5 is that his passport was valid up to 29.03.2026. Prior to its expiry, an application for renewal of the passport was submitted, wherein the pendency of the present appeal was specifically disclosed. The passport could not be renewed as the Passport Authority insisted upon obtaining appropriate permission from the competent Criminal Court. Hence, the present application has been preferred.
Learned counsel for the appellant/applicant No.5 submits that the prayer is only for renewal of the passport, however for travelling abroad, permission of the competent Court would still be required. It is submitted that renewal of the passport would not impede or prejudice the proceedings pending before the Court. It is further submitted that denial of renewal of the passport amounts to violation of Article 14/21 of the Constitution of India and that the appellant/applicant No.5 is entitled to renewal of the passport.
Learned counsel appearing for the Passport Authority submits that the case of appellant/applicant No. 5 is covered by Section 6(2)(e) of the Passports Act, 1967, as the appellant was convicted under Section 302/149 of the IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life vide judgment and order dated 23.05.2023, which falls within the period of five years immediately preceding the date of his application. It is submitted that in cases falling under Section 6(2)(f) of the Passports Act, the Central Government has relaxed the rigours of the said provision subject to certain conditions one of which is obtaining permission from the competent Court before which the criminal proceedings are pending. It is submitted that the notification issued by the Central Government relaxing the rigours of the provisions of Section 6(2) (f) is not applicable in the present case. Therefore, according to learned counsel appearing for the Passport Authority, the present application is not maintainable.
Learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that since the appellant/applicant No.5 has already been convicted and the appeal is pending for the consideration, the appellant/applicant No.5 cannot be permitted to obtain a passport as the same may facilitate travel abroad, even without obtaining prior permission of the competent Court. He, therefore, prays for dismissal of the application.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.
In this regard, it would be apposite to refer to Section 6(2) (e) & (f) of the Passports Act, 1967 mentioned hereinbelow:-
“6. Refusal of passports, travel documents,
etc.—(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the passport authority shall refuse to make an endorsement for visiting any foreign country under clause(b) or clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 5 on any one or more of the following grounds, and on no other ground, name (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the passport authority shall refuse to issue a passport or travel document for visiting any foreign country under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 5 on anyone or more of the following grounds, and on no other ground, namely:—
…...(e) that the applicant has, at any time during the period of five years immediately preceding the date of his application, been convicted by a court in India for any offence involving moral turpitude and sentenced in respect thereof to imprisonment for not less than two years;
(f)that proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the applicant are pending before a criminal court in India;”
Section 6(2)(e) of Passport Act, 1967 relates to a case where the applicant has, at any time during the period of five years immediately preceding the date of the application, been convicted by a Court in India for an offence involving moral turpitude and has been sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years. In the present case, the appellant was convicted vide judgment and order dated 23.05.2023 under Section 302/149 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life, which conviction falls within the period of five years immediately preceding the date of the application.
Now, the question that arises for consideration is whether a conviction under Section 302 of the IPC would amount to a conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude. The Passport Act does not define or specify the offences that may be categorized as offences involving moral turpitude. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the nature and category of offences that would fall within the ambit of “moral turpitude” while dealing with a service-law matter in State Bank of India & Ors. v. P. Soupramaniane reported in (2019) 18 SCC 135. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereunder :-
“9.Moral Turpitude’ as defined in the Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.) is as follows:
“Moral Turpitude-The act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in the private and social duties which man owes to his follow man, or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.
“implies something immoral in itself regardless of it being punishable by law”; “restricted to the gravest offences, consisting of felonies, infamous crimes, and those that are malum in se and disclose a depraved mind.”
10.According to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, ‘Moral Turpitude’ is :
“An act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.”
11.Burton Legal Thesaurus defines ‘Moral Turpitude’ as:
“Bad faith, bad repute, corruption, defilement, delinquency, discredit, dishonor, shame, guilt, knavery, misdoing, perversion, shame, ice, wrong.”
12.There is no doubt that there is an obligation on the Management of the Bank to discontinue the services of an employee who has been convicted by a criminal court for an offence involving moral turpitude. Though every offence is a crime against the society, discontinuance from service according to the Banking Regulation Act can be only for committing an offence involving moral turpitude. Acts which disclose depravity and wickedness of character can be categorized as offences involving moral turpitude. Whether an offence involves moral turpitude or not depends upon the facts and the circumstances of the case.
13.Ordinarily, the tests that can be applied for judging an offence involving moral turpitude are:
(a)Whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience or society in general;
(b)Whether the motive which led to the act was a base one, and
(c)Whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrators could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society.
14.The other important factors that are to be kept in mind to conclude that an offence involves moral turpitude are: the person who commits the offence; the person against whom it is committed; the manner and circumstances in which it is alleged to have been committed; and the values of the society.
15.According to the National Incident – Based Reporting System (NIBRS), a crime data collection system used in the United States of America, each offence belongs to one of the three categories which are: crimes against persons, crimes against property, and crimes against society. Crimes against persons include murder, rape, and assault where the victims are always individuals. The object of crimes against property, for example, robbery and burglary is to obtain money, property, or some other benefits. Crimes against society for example gambling, prostitution, and drug violations, represent society’s prohibition against engaging in certain types of activities. Conviction of any alien of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law in the United States of America. To qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude for such purpose, it requires both reprehensible conduct and scienter, whether with specific intent, deliberateness, willfulness or recklessness.
16.There can be no manner of doubt about certain offences which can straightaway be termed as involving moral turpitude e.g. offences under the Prevention of Corruption of Act, NDPS Act, etc. The question that arises for our consideration in this case is whether an offence involving bodily injury can be categorized as a crime involving moral turpitude. In this case, we are concerned with an assault. It is very difficult to state that every assault is not an offence involving moral turpitude. A simple assault is different from an aggravated assault. All cases of assault or simple hurt cannot be categorized as crimes involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the use of a dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim may may result in an offence involving moral turpitude. In the instant case, there was no motive for the Respondent to cause the death of the victims. The criminal courts below found that the injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature. On an overall consideration of the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the crime committed by the Respondent does not involve moral turpitude. As the Respondent is not guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude, he is not liable to be discharged from service.”
A close reading of the aforesaid ratio of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it reveals that in order to qualify a crime as an offence involving moral turpitude, the conduct must be reprehensible and scienter accompanied by a specific intention, deliberateness, willfulness, or recklessness. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also considered whether all offences involving bodily injuries could be categorized as offences involving moral turpitude and held that every assault does not constitute an offence involving moral turpitude. Simple assault is distinct from aggravated assault, and all cases of simple assault or hurt cannot be categorized as offences involving moral turpitude. However, the use of a dangerous weapon, which is capable of causing the death of the victim, may constitute an offence involving moral turpitude.
A conviction under Section 302 of the IPC presupposes an aggravated form of assault coupled with the requisite criminal intention, resulting in the death of the victim due to the injuries inflicted. Applying the test laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, an offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC would clearly fall within the category of offences involving moral turpitude.
Section 6(2)(f) relates to the pendency of criminal proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the applicant before a criminal court in India. The Central Government issued a notification dated 25.08.1993 relaxing the rigours of Section 6(2)(f), subject to the conditions stipulated therein. The relevant notification reads as follows :-
“G.S.R. 570(E)--In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of Section 22 of the Passports Act 1967 (15 of 1967) and in supersession of the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of External Affairs No. G.S.R. 298(E), dated the 14th April, 1976, the Central Government, being of the opinion that it is necessary in public interest to do so, hereby exempts citizens of India against whom proceedings in respect of an offence aileged to have been committed by them are pending before a criminal court in India and who produce orders from the court concerned permitting them to depart from India, from the operation of the provisions of Clause (f) of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the said Act, subject to the following conditions, namely:-
(a)the passport to be issued to every such citizen shall be issued-
(i)for the period specilied in order of the court referred to above, if the court specifies a period for which the passport has to be issued; or
(ii)if no period either for the issue of the passport or for the travel abroad is specified in such order, the passport shall be issued for a period one year,
(iii)if such order gives permission to travel abroad for a period less than one year, but does not specify the period validity of the passport, the passport shall be issued for one year; or
(iv)if such order gives permission to travel abroad for a period ex-ceeding one year, and does not specify the validity of the pass-port, then the passport shall be issued for the period of travel abroad specified in the order.
(b)any passport issued in terms of (a) (ii) and (a) (iii) above can be further renewed for one year at a time, provided the applicant has not travelled abroad for the period sanctioned by the court; and provided further that, in the meantime, the order of the court is not cancelled or modified;
(c)any passport issued in terms of (a) (i) above can be further renew-ed only on the basis of a fresh court order specifying a further period of validity of the passport or specifying a period for travel abroad;
(d)the said citizen shall give an undertaking in writing to the pass-port issuing authority that he shall, if required by the court con-cerned, appear before it at any time during the continuance in force of the passport so issued.”
A reading of the aforesaid notification clearly demonstrates that the application of Section 6(2)(f) of the Passport Act was exempted in cases where criminal proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the applicant and such a criminal proceedings are pending before a criminal court in India, provided that the applicant produces an order of the concerned court permitting him to depart from India with certain conditions.
On conjoint reading of clauses (e) and (f) of Section 6(2) of the Passports Act, it is apparent that clause (f) relates to the pendency of criminal proceedings where the allegations of commission of an offence are under consideration. In such a situation, the accused continues to enjoy the presumption of innocence unless and until he is convicted by a competent Court. Clause (e), on the other hand, operates in a different field, namely, where the applicant has already suffered a conviction within the period prescribed therein. Thus, the two provisions operate in distinct fields. There is no similar exemption or relaxation granted by the Central Government in respect of clause (e) of Section 6(2) of the Passports Act so as to dilute the rigours of the said provision in the manner sought by the appellant/ applicant. Section 6(2)(f) of the Passports Act remains on the Statute Book. In the absence of any relaxation from the operation of the said provision, this Court cannot pass an order permitting the renewal of the passport and also granting permission to depart from India, as doing so would amount to overlooking relevant provisions and effectively rendering the statutory provision nugatory.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, the application (I.A. No.01/2026) is not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed.
However, the appellant/applicant No.5 shall be at liberty to avail such appropriate legal remedy as may be available to him in accordance with law.