Suraj Bhan and others vs Banwari and others

M. R. Sharma, J. (Oral)

Hardwari had two sons Maman and Puran Singh. Banwari and Sukh Lal are the sons of Maman. Smt. Kiran, Smt. Sarti and Smt. Bhartu are his daughters. Puran Singh had two children Jagmal son and Smt. Ankauri daughter by name. The family had joint land in village Kutabpur. On January 8, 1959. Jagmal son of Purn Singh made an application before the Revenue Officer for partition of the land. Some objections were raised before the Revenue Officer, who on August 31, 1961 passed order Ex. P 2 whereby he consigned the application to Record Room with the observations that the first party should get the question of title decided first of all by the Civil Court. Thereafter, Sultan and Surinder Singh sons of Suraj Bhan happened to acquire 1/8th share of and by way of gift from their grandmother Smt. Phulan. In this manner, Sultan and his minor brother Surinder Singh had also become the co sharers of the land dispute.

Banwari respondent No. 1 made another application for partition of the land in the year 1969 before the Revenue officer. Revenue officer summoned the parties. Before him, Shri Shiv Narain, Advocate, appeared and made a statement to the effect that the possession be kept intact and the land of the parties be partitioned. Sansar Chand. P. W. 2 who at the material time had been working as a Reader of the Revenue officer made a statement that the Advocate represented Suraj Bhan as well his sons Sultan and Surinder Singh. This statement was accepted by the Revenue who effected partition of the land.

Suraj Bhan and his sons Sultan and Surinder Singh brought a suit, for declaration that the petition proceedings were void and honest in the eyes of law. This suit has been dismissed by both the learned Courts below. The plaintiffappellants have come up in second appeal.

Shri Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that in the face of the earlier order Ex. P. 2, dated August 31, 1961, passed by the Revenne Officer to the effect that question of title be got decided first, stood in the way of the second partition application. He submitted that in the presence of this order the Revenue Officer had no jurisdiction to effect partition. In support of this contention, the learned counsel has relied upon Tirath Ram and others v. Mt. Nihal Devi, AIR 1931 Lahore 664, Bachan Singh v. Madan Singh and others, 1897 Punjab Record 61, and Daya Singh v. Ajaib Singh, 1979 PLJ 369. These authorities are, however, distinguishable. In the present case, the cosharers appearing before the Revenue Officer for the second time, made a joint statement that the holding belonging to the family be partitioned after respecting the individual possessions as far as possible.

The learned counsel for the appellants then argued that according to Sansar Chand P. W. 2 Sultan and Surinder Singh were not impleaded as parties in the second application for partition and since Surinder Singh was a minor, no order could be passed against him, without appointing his guardian ad litem. In this connection the learned counsel drew my attention to application filed by Suraj Bhan before the Revenue Officer, wherein it had been stated that Surinder Singh and Sultan were also necessary, parties. There is no merit in this submission either. Suraj Bhan, when he appeared before Revenue Officer for the first time, might have entertained some reservations about the desirability of having the land belonging to the family partitioned, but he himself at a later stage gave a conditional consent to the partition and at that time, the counsel was not representing Suraj Bhan but also through him two minor sons. The proceedings before the Revenue Officer are not conducted that meticulously as are conducted before ordinary Civil Courts. When the father of the minors had appointed an Advocate and it was given out to the Revenue Officer that the father was also acting on behalf of his minor sons, the Revenue Officer had jurisdiction to treat the statement of the counsel made on this point. In this situation, there was no necessity of observing the elaborate procedure of appointing guardian ad interim of the minor party. I might also add that land belonged to two branches of the family. If all the major and adult members of one branch gave their consent for partition, it would be difficult to accept the argument that one of the persons who had given the consent had not acted on behalf of minor son especially when the counsel appointed by him had given indication before the Revenue Officer that the statement was being made on behalf of the minor also. No other point was raised before me.

For the reasons afore mentioned, I find no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same.

No costs.