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Judgment
SACHIN DATTA, J. (ORAL)
By way of the present petition filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) [corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”)], the petitioner seeks quashing of FIR No.0181/2026 dated 03.09.2026, registered at PS Hazrat Nizamuddin, South East District, New Delhi, under Sections 64(1) and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), and all proceedings emanating therefrom.
The factual conspectus is that the FIR was registered on the complaint of the respondent no.2. She states that she came to know the petitioner at a gym in January, 2026. They gradually became friends, and thereby starting communicating with one another using various social media platforms.
The FIR narrates how the acquaintance between the complainant/respondent no.2 and the petitioner progressed. The said FIR makes a specific allegation of forcible sexual intercourse, alleged to have been committed in a hotel room under the threat of a knife. The relevant portions of the same are reproduced hereunder:
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the parties were in a consensual relationship, as is evident from the chats/messages between the petitioner and the respondent no.2. He further submits that the petitioner was assaulted by respondent no.2’s husband and that, despite the petitioner’s attempt to register the FIR against respondent no.2’s husband, no such FIR was registered with regard thereto.
It is further submitted that the complainant/respondent no.2 and her husband have been trying to extort money from the petitioner. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner has already paid Rs.1,50,000/- to the complainant/respondent no.2 and her husband, and that a further demand of Rs.10,00,000/- has been raised. The petitioner has, thus, alleged that he has been falsely implicated in the instant case.
Learned counsel also places reliance upon the order dated 08.09.2026 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (SFTC), South-East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi in Bail Matters No.2686/2026, whereby the petitioner was granted bail, and in particular upon the observation recorded therein that the WhatsApp chats between the petitioner and the complainant/respondent no.2 prima facie show that the petitioner and the complainant/respondent no.2 were in a consensual relationship.
The law governing the exercise of jurisdiction to quash an FIR under Section 528 BNSS [corresponding to Section 482 CrPC] is well settled.
Such jurisdiction is available, inter alia, where the allegations in the FIR, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence, or where the proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides.
The leading authority on this point is State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein the Supreme Court laid out the categories of cases in which such power may be exercised. The relevant extracts have been reproduced hereunder:
“102.… (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
(7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
Furthermore, it would be beneficial to reproduce the following observations (qua the powers of the High Court to quash FIR) of the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21, as relied upon by Bhajan Lal (supra):
“Cases may also arise where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. …”
Considering the above dicta, this Court, at this stage, must not embark upon appreciation of evidence. Rather, it is incumbent on this Court to consider if the allegations stated in the FIR prima facie satisfy the elements of the offences invoked therein. This Court cannot undertake an extensive exercise to weigh the defence against the allegations or decide which version of the factual account is true.
Tested on this standard, no case for quashing is made out in the present case. As noticed, the FIR makes a specific and detailed allegation of rape, which, taken at face value, discloses the ingredients of the offence punishable under Sections 64(1) and 351(3) BNS.
It is pertinent to note that the case made out by the complainant does not conceal any prior acquaintance. The FIR itself narrates the friendship from January, 2026 and as to how the association between the respondent no.2 and the petitioner progressed over a period of time. The circumstance that the parties were previously acquainted, or that they exchanged intimate messages, as has been pressed upon by the petitioner, does not by itself establish consent to the sexual act alleged. Reference in this regard may be made to this Court’s observations in Akshay Aditya v. State of NCT & Anr., BAIL APPLN. 3355/2026, pronounced on 30.10.2026:
“47.The consensual nature of the relationship, even if accepted, does not by itself answer the specific allegation of force on the identified dates, made in the FIR and reiterated in the statement of the complainant under Section 183 BNSS. In this regard, it must be emphasised that consent to a relationship is not tantamount to consent to each act within it. A reference can be made to Explanation 2 to Section 63 of the BNS, which defines consent in the following terms:
‘Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act: Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity.’”
(emphasis supplied)
To accept the petitioner’s case at this stage, the Court would have to conduct a mini-trial, weighing his version and documents against the allegations in the FIR to determine consent. The same would be beyond the province of this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS.
With regard to the ground of a malicious FIR, even taking the petitioner’s argument at its highest, it rests entirely on an examination of the chats/messages exchanged and his own version of a consensual relationship. However, the authenticity of these chats is itself disputed. Additionally, the petitioner’s allegations of assault against respondent no. 2’s husband is also disputed and requires verification/investigation. Cumulatively, these are disputed questions of fact that must be established at trial.
The Supreme Court in Pardeep Kumar Kesarwani v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947, has laid down the following guidelines in the context of a malicious/mala fide FIR:
“20.The following steps should ordinarily determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-
(i)Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality?
(ii)Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.
(iii)Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?
(iv)Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?
If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal – proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid guidelines, the present case does not qualify for quashing. It cannot be said that the petitioner has been able to make out any irrefutable case; there are several aspects which necessarily have to be tested during trial.
Considering the circumstances, this Court finds no merit in the present petition.
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. The pending application also stands disposed of.
It is made clear that the petitioner shall be at liberty to raise all pleas including those based on the chats, the alleged assault, the alleged demand for money etc. before the learned trial Court which shall duly consider the same in accordance with law.
Nothing stated hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.