Sunil Dutt vs Union Of India & Ors.

By Justice Rajiv Joshi, Member (Judicial)

Heard Shri Anil Kumar Singh assisted by Shri Pradeep Kumar Dubey, learned counsel for the applicant and Shri Shree Prakash Rai, learned counsel for the respondents.

The applicant has filed the present Original Application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 seeking the following main relief(s):-

The brief facts of the case, as stated in the Original Application, are that the applicant was engaged as Grameen Dak Sevak (Branch Postmaster), Ghillor Branch Post Office under Nadigaon Sub-Post Office, District Jalaun and was also deployed in connection with the India Post Payments Bank (IPPB) scheme. During the period from 20.01.2019 to 19.04.2019, certain IPPB transactions relating to an amount of Rs.2,43,085/- were found not to have been reflected in the corresponding records of the Branch Post Office. The applicant was thereafter put off duty vide order dated 17.05.2019 and disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him under Rule 10 of the Gramin Dak Sevak (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011.

The respondents have filed their Counter Affidavit, wherein the averments made in the OA have been opposed and the impugned orders have been defended. It has been pleaded that the applicant had deposited an amount of Rs.2,43,085/- in his personal IPPB account instead of depositing the same in the concerned Sub-Post Office, he had been provided training in IPPB operations and the charges against him were duly established in the departmental enquiry. The respondents have accordingly sought dismissal of the OA.

The applicant has filed a Rejoinder Affidavit to the Counter Affidavit, denying the allegations made by the respondents and reiterating the averments and grounds taken in the OA.

Learned counsel for the applicant, while assailing the impugned orders, contended that the action taken against the applicant is unsustainable, primarily on the following grounds:

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has opposed the OA and supported the impugned orders. His submissions, in substance, are as follows:

We have carefully considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for both the parties and perused the pleadings as well as the material available on record.

Before examining the challenge to the impugned orders, it would be appropriate to bear in mind that the present proceedings are not in the nature of an appeal against the findings recorded in the departmental enquiry. In exercise of judicial review, the Tribunal is primarily concerned with the decision-making process, including compliance with the prescribed procedure and principles of natural justice and whether the findings are supported by evidence and are free from perversity or other legal infirmity.

It is well settled that judicial review of disciplinary proceedings is directed not against the decision itself but against the decision-making process. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, the Apex Court has held that the Court/Tribunal is required to examine, inter alia, whether the enquiry was conducted by a competent authority, whether the prescribed procedure and principles of natural justice were followed and whether the findings are supported by some evidence. The Court/Tribunal does not ordinarily act as an appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence or substitute its own findings for those recorded by the disciplinary authority.

The aforesaid principle has been reiterated in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, wherein the Apex Court has held that in judicial review, the Court should not re-appreciate the evidence, examine its adequacy or reliability, or interfere where there is some legal evidence supporting the finding. Interference may, however, be warranted where the enquiry is contrary to the prescribed procedure or principles of natural justice, or where the finding is based on no evidence, is perverse, or is such that no reasonable person could have arrived at it.

Keeping the aforesaid parameters in view, we have carefully examined the Enquiry Report dated 18.12.2020 and the material referred to therein. The relevant findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are reproduced below:

A perusal of the aforesaid findings shows that the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer was based upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence available on record. The Enquiry Officer also dealt with the principal defences raised by the applicant before recording the charge as proved. We shall, therefore, examine whether the said findings suffer from any of the infirmities warranting interference in judicial review.

The principal defence of the applicant regarding lack of training has thus been specifically considered in the departmental enquiry. The Enquiry Officer referred to Memo No. B/IPPB/2016-17 dated 23.10.2018 regarding training and also noticed that the applicant had opened a number of IPPB accounts. On the basis of the material available before him, the Enquiry Officer did not accept the plea that the applicant had no training or knowledge of the IPPB system.

We find no material on record to demonstrate that the aforesaid consideration was irrelevant or contrary to the evidence brought during the enquiry. The applicant seeks a different appreciation of the same material; however, such re-appreciation is not ordinarily permissible in exercise of judicial review, particularly when the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer is supported by evidence available on record.

The applicant has also questioned the reliance placed upon his statement dated 24.04.2019 and the letter marked as Exhibit K-6. These documents were part of the evidence considered during the enquiry and the Enquiry Officer has noticed their contents along with the applicant's IPPB account statement and other documentary material. The applicant's subsequent explanation that there was no dishonest intention and that the amount was ultimately deposited constitutes essentially a defence on merits. Whether such explanation should prevail over the evidence relied upon by the Department is a matter of appreciation of evidence. We find no perversity or other legal infirmity in the manner in which the Enquiry Officer considered the aforesaid material.

The subsequent deposit of the amount also does not, by itself, invalidate the finding recorded in the disciplinary enquiry. The Enquiry Officer noticed the applicant's own statement regarding deposit of Rs.12,500/- at Nadigaon Sub-Post Office and the remaining amount of Rs.2,30,585/- at Orai Head Post Office. Thus, the circumstance of subsequent deposit was before the Enquiry Officer and was not ignored. Its evidentiary or mitigating effect cannot, however, by itself erase the misconduct found proved in the disciplinary proceedings.

The defence evidence was also taken into consideration. The defence witness Krishnakant stated that only Rs.10,000/- had been transferred to his IPPB account on 10.04.2019, whereas the applicant had referred to a transfer of Rs.45,000/- to the said witness. The Enquiry Officer was entitled to consider this evidence along with the other material available on record. We find no ground to hold that the defence evidence was excluded from consideration.

The plea that the enquiry was conducted unfairly or in a biased manner also does not find support from the material placed before us. The applicant participated in the enquiry proceedings and examined a defence witness. The enquiry report further records that on 22.07.2020 the applicant expressed his satisfaction with the enquiry proceedings and requested that the enquiry be continued. He was thereafter supplied a copy of the enquiry report and was afforded an opportunity to submit his representation, which he availed by submitting the representation dated 18.01.2021.

We have also considered the reliance placed by learned counsel for the applicant upon Office Memorandum No. 5-4/2019-PA (Tech-II) dated 22.07.2021. The said memorandum was issued subsequent to the period to which the charge against the applicant relates and, therefore, cannot by itself be relied upon to determine the legality of the conduct for the period in question. Even otherwise, the provisions relied upon by the applicant regarding monitoring, verification and reconciliation by the supervisory authorities do not, by themselves, absolve the applicant of his own responsibility in respect of the IPPB transactions entrusted to him. The existence of a supervisory mechanism may be relevant to examine the role of other officials, but it does not render the finding against the applicant unsustainable where such finding is independently supported by the evidence adduced in the disciplinary proceedings.

The reliance placed upon Union of India v. J. Ahmed, (1979) 2 SCC 286 and Inspector Prem Chand v. Government of NCT of Delhi, (2007) 4 SCC 566, does not advance the applicant's case. There can be no quarrel with the general proposition that mere inefficiency, negligence simpliciter, an error of judgment or an innocent mistake, without the requisite blameworthy element, may not constitute misconduct. However, the present case cannot be equated with a case resting merely upon inefficiency or an isolated error of judgment. The finding recorded in the departmental enquiry is based upon the documentary evidence relating to the IPPB transactions, the discrepancy between the SAP-generated and manual records, the applicant's IPPB account statement and the statements/documents relied upon by the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer, upon consideration of the said material, recorded a finding of misconduct against the applicant. Thus, the aforesaid decisions, while laying down the general principle relied upon by the applicant, do not render the finding recorded in the present case perverse or unsustainable.

The reliance placed upon D.G. P&T Instruction No. 114/176/78-Disc. II dated 13.02.1981 and the contention that the applicant's lapse was merely contributory or subsidiary in nature are also of no assistance. The said instruction cannot be read as conferring immunity upon an official against whom a substantive charge is independently established on the basis of the evidence adduced in the disciplinary proceedings. In the present case, the applicant was functioning as Branch Postmaster and was entrusted with the IPPB transactions in question. The finding against him was not founded merely upon the lapse of a supervisory or subsidiary official, but upon material specifically relating to the transactions handled by the applicant. The alleged role of supervisory officials, therefore, does not by itself render the finding recorded against the applicant unsustainable.

We have also considered the decision of the Kolkata Bench of this Tribunal in Sankar Chandra Hembram v. Union of India & Ors, O.A. No. 350/647/2018, decided on 26.08.2022. The said decision turned upon its own facts, including the nature of the charge of contributory negligence and the issue of apportionment of responsibility. The present case stands on a different footing. The applicant herein was the Branch Postmaster entrusted with the IPPB transactions in question and the finding against him is based upon material directly relating to those transactions. The said decision, therefore, does not lay down any proposition that a person directly connected with the transaction cannot be proceeded against merely because supervisory officials may also have had a role in monitoring the same.

The decision in Ashok Kumar Gupta v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025.DHC.6883, also does not advance the applicant's case. The said decision arose in the context of criminal proceedings and was concerned with the criminal culpability of the petitioner on the material placed before the Court. The observations therein regarding selective attribution of responsibility have to be understood in the factual and legal context of that case. In the present matter, the finding against the applicant is based upon evidence specifically relating to the IPPB transactions handled by him. The fact that supervisory officials may also have had responsibilities in monitoring the transactions does not, by itself, preclude disciplinary action against the applicant for his own proved conduct.

The applicant has also challenged the appellate order dated 09.08.2021 on the ground that the same is non-speaking and does not deal with the grounds raised in the appeal. In this regard, reliance placed by the learned counsel for the applicant on the judgment of the Apex Court in Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. Jagdish Sharan Varshney & Others, (2009) 4 SCC 240, may be noticed. The Apex Court has held that an appellate authority is required to apply its mind to the grounds raised in the appeal and that although an appellate order affirming the disciplinary order need not contain elaborate reasons, it cannot be a wholly non-speaking or mechanical order.

We have perused the appellate order dated 09.08.2021. The appellate authority has specifically recorded that the appeal, the charge-sheet and the relevant documents were duly examined and that the applicant had not presented any new fact in the appeal. It further recorded that the grounds taken in the appeal were not found acceptable and that the applicant had been negligent in the discharge of departmental duties and had misutilised Government money, which was found to have been established in the disciplinary proceedings. On that basis, the appellate authority confirmed the penalty order dated 25.01.2021 and rejected the appeal. Thus, the appellate authority has not merely recorded a bald or mechanical confirmation of the penalty, but has indicated the basis on which the appeal was considered and rejected. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, therefore, we do not find the appellate order to suffer from such non-application of mind or absence of reasons as would warrant interference. For completeness, the relevant portion of the appellate order dated 09.08.2021 is reproduced hereinbelow:

On an overall consideration of the material on record, we find that the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer cannot be characterised as one based on no evidence or as perverse. The defence raised by the applicant was considered and no violation of the principles of natural justice or any other procedural infirmity has been demonstrated. We, therefore, find no ground to substitute our own assessment for that of the Enquiry Officer.

We may now consider the challenge to the quantum of punishment. The misconduct found proved against the applicant relates to IPPB transactions involving Government money amounting to Rs.2,43,085/-. The matter, therefore, cannot be treated as a mere technical or procedural lapse. The applicant, while functioning as Branch Postmaster and handling IPPB transactions, was entrusted with public money, and the finding recorded in the enquiry concerns the manner in which such transactions were dealt with and accounted for.

The fact that the amount was subsequently deposited is certainly a relevant circumstance; however, it does not, by itself, obliterate the misconduct found proved in the disciplinary proceedings. The circumstance of subsequent deposit was before the Enquiry Officer and, therefore, cannot be said to have been ignored. Likewise, the circumstances relating to training and supervision, as urged by the applicant, have also been considered herein. Having regard to the nature of the misconduct found proved, the amount involved, the responsibility attached to the post held by the applicant and the material relied upon in the departmental enquiry, we are unable to hold that the penalty of dismissal from engagement is so disproportionate to the proved misconduct as to shock the conscience of the Tribunal and warrant interference in judicial review.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the applicant has failed to establish any violation of the prescribed procedure, denial of reasonable opportunity, perversity in the findings of the Enquiry Officer or any other legal infirmity warranting interference by this Tribunal. The grounds raised by the applicant essentially seek re-appreciation of the evidence and substitution of the findings recorded in the departmental enquiry, which is beyond the permissible scope of judicial review. We, therefore, find no legally sustainable ground to interfere with the order dated 25.01.2021 passed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate order dated 09.08.2021.

Accordingly, the Original Application is dismissed. The impugned order dated 25.01.2021 passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate order dated 09.08.2021 are affirmed.

Before parting with the matter, we deem it appropriate to observe that the penalty imposed upon the applicant carries the consequence of ordinarily operating as a disqualification for future employment. However, any future application or engagement by the applicant, if otherwise permissible under the applicable rules, shall be considered by the competent authority strictly in accordance with law and the rules governing such appointment. We express no opinion on the applicant's eligibility or entitlement for any such future employment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

All pending MAs, if any, shall be treated as disposed of.