Sunder P. Lalvani, Managing Partner of M/s. Lalwani Brothers vs State of Maharashtra

This is an application filed by the original accused in Criminal Appeal No. 415 of 1983. This Court, by a final Judgment and Order dated 26-8-1991, allowed the Criminal Appeal which had been filed by the State of Maharashtra. That appeal was directed against an order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 38th Court, Ballard Pier, Bombay, on 3-5-1983. The accused, who is a businessman, was charged with having committed an offence punishable under S. 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, essentially in so far as having obtained an import licence valued at Rs. 47,84,761/- had imported items on the basis that they were for his actual use and that the same had been sold in the open market. The appeal preferred by the State of Maharashtra against the order of acquittal was admitted by this Court and notice in respect of the same was served on the Accused on 5-10-1983. The Accused, though a well-placed businessman, did not take any action on that notice and did not have any appearance filed on his behalf. Even though the appeal related to the year 1983, it was only in October, 1989 that the same finally appeared on board. My learned brother, Moharir, J., after hearing the matter for a considerable length of time, made an endorsement in the case papers that the Accused should be served once again. Though it is now contended before me by Mr. Vashi, learned Counsel who represents the Applicant-Accused, that the Court directed that his client should be served once again because the Court was of the view that the earlier service was not a good or valid service, I am satisfied from a perusal of the proceedings that this was, in fact, not so. The facts of this case are gross and it was obvious that after hearing the appellant''s learned Counsel for some time, the Court was, prima facie, of the view that the acquittal order would have to be disturbed. It was purely a magnanimous gesture on the part of my brother Moharir, J. that he felt that the Accused be herd at least on the question of sentence and that for this purpose he be afforded one more opportunity. A fresh notice from this Court was accordingly served on the Accused, after which the petition came up for final hearing before me in the month of August 1991. This appeal is already 8 years old and is one of the very few old pending matters. There is nothing in the case papers to indicate as to why it was not listed for hearing all these years, but it is left to the Court to draw and appropriate inference that this could not have happened by accident. The matter was ready for hearing in 1983 itself and one may reasonably assume that it was deliberately kept in cold-storage. That the Accused had nothing to do with it is difficult to accept.

In spite of service of fresh notice, the Applicant-Accused once again ignored this proceeding and did not appear when the matter reached for final hearing. In fact, for this reason, the appeal was adjourned several times purely in order to enable the Accused and his learned/Counsel, if they had missed out on the matter, to appear. Thereafter, having regard to the importance of the case and the complexities involved, the Court directed Mr. Patwardhan, Senior Advocate on the Customs Panel, to assist the Court, apart from the learned A.P.P. It is also essential for me to record that since the Accused was not represented, though served, I had taken the additional precaution of personally reading the entire paper-book meticulously so that anything that was in favour of the Accused or that could be argued on his behalf should not be overlooked, but, on the other hand, that it should be taken into consideration. This last safeguard was considered essential by me because, to my mind, no incorrect order should be passed, even if the Accused has defaulted. After a careful consideration of the record and the arguments and the position in law, the appeal was allowed and the Applicant-Accused was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay a fine in the sum of Rs. 10,00,000/-, in default, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for nine months. The final Judgment and Order in the matter were passed on 26-8-1991 and the same have been signed and the writ has also been despatched to the lower Court. Thereafter as late as on 24-9-1991, the Constituted Attorney of the Applicant-Accused has filed the present Miscellaneous Criminal Application for review of the judgment, the principal ground being that the same is an ex parte decision which ought to be set aside. Mr. Vashi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Applicant-Accused, raised several additional points which require decision and I have accordingly issued rule and heard learned Counsel on both sides.

The first ground on which Mr. Vashi contends that a review is essential proceeds on the footing that the decision was an ex parte one. If by this argument learned Counsel contends that he defines the term "ex parte" as meaning an order passed after hearing only one side, he may be literally correct, but I have already indicated in this order that this position is, in fact and in spirit, not so. This Court did take into consideration the defence pleaded before the lower Court, the arguments advanced on behalf of the Applicant-Accused, the position in law as also what best could have been contended on his behalf. It is on a consideration of these factors that a heavier sentence and a heavier fine was not awarded, even though this case would have fully justified such a decision.

While putting forward this charge against the Court that the case has been disposed of ex parte, Mr. Vashi overlooks certain factors, namely, the totally unpardonable conduct on the part of his client. In the first instance, his client is not an ignorant or illiterate person, but is a big businessman, who has seen through a long proceeding before the trial Court and is obviously aware of his duties in relation to a pending litigation. He was served with the notice from this Court on 5-10-1983. Admittedly, he took no steps to have an appearance filed on his behalf. At this juncture, it is necessary for me to advert to legal position that is now well settled, namely, that a litigant who has notice of a proceeding and who does not appear for any reason in spite of that notice cannot contend that he has been deprived of his right of being heard, because the responsibility of the judicial forum, namely, the Court, is that he be afforded an opportunity of being heard and it is not the function of the Court virtually to chase the litigant and ensure that he remains present at the hearing. The law has been crystallized in a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of A.H. Satranjiwala Vs. The State of Maharashtra, , wherein Kania, J. (as he then was) has very clearly laid down that once the notice is served on the party concerned that it must be held that due opportunity has been afforded and that no cognizance can be taken if the litigant does not avail of that opportunity of being heard. In other words, the law is to the effect that there is no breach of the principal of audi alteram partem once such an opportunity has been made available. Last it can be contended that this is a harsh view of the situation and that having regard to the penal consequences involved, a Court of good conscience should still afford an opportunity, it was precisely for this reason that in October 1989 Moharir, J. directed fresh notice to be issued to the applicant-Accused once again. Not only has this second notice been ignored but an argument was sought to be advanced to the effect that this notice, which was served at the office of M/s Lalwani Brothers, namely, the firm of the Applicant-Accused where he is still doing business, is not good service because it does not bear the signature of the Applicant-Accused.

Mr. Vashi, with some degree of seriousness, tried to contend that having regard to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to the service of summons that since the fresh notice bears the signature of the representative of the firm and not of the Applicant-Accused that this Court must accept the position that it is not good service. This submission illustrates abundantly as to what extent technicalities can be argued in proceedings of the present type which relate to a prosecution that commenced in the year 1981, in relation to transactions pertaining to the year 1967 in which the charge was framed on 17-2-1977. This argument, since advanced, needs, however, to be dealt with. I have pointed out to Mr. Vashi that under the law relating to partnerships, service effected at the registered office of a partnership is good service. There is no contention taken up that the party who signed on the duplicate copy of the notice had no authority to receive it or that the same did not, in the normal course of business, reach the Applicant-Accused. Even if such a contention were to be advanced, it deserves to be rejected.

Essentially this is an Application for review of a final judgment of this Court and would, therefore, be governed by the provisions of S. 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Very recently, this Court had occasion to deal with a similar situation in the case of Shri Suresh T. Kilachand v. Sampat Shripet Lambate (Criminal Appln. No. 2123 of 1991 in Criminal Appeal No. 398 of 1980), decided on 24-10-1991, I have referred Mr. Vashi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Applicant-Accused, to the detailed judgment of this Court delivered in that case wherein, after discussing the legal position and the case law, this Court has taken the view that a review is not permissible. An argument was advanced in that case based on the decisions of the Rajasthan High Court and the Karnataka High Court that even if a review is not permissible that a recalls of the judgment would be competent, if it is shown that there has been an infringement of the basis principles of natural justice. First of all, I have already held that the Applicant-Accused was afforded two opportunities of hearing in this case and not having availed of either of them, it cannot be pleaded that the rules of natural justice have been infringed. That sport, with due respect to the aforesaid two decisions, and having regard to the contrary position as laid down by the Supreme Court, I have already held that where a review is not permissible, a recall is also not competent. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not make a provision for any such procedure, and secondly, even if the inherent powers u/S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are to be invoked, it would not be open to this Court to permit something thereunder which is specifically prohibited u/S. 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Mr. Vashi advances the argument that since s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure starts with the clause "nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court ........." that it would be permissible to contend that in appropriate cases the jurisdiction under the inherent powers transcends the bar prescribed by other provisions in the Code. As an illustration, Mr. Vashi submits that a revision application against an interlocutory order, however erroneous the order may be, is barred u/S. 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; whereas it is still permissible to a litigant to move a High Court and to obtain a relief in such a case u/S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Reliance is placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra, , wherein the Supreme Court had culled out the situations in which High Court would and would not exercise its inherent powers. It was clarified in that case that the power to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court would entitle the High Court to act in a situation where such a relief was necessary. What needs to be borne in mind is that the two jurisdictions of the High Court, the first being its revisional power u/S. 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the second being the inherent powers u/S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, are independent of each other; that they are distinct and, furthermore, that they are entirely different to each other. The High Court is barred from exercising its revisional jurisdiction in an interlocutory order and, therefore, could not and would not entertain a revision against such an order. If a litigant, however, invokes the inherent jurisdiction, the remedy sought is a different one and the relief claimed is by way of quashing of the proceeding and not a mere revision of the order. It, therefore, follows that in granting such a relief, the High Court is not in any manner exercising a jurisdiction that is barred u/S. 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is no contradiction with regard to this position because of facts of the present case indicate that S. 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes a finally to the jurisdiction of the Courts in criminal proceedings through a final order and, therefore, resort cannot be had to S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for purposes of revival of that jurisdiction. It is not a matter of claiming a different relief through another channel which the law may permit in certain cases, but the question really involved was overriding a specific bar prescribed in the Cr.P.C. which is impermissible.

In support of his argument that the inherent powers are not circumscribed by S. 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Mr. Vashi relied on the decision of a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of In Re: Puritipatti Jega Reddy, . The facts of that case are distinguishable because it was held that even though the Cr.P.C. did not permit a second revision to the High Court after the revision application had failed before the Sessions Court that it was permissible to invoke the inherent powers u/S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The same view has been enunciated in the case of Krishna Sadan Ghosh Vs. Govind Prasad Saraf, . Mr. Vashi also referred to a few other decisions along the same lines. It is unnecessary to set then out as they involve the very same principle.

A single Judge of this Court (Ashok Agarwal, J.) in the case of Bhanu M. Vakil Vs. Chandra Oshiram Keswani and another, , was dealing with a case relating to stay of criminal trial pending decision of a civil Court between the same parties. In that case, the learned Judge had occasion to observe that the jurisdiction of the High Court u/S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and its supervisory jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India can justifiably be resorted to despite the bar u/S. 397 of the Cr.P.C., if the facts and circumstances of the case warrant interference so as to prevent the abuse of the process of Court. Agarwal, J. had occasion to consider the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajan Kumar Manchananda v. State of Karnataka JT(1987) 5 637 (1) wherein the Supreme Court had occasion to strike down an order of the Karnataka High Court on the ground that the proceeding before the High Court, though on filed u/S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was in substance and in effect a second revision application which was barred under the Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court had occasion to examine the nature of the proceedings and very rightly observed that such a proceeding, which in form and in substance was a second revision, had wrongly been "labeled" as a petition u/S. 482 of the Cr.P.C. and that such a procedure could not be permitted because every second revision, though barred, could be then entertained by "labeling" it as a petition under the inherent power. In the same decision, Agarwal, J. had occasion to consider Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra, referred to supra and to take the same view, namely, that it was permissible in appropriate cases to grant a relief through a different type of proceeding notwithstanding the bar u/S. 397 of the Cr.P.C.

One could almost go on endlessly with regard to the number of decisions in relation to this issue, but it would be useful to advert to a Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of Sailesh v. Dilip Harilal 1980 Bom CR 208, wherein it has been conclusively held that in appropriate cases, the inherent jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution can justifiably be resorted to despite the bar u/Ss. 397 and 399 of the Cr.P.C. The controversy before me, as already indicated, relates to a question of revival of jurisdiction and not so much as a question as to whether this Court can grant a relief under one provision of the Code or another. Effectively, on final disposal of the proceedings, this Court has become functus officio. Whereas under the Cr.P.C. a specific provision exists for setting aside orders and decrees, be they ex parte or otherwise, the Cr.P.C. does not incorporate any such provision. Obviously the consequences of a criminal proceeding being that it ends in either discharge, acquittal or conviction, the resurrection or re-opening of such a proceeding would have far graver consequences than the ones governed by the Cr.P.C. some of them being virtually irreversible. It is for this reason that the bar u/S. 362 of the Cr.P.C. exist and, therefore, to my mind, the issue involved here is not whether the Court can grant a relief through one channel or another, but the question is as to whether at all the Court can do anything in the matter once its jurisdiction has been exhausted. The answer is a definite ''no''.

Mr. Vashi advanced a submission that this Court should not plead helplessness if he demonstrates that his client should be given a second opportunity. This is an amazing contention because even on merits, Mr. Vashi''s client has been given a second opportunity, which other litigants are not afforded, and what he thereby asks for is a third round. It is also not a case where this Court has expressed its helplessness, but, in fact, happens to be a situation where this Court has finally decided the matter and this Court is applying the law which insists on a degree of finality to criminal proceedings.

Lastly, Mr. Vashi submitted that S. 385 of the Cr.P.C., which deals with the hearing of criminal appeals, requires that the Accused be heard. There is no dispute about this requirement, but learned counsel for the Department rightly points out that the Section itself uses the words "if he appears". In the present instance, we have a classic illustration of an accused refusing to appear before the High Court in spite of service of notice on not one but on two occasions. I have already dealt with this aspect of the matter in the earlier part of this judgment and pointed out that the principles of natural justice are complied with once the Accused is afforded an opportunity of a hearing. As a necessary corollery, it follows that the Court is not obliged to wait indefinitely for an accused who does not appear before the Court when required to do so.

Mr. Vashi advanced certain arguments with regard to the merits of the case which I do not propose to deal with as these are exclusively within the jurisdiction of a Court of Appeal and are not within the scope of the present proceedings. Mr. Vashi sought to submit that the sentence imposed on the Applicant-Accused is disproportionate to the offence proved against him. In this regard, it is essential to call attention to the observations of the Supreme Court and of this Court. While dealing with economic offences in the case of Balkrishna Chhaganlal Soni Vs. State of West Bengal, , Krishna Iyer, J. (as he then was) made the following observations (paras 17 to 19) :

"Guilt being established, the fifth act of the tragedy is reached Social and economic offences stand on a graver footing in respect of punishment. The appellant''s advocate pleads in elimination of the imprisonment that gold of considerable value has been confiscated, that his client has gone out of business (his licence having been cancelled) and the possibility of further mischief is absent, seven years of criminal proceedings have been a long ordeal deterrent enough to inhibit future anti-social adventures, and some jail term he has already undergone. Counsel submits that his client will now turn a new leaf if he is not returned to prison. We decline to be moved by this dubious prospect.

The new horizons in penal treatment with hopeful hues of correction and rehabilitation are statutorily embodied in India in some special enactments; but crimes professionally committed by deceptively respectable members of the community by inflicting severe trauma on the health and wealth of the nation and the numbers of this non-criminal tribe are rapidly escalating form a deterrent exemption to human softness in sentencing.

The penal strategy must be informed by social circumstances, individual factors and the character of the crime. India has been facing an economic crisis and gold smuggling has had a disastrous impact on the State''s efforts to stabilize the country''s economy. Smugglers, hoarders, adulterators and others of their like have been busy in their underworld because the legal hardware has not been able to halt the invisible economic aggressor inside. The ineffectiveness of prosecutions in arresting the wave of white-collar crime must disturb the Judges'' conscience. While we agree that penal treatment should be tailored to the individual, in the extreme category of professional economic offenders, incarceration is peculiarly potent. When all is said and done, the offences for which the appellant has been convicted are typical of respectable racketeers who, tempted by the heavy pay-off, face the perils of the law and hope that they could smuggle on a large scale and even if struck by the court they could get away with a light blow."

The Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal and Another, , had occasion to deal with a situation where an application for adducing additional evidence was rejected on the ground of delay of six years. The Court had occasion to observe that in an age when delay has become a part of life and the order of the day, it was no good ground for refusing to act in order to promote the interests of justice. The Court further observed as follows (para 5) :

"To deny the opportunity to remove the formal defect was to abort a case against an alleged economic offender. Ends of justice are not satisfied only when the accused in a criminal case is acquitted ....... A disregard for the interest of the community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the community in the system to administer justice in an even handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the National Economy and National Interest."

I have already had occasion to observe that, undoubtedly, the incident involved in the present revision application have taken place a very long time back, but that is no ground for glossing over or watering down the gravity. With the load on the trial Courts, delays in the disposal of cases are inevitable and with some degree of effort on the part of the Accused, these delays are compounded, magnified and protracted, as is evident from the time factor involved in the disposal of the present appeal. If that were to be treated as a circumstance for the grant of leniency, it would only create an incentive for further delays. This Court must, therefore, uphold the view that the law will take its course, the time factor regardless.

Having regard to the principles enunciated in the aforesaid decision and the reasons set out in the earlier judgment, the sentence imposed on the Applicant-Accused is in keeping with those tenats.

In the result, this criminal application is dismissed. The rule to stand discharge. The earlier order of status quo ante dated 25-9-1991 shall continue for a period of 4 (four) weeks from the date on which a certified copy of the judgment in this criminal application is ready for delivery to the applicant. The office shall furnish the certified copy on an urgent basis provided the applicant files an urgent application in this behalf. If no such application is filed, this order shall taken effect on the expiry of 4 (four) weeks from the date on which it is signed.

Application dismissed.