AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
VIRINDER AGGARWAL, J. (Oral)
Petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of FIR No. 79 dated 2011, registered at Police Station Bhawanigarh, District Sangrur, Punjab, under Sections 420 and 120-B IPC, 1860 (Annexure P-1), along with consequential quashing of the charge-sheet (Annexure P-2), the charges framed pursuant thereto, and order dated 14.06.2023 passed by the learned ACJM, Sangrur, in Case No. CHI/296/2023 (Annexure P-3).
Further prayer is made for staying the operation and further proceedings in Case No. CHI/296/2023, pending before the learned Court of CJM, Sangrur, during the pendency of the present petition.
The FIR came to be registered on the basis of an application submitted by Ravinder Singh, alleging that he had been induced by Somesh Sharma, resident of Mohali, who represented that he had extensive contacts with officials at the Embassy in Delhi and could secure a safe and guaranteed educational visa for his son, Gurpreet Singh, for the United Kingdom, followed by assured employment and settlement there. It was further alleged that Somesh Sharma represented Prem Kathuria, proprietor of M/s Pacific Overseas Consultants, Delhi, as a highly influential person having substantial connections with the concerned authorities, and assured that, upon payment of ₹4.70 lakh, the requisite visa and subsequent employment for Gurpreet Singh would be arranged.
It was alleged that Somesh Sharma visited the complainant's residence in January 2011 and received ₹4.70 lakh on the aforesaid assurances, but did not issue any receipt, stating that the same would be provided by Prem Kathuria upon his return from Delhi. Thereafter, despite repeated visits to the office of the accused at Mohali, the complainant was allegedly given repeated assurances that the visa process was underway. It was further alleged that certain blank papers, documents and agreements were got signed from the complainant on the pretext of processing the visa application, and that representations were also made regarding arranging financial documents, including bank statements and income-tax returns, for submission before the Embassy.
The complainant further alleged that, upon becoming suspicious of the conduct of the accused and demanding return of his documents, passport and money, Somesh Sharma initially assured repayment and subsequently issued a cheque for ₹1.70 lakh, promising to pay the balance ₹3 lakh shortly. The said cheque was allegedly dishonoured for want of sufficient funds. It was further alleged that, upon demanding repayment and threatening legal action, the complainant was threatened with serious consequences and was advised to forgo the amount. The complainant also alleged that Somesh Sharma had similarly induced other persons by making false assurances regarding visas and overseas settlement and had thereafter become untraceable.
On these allegations, the complainant asserted that the accused had dishonestly induced him to part with his hard-earned money on false representations, retained the amount without fulfilling the promised services, and had also obtained his blank signed documents and other papers. He accordingly sought recovery of his documents and initiation of appropriate criminal action against Somesh Sharma and Prem Kathuria in accordance with law.
The petitioner, appearing in person, submits that the impugned FIR is a product of mala fides and an abuse of the process of law, arising from a commercial/immigration dispute which was subsequently given a criminal colour. It is contended that the entire alleged amount of ₹4.70 lakhs stood substantially repaid, with ₹3.00 lakhs having been paid in cash and the balance of ₹1.70 lakhs through cheque, and the relevant documents had also been returned to the complainant much prior to registration of the FIR. The contemporaneous material, including the statement recorded before the Economic Offences Wing and the reports placed before the NHRC, materially contradict the subsequent prosecution version.
It is further submitted that the petitioner himself had raised complaints against the persons allegedly responsible for the underlying fraudulent activities and had repeatedly approached the police, NHRC and other authorities seeking protection and redressal. The petitioner also places reliance upon the orders/proceedings of the NHRC and the Hon'ble Supreme Court to demonstrate the persistent procedural irregularities, threats and harassment allegedly suffered by him. Despite the passage of several years, the complainant and material witnesses have repeatedly failed to appear before the Trial Court, even after coercive processes were issued, rendering the continuation of the proceedings oppressive and futile.
The petitioner submits that he has already suffered incarceration, prolonged prosecution and repeated appearances before the Trial Court for more than a decade, whereas the foundational witnesses have not come forward to substantiate the allegations. In these peculiar circumstances, continuation of the criminal proceedings would serve no legitimate prosecutorial purpose and would amount to permitting the criminal process to become an instrument of harassment. Reliance is placed upon V. Ganesan vs. State represented by the Sub-Inspector of Police and Others, AIR 2026 SC 1547; Parag Kishore Satoskar and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and Another, 2026 INSC 846; Vesa Holdings Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala, AIR 2015 SCW 2245; Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947; and Anukul Singh Uttar Pradesh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 INSC 1153.
On the cumulative effect of the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner submits that the present case falls within the exceptional parameters warranting interference under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, and accordingly prays that FIR No. 79 of 2011, the consequential charge-sheet, the order framing charges dated 14.06.2023 and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom be quashed and petition be allowed.
Respondent No.2, despite due service, chose not to appear and contest the present proceedings.
Learned State counsel, has vehemently opposed the petition and submitted that the present FIR was registered against the petitioner-Sumesh Sharma and co-accused Prem Kathuria on the basis of the complaint submitted by Ravinder Singh. It is contended that, during investigation, co-accused Prem Kathuria was found innocent; however, the role of the petitioner was duly substantiated, as he admittedly received an amount of ₹4,70,000/- from the complainant, out of which ₹3,00,000/- was subsequently returned to Gurpreet Singh, son of the complainant, whereas cheque No. 699082 for the remaining ₹1,70,000/-, drawn on SBI account No. 30581663553, was not encashed. It is, therefore, argued that the petitioner, despite having received the aforesaid amount for facilitating the foreign education and settlement of Gurpreet Singh, neither arranged for his travel abroad nor returned the entire amount or the documents entrusted to him, thereby disclosing his specific role in the commission of the alleged offence. Respondent No.2 chose not to appear to contest.
It is further submitted that, upon completion of investigation, the police presented the challan before the learned Trial Court, which thereafter took cognizance and framed the charge under Section 420 IPC vide order dated 14.06.2023 in Case No. CHI/296/2023. Learned State counsel submits that the registration of the FIR, presentation of the challan and framing of charge were all in accordance with law and that no illegality, perversity or procedural irregularity has been demonstrated by the petitioner warranting exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. It is contended that the allegations disclose a prima facie cognizable offence and the disputed factual questions, including the receipt, repayment and alleged non-return of the remaining amount and documents, are matters for adjudication upon appreciation of evidence at trial and cannot appropriately be determined in proceedings for quashing.
Accordingly, learned State counsel submits that the present petition is devoid of merit and that the petitioner has failed to make out any exceptional circumstance warranting interference with the criminal proceedings at this stage. Having regard to the nature and gravity of the allegations and the material collected during investigation, dismissal of the petition is, therefore, prayed for.
The petitioner has filed a rejoinder to the reply submitted by the respondents, wherein the averments and submissions made in the petition have been reiterated and reaffirmed. The petitioner has specifically controverted and denied the assertions and contentions raised by the respondents, submitting that the same are misconceived, factually untenable and contrary to the material available on record. It is further asserted that the reply filed by the respondents does not satisfactorily rebut the grounds urged in the petition or dislodge the circumstances relied upon by the petitioner in support of the relief sought. The petitioner has accordingly maintained that the impugned proceedings suffer from the infirmities highlighted in the petition and, therefore, reiterated his prayer for allowing the present petition and granting the reliefs sought therein.
Having heard petitioner in person and learned State counsel and after going through the paper-book with their able assistance and upon a careful and holistic consideration of the allegations contained in the FIR, read conjointly with the material collected during the course of investigation, this Court is of the considered prima facie view that the impugned FIR cannot be said to be bereft of allegations disclosing the commission of cognizable offences. Equally, the allegations, if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety at this stage, cannot be said to be incapable of constituting the essential ingredients of the offences alleged, nor can they be characterised as so patently absurd, inherently improbable, inherently lacking in credibility or manifestly frivolous as to warrant exercise of the extraordinary and inherent jurisdiction of this Court for stifling the criminal proceedings at their inception.
The present case, therefore, does not fall within any of the well-recognised categories in which the inherent jurisdiction may legitimately be invoked to interdict or quash criminal proceedings. The disputed factual assertions, the evidentiary worth of the material collected during investigation and the respective defences of the parties are matters which require appropriate examination in accordance with law and cannot be subjected to a meticulous adjudication in proceedings invoking inherent jurisdiction. The parameters governing such jurisdiction stand authoritatively delineated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana and Others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1991 (1) RCR (Criminal) 383. The present case, upon an application of the said principles, does not disclose any exceptional circumstance warranting interference by this Court. The relevant observations are reproduced hereunder:-
“107.In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
1.Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2.Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3.Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4.Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
5.Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6.Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7.Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
108.We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice.”
In M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401, a Three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court authoritatively delineated the scope and ambit of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Reaffirming the settled legal position, the Court held that the power to quash criminal proceedings is extraordinary in nature and is to be exercised sparingly, with great circumspection, and only in exceptional cases, the expression "rarest of rare" being employed in a context distinct from that governing the imposition of capital punishment.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings, the High Court is not expected to enter into disputed questions of fact or adjudicate upon the correctness, reliability or genuineness of the allegations levelled in the FIR or complaint. At such stage, the Court cannot examine the defence available to the accused, undertake a meticulous appreciation of evidence, or conduct a mini-trial. Interference would be justified only where the case unmistakably falls within the well-recognised parameters governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction, particularly those enunciated in R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 and State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal (supra).
Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid settled principles, the present case does not satisfy any of the parameters laid down in Ch.Bhajan Lal (supra) or M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra) so as to warrant the exercise of the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction of this Court. At this stage, there is no material to prima facie indicate that the impugned FIR is manifestly mala fide, frivolous, vexatious, or actuated by an ulterior motive amounting to an abuse of the process of law. On the contrary, the allegations contained therein disclose the commission of cognizable offences, thereby necessitating a fair, impartial and complete investigation. Judicial interdiction at this incipient stage would, therefore, be wholly unwarranted.
It is an admitted position emerging during investigation that the complainant received ₹3,00,000/- in cash and a cheque of ₹1,70,000/-, and that the documents of the complainant's son were also returned well prior to registration of the FIR. However, these circumstances, by themselves, do not obliterate the foundational allegation that the petitioner had represented himself to be an agent/representative of M/s Pacific Overseas Consultants, Delhi, and had thereby induced the complainant to part with the money. Material collected during investigation allegedly indicates that the said concern had ceased its operations approximately two months and twenty days prior to the transaction in question. Thus, the allegation is that the petitioner knowingly projected himself as acting on behalf of an entity which had already ceased operations and, on the strength of such representation, induced the complainant to enter into the transaction. The subsequent repayment of part of the amount or return of documents cannot, at this stage, conclusively negate the allegation of cheating or the dishonest intention attributed to the petitioner at the inception of the transaction.
The rival versions give rise to disputed questions of fact relating to the petitioner's representation, his authority to act on behalf of the aforesaid concern, the status of its operations at the relevant time, the circumstances surrounding receipt and subsequent repayment of the money, and, most importantly, the petitioner's intention at the inception of the transaction. Such questions necessarily require appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and cannot be conclusively determined in exercise of the limited inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
The subsequent return of part of the amount or the documents, though relevant, cannot by itself furnish a ground for quashing the prosecution when the allegations, taken cumulatively, prima facie disclose the ingredients of the alleged offences. The subsequent conduct of the parties cannot, at the threshold, conclusively determine the nature of the intention operating at the inception of the transaction. The defence sought to be projected by the petitioner is essentially evidentiary in character and is required to be tested on the basis of the material ultimately brought on record.
Furthermore, this Court, while exercising inherent jurisdiction, cannot undertake a meticulous evaluation of the evidentiary material or conduct a mini-trial for determining the truthfulness of competing factual versions. The material collected during investigation cannot be selectively assessed so as to record a definitive finding regarding the petitioner's innocence. The allegations, on their face, cannot be said to be inherently absurd, inherently improbable or wholly devoid of evidentiary foundation so as to warrant termination of the criminal proceedings at the threshold.
It is well settled that the inherent jurisdiction is extraordinary in character and is to be exercised sparingly, cautiously and ex debito justitiae, only where the allegations, even if accepted at their face value, fail to disclose any offence or where continuation of the proceedings would constitute a manifest abuse of the process of law. The present case does not fall within any such exceptional category. The disputed factual defence raised by the petitioner cannot be adjudicated merely on the basis of competing assertions and is appropriately left to be tested during investigation and trial.
The judicial pronouncements relied upon by the petitioner, though laying down the settled principle that a purely civil dispute cannot be given a criminal colour, are clearly distinguishable on facts and do not advance the petitioner's case. In the present case, the allegations and material collected during investigation prima facie indicate dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction, as the petitioner allegedly represented himself to be the representative/agent of M/s Pacific Overseas Consultants, Delhi, despite the said concern having ceased its operations approximately two months and twenty days prior to the transaction.
The mere availability or pendency of a civil remedy does not, ipso facto, extinguish criminality where the allegations prima facie disclose deception and dishonest inducement at the inception. Whether the petitioner in fact made such representation and acted with the requisite dishonest intention are matters for appreciation of evidence. Thus, the present case is not one of a mere subsequent breach of a civil or contractual obligation, and the authorities relied upon by the petitioner are consequently factually inapposite and afford no ground for quashing the FIR or the consequential proceedings.
Accordingly, having regard to the nature of the allegations, the material presently available on record and the settled parameters governing exercise of inherent jurisdiction, this Court finds no justifiable ground to interdict the criminal proceedings at this stage. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate either the complete absence of a prima facie case or any manifest abuse of the process of law warranting interference under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. Consequently, without expressing any opinion on the ultimate merits of the allegations, lest any observation herein prejudice either side during investigation or trial, the present petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed.
It is, however, clarified that the observations recorded herein are strictly confined to the adjudication of the present petition and shall not be construed as a final expression of opinion on the merits of the allegations or the evidentiary worth of the material relied upon by either side. The Investigating Agency and, thereafter, the learned Trial Court shall proceed independently and strictly in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observation contained in the present order.
In view of the final adjudication of the principal proceedings, all pending miscellaneous, ancillary or interconnected applications, if any, arising therefrom, shall stand disposed of accordingly. No separate or further orders are warranted in respect thereof.