Sumesh Chawla vs Sandeep Baweja & Anr.

The present Appeal, under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (substituted now) (for short "the Act") has been filed by the Appellant (hereinafter called as "the Appellant") against the order dated 08.05.2017 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, U.T. Chandigarh (for short "the State Commission") in Complaint No.625 of 2016, whereby the Complaint of the Respondent No.1 (hereinafter called as "the Complainant") was allowed.

The present First Appeal has been filed after a delay of about 999 days i.e. almost three years. I.A. No.3176/2020 seeking condonation of delay has been moved by the Appellant. Arguments on this application are being heard.

I.A. No.3176/2020 (condonation of delay)

In the present application for condonation of delay the only ground is that the address of the Company in which the Appellant was once a time a Director, was changed and therefore the copy of the final order could not be served on the Appellant and he was not aware of the passing of the order of the State Commission dated 08.05.2017. Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that the Appellant was served of this order only on 25.01.2020, the date on which he was arrested in the Execution Petition filed by the Respondents. Immediately, thereafter, he filed the present appeal on 02.03.2020. It is argued that the delay was not intentional but due to these circumstances.

I have given thoughtful consideration to the arguments of learned counsel. Learned counsel, on enquiry, has admitted that the Appellant had been a party to the Complaint No.625/2016 filed before the State Commission and he was duly served of the complaint and he had authorised the Company to represent him and contest the complaint on his behalf. He has also admitted that the Company has throughout participated in the trial and the order of the State Commission is on merit, after hearing both the parties. He also admits that even though he was aware that the address of the company had changed during the trial before the State Commission yet by mistake he could not inform the State Commission of the change of the address, as on his behalf the Company was fighting his case. He has not disputed that the Company stood served of the impugned order and he has no information that the Company has filed any appeal or not. As contented in the application, the office address of his Company wherein he was a director is SCO No.196-197, Top Floor, Sector 34-A, Chandigarh, which he alleges, have been vacated by the Company, in pursuance of the directions given by the Rent Controller, vide its order dated 21.10.2013 and this fact finds mentioned in the order dated 08.05.2017. These facts clearly shows that the Company who had been contesting the matter on its behalf and on behalf of the Appellant, was also aware that the premises on which they were originally situated had been vacated and also brought this fact to the notice of the State Commission. Even after change of the address as Company as which the appellant was served of the complaint, changed the address, there is no dispute that the Company was duly served of the impugned order. It is not the contention of the appellant that he had provided his private address to the State Commission, and therefore the State Commission was under obligation to send him the free copy of its order at that address. This plea of the Appellant, therefore, has no merit. If the Company had changed the address, who had been authorised by him to contest his case, and had been contesting the matter and where there is no plea that company was not served of the impugned order, it cannot be said that the appellant was not served of the impugned order. If the Company is served, who was contesting on his behalf, he was also served. Even otherwise, he was a party of the complaint pending before the State Commission, it was his duty to be vigilant of the ongoing matter against him. If he was sleeping over his rights and did not bother as to what was happening in his case, it is him who had to be blamed.

It is settled proposition of law that condonation of delay is not a matter of right and the party seeking condonation needs to explain the delay of each and every date by showing sufficient causes which prevented it to approach the Commission within stipulated period of limitation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Ram Lal and Ors. vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361" has held as under:

"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after PPsufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant."

In another case, "R. B. Ramlingam vs. R. B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) (2) CLJ (SC) 24" Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the criteria to determine whether the reasons given by the party are sufficient for condonation of delay or not. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"5. We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition."

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has again warned the Commission under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to keep in mind the special provisions of limitation provided under the Act while dealing with application for condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, (2011) 14 SCC 578," has held as under:

"5. It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Fora."

In view of the above, I found no reasonable ground for condoning the delay of almost three years (999 days). I.A. No.3176/2020 is dismissed.

First Appeal:

Since the appeal has been filed with a delay of 999 days, the appeal is also dismissed with no order as to cost.