Sultan Singh vs State of Haryana

K.K. Srivastava, J.

Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner Sultan Singh is the fatherinlaw of the complainant Smt. Sashi Bala (since deceased) seeking quashing of F.I.R. No. 20 dated 28.1.1994 Police Station Jhajjar registered under Sections 498 A/406, Indian Penal Code. The grounds on which the F.I.R. is sought to be quashed, stated briefly, are as under:

(i) No specific date and time has been mentioned in respect of the alleged demand of dowry items comprising of colour T.V., refrigerator and a plot of land. The FIR lacks in the details i.e. mode and manner of demand;

(ii) There are no specific names of persons, time and date of alleged beatings to the complainant Shashi Bala regarding the demand of dowry items;

(iii) The complainant has since died and the averments made in the FIR were within the specific and exclusive knowledge of the wifecomplainant and the same cannot now be legally established;

(iv) The offence was committed at Bahadurgarh but the FIR was lodged at Jhajjar and the case is also pending in the Court of a Magistrate at Jhajjar. Under Section 177, Criminal Procedure Code, it has been averred, ordinarily the place for inquiry and trial is the Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence is committed; and

(v) The lodging of the FIR is a counterblast to the divorce petition filed by Dharam Vir, husband of the complainant Smt. Sashi Bala.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the authority reported in Parmod Kumar Oberoi and others v. Radha Rani, 1991(1) Chandigarh Law Reporter 524 wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that general allegations made by the complainant regarding the harassment for demand of dowry did not even prima facie constitute the alleged offence and criminal proceedings on the basis of such complaint amounted to abuse of process of Court and were liable to be quashed. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on an observation made by the Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak, in the order passed on a petition for anticipatory bail on 11.2.1994 to the following effect:

"In the circumstances, it appears that the registration of the case is only a counterblast to put pressure on the other party."

Notice of this petition was issued to the respondentState. Written statement has been filed on behalf of the respondentState by the Superintendent of Police, Rohtak, controverting the allegations made in the petition. It has been submitted in the written statement that prima facie offence was established against the petitioner and others for committing offences under Sections 498A/406, Indian Penal Code. It has further been submitted that in response to the allegations made in the F.I.R. all relevant evidence has been collected and challan in the case has been but up in the Court on 23.4.1994. The trial Court framed charge on 22.7.1994 and the case is ripe for final disposal. It has also been contended that dowry articles mentioned in the F.I.R. were recovered by the Investigating Officer of the case on 10.4.1994 from the possession of the accused persons. The learned District Attorney for the respondentState has argued that subsection (4) of Section 181, Criminal Procedure Code amply permits and filing of the case at Jhajjar where the deceasedcomplainant resided with her parents after coming from the house of her inlaws. He has further contended that at this stage the allegations made in the F.I.R. cannot be thrown on mere probabilities and suspicion. If the allegations made in the F.I.R. make out a prima facie case, the question of quashing the F.I.R. will not arise. Apart from it, it was contended that the death of the complaint will not frustrate the trial as the F.I.R. which had been signed by her would be admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act as the statement of the deceased person and other witnesses cited in the F.I.R. and relied on by the prosecution can be examined at the trial in support of the case of the prosecution based on the F.I.R., aforesaid, and, therefore, the death of the complainant will not ipso facto be sufficient to quash the F.I.R. and it cannot be said that the continuance of the proceedings before that trial Court will be an abuse of the process of laws.

A perusal of the allegations made in the F.I.R. which has been quoted in extenso in the petition in para 1(page No. 5 to page No. 8 of the paper book), leaves no room for doubt regarding specific allegations about the various offences committed by the petitioner and other accused. Section 32 of the Evidence Act is relevant for admissibility of the allegations made in the F.I.R. as also in the statement of the complainant, if recorded during investigation under Section 161, Criminal Procedure Code. The Hon''ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Thirukkural Perumal, 1995 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 397, has held that the power of quashing an F.I.R. and criminal proceeding should be exercised sparingly by the Courts. Indeed, the High Court has the extraordinary or inherent power to reach out injustice and quash the First Information Report and criminal proceedings, keeping in view the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in various judgments including the State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.) 426, but the same has to be done with circumspection. The normal process of the criminal trial cannot be cut short in the rather casual manner. The Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complainant on the basis of the evidence collected during investigation only while dealing with a petition under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code seeking the quashing of the F.I.R. and the criminal proceedings. It may further be noticed that the trial Court has, after applying its judicial mind to the material before it, has found a prima facie case to frame charge against the petitioner and the other accused and the case is fixed for recording evidence. It cannot, thus, be said at this stage whether the allegations made in the F.I.R. suffer from vagueness and generality sufficient enough to quash the F.I.R. on that score alone.

So far as the jurisdiction is concerned, it will be relevant to refer to Section 181(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which runs as under:

"181. Place of trial in case of certain offences. (1) xx xx xx

xx xx xx xx xx xx

(2) xx xx xx xx xx

(3) xx xx xx xx xx

(4) Any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is the subject to the offence was received or retained, or was required to be returned or accounted for, by the accused person."

Section 177, Criminal Procedure Code provides that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.

The jurisdiction is to be seen on the basis of allegations made in the F.I.R. and if any part of the offence is committeed within the local limits of the Court where the case is pending, the Court will have jurisdiction to deal with the matter and try the case (vide Section 181(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure). However, I am refraining myself from making any observation regarding the matter of jurisdiction as the same may be validly taken before the trial Court by the petitioner.

In view of the foregoing discussion, this petition for quashing has no substance and is hereby dismissed.